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MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
1945–1950

*by*  
*Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.*



*CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  
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## Foreword

The struggle for Okinawa was the last battle of World War II and the bloodiest campaign in the Pacific against Imperial Japan. Long before the battle ended, U.S. Army civil affairs officers began the task of providing essential services for the island's war-torn population.

This volume is an authoritative account of the Army's military government efforts on Okinawa from the first stages of planning until the transition toward a civil administration began in December 1950. It is a fascinating history of how a small group of idealistic men with a limited, temporary mission saw their numbers and their role expand into a long-term commitment as American strategic considerations changed. The story ranges from the strategic planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council in Washington to the civil affairs planning of the Tenth Army and beyond to the military government teams in the field. Although this is a success story, there are certainly lessons to be learned from the complex and often difficult interplay of the tactical occupation forces, the civil affairs officers, and the Okinawan population.

With this volume, the Center of Military History continues its history of American military government during World War II. That effort began with the annotated documentary volume *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* in the U.S. Army in World War II series, and continued with Earl Ziemke's *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* in the Army Historical Series. This volume differs in format from both earlier books: it is a concise case history of a unique military government experience, augmented by selected documents that provide for more detailed study of current civil affairs concerns. For the uniformed student of military government, as for the general reader, this book should offer an interesting and instructive account of an often overlooked period of American-Okinawan history.

Washington, D.C.  
24 April 1987

WILLIAM A. STOFFT  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
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## Preface

This book describes the experiences of American civil affairs officers on Okinawa during the years 1945–1950. It follows these often idealistic men as they planned, trained for, and executed their important and unusual military government mission. In a series of stages they moved from the serenity of America's universities, through the front lines of the battle for Okinawa, and into the turmoil of a devastated and distant island society requiring almost total reconstruction. In describing these accomplishments and failures I stress the programs and projects that, taken as a whole, constituted the agenda for military government in the Ryukyu Islands. The present account, therefore, is to a large extent an administrative history. I have, at times, briefly overstepped the closing date given in the title in order to demonstrate the full impact of policies and programs begun in the regime's last months. In a sense it is appropriate that the narrative at times looks ahead, because the civil affairs officers who served during the military government years, through their actions and their programs, had a profound impact on the United States Civil Administration in the Ryukyus. That particular administration, the heir to all that the military government personnel accomplished—as well as to all their failures—lasted until the islands reverted to Japanese administrative control in 1972.

The book makes no attempt to ignore those areas where military government activities were disappointing, most notably in their efforts to reach a timely and lasting solution to the land issue on Okinawa. At the same time, these defects in no way detract from the very real accomplishments the American administration wrought in the years 1945–1950. During that brief period of time military government transformed the island society by creating a political and economic environment that enhanced the Okinawans' capacity to cope with postwar world realities.

Throughout much of the narrative, the book traces the tensions that existed between those charged with the military government mission and the tactical forces whose larger purpose was served by that mission. When it came to the allocation of finite resources of shipping space, material, and land—especially land—reasonable uniformed officers often disagreed about how these resources should be distributed. The recounting of these disagreements, the frustrations, and the inevitable compromises, is central to this volume.

The reader may find other features of the story unpleasant, notably the account of how certain American servicemen outside the military government effort threatened the success of the civil affairs program by undermining Ryukyuan-American relations. In the final analysis, however, this element was more than offset by the behavior of most American servicemen, whose friendly attitude toward the local population contributed to a reservoir of goodwill that facilitated the work of the American occupation forces.

In many ways the early American experience in the Ryukyu Islands was unique, yet at the same time this case study in military government trial and error remains instructive for the student of civil affairs, regardless of time or location. Because of the universality of the civil affairs experiences and the subsequent lessons learned, the volume includes a number of representative documents that underscore some of the problems faced by military government officers in the field, as well as others that highlight American initiatives and policies designed to improve the lives of Okinawa's citizens.

Several of the participants in this story freely shared their knowledge and experiences with me, as my footnotes and note on sources attest. Two of these men, who also agreed to review the text of the manuscript, deserve special mention: Professor Emeritus Shannon McCune of the University of Florida and Edward O. Freimuth. Paul Neuland, whose own experiences with the American administration of Okinawa date from a later period, was nonetheless familiar with the details of the military government period and was also kind enough to review the manuscript.

I want to note the contributions of Edward O'Flaherty, whose partial draft on American military government on Okinawa addressed the subject before my own interest in it, and Alfred M. Beck, who likewise preceded me and who conducted a portion of the research needed to produce the final manuscript. Edward J. Boone, Jr. and Ellen Folkama of the MacArthur Memorial Archives in Norfolk, Virginia, were most helpful in facilitating my research at that institution. Eddie Reese of the National Archives' Modern Military Branch, and Bernard Cavalcante of the Naval Historical Center's Operational Archives Branch also willingly assisted my research. I am grateful for the patience and skill demonstrated by my editor, Mary F. Loughlin.

In preparing this study I received the welcomed assistance of several colleagues at the Center of Military History. Morris J. MacGregor, then Chief of the General History Branch, deserves special mention for his general supervision of the manuscript and for his numerous helpful suggestions. David Trask, Chief Historian of the Center, and Lt. Col. Richard O. Perry, Chief, Histories Division, were the primary reviewers of the manuscript, along with Robert Ross Smith and (then Col.) James W.

Dunn. Their suggestions, along with those of John Elsberg, Editor in Chief of the Center, and Barbara Gilbert of the editorial staff greatly improved the document during its progress toward publication. Linda M. Cajka prepared the graphics. Gina D. Wilson faithfully and patiently typed the various versions of the draft manuscript, and LaJuan Watson ably assisted in typing the documents. Finally, a very personal expression of gratitude goes out to my wife, Dorothy, for her patience, insight, and encouragement during the years I worked on this volume.

Despite the generous contributions of others, the author alone must bear the responsibility for the interpretations and conclusions expressed in this study, as well as for any errors of fact it may contain.

Washington, D.C.  
24 April 1987

ARNOLD G. FISCH, JR.



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All photographs are from the Department of Defense files.

Part One

MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN  
THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
1945-1950



# Introduction

The first sustained American presence in the Ryukyu Islands began with Commodore Matthew C. Perry's arrival on Okinawa in May 1853 and ended with his departure slightly more than one year later. The island and its people were a mystery to Perry, who nevertheless sought to use them as a lever to pry open Japan, at that time closed to Occidentals. The second American "visitation" began in April 1945 with the last bloody battle of World War II. Once again, American forces had come to the Ryukyus to use them as a steppingstone to Japan.

Unlike Commodore Perry, the 20th-century American military commanders and especially their military government subordinates could call upon the best of contemporary sociological and anthropological sources, yet they too encountered much that was bewildering about Okinawan society. Two characteristics seemed particularly alien to them: the people's lack of enthusiasm for things military and their intense attachment to the land. Like Perry before them, these 20th-century Americans came with the intention of being visitors, but in the end they stayed for twenty-seven years. In the process they not only administered the society but fundamentally transformed it as well.

American forces seized Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands, to serve as a forward base for bomber raids against Tokyo and other major Japanese cities and as a staging area for the anticipated invasion of the home islands. Okinawa's role as a staging area proved to be brief. Only six weeks after the Okinawa campaign officially concluded, hostilities against Japan ceased. American military forces on the island were then immediately and drastically scaled down. The Army placed little priority on programs for maintaining base facilities and rehabilitating the island. As a consequence, the Okinawan economy, struggling to recover from the war, stagnated. The onset of the Cold War and the communist victory in China, however, led to major changes. American strategists designated Okinawa as a crucial link in a chain of bases to be developed by the United States to protect the Philippines, Japan, and other American interests in the Pacific and the Far East. That decision prompted a significant development of American facilities on the islands as well as a revitalization of the Ryukyuan economy.

In addition to their military duties, American commanders on Okinawa shouldered an ancillary responsibility for administering the Ryukyuan population. This mission could not be taken lightly, for it involved both promoting America's national interests in the occupied area and meeting America's obligations under international law. Successfully performing these administrative tasks was not always easy. Commanders and their subordinates in the military government organization were men of varying capabilities who faced complex problems, often involving conflicts between military priorities and civil affairs obligations. More often than not these conflicts went unresolved. As a result, America's military government experiences on Okinawa at times produced a "us" versus "them" tension between the tactical commanders and their civil affairs subordinates. These tensions emerged, not because one group of military officers was "good" while another was "bad," but because the allocation of finite resources and land on Okinawa often required compromises that frustrated everyone in uniform and sometimes led to failures in communication between the two groups. These same tensions also grew up between the military occupiers and the indigenous population.

Following the conquest of Okinawa, the American forces faced an uncertain reception from the island's population. Many, if not most, Okinawans continued to think of themselves as Japanese subjects and looked toward an early departure of the occupying troops. Others sought to use the American presence as a vehicle for detaching themselves from Japan, thereby restoring the Ryukyuan kingdom. Still others—a very few—hoped for annexation by the United States. Initially, at least, most Okinawans appeared apolitical, desiring nothing more than to be allowed to return to their small farms in peace. But as the years passed, they became quite vocal in their opposition to the presence of American troops. In particular they resented the fact that American military facilities absorbed more and more of their arable land. Fueling this resentment was their growing fear that the presence of foreign bases might prompt a communist attack rather than deter one. The Americans never successfully convinced the Okinawans that they had not become vulnerable pawns in the Cold War. This failure, along with an emerging debate over land usage, fed a growing desire among the people to revert to Japanese control.

Strictly speaking, the effective date of the Japanese peace treaty, 28 April 1952, marked the date that the American command in Okinawa changed from military government to civil administration. During the period between the World Wars, the Army War College staff had developed a distinction, reflected in later field manuals, between the two terms. The former referred to the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority in "occupied territory," the latter, to governmental functions



conducted “in a friendly country or area,” often as a result of a formal agreement.<sup>1</sup> The Ryukyus, therefore, technically remained occupied enemy territory with an American military government until April 1952.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, anticipated the peace treaty by some eighteen months. When preliminary negotiations made clear that the treaty would endorse a long-term American presence in the archipelago, they instructed the Far East commander, General Douglas MacArthur, to organize a civil administration for the Ryukyus. Accordingly, American civil administration of the islands began on 15 December 1950.<sup>2</sup> Titles were changed—the term military governor, for example, became at first simply, governor, later high commissioner—but the principal characters and their duties remained the same. As they had since the invasion, all major figures in the island administration continued to be military officers. Further softening the lines of demarcation between military government and civil administration, the Army invariably used the titles military government officer and civil affairs officer interchangeably.<sup>3</sup>

Although the transition from military government to civil administration involved such semantic changes, many civil administration policies and programs continued to reflect the philosophy taught to American officers in military government classes in the early years of World War II. Much of that philosophy was challenged and even modified over the years in response to changes in American foreign policy and to specific conditions encountered in the islands. Nevertheless, early emerging military government policies and practices remained the animating forces in the American administration.

The American administration of the Ryukyus developed progressively. From a relatively simple conception of military organization as a vehicle for population and disease control, it quickly evolved into a policy of civil administration that demanded a comprehensive politico-socio-

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<sup>1</sup>USA, USN, and USAF, *Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government* (FM41-5; OPNAV P21-1, and AFM 110-7, NAVMAC 2500), 1958, pp. 3-4. See also Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), note, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Memo, JCS to CINCFECOM, 11 Oct 50 (SM 2474-50), File CCS 383.21 POA (1-12-45), Sec. 3, Record Group 218, Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, DC, derived from JCS 1231/14, 4 Oct 50; Appendix D of MSG, GHQ FECOM to CG RYCOM, AG 091.1 (5 Dec 50 RCA), 5 Dec 50, sub: Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers. See also USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the period ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 120, copy in Center of Military History Library. USCAR is the United States Civil Administration, Ryukyus, the American occupational regime as of 15 December 1950.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, *Joint Manual for Civil Affairs* (FM 41-5), Nov 66; HqDA, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 41-10), May 62; *Civil Affairs Operation* (FM 41-10), Aug 67 and Oct 69; and PMG manuscripts on the history of military government training. These sources all use the terms civil affairs officer and military government officer synonymously, a practice continued in this volume.

economic stewardship for a third world country. This transformation came about because some military government officers foresaw early in the occupation that conditions facing them on Okinawa would require a commitment of men and resources beyond anything heretofore contemplated. Well before the strategic decision to retain the Ryukyu Islands on a long-term basis necessitated a solid economic and social base for the American presence, this small cadre of highly motivated and educated officers began to sketch a broad outline for a comprehensive revival of society in the archipelago.

This volume relates how the Army's military government units, deficient in supplies, training, and experience, and organized for a brief sojourn in the Pacific Islands, overcame their limitations to administer and restructure a destitute island land. In so doing, by what they accomplished and by what they left undone, they bequeathed a legacy that continued to affect events in the Ryukyus and in the Orient to the present time.

## CHAPTER I

# The Governors

Before World War II the U.S. armed forces shouldered military government responsibilities with the greatest reluctance. Professional officers considered civil affairs assignments little more than accidents of war, and, as a result, few became specialists in that field. Those who did gained their expertise through “hands on” experience; no service offered training courses in military government. American commanders dealt with civil affairs in occupied territories as best they could, using available personnel. The Army had administered military government in this ad hoc fashion in areas as dissimilar as Mexico, the southern United States (during and after the Civil War), the Caribbean, the Philippines, the Rhineland, and Siberia. In each of these situations, the Army, largely unprepared, had had to assume military government responsibilities because of circumstances, but it remained uncomfortable with that role. World War II marked the first efforts by the American military to use trained civil affairs specialists within an organized military government staff structure. Those efforts resulted from the services’ growing awareness of the inevitability of such assignments and the need for better preparation.<sup>1</sup> Significantly, both the Army and the Navy arrived at those conclusions before the White House assigned the principal military government role to them. By the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff had conceived strategic plans for Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa, both the War and Navy departments had selected the trained civil affairs personnel in expectation of occupation responsibilities in the Far East and elsewhere.

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<sup>1</sup>For the evolution of this critical awareness, see U.S. Army, PMGO, History of Training—Military Government: A Summary 1939–31 December 1944, circa 1945, pp. 3–4, MS in Center of Military History (CMH) files; History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II to March 1946, part I, ch. 2, p. 3, MS in CMH files; Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington: Dept of Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964), pp. 6–7. Volume hereafter cited as Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*; and Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), pp. 3–8, 17–20.





GENERAL GULLION

### *Organizing Military Government Training*

In the wake of World War I, various committees at the Army War College had begun to recommend preparation of a military government field manual. But, as late as 1939 the Judge Advocate General, Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, had rejected the idea, arguing that his office had already produced a field manual on military law which contained a chapter on military government.<sup>2</sup> Early in 1940, following War College studies which put military government in a broader perspective, the Army Staff urged General Gullion to produce a separate, com-

prehensive civil affairs manual. In response, the Judge Advocate General's staff prepared *Military Government* (FM 27–5).<sup>3</sup> This volume not only introduced policies and procedures that went well beyond the civil affairs section of the military law manual, it also set standards and goals for the Army civil affairs officers who served during World War II and the postwar occupation period.

Many of the precepts set forth in FM 27–5 evidenced the idealism of its authors. *Military Government* directed that an occupation should be as just, humane, and mild as possible, and that the welfare of the people governed should be the goal of every civil affairs officer. It rejected injustice and harshness as violations of the Army's honor and as detrimental to the goal of an enduring peace. The manual also stipulated, that insofar as practicable, military government should use indigenous civilian personnel and avoid changes in existing laws, customs, and institutions.

The manual, however, had a distinctly legalistic focus, an emphasis that precluded much consideration of certain practical civil affairs subjects such as medicine and supply. Moreover, it was written exclusively for the Army. Its nomenclature and its references to organization did not apply to the Navy, although the probability of global war brought with

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army, JAG, *Rules of Land Warfare* (FM 27–10), Vol. 7, *Military Law*, 2 Jan 34, ch. 10.

<sup>3</sup>*Military Government* (FM 27–5), 30 Jul 40. The manual was revised in 1943 and published by both the War and Navy departments as *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* (FM 27–5, OPNAV 50E–3), 22 Dec 43.

it the likelihood of joint military government ventures. Above all, the manual's authors ignored another probability, that of conflicting priorities between the civil affairs officers and the operational commanders, as well as the need to reconcile these differences. In fact, conflicting priorities and the need to reach suitable compromises with their tactical counterparts would later provide one of the biggest challenges faced by military government officers.

The War Department provided in FM 27-5 that the personnel division (G-1) of the General Staff would bear the responsibility for military government planning and would supervise, though not actually conduct, civil affairs training. This assignment seemed logical, since the Army War College's G-1 committees had concentrated on military government during the interwar years. In early December 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, recommended that a military government school be established and that the Provost Marshal General be charged with its operation.<sup>4</sup> Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall accepted Haislip's recommendation and directed the Provost Marshal General to establish such a school.<sup>5</sup>

General Gullion, who was then serving as Provost Marshal General as well as Judge Advocate General, selected the University of Virginia as the site for the school. His decision was based on two considerations: Charlottesville's proximity to Washington, and the University's offer to provide facilities for only \$75 per month—a significant factor, considering the new school's modest budget. On 11 May 1942 the School of Military Government opened at Charlottesville with forty-nine student officers in attendance. With guidance from the field manual, *Military Government*, and the active collaboration of the War College committees, the faculty constructed a curriculum based on the assumption that all



GENERAL MARSHALL (1945 photograph).

<sup>4</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-1, to CofS, 3 Dec 41, G-1/16308-125, sub: Training of Personnel for Military Government and Liaison. Copy in CMH files; Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*, pp. 6-13.

<sup>5</sup>Directive, CofS to AG, CofS/21360-1, 6 Jan 42 and memo, AG to PMG, AG/353 (12-3-41)MT-A, 9 Feb 42, sub: Training of Personnel for Military Government and Liaison. Copies in CMH files.



the student officers enrolled would already be qualified in some relevant technical or professional skill. Since the term military government implied all aspects of administration in an occupied area other than those of a strictly military nature, numerous political and socio-economic skills, as well as other nonmilitary talents, were deemed appropriate qualifications for a successful civil affairs mission. The curriculum stressed such aspects of military government as fiscal problems, public health and safety, civilian supply, international law as it applied to civil affairs, and the fundamentals of public administration applicable to occupation situations. It also provided the student officers with a review of earlier American and foreign occupation experiences.<sup>6</sup> The military government field manual specified that, time and facilities permitting, foreign languages should also be part of the curriculum. Interestingly, Japanese was not introduced until the fifth class matriculated. One reason for this omission was the lack of qualified Japanese-language instructors; another was the early tendency to focus on Europe and North Africa rather than on the Pacific.

The eighth class was the first devoted to the study of the Far East, and the staff revised the curriculum substantially. It eliminated foreign languages and most of the detailed studies of specific areas. It did, however, establish an Intelligence Section to teach something about the Japanese home islands, and student officers began to contemplate the “Tokyo Problem”—an integrated approach to all the major military government problems the staff anticipated in an occupied Japan. Other changes included amplification of the supply course and instruction on staff management functions. The staff also instituted a short course in naval organization, presumably in anticipation of joint Army-Navy civil affairs efforts in the Pacific. The goal of this instruction was to produce highly trained but flexible civil affairs specialists who could function as staff officers in a variety of different situations and locations. Following the tone set forth in the military government manual, the curriculum was as high-minded as it was intensive; nothing in the course of study was likely to suppress any idealism the student officers might have brought to Charlottesville.

Originally, the Provost Marshal General designed the school to train up to 100 officers in each class, but its capacity soon increased to 150.<sup>7</sup> As the United States continued to prosecute the war on a global scale,

<sup>6</sup>For more on the Charlottesville curriculum, see PMGO, *History of Training—Military Government*, pp. 18–20; Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*, pp. 11–12.

<sup>7</sup>Memo, JAG to PMG, 13 Mar 45, sub: Establishment of the School of Military Government; memo, ACoFS, G-1, REJ 6945 WDGAP 320, 23 Jan 43, sub: The War Dept. Military Government Program. Copies in CMH files.



the growing need for additional civil affairs officers became increasingly apparent to the Provost Marshal General. Charlottesville's annual production of 250 graduates was inadequate against a projected requirement for nearly 6,000 civil affairs officers by the end of 1944. Even while the first class was in attendance, Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham, the school commandant, suggested to the Provost Marshal General the possibility of training more civil affairs personnel by establishing additional civil affairs courses at other universities.<sup>8</sup> The suggestion was timely; on 23 November 1942 the War Department authorized the Provost Marshal General to give reserve commissions to 2,500 men with skills in law, engineering, public health, and communications.<sup>9</sup> After an initial month of training in basic military and military government skills at the Provost Marshal General's School, Fort Custer, Michigan, these reserve officers would attend a three-month course at one of ten Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) that the Provost Marshal established at civilian universities in March 1943.<sup>10</sup>

The Civil Affairs Training School served a purpose different from the School of Military Government, a difference reflected in the training objectives and the curricula. Most training school students were junior-grade officers who were expected to function as specialists and technicians in field operations and assignments. Consequently, their training stressed information, as opposed to theory. Their curriculum centered around political systems and attitudes, local government organization, economic and judicial systems, public health and welfare, education, and the press and propaganda machinery of those areas likely to be occupied. There was a further emphasis on foreign language proficiency and practical approaches to problems likely to be encountered. The Provost Marshal expected Civil Affairs Training School graduates to function in direct contact with the populace in occupied areas, whereas the more senior officers at the School of Military Government were expected to deal with their own and with allied staffs.<sup>11</sup> This distinction, at least on Okinawa, became far less clear in actual operations: military government officers in the Ryukyus, regardless of their civil affairs alma mater, were often called upon for both field and staff functions.

Originally, the program devised for these new civil affairs schools was devoted almost exclusively to training for the Mediterranean and Euro-

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<sup>8</sup>Memo, Commandant, School of MG to the PMG, 11 Jun 42, sub: Planning for Mil. Govern., copy in CMH files; Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*, pp. 12–13.

<sup>9</sup>WDGAP 210.1 ORC, AG 210.1 (11–23–42), 23 Nov 42. Copy in CMH files.

<sup>10</sup>PMGO, History of Training—Military Government, pp. 20–21; John Brown Mason, "Lessons of Wartime Military Government Training," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 267 (Jan 50): 185–186. These courses were later reduced to two months duration.

<sup>11</sup>PMGO, History of Training—Military Government, pp. 42, 44–45.

pean theaters. The Provost Marshal General, however, committed the school at the University of Chicago to the Far Eastern theater on an experimental basis; in 1944 five of the other schools, those at Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, Stanford, and Yale, added Far Eastern programs.

But, regardless of the theater orientation, by early 1943 the fundamental principles guiding the War Department's civil affairs program were firmly in place. They were carefully set forth in the *Military Government* field manual and in the curricula of the military government schools, and the civil affairs personnel necessary to put them into practice were in training. These steps represented a major achievement for the Provost Marshall General's Office. The War Department was no longer as reluctant to become involved with civil affairs.

The Secretary of War underscored the Army's growing interest in civil affairs matters when he established the Civil Affairs Division in the General Staff on 1 March 1943.<sup>12</sup> It quickly became an important special staff division with authority to supervise all military government activities within the War Department. In addition, its officers came to speak for the department when coordinating civil affairs matters with other agencies, including the Navy, which had assigned a liaison officer to the division.

### *The Navy's "Ivy League" Civil Affairs Schools*

The Navy's program to prepare reserve officers for military government duties developed more abruptly than the Army's. In March 1942, sixteen eminent Columbia University faculty members formed the Committee on Emergency Program of Training in International Administration and developed a course in international administration to be offered to departments in the executive branch. Members of the committee approached a former Columbia dean, Dr. Joseph W. Barker, then a special assistant to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, with an outline of the course. Barker liked the idea and forwarded the proposal to Rear Adm. Randall Jacobs, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. On 9 June, Vice Adm. Frederick J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, issued a directive on establishing a civil affairs course and requiring Admiral Jacobs

<sup>12</sup>Memo, AG (Maj Gen James A. Ulio) to Col J.H.F. Haskell, AG 014.1 (2-27-43) OB-S-E, 1 Mar 43, sub: Civil Affairs Division, copy in CMH files. Col John Haskell was designated Acting Director.

to contract with Columbia University for military government instructors and facilities.<sup>13</sup>

The school opened in mid-August 1942 with an initial class of fifty-seven trainees, including twenty-eight civilians selected for commissioning by virtue of having prior qualifications in law, government, medicine, or area studies of the Orient. Ten of the twenty-eight were conscientious objectors. On 10 September the Navy formally designated the program as the “U.S. Naval Reserve Midshipmen’s School (Military Government and Administration) New York, New York.”

The opening of the Columbia facility underscored the Navy’s recognition that it also had a military government function to prepare for, although the Navy’s focus was on the Pacific, rather than on North Africa and Europe. Admiral Horne formalized the Navy’s civil affairs commitment on 1 December 1942 when he directed Capt. Harry L. Pence, who had had occupation experience in Trieste after World War I, to undertake general supervision of military government affairs. Horne told Pence to develop broad policy and provide liaison to the Columbia University school and the Army.<sup>14</sup> One month later the program was given separate status under the Chief of Naval Operations and was designated the Office for Occupied Areas, with Captain Pence as its head. By January 1943, therefore, the Navy had a functioning civil affairs administration activity and officer training school.<sup>15</sup>

Military government in the Ryukyus would benefit little from the area studies portion of the Navy’s school at Columbia, however, because during the time the school was in operation Taiwan—rather than Okinawa—was the perceived objective. Consequently, it was Taiwan’s geography, institutions, and mores that were scrutinized. Relatively little attention was given to the Mandated Islands and virtually none to the Ryukyus.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OCNO), United States Naval Administration in World War II, MS in three vols., 1946, RG 38, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Record Service, Suitland, MD. The history of the Navy schools at Columbia and Princeton is in Chps. I & II of Vol. I, part II; Lt Comdr Dorothy E. Richard, USN, *The Wartime Military Government Period 1945*, Vol. I of *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands* (Washington: Dept. of the Navy, OCNO, 1957), pp. 36–37, 47; Sidney Connor, “The Navy’s Entry into Military Government,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 267 (Jan 50): 9–18; Schuyler C. Wallace, “The Naval School of Military Government and Administration,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 231 (Jan 44): 29–33. See also William H. Hessler, “Military Government in the Navy,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 69, No. 11 (Nov 43): 1471–1474.

<sup>14</sup>Ltr, VCNO to BuPers, Op–13–D–JS, Serial 195513, 1 Dec 42, RG 38.

<sup>15</sup>The Office for Occupied Areas (Op–11X) was subsequently redesignated as Occupied Areas Section (Op–50E), and then, on 2 Aug 44, as Military Government Section (Op–13–2).

<sup>16</sup>Richard, *U.S. Naval Administration—Pacific Islands*, Vol. I, p. 63. The Mandated Islands were the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas—territory occupied by Japan after World War I under a League of Nations mandate.



This fact was particularly unfortunate, since the majority of the military government officers who served on Okinawa during 1945–1946 were graduates of the Navy's programs.<sup>17</sup>

The Ryukyus were not entirely neglected, however, because the Navy did take advantage of considerable prewar anthropological work done regarding Okinawa at Yale University. From July 1937 to December 1941, Yale had hosted the Cross Cultural Survey, a project to assemble, translate, and classify maximum information on selected peoples and cultures. Prof. George P. Murdock directed the program and was assisted by fellow anthropology professors Clellan S. Ford and John W. M. Whiting.<sup>18</sup> After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Army's Military Intelligence Service recommended to their respective departments that the three professors concentrate their work on the Japanese Mandated Islands. By late 1942 it became clear to the survey team that they could not cover such a large portion of the Pacific region and provide information that correlated with the invasion schedule. The Navy, therefore, took over the project and in April 1943 commissioned the three, assigning them to the military government school at Columbia.

Murdock, Ford, and Whiting produced eight civil affairs handbooks, including one for the Ryukyus.<sup>19</sup> These works became the principal source materials for civil affairs planning for the major Japanese-held island groups. The *Ryukyuan Handbook* was an extensive (334 pages) and extremely detailed treatise on practically every aspect of Ryukyuan society and history. Not only did it devote space to the usual political, anthropological, and economic concerns such as governmental institutions, social classes, and employment characteristics, it also treated more esoteric subjects as inheritance laws, prostitution, and censorship. Although difficult to fault for its scope of coverage, the handbook was based on information at least five years old. Over 95 percent of it had been extracted from Japanese sources which displayed the traditional Japanese bias that the islanders were backward rustics. Unfortunately, the handbook also reflected, perhaps inevitably, the impression that the Ryukyu Islands were more primitive and undesirable and the society less developed than it actually was.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup>Lt Comdr James T. Watkins, IV, USNR, Military Government Planning, Xth Army, August 1944–February 1945, unpublished MS in Watkins Papers, RG 200, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD.

<sup>18</sup>See Clellan S. Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 267 (Jan 50): 175–182.

<sup>19</sup>*Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands* (OPNAV 13–31), promulgated 15 Nov 44.

<sup>20</sup>Watkins, Military Government Planning, Xth Army, August 1944–February 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 200. OPNAV 13–31 at least revealed an awareness that Japanese attitudes toward the Ryukyuans had colored the sources for the handbook. See OPNAV 13–31, p. 68.

Meanwhile the Chief of Naval Operations' Military Government Section—formerly the Office for Occupied Areas, in conjunction with Princeton University, devised a civil affairs course lasting eight weeks (compared to thirty-six weeks at Columbia) with less stringent entrance requirements. The Princeton facility was designed to produce governors by the hundreds. The first class of 447 officers entered the “U.S. Naval School of Military Government, Princeton University” on 3 October 1944 and followed a curriculum emphasizing the technical aspects of civil affairs at the expense of the academic and theoretical. The military government school at Columbia closed in December 1944; the one at Princeton on 17 March 1945 after



ADMIRAL NIMITZ

graduating three classes. These two schools trained a total of 1,333 naval officers and nearly 300 Army officers for military government duties. Several of the Columbia and Princeton graduates also attended one of the Army's Civil Affairs Training Schools at Chicago, Stanford, or Harvard, while others received training at the Army's School of Military Government at Charlottesville.

Some of the graduates of the Navy's schools at Princeton and Columbia were eventually assigned to Admiral Nimitz's headquarters to assist in planning civil affairs activities for Okinawa. And, with few exceptions, the officers who served with military government on Okinawa in 1945–1946 were graduates of the Navy's two military government schools or the Army's schools at the universities of Virginia and Chicago.<sup>21</sup>

### *Civil Affairs Officers and Operation Iceberg*

While the Army and Navy military government schools trained future governors and the armed services and the civilian agencies defined their respective roles in civil affairs planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached

<sup>21</sup>Sgt J. Bloch, the Military Government on Okinawa, MS in IsCom Background Material, RG 407, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD; Watkins, Military Government Planning, Xth Army, August 1944–February 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 200.


some strategic decisions about the Pacific War. They concluded that an invasion of the Japanese home islands, preceded by an intensive aerial bombardment, would be necessary to force an Imperial surrender. During the spring and summer of 1944 the Joint Chiefs debated the best strategic location for the bases to stage air raids on the home islands (*see Map 1*). After reviewing relevant military considerations, they decided to proceed with an invasion of Luzon, but to bypass Taiwan in favor of a direct assault on Okinawa (Operation ICEBERG). In October 1944 they ordered General Douglas MacArthur to invade Luzon in late December and directed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to assault Iwo Jima and Okinawa early in 1945.

Military government planning was an integral part of the tactical preparations for ICEBERG. The assault forces were certain to encounter thousands of Okinawans in the American advance across the island. To facilitate combat operations and minimize civilian casualties, these citizens had to be removed from the front-line areas to collection points where care and custody could be provided. In planning for civil affairs operations in the Ryukyus, the initial issue to be settled was what contribution each of the uniformed services would make. By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy was responsible for military government in captured Japanese island areas.<sup>22</sup> Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific, would therefore assume the role of military governor in the Ryukyus. Once the amphibious phase terminated, however, ICEBERG would be for the most part an Army effort, with Army troops constituting most of the garrison force and civil affairs responsibility delegated to Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., Commanding General, Tenth Army. The “law of the land” would be based in the military proclamations issued in Nimitz’s name and posted in both English and Japanese by civil affairs officers traveling with the combat troops. But, since the War Department was unable to supply sufficient trained personnel to implement the new “law of the land” and handle the entire military government assignment, that effort, like many other Tenth Army functions, would become a joint service endeavor. The War Department provided 183 civil affairs officers, including Brig. Gen. William E. Crist as Deputy Commander for Military Government, while the Navy provided the remainder of the officers—almost 75 percent. The Navy also provided enlisted men to staff the various military government teams. Because of the joint service and concurrent mission aspects, organization shifted with the operational phase. During the assault phase, General Crist would receive his directions from

<sup>22</sup>JCS 819/5, 8 Jun 44, File CCS 383.21 (4–21–44), Sec. 1, RG 218, Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, DC.



# THE RYUKYUS STRATEGIC LOCATION IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC



MAP 1

General Buckner. During the garrison phase, however, Crist would drop one step further on the command ladder, serving under the direction of the Island Commander, Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace, USMC.<sup>23</sup>

Regardless of their service affiliation, individuals assigned to military government headquarters assembled at Schofield Barracks on Oahu. Those destined for military government field detachments gathered at the Civil Affairs Staging Area, Fort Ord, California. The more junior officers in the field teams, who had trained earlier in the war at the services' civil affairs schools, focused on the functional details of administering and sustaining the civilian population. On the other hand the more senior officers at headquarters, who for the most part lacked formal military government training, were far less concerned with the details of civil administration. They directed their attention to the broader problems of integrating military government into tactical operations, ironing out headquarters administrative procedures, and procuring and allocating materials and supplies.<sup>24</sup>

Military government planning began on 15 August 1944 when four Army and fifteen Navy civil affairs officers arrived at Schofield Barracks to constitute the Civil Affairs Section (later, Military Government Section), Headquarters, Tenth Army, under the G-1. A lieutenant commander headed the section, assisted by an Army major. Both men had gained military government experience in Italy, but it remained to be seen if such experience could readily be transferred to the Pacific theater. Among those officers arriving at Schofield Barracks were Lt. Comdr. George P. Murdock and members of his staff who had prepared the *Handbook* on the Ryukyus. By the end of November 1944 the Military Government Section had undergone a number of significant changes. It was removed from its subordinate position under G-1 and became a separate staff section under General Crist. The planning staff expanded to over forty officers, one-fourth of whom were Army officers.<sup>25</sup>

Interservice rivalry at times hindered planning, but the military government mission on Okinawa would require a high degree of interservice

<sup>23</sup>U.S. Army, *Participation in the Okinawa Operation, April–June 1945* (U.S. Army Forces PAO), 2 vols., Vol. I, pp. 10–11, RG 77, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD; rpt., Maj Gen Frank D. Merrill through CINC USAFPAC to the AG in Wash., 3 Sep 45, sub: Rpt. of Operations in the Ryukyus campaign, Tenth Army Action Rpt., Ryukyus, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. I, p. 11–XXVII–2. Copy in CMH Library; rpt, HQ Tenth Army to CINC USAFPAC, Serial No. 002355–1, 2 Aug 45, sub: Mil. Govern. Rpt—Ryukyus Area, RG 407; Roy E. Appleman, et al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948), p. 35; Charles S. Nichols, Jr. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific* (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3 Div., 1955), p. 268.

<sup>24</sup>Watkins, Military Government Planning, Xth Army, August 1944–February 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>25</sup>Tenth Army, Roster of Officers, Mil. Govern. Section, APO 356, 12 Feb 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

coordination and cooperation for success, and accommodations had to be reached. In the area of supply, for example, considerable vacillation and posturing transpired before the services reached an agreement that divided the responsibility for procurement, with the Army providing supplies for the military government headquarters and field detachments, and the Navy assuming responsibility for civilian supplies, including medical needs.<sup>26</sup> In other areas, such as personnel and administration, procedures and organization were so dissimilar that integration into the same organic units proved troublesome. Moreover, because the Army civil affairs graduates were usually older and of higher rank than their Navy colleagues, difficulties arose both in Washington and the field.<sup>27</sup>

Problems also arose because of the 3,000-mile separation between the field staff assembled at Fort Ord and the military government headquarters staff at Schofield Barracks. Effective liaison proved to be very difficult between planners and those expected to carry out the plans. Advance copies of all military government documents were sent to Fort Ord for study, but there was little opportunity for an exchange of comments. During late November and early December 1944, Army Col. William A. Boekel served as liaison officer between the two staging areas, but he could not close the communications gap. Consequently, the field officers were never completely informed of headquarters plans and desires, and officers at headquarters had no clear concept of the difficulties the field teams anticipated.

The planners had only a relatively brief time to do their job. They had prepared for the invasion of Taiwan, and when the strategic decision was made in the fall of 1944 to substitute Okinawa as the target, they had only a few months to devise specific military government plans for the islands. Their natural tendency was to translate Taiwan planning to Operation ICEBERG, but this only served to skew the projections of available resources and estimates of manpower requirements. In fact, little was known about exactly what sort of society and what kinds of resources civil affairs officers would encounter on Okinawa. The planners' principal source of information was the Murdock team's *Handbook*, but the material in that reference was hardly current. To an uncomfortable extent the planners were forced to devise detailed operations based only on dated materials and their barely-developed intuitions for military government.

The planners, however, did receive guidance from the Pacific commander. Although not formally issued until a month before the actual invasion, Admiral Nimitz's political, economic, and social directive for

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<sup>26</sup>Richard, *Naval Administration—Pacific Islands*, Vol. I, p. 184.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid, Vol. I, p. 62.



the government of the Ryukyus was widely circulated in draft form within Tenth Army headquarters, and operations officers were well versed in its provisions when they set about preparing their detailed plans for ICEBERG. The directive set forth the duties and limitations of civil affairs activities in captured Japanese territories. The records suggest that none of those involved in drawing up the Nimitz directive had military government training. On the contrary, the officer in charge was a senior submarine commander with a collateral specialty in military law.

The Nimitz directive contrasted in spirit and tone with the military government manual and the area handbook. Understandably, Nimitz focused on the American military units, rather than on the civilians. More than once he reminded his subordinates that their military mission was paramount and that the basic aim of military government was “to facilitate to the greatest extent possible” the task of defeating Japan. “Military government,” Admiral Nimitz wanted the Okinawans reminded, “is a necessary part. . . of destroying Japan’s power of aggression.”<sup>28</sup> He went on to proclaim that military government should be stern but just, while making clear that the treatment afforded the islanders would depend on how they behaved. Noticeably, his directive failed to make the ethnic and social distinctions between the Ryukyans and the Japanese so carefully drawn by the authors of the handbook. While Koreans and Taiwanese Chinese might be granted special treatment when conditions allowed, “ordinary Japanese subjects”—he included the Okinawans in this category—could expect no such preferred treatment. Here his directive was at sharp variance with the manual and the handbook. Where the latter sources wanted to apply to the islanders most of the rights and privileges afforded liberated peoples under international law, the Pacific commander emphasized the rights and responsibilities of American forces against enemy civilians during combat. Despite this emphasis, there was much positive advice for military governors in the directive, and much practical direction on the conduct of military government operations—directions that obviously derived from a careful reading of the joint military government manual. Nimitz, for example, wanted local government machinery, including the courts, to continue functioning and, although he left it to the discretion of the Tenth Army commander whether schools should be closed or left open, he made it clear that all schools ought to be reopened as soon as practicable.

The extent to which the Nimitz directive influenced military government operations on Okinawa remains unclear. The abbreviated planning

<sup>28</sup>Directive, CINCPAC–CINCPAC to CG Tenth U.S. Field Army, CINCPAC File A17–10/A–1(10), 1 Mar 45, sub: Political, Economic and Financial Directive for Military Government in the Occupied Islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters, Freimuth Papers.

phase combined with an unexpectedly large influx of refugees during the battle to give military government a distinctly ad hoc flavor at first. Nevertheless, the directive was important not only because of its influence on operations planning, but also because it marked the earliest and probably clearest exposition of a narrowly focused philosophy of military government that would figure prominently in all subsequent Ryukyuan-American relations. It represented an extreme expression of one of the sides of the argument over military mission versus military government that, by the end of the decade, would come to involve members of the President's National Security Council.

The influence of the Nimitz directive was particularly obvious in "Operational Directive Number 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General Tenth Army" (short title: GOPER), part of the basic plan for the Okinawan campaign prepared by the Tenth Army's operations staff.<sup>29</sup> In GOPER, the Tenth Army operations staff defined the military government responsibilities of the commanders of the expedition's major elements. While they referred to furthering national policies and fulfilling the obligation of occupying forces under international law, they obviously and understandably intended their third objective—assisting military operations—to be paramount. This was made clear when they enumerated the commanders' duties in support of the objectives: maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active and passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, and mobilizing local resources in aid of military objectives.

To accomplish these objectives, the operations directive called on commanders to exercise rigid control over the civilian population. They might "demand and enforce from the inhabitants. . . such obedience as may be necessary" not only for war purposes and the maintenance of law and order, but also for proper administration of the area "under circumstances of hostile occupation." Civilians found in violation of "military enactments" were to be surrendered to the military government for trial and punishment in exceptional military courts. "Local native courts" were to be closed until further notice.

The Tenth Army planners went on to delineate in general terms the types and numbers of military government units to be organized and the duties they were to perform. In a separate document, Annex 15 to Operations Plan 1-45 (Tenth Army's comprehensive plan for ICEBERG), they set forth in specific terms the table of organization and equipment for

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<sup>29</sup>Operational Directive No. 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General Tenth Army (GOPER), 6 Jan 45, Copy in Tenth Army Background Papers, RG 407.

each military government detachment and assigned the individual units to specific combat organizations.<sup>30</sup> In keeping with Nimitz's order to be stern but just, Tenth Army planners outlined in considerable detail the commanders' duty in the areas of government, health and welfare, labor, commerce and industry, finance, transportation, and construction. If the details of these duties would allow a humane and progressive commander to begin rehabilitating the Okinawans, they also could be used to justify a strict or even arbitrary governance of a conquered enemy. In the end, the planners set a course for every phase of Ryukyuan life that could not but remind commanders that they were dealing with enemy civilians who in the absence of careful control might well disrupt or even subvert the progress of the military campaign.

A third Tenth Army planning document introduced the other side of the debate between military mission and military government. Issued by officers in the Military Government Section in the form of a technical bulletin on 25 February 1945, "Military Government" reflected the training its authors had received in the services' civil affairs schools.<sup>31</sup> Examining in considerable detail the duties and opportunities outlined for military government units in Tenth Army's operations directive, these officers seized every opportunity to interpret the directive in reasonable terms, seeking to limit its application only to those areas and cases where absolutely essential. They sought to show civil affairs officers how to save their military commanders from needless confusion and error in dealing with civilians and to relieve the commanders of onerous duties for which they had little training or interest. Their objective was never in doubt. In their methodical delineation of the civil affairs officers' day-to-day duties, they looked to the early restoration of Ryukyuan society with a healthy respect for its prewar configuration, if also a somewhat idealistic determination to bestow on the islanders the blessings of 20th-century democracy.

In the area of Ryukyuan law, for example, the military government planners called on civil affairs officers to inventory for the island commander those local laws and ordinances, not specifically abrogated by proclamation, that should be modified or suspended. They believed the list would prove to be a short one and would consist mostly of law related to Japanese militarism and nationalistic cults. Ordinary civil and criminal law would continue in force. They also advised the military police on the

<sup>30</sup>Annex 15 to Tentative OpPlan (Tenth Army) No. 1–45, 6 Jan 45, Appendix A, RG 407. For discussion of the organization and duties of the military government units in ICEBERG, see chapter II.

<sup>31</sup>Tenth Army Military Government Section, "Military Government," 25 Feb 45, copy in CMH files.



establishment of exceptional military courts, the manner in which they were to be conducted and procedures for bringing cases to trial. They looked to the early reopening of local courts (criminal courts first, then civil and higher courts), and to that end ordered a screening of the Okinawan judges and lawyers to ascertain qualifications and degree of trustworthiness. Amid the detailed attention to local court procedures, they made clear that the exceptional military courts would be used for only truly exceptional cases. They looked to the local police for local law enforcement wherever possible and called on civil affairs officers to respect property rights and work for their early restoration where they had been abrogated.

The military government planners' ideas of Ryukyuan government were clearly spelled out in their discussion of the wartime resettlement program and the organization of the emergency resettlement camps they knew would be needed to accommodate the homeless and shifting populations in the wake of battle. They admonished civil affairs officers to follow local custom in government matters as far as possible. They went into great detail on the selection of civilian leaders, counseling officers to select tough-minded, skeptical Ryukyuan who, they believed, would contribute most to the restoration of civilian law and order.

In some areas their technical advice appeared at odds with the intentions of the military commanders. For example, Tenth Army directives put a halt to most normal communications and closed all schools, but the military government planners looked to the rapid restoration of the mails and press, even if heavily censored, and made elaborate plans for the early opening of schools, organized and operated by islanders under a committee of three or more Okinawans with educational experience. They stressed that plans for a formal educational system should be in place so that schools might open as soon as command permission was obtained.

The planners returned repeatedly to the subject of the resettlement camps. They wanted to use the experiences they would gain in these places to facilitate the restoration not only of local government, but also of local construction, industry, agriculture and fishing and an organization of civilian labor. They even gave the command's obligation to register the people by occupation a broad interpretation. Knowledge of local specializations would, they reasoned, lead to employment in military construction, which in itself would help restore wages and a moneyed economy and facilitate the regeneration of the islanders' small industrial capacity. In similar tones the discussion of diet, medicine, disease, and social regulation revealed a planning group basically sympathetic to local

needs and customs and armed with a strong humanitarian approach to solving problems.

In many ways the military government planners may have reminded their audience of old-fashioned schoolmarms. In didactic tones they outlined a step-by-step procedure to restore a population largely unknown to them. It would not be difficult to imagine the reaction of harried civil affairs officers forced to read through pages of material beginning “effective planning of operations requires the employment of these basic methods: maintenance of advanced estimates and tabular summaries.” Yet if the planners’ earnestness in matters of diet, medicine, and all other things Okinawan tried the patience of some of their subordinate civil affairs officers and sometimes prompted the derision of their contemporaries in the tactical units, it nevertheless was compelling enough to fuel the rehabilitation of Ryukyuan society that would take place during the next five years.


Such planning had not been easy. The planners had faced the exigencies of a major military campaign and the puzzle of a society of unknown loyalty and questionable recuperative capacity. They had also contended with the pervasive and, at times, competing needs of the tactical forces.

In January 1945, while the “Military Government” bulletin was being completed, Tenth Army planners imposed a dual staff relationship upon the Military Government Section. The section was split—at least on paper—into a small Tenth Army Military Government headquarters and a larger Island Command component. General Crist, as discussed earlier, served on the staff of the Commanding General, Tenth Army, as well as on the staff of the Commanding General, Island Command. In theory, military government headquarters was a staff section of Tenth Army for purposes of planning, but was considered a staff section of Island Command for operations (*see Chart 1*). In reality, the planning and operational aspects of ICEBERG overlapped considerably, with resultant confusion and perplexity among military government personnel.<sup>32</sup> Until the military government field detachments came under the operational control of Island Command, which for most teams was estimated to be less than a month, they would be directed by the corps or divisions to which they were attached. Tenth Army military government planners organized these field teams according to the prescription set forth in GOPER.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Lt Willard A. Hanna, USNR, untitled MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukys, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. 1, p. 11–XXVII–1, copy in CMH Library; XXIV Corps Ops Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 45, undated, and Sgt J. Bloch, untitled MS, Island Command Background Material, RG 407.

<sup>33</sup>Operational Directive No. 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General, Tenth Army, (GOPER), 6 Jan 45, RG 407; Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukys, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. 1, pp. 11–XXVII–1 and 11–XXVII–2, copy in CMH Library.

CHART 1—MILITARY GOVERNMENT DUAL STAFF ASSIGNMENT





Organized at Fort Ord, the detachments were of four different types, each designed to perform a specific function:

(1) Six “A” teams, each attached to a division and consisting of four officers and eleven enlisted men, would operate during the initial assault. In addition to serving as each division’s military government staff, “A” teams would conduct reconnaissance, post military government proclamations, locate civilian food and medical supplies, establish collection centers, and evacuate civilians from battle areas with the aid of the military police.

(2) Ten “B” teams, each with eight officers and nineteen enlisted men, were assigned at a rate of one to each division and one to each corps. These teams were to continue the work of the “A” detachments. As the “A” teams moved on with combat forces, the “B” teams were to proceed with evacuations and to control the collection centers established by the “A” detachments.


(3) Twelve “C” (or “camp”) teams, consisting of ten officers and twenty-six enlisted men, would be assigned to the two corps operating in the islands. These detachments were to establish and operate a series of civilian camps for refugees. Tenth Army designed each camp to be able to handle 2,500 islanders initially, and eventually, 10,000.

(4) Six “D” (or “district”) teams, of twenty-two officers and sixty enlisted men, were to be landed on Okinawa during the last assault phase or early garrison phase. Their role was to assume military government responsibilities at the district level, absorbing the “B” teams and controlling the “C” teams within their respective district boundaries, once Okinawa was so divided. According to civil affairs planners, a “D” team, augmented by a “B” team, could administer a civilian district containing between 60,000 and 100,000 people.

Tenth Army planners decided that once on Okinawa, these detachments would be augmented in the field by twenty Navy G–10 dispensaries (25 beds, one officer and six corpsmen each), six Navy G–6 hospitals (500 beds, fifteen officers and one hundred fifty-eight men each), a quartermaster truck company, a Navy construction battalion, eight Navy N1A camp hospital units (each capable of providing tentage and other personnel support for 250 staff and patients), an Army military police battalion, and an undetermined number of Army interpreters. Taken all together, these components constitute an impressive array of resources and reflect the seriousness with which Tenth Army planners viewed their military government mission.

Headquarters, Tenth Army, assigned the military field detachments to the various tactical components and scheduled them to land on the target in stages. On 17 February 1945 military government components

CHART 2—MILITARY GOVERNMENT FIELD DETACHMENT ASSIGNMENTS





assigned to the XXIV Corps or to its three divisions, the 7th, the 77th, and the 96th, arrived on Leyte in the Philippines. The other detachments assigned to assault divisions and corps staged on other islands. Military government teams attached to the III Amphibious Corps and to the 6th Marine Division (Reinforced) staged on Guadalcanal; other detachments joined the 2d Marine Division on Saipan, the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) in the Russell Islands, and the Army's 27th Division on Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides (*see Chart 2*).

Tenth Army's Island Command under General Wallace staged in Hawaii with the Second Provisional Military Police Battalion (later the 52nd Military Police Battalion) and with the Military Government Headquarters Detachment under General Crist attached (*see table below*).<sup>34</sup>

*Military Government Teams Comprising the MG HQ Detachment*

A-100X	D-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
B-100X	G-10-A, B, C, D, E, F, G
C-3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12	NIA-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

These assignments, made during the planning and staging phases, were not rigid, nor were they meant to be. The civil affairs planners assumed that a number of military government field detachments—especially the “B” and medical teams—would be fairly mobile. “A” and “B” teams might leapfrog one another depending upon the course of tactical operations. “B” teams would be transferred from one corps or division to another as needed. Even semipermanent “C” teams would find themselves under the operational control of whichever tactical unit controlled the area where the military government refugee camps were located.<sup>35</sup> Ultimately, events in the field, such as the rapid American advance across the island and the unexpectedly large influx of refugees into American lines, dictated a degree of mobility and flexibility for military government personnel far beyond anything envisioned by Tenth Army civil affairs planners.

The planners had made an effort to be prepared, but as they discovered, no amount of preinvasion training or planning could have adequately prepared Tenth Army's civil affairs staff for the enormous problems they faced on Okinawa during the summer and autumn months

<sup>34</sup>Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. I, pp. 2-I-2 through 2-IV-6, copy in CMH Library; XXIV Corps Ops Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 45, undated, RG 407.

<sup>35</sup>Operational Directive No. 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General, Tenth Army (GOPER), 6 Jan 45; The XXIV Corps in the Conquest of Okinawa, MS in three vols, XXIV Corps Records, Vol. 1, p. 138, RG 407. See also the movement of the peripatetic Det B-10 as outlined in: Rpt, CO, Det B-10 (Lt Comdr R. F. Lynch, USNR) to CG, 1st Marine Div., 6 Jul 45, Sub: Mil. Govern. Activities (fm 011400 May to 020001 Jul); rpt, Capt Charles W. Runyan, QMC, AUS, to MG HQ IsCom, Okinawa, undated, sub: Hist. of Ops of the MG Det B-10 in Okinawa. Both rpts in RG 407.

of 1945. The magnitude of these problems stood in sharp contrast to military government's limited mission, objectives, and resources.



## CHAPTER II

# The Battle for Okinawa


“Loochoo” and “Ryukyu” are, respectively, the Chinese and Japanese derivations of the same 7th-century Chinese ideograms which depict the archipelago as a “floating horned dragon.” “Okinawa” is a term of Japanese derivation meaning “a rope in the offing.” The term properly refers only to Okinawa Jima, the largest island in the chain, although it is often used to denote Okinawa Gunto—that island plus its immediate outlying islands. It is sometimes misapplied to the entire archipelago.

The people of the Ryukyu Islands, although resigned to the severe typhoons that annually sweep their islands, were unprepared for the *tetsu no bofu*, the typhoon of steel, as the American assault on the islands in April 1945 has been characterized.<sup>1</sup> The campaign, which officially lasted eighty-two days, was the last battle of World War II. For Americans, it also proved to be the bloodiest of all the Pacific campaigns against the Japanese Empire. For the people, the society, and the very land itself in that small portion of the empire, the battle was a devastating experience. The magnitude of the destruction and the sudden appearance of many thousands of hapless civilians meant that long before the battle ended, American civil affairs officers embarked on a military government experiment of unprecedented scope and duration.

The Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) reach southwest from the Japanese home islands in a 775-mile curvilinear chain to within seventy miles of Taiwan (*see Map 2*). The archipelago, which separates the East China Sea from the Pacific Ocean, consists of some 140 islands or islets—only thirty or so of which can support permanent human habitation—and countless rocks and reefs in major island groupings. Most of the islands are the peaks of three distinct mountain ranges rising along the edge of the continental shelf. Others are volcanic in origin. Coral formations are found on both types. East of Okinawa, the largest of these

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<sup>1</sup>The spelling of Japanese terms and proper names may vary, depending upon the time period and whether they are used in Okinawa or the home islands. The author has attempted to use standard Japanese throughout. All diacritical marks have been omitted in this volume.



MAP 2



islands, the deep Ryukyu Trench falls away sharply to depths in excess of twenty-five thousand feet.<sup>2</sup>

Despite their temperate zone location, the islands bask in a semi-tropical atmosphere because of the Kuroshio (Black) Current which flows northward from the North Pacific Equatorial Current, channeling tropical waters through the Ryukyus. This current keeps the water immediately surrounding the archipelago five to fifteen degrees warmer than the water further offshore. The humidity is above 76 percent the year round, and life there would be most uncomfortable were it not for the constant sea breezes. Naha, Okinawa's capital city, has a mean annual temperature of 72°F and an average of 202 rainy days each year with a mean annual precipitation level of nearly 83 inches. Rainfall is heaviest during the months of May and June. April through October, however, is the typhoon season, and, at a minimum, three typhoons strike or closely skirt the islands each year; the number has been as high as forty-five.<sup>3</sup>

With a land area of some 454 square miles, Okinawa is by far the largest of the Ryukyu Islands. The island is sixty miles long and ranges in breadth from two to sixteen miles. The northern part of the island, north of the isthmus between Ishikawa and Nakadomari, is rugged and mountainous, with considerable tree cover. Agriculture there is limited to the coastal areas and to small terraces. The central portion of the island, south of the isthmus, consists of a hilly, dissected limestone plateau of some 50,000 acres, with its highest elevations averaging 500 feet above sea level. The land rises gently from this central plain to a hillier 30,000 acre plateau in the south. This plateau is bounded by steep escarpments descending to raised beaches, except at the extreme southern tip where the escarpment becomes a sea cliff. Okinawa's irregular terrain, which is dotted with hills, ravines, and caves, offers numerous natural defensive positions.

### *The Ordeal of Japanese Defense Preparations*

Initially, the outbreak of hostilities in China and the Pacific did not affect Okinawa. The island had neither surplus food nor a great deal of industry to assist the Japanese effort. Its harbor facilities were unsuitable

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<sup>2</sup>Unless otherwise noted, the background geographic material in this volume is based on the following: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands*, OPNAV 13-31, 15 Nov 44; M.D. Morris, *Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail* (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1968), cited hereafter as Morris, *Tiger by the Tail*; Earl Rankin Bull, *Okinawa or Ryukyu: The Floating Dragon* (Newark, Ohio: privately pub., 1958); and George H. Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People* (Rutland, Vt. & Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1958), cited hereafter as Kerr, *An Island People*.

<sup>3</sup>Donald P. Whitaker, et al., *Area Handbook for Japan*, 3rd ed. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974).

for large warships, and the airstrips served only as steppingstones for Japanese flights to Taiwan and beyond. The island's main contribution to the war effort lay in its production of sugar cane. The black sugar crop was shipped to Japan, where it was converted into commercial alcohol for torpedoes and engines. Fully one-fourth of Okinawa's cultivated land was devoted to sugar cane production.<sup>4</sup>

As hostilities came closer to the home islands, the Japanese began more extensive defense preparations on Okinawa.<sup>5</sup> Following American air strikes against Truk Island in February 1944, *Imperial General Headquarters* drafted new plans for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands. On 1 April Lt. Gen. Masao Watanabe activated the Japanese *32d Army* to be stationed on Okinawa with its headquarters in the suburbs of Naha.<sup>6</sup> At that time the Okinawan defenses were considered secondary to the Marianas defense line, which the Japanese hoped would prove impenetrable. But in July 1944 American forces breached the Marianas line at Saipan, forcing *Imperial General Headquarters* to reconsider its defensive strategy. In August Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima replaced General Watanabe as commanding general of the *32d Army*. Ushijima reorganized the staff, replacing most of the incumbent officers with talented young men from *Imperial General Headquarters*. Reinforcements for the *32d Army*, including service and support units, arrived from the home islands throughout the summer and fall of 1944. While the *32d Army* augmented its manpower, work proceeded on the construction of various defense works, including countless concrete pillboxes and fortified positions, tank traps, and mine fields. In addition, dozens of Okinawa's natural rock and coral caves, supplemented by man-made tunnels, were stocked with materiel and fortified. These caves became the basis for an extensive network of underground defensive positions. Approximately 20,000 Okinawans were conscripted for the *Boeitai* (Okinawan Home Guard) for labor service and assisted in the construction of airstrips and fortifications. Because time was short for the island's defenders and there were not enough men to meet construction goals, many women were also pressed into labor service—some were obliged to work on airfield construction.<sup>7</sup> This conscription of so many island women for service away from the home had

<sup>4</sup>Morris, *Tiger by the Tail*, p. 56; David D. Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," *Far Eastern Quarterly* 7 (May 1948): 257.

<sup>5</sup>This account of Japanese preparations, units, and weapons was taken from the following sources: Japanese Monograph No. 83 (Navy): Okinawa Naval Operations, January–June 1945; Japanese Monograph No. 53: 32d Army Operations in Okinawa, March–June 1945; and Japanese Monograph No. 135: Okinawa Operations Record of the 32d Army, March–June 1945 (rev. ed.). Copies in CMH files. See also Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, pp. 84–96, 483–485.

<sup>6</sup>A Japanese army was the equivalent in strength to a U.S. Army corps.

<sup>7</sup>Interview, Prof. Seigen Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83. Miyazato's mother was one such conscripted laborer.

a distinctly negative impact on Okinawa's traditional close-knit family life.

By late March 1945 General Ushijima could deploy a sizable number of men and weapons in defensive positions. Additional forces—naval personnel, communications troops, engineers, and other miscellaneous elements—brought the estimated strength of the *32d Army* (counting home-island Japanese only) to over 77,000 men. To these were added the Okinawans: 20,000 *Boeitai*, 750 male middle-school students organized into *Tekketsu Kinnotai* (Blood and Iron Students Corps) volunteer units trained for combat, and thousands of others conscripted as civilians for service functions or pressed into service with the *32d Army*. Counting the *Boeitai*, the *Tekketsu* units, and the numerous civilian “volunteer” laborers, one Japanese source estimated that “. . . almost all Okinawan males from 18 to 45 years old were mobilized for combat.”<sup>8</sup> Additionally, about 600 middle-school girls were trained specifically for medical service. Although the total number of Okinawans mobilized is open to some dispute, observers later agreed that one overall conclusion appears valid: the Japanese preparations had a thoroughly adverse impact on most facets of Okinawan society.<sup>9</sup>

Since no accurate records exist of all the Okinawans drafted into the *32d Army*, the exact strength of the Japanese force at the time of the American invasion cannot be stated precisely, but it certainly exceeded 100,000 men. These forces were positioned in anticipation of the American landing, and they were well supplied. Once *Imperial General Headquarters* recognized that the Philippine campaign was lost, most of the weapons and material originally destined for that sector were sent to Okinawa instead. The defensive preparations, of necessity, also included foodstuffs and by the end of March 1945 the *32d Army* had stockpiled enough provisions to sustain its units until mid-September. Although foodstuffs had been imported to feed both the civilian population and the military, no plans were made to distribute food for civilian use once hostilities began.

In an effort to ease the food shortage, while at the same time improving operational efficiency, *Imperial General Headquarters* decided to evacuate Okinawans to the home islands. Before the American assault, some 80,000 civilians were taken to Kyushu on transports that had brought troops and munitions to Okinawa. In another less ambitious, but no less painful, population shift, the *32d Army* relocated approximately 60,000 civilians

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<sup>8</sup>Japanese Monograph No. 135: Operations Record of the 32d Army, March–June 1945 (rev. ed.), pp. 48–49, CMH files. See also Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, p. 415.

<sup>9</sup>See, for example, Kerr, *An Island People*, pp. 5, 463–464. Kerr considers the mobilization of Okinawan civilians far less thorough than the author of Japanese Monograph No. 135 recalls.





OKINAWA JIMA



from the southern half of the island, where the Army intended to make its stand, to the rugged, far less populated north. About one-half of this number were children and the aged. The dislocation of so many civilians caused considerable hardship and made matters all the more difficult for the American civil affairs officers after the campaign ended. But, even with 80,000 inhabitants removed to Japan and 60,000 more hiding in the northern caves, there were still over 360,000 civilians in potential danger in central and southern Okinawa.

Thus, for months before the American forces landed on their island, Okinawans were plagued with total disruption of their peaceful way of life, increased pressure on their meager food supplies, family separations, arduous forced labor, and relocation. Individual homes and even entire villages were commandeered to house the swollen Japanese garrison. The Okinawans resented these disruptions as they resented the attitude of the Japanese military, who were unable to communicate in the local Okinawan dialects and who regarded their hosts as “rustics.” This touched on all things Okinawan. With little thought to cultural considerations, the *32d Army* had located its headquarters in the historic city of Shuri beneath the castle of Okinawa’s kings, thereby ensuring Allied destruction of this ancient treasure. The Okinawan bureaucracy knew that an attack was imminent, but the local government was so thoroughly dominated by home-island Japanese that little was done to protect the island’s historic treasures or the ancient archives of the kings.<sup>10</sup> The manifestations of the *32d Army*’s presence left in many native Okinawans a residue of ill will against the home-island Japanese.<sup>11</sup>

The Okinawans, with no tradition glorifying warfare and the warrior, insisted, to the consternation of the Japanese, on retaining an indifference to things military. Such an attitude was suspect in a society where the civilian population had come to exist primarily to feed and outfit the military, but those suspicions did not surface suddenly in 1945. Ten years earlier Lt. Gen. Torao Ishii, then garrison commander, had cast doubt upon the Ryukyuan’s loyalty when he vehemently denounced the carefree attitude of the islands’ young men. The Ryukyuan deeply resented his public condemnation. Despite their lack of military fanaticism, the Ryukyuan did not think of themselves as fundamentally disloyal to the empire. At the same time, however, they did resent the increasing military demands for “voluntary” contributions of time and resources—contributions that the Okinawans could ill afford.<sup>12</sup> For the most part these

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<sup>10</sup>Kerr, *An Island People*, p. 467.

<sup>11</sup>It is a lingering memory that some Okinawans want to keep alive. See Prof. Masahide Ota, “Remember Battle of Okinawa—and Textbook Issue,” *The Japan Times*, 6 Feb 83, p. 14.

<sup>12</sup>Interview, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83. See also OPNAV 13–31.

levies were borne stoically by the Okinawans; very few became active dissenters. The vast majority of the population remained loyal, if not particularly enthusiastic about Japan's foreign adventures. A few Okinawan nationalists endured, and their movement survived until the American invasion in 1945. One of their spokesmen, a prefectural librarian from Shimabuku, lost his position in 1940 for publicly denouncing Japan's intensified efforts to assimilate the Ryukyus into a militarized Japan.<sup>13</sup> The librarian was an exception, however, for by 1940 most Okinawans were responding positively to a decade of propaganda that extolled the heroic deeds of Japan's soldiers in China. Okinawans, too, were serving in most branches of Japan's armed services, and some had achieved officer rank.<sup>14</sup>

### *War Comes to the Ryukyus*

Beginning in late September 1944 American aircraft and submarines began to tighten a noose around the Ryukyu Islands. Japanese surface shipping became extremely hazardous. B-29's of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Air Forces and planes of the Navy's fast carrier forces struck repeatedly at enemy positions throughout the western Pacific. Naha, the major population center, came under heavy air attack. On one day, 10 October, carrier planes struck the city in five separate bombing and strafing raids, leaving a wake of destruction that was nearly total. The mayor of Naha, a Japanese sympathizer named Jugo Thoma, some years later described the raid as a "holocaust."<sup>15</sup> Japanese officials, in what can only be regarded as the height of audacity given their own record, complained that American planes had indiscriminately struck at military and civilian areas alike.<sup>16</sup>

Additional raids followed in early 1945. Shuri—Okinawa's second largest city, its ancient royal capital and cultural center, and the site of the 32d Army's headquarters—became a major target. Thus, well before the invasion, the city and its ancient treasures were destroyed. Most residents of the city were left homeless—if they were among the fortunate ones who survived.

<sup>13</sup>Garland Evans Hopkins, *The Story of Okinawa* (Washington: Privately published by the Friends of Okinawa, 1947), p. 11.

<sup>14</sup>Interview, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83.

<sup>15</sup>*Memoirs of Jugo Thoma*, Jugo Thoma Memoirs Publishing Assn. (Naha: Hoshi Printing Co., 1969); see also chapter II, Edward O'Flaherty, "American Military Government and Civil Administration, Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1972," incomplete MS, copy in CMH files, cited hereafter as O'Flaherty MS.

<sup>16</sup>SWNCC File 36, 1 Mar 45, Records of the Sec. Army, Asst. Sec. Army, RG 335; JCS 1264/1, 23 Feb 45, sub: Japanese Complaint of Alleged Air Bombardment of Non-military Installations in Okinawa, RG 218.

# THE PLAN OF ATTACK

0 5 MILES

IE SHIMA

X A Fld

Motobu Peninsula

PACIFIC OCEAN

Ishikawa

Hagushi

Yontan A Fld

Bishi R

X Kadena A Fld

Futema

Kuba Pt

Machinato A Fld

Yonabaru A Fld

NAKAGUSUKU BAY

Chinen Pt

Minatoga

XX 2 Mar  
Demonstration

III Amph

XX

6 Mar(-)

XX

1 Mar

XX

7

XXIV

XX

96(-)

KEISE IS

KERAMA IS

XX 77 +





THE HAGUSHI BEACHES, 1 APRIL 1945

The first American troops landed in the Ryukyu Islands at 0804 hours on 26 March 1945.<sup>17</sup> The 3d Battalion Landing Team, 305th Regimental Combat Team, 77th Division, assaulted the beaches of Aka in the Kerama *Retto* (island group), just fifteen miles from Okinawa. Three other teams followed immediately. By nightfall on 29 March, American forces had occupied all the islands of the Kerama group (*see Map 3*). On L-Day, Easter Sunday, 1 April 1945, Tenth Army combat units assaulted the Hagushi beaches on the west coast of Okinawa itself.<sup>18</sup>

The advance elements of military government headquarters, consisting of ten officers, including General Crist, and thirteen enlisted men, landed on Okinawa on L-Day. The second and third elements reached the island approximately ten days later; thereafter, headquarters elements arrived at about two-week intervals, until the rear echelon of two officers and four enlisted men landed in mid-May with the rear echelon, Headquarters, Tenth Army. As previously planned, military government field teams came ashore on the island independent of headquarter's landings. The great majority of 15-member "A" detachments, such as A-4 with the 7th Division, landed on 1 or 2 April. These teams immediately fanned

<sup>17</sup>For a complete description of the battle for Okinawa, see Appleman, et. al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle*; Nichols and Shaw, *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific*; James H. Belote and William M. Belote, *Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); and Lt. Comdr. Frank A. Manson, USN, *Battle Report: Victory in the Pacific*, Vol. V of Battle Report Series (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1949).

<sup>18</sup>For further information on the selection of the invasion beaches, see Rear Adm. Robert N. Colwell, USNR (Ret), "Intelligence and the Okinawa Battle," *Naval War College Review* 38 (Mar-Apr 85): 81–95.





JAPANESE SOLDIER EMERGES FROM A CAVE TO SURRENDER

out through the combat zone to collect civilians. Most of the 27-member “B” teams, which were to continue and expand the relief efforts of the advancing “A” teams, landed on L+2 or L+3 and began establishing holding areas for displaced islanders. The small but relatively mobile 25-bed Navy G-10 dispensaries landed with the “A” and “B” detachments (G-10-5, for example, with the 7th Division on 1 April) and began dispensing medical assistance to the Okinawans. The first 36-member “C” team—the teams charged with operating the refugee camps—was ashore by sundown on 3 April. At that time there were some 45 officers and 125 enlisted men assigned to military government teams on the island and all were immediately involved, for American combat forces advanced rapidly during the first few days of the invasion and thousands of non-combatant Okinawans came into the lines.<sup>19</sup>

The 32d Army made no serious attempt to contest the landings. Japanese strategists believed, mistakenly, that if they permitted the American ships and troops to concentrate off the Hagushi beaches, the Japanese fleet coming down from the home islands could trap and destroy them. The American success in sinking the Japanese naval relief force, including

<sup>19</sup>XXIV Corps Ops Rpt, Ryukyus, 1 Apr–30 Jun 45, undated, pp. 93–94 and Figures 23 & 24, RG 407; History of Mil. Govern. Ops. on Okinawa 1 April to 30 April 1945 (L-Day to L + 29), 10 May 45, Tenth Army Records, pp. 4–5, RG 407.

the super-battleship *Yamato*, shattered this optimistic strategy, and the American forces quickly moved inland. Some turned north, but most proceeded south toward the main Japanese defensive positions around Shuri and Naha.<sup>20</sup> As the fighting intensified, particularly in the south, casualties, both military and civilian, increased. Many islanders remained in hiding in the caves. Weakened by fever and lack of food and conditioned by Japanese propaganda, they refused to emerge when American servicemen ordered them out. The GIs, reluctant to enter the caves because of warnings about boobytraps and fanatical Japanese holdouts, cleared them with explosives and flame throwers. These tactics saved American lives, but countless civilians died or were wounded.

Casualties were extremely heavy on both sides for a single campaign. American battle casualties totaled 49,151 dead and wounded; there were also 26,211 non-battle casualties. Japanese military losses were even more staggering, an estimated 110,000 combatants and service troops killed and 7,400 captured. These figures include an unknown number of last-minute Okinawan conscripts and civilians. The precise number of civilian casualties will probably never be known, but the lowest estimate is 42,000 killed. In all likelihood, somewhere between one-tenth and one-fourth of the civil population perished.<sup>21</sup>

Bad as was the fighting, it might have been worse had it not been for the work of Tenth Army's psychological warfare units before and during the invasion. Between 25 March and 17 April, Fifth Fleet carrier planes dropped some five million leaflets on the island. Planes were also used to distribute the psychological warfare office's newspaper, the *Ryukyu Shuho*, which attracted considerable attention among enemy soldiers and civilians alike. Other propaganda tools—such as tank-mounted amplifiers, aircraft with loudspeakers, and remotely controlled radios parachuted behind enemy lines—contributed to the psychological operations effort.<sup>22</sup>

The psychological warfare teams' immediate objective was to depress Japanese morale so that enemy soldiers would surrender rather than resist. The long-range goal was more ambitious: to promote the idea that Okinawans were ethnically and culturally different from the home-island Japanese. Consequently, the leaflets and loudspeakers not only told the Japanese soldier why and how he should surrender, they also told the

<sup>20</sup>Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, pp. 72–74, 76–77.

<sup>21</sup>See Norman D. King, *Civilian Casualties in the Battle of Okinawa* (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida, Dept. of Geography, Research and Information Papers, Ryukyu Islands Project Pamphlet No. 19, 1972).

<sup>22</sup>Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, p. 34; Report of Psychological Warfare Activities, Okinawa, 15 Sep 45, File 110–39, RG 407.



MAP 4



Okinawan citizenry not to be afraid, for they were not regarded as the enemy.

Before Operation ICEBERG, psychological warfare operations against the Japanese had been something of a disappointment. Nimitz's staff, which was largely responsible for the ICEBERG psychological warfare planning, judged this operation to be the most successful of the Pacific war. Military resistance from the civilian population was negligible, and larger numbers of enemy soldiers surrendered earlier in the campaign than had been anticipated.<sup>23</sup> Most certainly the success of the psychological warfare efforts in the Ryukyus helped reduce the toll of human suffering during the campaign for the islands. Unfortunately, the loss of life and property on Okinawa in particular still reached immense proportions.

The first task of military government personnel was to assemble the islanders, many of whom were wandering about the battlefield in search of food or relatives. The collection camps were very modest affairs, sometimes only a circle of barbed wire and a pit latrine. Many early camps lacked even canvas protection from the chilly Okinawan nights. Some islanders willingly came forward to surrender; others, conditioned by Japanese propaganda to fear the invaders, had to be captured by American assault troops. Many others appeared in camp only as the result of military-government detachment searches. The civilians exhibited considerable fear, but no one offered resistance; a stoic sense of resignation seemed to prevail. The first "D" (or District) team of 82 members, which was capable of administering a civilian population of 60,000 to 100,000, did not land until 27 April. Until then, the smaller detachments—high on humanitarian purpose, but low on supplies—were very much on their own.

Two teams, B-10 and C-1, typified the activities of military government detachments during the assault phase. Attached to the 27th Division, B-10 team came ashore on 9 April and established civilian collection centers at Chatan and at the nearby village of Momobaru Aza (*see Map 4*). The Chatan facility was particularly spartan—little more than a barbed wire enclosure. On 1 May the team transferred from the 27th Division to the 1st Marine Division and immediately established new centers at Iza (Isa) and at "Berger Beach" near Itoman. Berger Beach was particularly busy, processing nearly 13,000 refugees every two weeks during June.<sup>24</sup> Once rested, fed, and given preliminary medical attention, the

<sup>23</sup>"Psychological Warfare Development And Responses," CINCPAC-CINCPA Bulletin No. 109-45, 15 May 45, p. 13, File 110-39, RG 407.

<sup>24</sup>Rpt, MG Det. B-10 to MG HQ IsCom, undated, Sub: Hist. of Operations of Mil. Govern. Det. B-10 in Okinawa, File 98ISC1-5, RG 407.



team's civilian charges were transferred to larger temporary camps at Koza, Shimabuku, and Naha.

As with the other camp teams, C-1's mission was to establish and operate a compound capable of receiving large numbers of refugees from the sixteen "A" and "B" detachments operating in the Ryukyus. C-1 team came ashore on 4 April near Sobe. Some 1,000 former Sobe residents came out of hiding that first day and placed themselves under military government care. C-1 established a temporary facility there, then moved to a permanent camp near Koza. Activity was minimal at first, but 225 more refugees arrived on the 16th and another 300 came in within two days. The detachment's lone interpreter struggled with the problem of registering the newcomers. The next week brought in more than a thousand new arrivals, and by the fourth week C-1 had a total of 3,378 civilians under its care. The number of refugees reporting in continued to increase. By 1 June, 144,311 civilians—some 40 to 45 percent of the surviving population—were under American care.<sup>25</sup>



MILITARY GOVERNMENT HEAD-  
QUARTERS CAMP at Shimabuku.

### *Refugee Care*

Once the refugees had been gathered into the various camps, the civil affairs teams' most immediate concern was food supply. Food had long been a problem on Okinawa, even before the war. Most of the land in the Ryukyus is moderately fertile at best; only a few areas of more fertile soil exist in central and southern Okinawa and on a few of the outlying islands. Okinawans, however, made the most of what they had: rice was grown in the fertile, but poorly drained, reclaimed coastal marsh areas; sweet potatoes, sugar cane, and green-leaf vegetables were cultivated on the upland plains. The sweet potato, first introduced from China, was the staple food crop for both men and animals. Sugar cane was the principal cash crop. Traditionally, and of necessity, as many as 75 percent of

<sup>25</sup>Lt Gene DeMambro, USNR (Unit Historian), Hist. of Ops., MG Det. C-1, File 98ISC1-5, IsCom Okinawa Background Material, RG 407; Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, p. 417.



FOOD RATIONING AND DISTRIBUTION *under military government supervision.*

Ryukyuan households engaged in agriculture.<sup>26</sup> Despite this manpower commitment, however, food had to be imported to feed the archipelago's population.

Military government planners knew that the Ryukyu Islands had never been self-sufficient in food production. Beyond that fact, little was certain about actual conditions on the island. There was no way of knowing, for example, how Japanese defense preparations had affected the food supply or the extent to which American preinvasion bombing and shelling might have destroyed food sources. The planners had, therefore, prepared for all as-

pects of a potential food shortage. Each division was issued 70,000 civilian rations for emergency feeding. The rations, calculated with Japanese preferences in mind, included rice, flour, dried fish, cooking oil, soybeans, and sugar. A regular ration contained 1,530 calories, but special rations were also prepared for laborers (2,000–2,500 calories), nursing mothers (2,200 calories), and very small children (782–921 calories). These last two diets included extra calcium in the form of evaporated milk, but all of the rations were “devoid of ascorbic acid (vitamin C) and deficient in riboflavin (vitamin B2). . . .”<sup>27</sup> Each division was to land its civilian rations in various echelons throughout the assault phase.

To their great relief, the American forces discovered that there was no immediate food crisis. This was all the more remarkable because the defending Japanese forces had thoroughly disrupted agricultural efforts by evacuating and/or conscripting for labor so many able-bodied citizens. Moreover, in the south, the soldiers of the *32d Army* often confiscated food from the civilians' meager stores.<sup>28</sup> Despite such confiscations, Okinawan civilians had managed to hide food in the island's coral caves. Consequently, one of the military government's immediate tasks was to

<sup>26</sup>Karasik, “Okinawa: A Problem in Administration,” p. 257.

<sup>27</sup>Ltr, CNO to CINCPAC, Serial No. 0192413 (SC), Op 13–2/ABM: eh, 18 May 45, sub: Basic Diets for the Civilian Population in the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Japanese Outlying Islands, Operational Archives, U.S. Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard.

<sup>28</sup>Henry Stanley Bennett, “The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Okinawa,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 72 (Feb 46): 265, 272, cited hereafter as Bennett, “The Impact . . . on the Civilians.”



salvage that food and distribute it through a rationing system. Under close military government supervision, the civilian population sought out the food caches. They also harvested the remaining sweet potato, wheat, barley, and millet crops. Since most of the other crops had been lost during the fighting, as had most of the livestock and the fishing fleet, these salvage operations became extremely important.<sup>29</sup> And they were successful. Detachment B-1's officers found the native salvage efforts "adequate," especially in such items as onions, cabbages, soybeans, and the ubiquitous sweet potatoes. Civil affairs officers at C-1 team, while finding no great quantities of rice, noted that the local fields "abound" in sweet potatoes and cabbages.<sup>30</sup>

During the battle, 1,402 tons of processed foodstuffs and 2,079 tons of harvested crops were salvaged and rationed. Until 21 June, the end of the assault phase, between 78 and 85 percent of the population, depending upon locality, was fed from local sources. Imported rations supported the remainder. While hoarding was a problem, the military government teams' biggest food problem during the fighting was one of timely and equitable distribution. Transportation, or lack thereof, was a major part of the food situation.<sup>31</sup> On most of the outer islands, where battle-related destruction was far less than on Okinawa, the food situation was less serious.

As the Ryukyus campaign officially ended (2 July 1945), however, military government teams found themselves facing a deteriorating food situation. During June the field detachments fed an average daily population of 196,000, with only 22 percent of the food being imported. By July the figures had risen to 295,000 persons fed daily, with 59 percent of the food being imported. In part, these statistics suggest that a growing number of civilians came under military government care in the last days of the campaign. There were, however, other, more serious reasons for the increase. By July the salvaged foodstuffs had been exhausted and considerable additional damage had befallen the island's crops. The retaining walls of numerous terraced fields and the intricate irrigation systems developed over the years had been damaged. Once the combat phase ended, bulldozers, heavy trucks, and graders, following base construction

<sup>29</sup>Memo, IsCom MG HQ to CG IsCom, 10 Jun 45, sub: History of Mil. Govern. Operations on Okinawa, 1 May to 31 May (L+30-L+60), Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>30</sup>Hist. of Operations of Mil. Govern. Det. B-10 in Okinawa; Hist. of Ops., MG Det. C-1, File 98ISC1-5, RG 407.

<sup>31</sup>Lt Col John Stevens and M Sgt James M. Burns, Okinawa Diary (March-14 May 45), 11 Apr 45 entry; HQ MG Det. B-9 through chain of command to the Adjutant General, 1 Apr 45, sub: Operations Rpt. Det. B-9 is reporting on ops. beginning 27 March in Kerama Retto; and memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407. See also Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar-30 Jun 45, Vol. I, p. 11-XXVII-5. Copy in CMH Library.

plans, continued the destructive work already begun by tanks and artillery. The man-made walls and irrigation ditches, so essential to farming on Okinawa, could not be easily replaced. The damage done to island agriculture by this necessary development was compounded by theft and vandalism on the part of American soldiers. Headquarters, Tenth Army, lamented the situation:

At the outset, an ample supply of food was uncovered. . . . Substantial losses were incurred by the uncontrolled action of troops and the lack of sufficient military government personnel to prevent such losses. Losses also incurred in livestock, poultry, . . . farm implements and building materials by needless destruction and lack of personnel and transportation to salvage such items for Military Government use.<sup>32</sup>

Military government teams made a maximum effort to have the civilians harvest the crops, but inadequate transport, countless shifts of population from one camp to another, and insufficient military government and military police personnel to supervise civilian harvesters resulted in large losses. Many crops, especially sweet potatoes, rotted in the fields.<sup>33</sup> The same detrimental factors, particularly the shifting between camps for battlefield or logistic considerations, also left the Okinawans with very little incentive to plant new crops.

Before long the more balanced civilian rations brought ashore by the assault divisions proved inadequate to support the growing number of Okinawans dependent upon imported rations. Military government teams attempted to keep the caloric level in the 1,530–1,990 range, but the nutritional value of the rations often became very questionable. At times chocolate was the only available food for several days. One Okinawan recalls a week when only butter was distributed in his camp; during another week the ration was powdered ice cream, which the Okinawans mixed with boiling water and consumed as a tea. During other weeks corn meal was supplied, but without the eggs or milk to make bread.<sup>34</sup>

Because of a world-wide shortage of fats and oils, as well as the dearth of farm animals locally, cooking oils and fats so essential to the Okinawan style of food preparation soon became very scarce. Military government teams found they could provide only about 3 percent of the local demand. Military government headquarters begged mess sergeants not to dispose of old oils and fats, but to distribute these items to Okinawan employees

<sup>32</sup>Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar–30 June 45, Vol. I, p. 11–XXVII–3. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>33</sup>War Diary of MG Det. B–5 (Lt Comdr E. R. Mossman, CO) with the 77th Div. notes that the sweet potato crop will be lost (15 May 45 entry), RG 407; Karasik, “Okinawa: A Problem in Administration,” p. 259.

<sup>34</sup>Interview, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83.



of the various units. Still the demand could not be met, and some Okinawans were reported to have used machine oil to cook their tempura.<sup>35</sup>

With the food situation deteriorating so badly and so quickly, General Crist warned civil affairs personnel to avoid using terms such as “concentration centers” when referring to the camps; Tenth Army personnel were advised that descriptions of civilian camp conditions would be censored from letters home.<sup>36</sup> In late September 1945 all pretense of maintaining the civilian rations at the April level was dropped, and the ration was cut in half until more rations could be imported.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, military government teams somehow managed to provide minimum amounts of food to support the civil population, and although the people of the Ryukyus experienced hardships and instances of malnutrition, actual starvation was averted. The question of food, however, and Okinawa’s lack of ability to feed itself, would remain a major concern of the American authorities long after hostilities ceased.

While the principles governing the production and distribution of food for a war-devastated people have almost universal application, those governing the provision of medical aid do not. The Army’s only experience with so many enemy civilians occurred in Europe. There military government medical officers were able to utilize local personnel and facilities; once organized and supplied, they carried the burden of civilian health care. Conditions and experiences in the Pacific, however, most notably on Saipan, convinced the planners that practically all medical care would have to be imported and furnished by military government. They greatly feared a large number of civilian battle casualties, as well as widespread tropical diseases resulting from the poor sanitation facilities on the island. Expecting the worst, Tenth Army planners could not hope to provide more than minimum humanitarian health care, and that only in the most extreme cases. Successful planning for medical facilities was a frustrating experience, not only because of limitations on military government assault tonnage, but also because of Tenth Army’s inability to obtain the type of facilities best suited for civilian medical care. The Saipan experience pointed to the need for mobile field hospitals, but with so many commitments elsewhere, the Army was unable to provide this type of facility. Military government forces on Okinawa had to make do with Navy hospital units, which were far less mobile and adaptable to assault

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<sup>35</sup>MG flyer, undated, but circa 1946–47, sub: Save Fats and Oils for the Okinawans, Freimuth Papers; interview, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83.

<sup>36</sup>Minutes of Brig Gen W. E. Crist’s staff officers conference, 12 May 45, Sgt J. Bloch files at MG HQ and Tenth Army General Orders 311.7 (TAXXAG), 3 Jun 45, sub: Censorship Regulations, RG 407.

<sup>37</sup>HQ, US Naval MG Unit, Okinawa, Directive No. 9, 28 Sep 45, sub: Civilian Rations Issue, Reduction of, RG 38.

conditions. The Commander, Expeditionary Troops, was responsible for medical care during the assault phase, while Island Command took over for the garrison phase. The Navy provided all medical supplies.

The military government teams were pleasantly surprised to discover the medical situation on Okinawa more favorable than had been anticipated. Cases of malaria were reported, but not in the epidemic proportions expected.<sup>38</sup> But because of the number of people hiding for so long in the island's caves, flea and louse infestation affected three-fourths of the population. Filariasis and dengue fever were widespread, and an estimated 35 percent of the population suffered from tuberculosis. Medical personnel also discovered approximately 150 lepers on Okinawa and sent them to the 850-patient leprosarium on small Yagaji (Yagachi) Shima to be cared for by two qualified Japanese doctors.<sup>39</sup>

In an effort to control insect-borne diseases and improve sanitation, military government teams attempted weekly spraying of islanders' houses and shelters with a 5 percent DDT in kerosene solution, while latrines were treated with 2 percent sodium arsenite. Islanders who emerged from the caves or from their huts had their bodies and bundles of clothing liberally dusted with DDT by the first military government personnel they encountered.<sup>40</sup>

During the campaign, the military government's medical facilities admitted over 30,300 civilians and treated a much larger number as outpatients. Toward the end of the campaign, almost 30 percent of the civilians encountered by the military government teams required medical attention. But, despite these figures and the fact that the 25-bed naval dispensaries were overtaxed, underequipped, and undersupplied, the facilities were able to care for the islanders. Only in the rarest cases was it necessary that the civilians receive treatment from the hospitals and dispensaries serving the tactical forces.<sup>41</sup>

While the medical personnel struggled with their limited resources,

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<sup>38</sup>Actually, the number of reported cases of malaria rose considerably *after* the American forces arrived on Okinawa, although whether this reflected an actual increase in malaria cases or simply better reporting is not clear.

<sup>39</sup>Rpt, HQ Tenth Army to CinC USAFPAC, Serial No. 002355-1, 2 Aug 45, sub: MG Operations Rpt, Ryukyus Area, RG 407; rpt, HQ MG IsCom to CG IsCom, 31 Jul 45, sub: History of Mil. Govern. Operations on Okinawa, 1 Jun to 30 Jun 45 (L+61 to L+90), Watkins Papers, RG 200; msg, HQ MG IsCom to War Dept. Gen. Staff, CNO, 30 Apr 45, RG 165, Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

<sup>40</sup>Interview, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83; Hist. of Operations of Mil. Govern. Det. B-10 in Okinawa, RG 407.

<sup>41</sup>Lt Comdr James Watkins, Disaster Relief Administration: Public Health, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; rpt, III Phib Corps MG Officer to CG III Phib Corps, 1 May 45, sub: Operational Rpt on Mil. Govern., ICEBERG, RG 407. For a detailed account of medical operations during ICEBERG, see Dr. Donald W. Mitchell, The U.S. Army Medical Service in the War Against Japan, Chp. XIX (Occupation of the Ryukyus), circa 1961. Copy in CMH Medical Hist. Branch files.





DUSTING WITH DDT

other civil affairs officers addressed the need for clothing and shelter. Both were in short supply. Heavy rainfall was a constant throughout most of the year, and day/night extremes of temperature were not uncommon. Proper clothing and adequate shelter, therefore, were as essential as food and medical care.

The amount of clothing salvaged for civilian use varied from location to location. In April the 27th Division reported "almost no clothing available [for] these natives and some are nearly naked," while the III Amphibious Corps reported salvaging sufficient clothing to allow a measure of modesty, but not enough warm clothes or blankets to provide real comfort.<sup>42</sup> Despite these conditions, pilferage of civilian clothing and personal effects by islanders was only a minor problem, remarkable in

<sup>42</sup>Rpt, Sgt Julius Bloch, MG files to 27th Div., MG Rpt, No. 3, 20 Apr 45 and MG Rpt, No. 1, 15 Apr 45, RG 407; ltr, Col Frederick P. Todd, CO, 1st Information and Historical Service to Col A. F. Clark, Chief, Historical Branch, G-2, WDGS, 29 Nov 45, Chief Hist. File 676 (b), CMH files; memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407.



LABORERS wearing cast-off uniforms marked "CIV".

view of the disintegration of Okinawa's social and legal institutions. Souvenir hunting by American servicemen, on the other hand, took a serious toll in civilian garments. During the month that they reported on a severe lack of clothing, the 27th Division indicated that American forces were guilty of looting homes. Capt. Oliver J. Cejka, AUS, of Detachment B-6 reported a "Most shameful example of vandalism . . . clothing, everything thrown out of houses" at Atanniya. Very early in the campaign, at Zamami Son in the Kerama Retto, souvenir hunters had also pilfered 75 percent of the Detachment B-9's store of salvaged shoes and clothing.<sup>43</sup>

Military government teams attempted to mitigate the shortage of civilian clothing by utilizing surplus and cast-off American uniform parts. This practice did much to alleviate the situation, but it created a recognition problem. The uniforms were therefore modified for civilian use, a process which included stenciling the letters "CIV" six inches high on shirts, jackets, and trousers.<sup>44</sup> If these uniforms had not been available, the clothing situation on Okinawa would have been even more of a problem. Even so, the shortage of adequate clothing soon prompted a private relief effort in Hawaii, where the Okinawa Relief Clothing Drive Committee was organized under the sponsorship of the Honolulu Council of Churches. This committee shipped to Okinawa some 150 tons of used clothing. Capt. W. D. Jennings, USN, Chief, Mid-Pacific Department of Civil Affairs, provided Navy sea transport.<sup>45</sup> Despite such private efforts the clothing situation remained unsatisfactory. American uniform parts continued to serve as staple clothing for Okinawans, especially those em-

<sup>43</sup>Rpt, Sgt Julius Bloch, MG files to 27th Div., MG Rpt, No. 3, 20 Apr 45; MG Rpt, No. 1, 15 Apr 45, RG 407. See also Sgt J. Bloch interview (14 Sep 45) with Capt Oliver J. Cejka, AUS (B-6), and rpt, HQ MG Det. B-9 (77th Div.) through the operations chain of command to the Adjutant General, 1 Apr 45, sub: Operations Rpt., RG 407.

<sup>44</sup>Watkins working note, undated, sub: Civilian Clothing, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>45</sup>Mitsugu Sakiara, "Okinawans in Hawaii; An Overview of the Past 80 Years," *Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii*, Ethnic Studies Program (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1981), p. 115.





*SURPLUS UNIFORM* clothes an Okinawan craftsman making shi-shi figurines for souvenirs.

ployed at military facilities, until 1947 when the Far East commander ordered an end to such use.<sup>46</sup>

Tenth Army planners had anticipated that a large number of civilian dwellings would be destroyed during the fighting, but they could not predict with any accuracy the actual extent of the destruction. Military government detachments that landed with the 77th Division in the Kerama Retto confirmed the worst fears: the majority of the houses on Zamami Shima were either totally destroyed or badly damaged. Similarly, the villages on the small island of Ie Shima, just off Okinawa, were “completely uninhabitable.”<sup>47</sup> The situation was somewhat better on the main island where perhaps 11,000–12,000 Okinawan houses survived, although at least half of these required extensive repairs. The 20 percent of Naha

<sup>46</sup>Msg, CG PHILRYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. G 34603 GSCAP, 1 Apr 47, File: Messages-PHILRYCOM April 1947, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>47</sup>Msgs, HQ Det. B-9 (77th Div.) through the chain of operations command to the Adjutant General, 1 Apr 45 and 5 May 45, sub: Operations Rpt., RG 407.



REBUILDING. *Gathering thatch for roofing in settlement camps.*

that had survived the October 1944 air raids was destroyed in the invasion. Military government team C-1 found only 12 houses left standing in Sobe. All suffered some degree of damage, but with no other shelter available they were of necessity used to house about 1,000 civilians.<sup>48</sup>

During the battle for Okinawa, the combatants shelled and burned many island dwellings that otherwise would have been available for housing. In some instances, of course, this was done to deny the houses to possible enemy snipers. In other instances, however, the evidence points to thoughtlessness or spite as the motivating force. In an effort to curb what he termed “much indiscriminate and unsupervised burning of native structures,” Tenth Army Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Elwyn D. Post, directed that such destruction be restricted.<sup>49</sup>

Other buildings—sometimes whole villages—fell victim to Island Command’s base development plan and its execution. The belief at the time was that Japan would not surrender without a sustained aerial bombardment and subsequent invasion. Consequently, bulldozer operators

<sup>48</sup>Hist. of Ops., MG Det C-1, File 98ISC1-5, RG 407.

<sup>49</sup>Directive, Tenth Army CofS to Distribution, 600.971 (TAACS), 12 May 45, sub: Letter of Instructions—Burning of Native Dwellings; directive, HQ IsCom to Distribution “B” & “D”, 600.971 (TDACS), 21 May 45, sub: Burning of Native Dwellings, RG 407; Bennett, “The Impact . . . on the Civilians,” p. 267.





STANDARDIZED HOUSING *being constructed under military government supervision.*

followed plans drawn up months before in Hawaii and leveled hundreds of houses to provide room for highways, B-29 air strips, and munitions dumps.<sup>50</sup> The base development plan not only increased the housing shortage; it also contributed to a growing land-usage problem.

Military government planners calculated that twelve refugee camps should be built to house some 120,000 civilians, in addition to the military government personnel themselves. Requirements for construction materials were necessarily large, with the biggest volume item 1.3 million board feet of lumber. Construction needs totaled 30,000 measured tons, about half of which arrived as part of the regularly-allocated military government tonnage; the rest came as part and parcel of the equipment and supplies assigned to the engineer units. But even these building materials were not adequate, and the lack of available shipping necessitated a local salvage effort to make up the difference. The planners had, however, anticipated that such construction efforts would be performed by a Navy Seabee unit. Admiral Nimitz had agreed on 1 January 1945, but the 27th Naval Construction Battalion did not arrive on Okinawa to assist the military government specialists until 4 June.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup>Watkins working note, "Lack of Shelter," undated, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>51</sup>Memo, Chief of Resettlement Engineering (Charles G. Day) to Operations Officer, MG HQ IsCom, 17 Aug 45, sub: Resettlement Program, Rpt. on, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

Despite the adverse circumstances, the military government succeeded in sheltering Okinawa's homeless on an emergency basis. During the eight weeks following the invasion, this was accomplished with severe overcrowding. Some dwellings which under normal circumstances would have housed five to ten people now sheltered fifty or more. Such overcrowding made sanitary standards difficult to maintain, but at least there was shelter from the elements.<sup>52</sup> The breakthrough of the main Japanese defense line in late May permitted military government personnel to pursue a six-week salvage drive for building materials. They razed abandoned villages that had been overrun in central and southern Okinawa and moved some 3 million board feet of lumber north to construct emergency housing. The program of razing buildings in the south to ship lumber north halted when the end of hostilities on the island brought the likelihood of resettlement in the south.

The vast majority of Okinawans came into contact with civil affairs officers during the assault phase of ICEBERG. Despite the circumstances, the Okinawans came to appreciate the efforts of the military government teams. Medical personnel were especially effective in forging a strong bond between the occupation forces and the civilian population. Much of this goodwill quickly dissipated, however, when the military's need for land came into conflict with the Okinawan traditional view of landholding.

Most Okinawans wanted nothing more than to return to their land to rebuild their homes and resume farming. For a great many, unfortunately, this wish could not be fulfilled since the level land that was best suited for farming was also ideally suited for airfields, munitions dumps, and other military installations. And compounding that loss of agricultural land, to repair areas torn up by heavy equipment, topsoil was scraped for fill. In that process, the intricate system of ditches and small dams that had controlled erosion for countless years was often damaged or destroyed. With the coming of the rainy season, the process of land destruction was completed as topsoil was washed away to sea.<sup>53</sup>

Although initial construction work supported the tactical forces engaged in combat on Okinawa, the ultimate goal of the base development plan for Okinawa and Ie Shima was construction of airfields and other facilities for the final assault on Japan. During the planning phase, Tenth

<sup>52</sup>Memos, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, and Ford to CG, MG HQ IsCom, 28 May 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, RG 407.

<sup>53</sup>Bennett, "The Impact . . . on the Civilians," p. 270; Karasik, "Okinawa: Problem in Administration," p. 259; Rpt, ASCOM I MG HQ to CG ASCOM I, 31 Aug 45, sub: History of Mil. Govern. Operations on Okinawa, 1 Jul to 31 Jul 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.



Army envisioned that after the seizure of the Kerama Retto and Okinawa, Phase III of Operation ICEBERG would involve the invasion of no less than five additional islands: Okino Daito, Kume, Miyako, Kikai, and Tokuno. These would then be developed as air bases and radar outposts. During the assault phase, however, reconnaissance revealed that of the five additional islands, only Kume was suitable for such development. It was taken on 26 June, and the remainder of Phase III was cancelled.

This cancellation had a considerable impact on Okinawa and Ie Shima. Many of the resources originally allocated to projects on the outlying islands were now brought to Okinawa—eighteen airstrips were now planned for Okinawa and four for Ie Shima, instead of the total of ten originally intended for these two islands. By the end of May, ten of the twenty-two airstrips were under construction. And, while the construction called for in the base development plan for Okinawa had not been completed by the end of hostilities, that development had absorbed more and more acreage and had reduced civilian habitation to small pockets, mostly in the inhospitable north of the island.<sup>54</sup>

One concerned observer of these developments stated that the tactical forces required so much of the island for military installations “that practically no space remained for the natives.”<sup>55</sup> The areas assigned to the refugees kept changing as the needs of the tactical units expanded. In many areas the continual movement of the displaced population thoroughly discouraged the planting of crops, and thus contributed to the deteriorating food situation. Faced with more and more civilians squeezed into small and widely dispersed pockets that could not support a rural society, military government teams could barely cope with the refugee situation.<sup>56</sup>

Between 1 April and 31 August 1945, changing battle lines and other military considerations necessitated the relocation of approximately 250,000 Okinawans, most of whom had to move many times. The mass movements began as early as 6 April when a military government team moved some 6,000 islanders, on foot, from Sunabe to Shimabuku (*see Map 4*). On 10 April a military government “B” detachment ordered another 6,000 people to move from Chatan to Nodake. To supervise the population shifts, Headquarters, Tenth Army, established the Office of Resettlement Engineering, with a civilian, Charles G. Day, as its chief.<sup>57</sup> Under his direction, the office organized one of the largest of these re-

<sup>54</sup>Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, pp. 419–421.

<sup>55</sup>Ford, “Occupation Experiences on Okinawa,” p. 178.

<sup>56</sup>IsCom MG HQ to CG IsCom, 31 Jul 45, sub: History of Mil. Govern. Operations on Okinawa, 1 Jun to 30 Jun 45, and HQ IsCom Okinawa, 30 Jun 45, Action Rpt IsCom, Okinawa 13 Dec 44–30 Jun 45, RG 407.

<sup>57</sup>Established by MG Special Circular No. 4, 24 May 45, Freimuth Papers.



locations in late May when the entire population of Ie Shima was dispersed to other islands.<sup>58</sup> This move resulted in a particularly large amount of ill will toward the American occupiers.

By the end of the summer, all of the major refugee camps had been turned over to the tactical units and the inhabitants had been moved northward to a relatively small settlement area, the military government area near Jinuza on the northeast coast (*see Map 5*). The large camp at Taira, which housed some 64,000 islanders, had been closed and its inhabitants moved to the Chijuka-Hentona area in the northwest. In late June, Tenth Army had determined to evacuate the entire civil population of the Motobu Peninsula to create a bivouac area for the III Amphibious Corps. With fifty trucks from the 1st Marine Division, military government teams evacuated between 20,000 and 22,000 inhabitants in seventy-two hours. This northward movement reached a peak in August with the evacuation of the Chinen Peninsula, a movement which used forty trucks and two LST's. The military government areas to which these civilian refugees were moved comprised only about 10 percent of Okinawa's land mass, and of that percentage, perhaps one-half was totally unsuitable for resettlement purposes.<sup>59</sup>

Throughout this difficult period the Okinawans remained calm and cooperative despite their hardships. And there was hardship and suffering. On 22 June, for example, while 881 evacuees were being transported by truck to Kushi, one truck—with dozens aboard—arrived with three dead: two children and one elderly woman.<sup>60</sup>

Under the strain of these abrupt evacuations from existing camps, military government planning sometimes broke down. On several occasions, refugees arrived at their new location only to find the camp already filled beyond capacity and camp authorities unwilling to take them in. For the evacuees, these refusals meant many unscheduled hours in the backs of trucks during which some of them became dehydrated or ill. Consequently, the Deputy Commander for Military Government, General Crist, ordered that no civilians be refused at any military government

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<sup>58</sup>Rpt, MG HQ IsCom to Lt James Watkins, USNR, 15 Jul 45, sub: Rpt on General Conduct of Mil. Govern., Southern Area from 1 Apr to 15 Jul 45: "Principal Mass Civilian Evacuations," RG 407.

<sup>59</sup>Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. I, p. 11–XXVII–5. Copy in CMH Library; Bennett, "The Impact . . . on the Civilians," p. 272; memos, Charles G. Day (Chief, Resettlement Engineering) to Ops. Officer, MG HQ IsCom, 17 Aug 45, sub: Resettlement Program, Rpt on, and Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. (Col C. I. Murray, USMC) to CG, Army Service Command I, 383.7 (TDCIV), 8 Aug 45, sub: Movement of Civilians, Watkins Papers, RG 200. See also Annex to Field Orders Nos. 74 and 75, 27th Div., 1 Jul and 5 Jul 45, sub: Evacuation Plan, RG 407.

<sup>60</sup>Memo, Lt Col Glenn MacDonald to the CO, IsCom, 25 Jun 45, sub: Incident Involving Civilians at G-13 at Kushi on 22 Jun 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.



location for any reason.<sup>61</sup> The problem, however, did not go away. Military government personnel at several locations continued to refuse to admit additional civilians. In response, truck drivers resorted to “dumping” islanders unannounced and then quickly driving off. In one nighttime incident, civil affairs personnel dumped many hundreds of stretcher cases at the naval hospital at Koza.<sup>62</sup>

Most of the population dislocations were necessitated by the exigencies of battle. The rest represented efforts by military government units to meet emergency needs for food and shelter. Nevertheless, the almost constant shuffling from place to place of people whose whole culture was rooted in the land is one of the more regrettable tasks undertaken by the military government detachments. Actually, American forces faced a cruel dilemma. Battlefield conditions and the overriding need to clear land for essential military use in the continuing war against the Japanese home islands vied with the humanitarian instincts and announced directives of military government officials and the measures they instituted to provide food, clothing, and shelter to the needy on an emergency basis, even against overwhelming odds. In the end such competing objectives frequently became counterproductive. The progressive ideas and admirable intentions of those trained at Charlottesville and Princeton would understandably compete with the dominant military mission, the rock upon which civil affairs efforts would often founder. As was so typical of American postwar involvement elsewhere, the dominant theme of these hectic months of military government on Okinawa was one of overriding compassion and humanitarian concern despite the parallel requirements of military necessity in an on-going war.

### *Military Government Organization: An Assessment*

The lack of correlated activities between the headquarters staff on Oahu and the field teams staff at Fort Ord that first emerged during the planning phase continued once both command levels arrived on the island.<sup>63</sup> Until Island Command assumed direction of most civil affairs activities at the end of April, detachments in the field remained under

<sup>61</sup>Minutes of Brig Gen W. E. Crist's staff officers conferences, 16 May and 24 May, Sgt J. Bloch files at MG HQ, RG 407; MG HQ IsCom, Mil. Govern. Circular No. 19, 16 May 45, sub: Receiving of Civilians, Watkins Papers, RG 200; Bennett, “The Impact . . . on the Civilians,” p. 273.

<sup>62</sup>Sgt J. Bloch interview with Capt Thomas Duncan at Kishaba, 25 Aug 45, Sgt J. Bloch files at MG HQ, RG 407.

<sup>63</sup>Lt Comdr James Watkins, Military Government Planning, Xth Army, August 1944–Feb 1945, MS. The general sources for this subsection are the Island Command background materials in RG 407, especially the MS by Sgt J. Bloch entitled “The Military Government on Okinawa,” and the papers of Lt Comdr James Watkins, IV, in RG 200, especially the untitled MS by Lt Willard A. Hanna, USNR, and the MS by Lt Lawrence and (then) Lt Watkins entitled “Supply.”

corps or division direction only and generally operated with a good deal of independence from military government headquarters at Headquarters, Tenth Army. As Operation ICEBERG passed from the conceptual to the operational phase, military government headquarters personnel functioned less as a staff section of Tenth Army for planning and more as a staff section of Island Command for operations. The Commanding General, Island Command, General Wallace, assumed complete responsibility for Okinawa from the Commanding General, Tenth Army, on 30 June 1945 when organized Japanese resistance collapsed. After that date the Deputy Commander for Military Government, General Crist, reported solely to the Island Commander (*see Chart 1*).<sup>64</sup>

During the course of the tactical operations on Okinawa, certain military government "A" and "B" teams overlapped territories, or jumped over one another. Although a certain amount of this form of overlapping was anticipated, the somewhat ill-defined relationship of "B" team to "A" team became a constant source of friction. Sensing this development, many of the tactical units used their relative isolation from military government headquarters to create more flexible arrangements—sometimes combining the "A" and "B" teams and recommending to the Island Command that the two team functions be combined in future operations.<sup>65</sup>

Regardless of the team structure used, mistakes in the training of military government field officers quickly revealed themselves. Although highly proficient in such areas as legal or fiscal specializations, these men lacked command experience and in most cases even civilian administrative experience. Consequently, those who commanded military government field detachments often were unable to organize their teams effectively. Most were naval reservists who found the adjustment to military life difficult. Their lack of acquaintance with military organization—either Army or Navy—and the prescribed command channels frustrated their efforts to obtain supplies and other assistance. In addition, neither military government officers nor enlisted men had been trained for combat.<sup>66</sup> Their lack of familiarity with small arms techniques

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<sup>64</sup>On 3 Jul 45 Col Charles Ira Murray, USMC, relieved General Crist as Deputy Commander for Military Government.

<sup>65</sup>War Diary of MG Det. B-5 (Lt Comdr E. R. Mossman, CO), undated entry; memo, IsCom MG HQ to Lt James Watkins, USNR, 14 Jul 45, sub: Rpt. on General Conduct of Mil. Govern., Southern Area, from 1 Apr to 15 Jul 45, and memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, IsCom background material, RG 407. See also memo, MG liaison officer with the 96th Div. to Chief Deputy MG Officer, IsCom, 28 Apr 45, sub: Recommendations for Consideration in Planning Next Operation, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>66</sup>Memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407; memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to CG MG HQ IsCom, 29 May 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

necessary to prevent enemy infiltration left military government camps vulnerable to occasional hit and run raids by small groups of Japanese soldiers. Consequently, military police units, in addition to supervising the civilian population of the camps, also had to defend the camps. The 52d Military Police Battalion, the one unit assigned to Island Command for military government duty, became badly overextended and had to be augmented by the divisional military police companies. Still, civil affairs officers could not count on more than one policeman for every 600 civilians in their care on Okinawa.<sup>67</sup>

The instruction received by the military government officers was deficient in important areas, and what specialized training they did possess proved initially far less of an asset than Tenth Army planners had expected. This is not to imply that these officers did not have considerable technical expertise. The composition of Detachment B-10 was typical: the senior officer, Lt. Comdr. R. F. Lynch, was a businessman. He was assisted by an Industry and Economics Officer (who had a business and labor relations background); a member of the Kentucky Bar Association served as Legal and Supply Officer; a medical doctor (specializing in pediatrics) on loan from the New York City Public Health Department served as the Public Health Officer; the former county engineer of Fulton County, Georgia, was the Engineering Officer; and a biochemist filled the Assistant Public Health Officer's assignment.<sup>68</sup> Until the cessation of hostilities on Okinawa, few civil affairs problems arose on Okinawa that required such expertise. No legal or fiscal issues needed to be resolved, no public safety problems had to be met apart from controlling the circulation of civilians, and no political or economic programs had to be devised. Apart from the medical, specialized skills were not needed to handle reconnaissance, salvage, and the basic needs of the civilian evacuees.<sup>69</sup>

Faced with the reality that their specialties could not be effectively employed, many "A" and "B" team officers became frustrated, although most were finally able to make the necessary psychological adjustment.

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<sup>67</sup>The situation was made even more acute by the fact that the bulk of the 52d MP Bn. did not arrive on Okinawa until the period 17 April–8 May 45. Tenth Army Action Rpt, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. I, pp. 11–XXVII–8 & 11–XXVII–9, copy in CMH Library; memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to CG MG HQ IsCom, 29 May 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>68</sup>Rpt, Capt C. W. Runyan (QMC), AUS, (Det. Historian) to MG HQ IsCom, Okinawa, undated, sub: Hist. of Operations of MG Det. B-10 in Okinawa, Island Command background material, RG 407.

<sup>69</sup>Memo, IsCom MG HQ to Lt James Watkins, USNR, 14 Jul 45, sub: Rpt on General Conduct of Mil. Govern., Southern Area, from 1 Apr to 15 Jul 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200; HQ IsCom, Historical Record—Island Command, Okinawa Gunto, Ryukyus, 13 Dec 44–30 Jun 45, 1 Dec 45, RG 407.



Nevertheless, one military government field officer advised Headquarters, Island Command, that instead of specialists, military government activity “demands preferably young men with general skills, common sense, and lots of energy.”<sup>70</sup> One type of field team, the district headquarters or “D” detachments with their twenty-two officers and sixty enlisted men, was large enough so that specialized abilities could be used effectively. But “D” teams had relatively little to do with military government operations during the assault phase. All of the technical expertise these men possessed and all of the idealism that civil affairs officers brought with them from Charlottesville, Chicago, and Columbia could not mask military government’s most glaring deficiency: the general unpreparedness of personnel for the tasks they faced. The lack of administrative, command, and field training or experience was manifest, even to contemporaries.<sup>71</sup>

One serious error in preinvasion judgment came to light very early in military government operations on Okinawa. Tenth Army military government planners originally estimated that perhaps 117,000 civilians would come through American lines in the northern portion of Okinawa by L+20 (21 April). U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, Intelligence (G-2) and Tenth Army G-2 strongly disagreed with this figure, and calculated that no more than 20,000 to 30,000 civilians would be encountered by L+20 in the northern two-thirds of the island. By contrast, Intelligence estimated that in the normally more populous southern portion of Okinawa, 200,000–250,000 refugees would enter American lines by L+20. The accuracy of G-2’s calculations was seriously diminished by the Japanese military’s decision to relocate thousands of civilians from the south to the sparsely-populated north, as well as by the decision not to oppose the American landings on the beaches. As a result, the Marines in the north advanced inland much more rapidly than expected and encountered thousands more refugees than Tenth Army G-2 anticipated. The III Amphibious Corps took in nearly 66,000 refugees by L+19 (20 April). In contrast, XXIV Corps, moving south and east, had taken in only 20,000

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<sup>70</sup>Memo, MG liaison officer with the 96th Div. to Chief Deputy MG Officer, IsCom, 28 Apr 45, sub: Recommendations for Consideration in Planning Next Operation, Watkins Papers, RG 200. See also memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407.

<sup>71</sup>Memos, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to CG, MG HQ IsCom, 28 May 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, and Ford to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, and MS by Sgt J. Bloch, The Military Government on Okinawa, RG 407; U.S. Army, *Participation in the Okinawa Operation, April–June 1945* (U.S. Army Forces POA: 1946), 2 vols., Vol. II, p. 707, RG 77.

civilians by L+10, rather than the 200,000 expected.<sup>72</sup> Such miscalculations of the number of civilians who would be encountered in different sectors of the island jeopardized military government planning in areas such as transport and supply, areas in which military government headquarters had already experienced planning difficulties.

When military government supply planning was redirected from Taiwan to Operation ICEBERG, the planning section's first impulse was to compare the populations of the two targets and to conclude that ICEBERG would require approximately two-thirds of the Taiwan estimates. Before the actual assault, however, military government headquarters rejected this simplistic basis. More pertinent considerations than population indicated a greater rather than a lesser need for civil affairs assistance. A greater proportion of the population would be likely to require direct relief in military government camps on Okinawa, a higher percentage probably would require medical care, and, with less agricultural resources, more islanders would have to be fed. Nevertheless, during the turmoil associated with the switch in strategic objectives, fewer military government personnel were assigned to ICEBERG than were originally scheduled to participate in the proposed Taiwan operation.

In October 1944 Tenth Army military government headquarters had prepared lists of supplies and equipment on the assumption that the Army would be solely responsible for supply arrangements on Okinawa. In late November, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stipulated that naval facilities would be responsible for supplies, while the Army would be accountable for requisitioning. This hybrid arrangement involved the conversion of stock numbers and components and resulted in considerable confusion. The situation was aggravated in December when the system was modified to enable Army units assigned military government duties to draw equipment directly from Army sources. Caught in the delay and confusion over service responsibility, military government supply lists never emerged in consolidated form and remained instead scattered among assault shipping lists and maintenance and resupply lists. In addition, although Tenth Army military government headquarters devoted considerable attention to calculating the supplies required for civilian consumption, far less attention was given to military government operational needs, and a very minimal amount of effort was directed to the procurement of supplies and materials for headquarters itself. Consequently, compared to other elements of Headquarters, Tenth Army, mil-

<sup>72</sup>Memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period of 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45; Lt Col John Stevens and M Sgt James M. Burns, Okinawa Diary (March–14 May 45) 11 Apr 45 entry, RG 407. See also Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," pp. 177–178.

itary government headquarters arrived critically short of transportation, tentage, mess gear, and the other essentials of field operations.

Whether for their own headquarters or for civilian needs, civil affairs officers found it difficult to secure adequate supplies and the shipping space necessary to transport them. Medical supplies, trucks, tarpaulins, building supplies, and tools were all needed by military government officers. But then, the tactical forces needed them as well. The invasion troops inevitably and understandably got priority. At every turn, plans for aiding the civilian population of the Ryukyus had to be adjusted to accommodate battlefield requirements.<sup>73</sup>

Preliminary supply planning in the autumn of 1944 initially allocated to military government approximately 1,500 measured tons of shipping which would be “integrated into the various echelons of shipping.” Although thus limited, the supplies would provide “minimum subsistence” to the native population.<sup>74</sup> When their inadequacy became apparent, military government officials tried to increase supplies and shipping allocations, but their colleagues in the tactical units argued that they needed the space for their own equipment. In the end, civil affairs officers convinced the Tenth Army commander that providing civilian supplies was necessary to fulfill his obligations toward noncombatants. He revised the quotas, and military government received a revised initial shipping allowance of 2,599.9 measured tons, of which 750 were devoted to medical supplies. This increase in shipping tonnage was modest considering the tasks military government would face on Okinawa. Later requisitions for military government would be prepared in blocks for automatic reassignment during the first six months of operations at the rate of 10,000 measured tons per month. Each block was calculated to provide for 30,000 civilians for thirty days. Despite this planning, military government field teams—at least for the first two months on Okinawa—were not equipped to perform at more than a minimal level.<sup>75</sup>

Those military government supplies that were delivered to the secured beaches of Okinawa often piled up in mute testimony to yet another nagging problem for military government: the lack of adequate transportation ashore. Each field team came ashore with transportation calculated to meet its minimum needs, ranging from “A” detachments with one jeep and one truck, to “D” detachments with eight jeeps and seven

<sup>73</sup>Ford, “Occupation Experiences on Okinawa,” p. 177.

<sup>74</sup>Working memo, HQ Tenth Army, ACoFS, G-4, undated—but with an enclosure dtd 3 Nov 44, sub: Logistic Implications, ICEBERG, RG 407. A measured ton, or freight ton, is a volume unit usually reckoned at 40 cubic feet.

<sup>75</sup>Memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, (Operations) to CG HQ IsCom, undated, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, Island Command background material, RG 407.



trucks. Military government headquarters had two jeeps and a single  $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck. Given the distances involved, the amount of direct relief to be supplied and administered, and the conditions of Okinawa's roads, these conveyances were wholly inadequate. Some captured Japanese vehicles had been hoped for, but very few could be kept in running order for lack of parts. Toward the end of April military government transport was augmented by the arrival of the 412th Quartermaster Truck Company. Its fifty trucks eased the situation somewhat, but they often operated around the clock to meet minimum transportation requirements.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, these particular trucks remained under the control of military government headquarters and were not always available when needed in the field. Military government field teams were forced to beg and deal for transportation with the tactical units, who were themselves short of trucks.<sup>77</sup> During August and September 1945 two additional truck companies (the 3078th and 3067th Engineer Dump Truck companies) began assisting military government by dividing their time between hauling rations and road construction.

The dearth of transportation adequate to distribute military government supplies in a timely manner meant that supply dumps on or near the beaches began piling up. Guards had to be posted to discourage "moonlight requisitioning" by tactical units, and even by other military government field detachments. Despite all precautions, losses at various supply points ranged from 5 to 30 percent.<sup>78</sup>

There were other problems in addition to supply and transport, ones that caused ill will between Army and Navy personnel. The personnel channels and administrative procedures of the two services proved so dissimilar that integration into the same organic units produced difficulties. Commanders of military government units lacked authority to discipline persons of another service. Ratings were not always comparable for identical job assignments, and personnel records were difficult to maintain properly. Moreover, friction between Army and Navy tactical units infected military government components and was exacerbated by the joint nature of military government operations, operations one author found to be replete with "the perpetual, sophomoric inservice rivalries."<sup>79</sup>

<sup>76</sup>Memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407.

<sup>77</sup>Rpt, Tenth Army HQ to CinC USAFPAC, 2 Aug 45, AG Serial No. 002355-1, sub: MG Operations Rpt—Ryukyus Area, RG 407.

<sup>78</sup>Rpt, CO, MG Team B-6 to CO, Tenth Army MG Section, 1 Jun 45, sub: History of MG Unit B-6 for the month of May 1945, RG 407.

<sup>79</sup>Morris, *Tiger by the Tail*, p. 61. See also IsCom Circular No. 13, 13 May 45, sub: Administration, Watkins papers, RG 200; memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407.

Once military government operations were well underway, Tenth Army's official conclusion was that this joint effort was a harmonious success: "Army and Navy personnel at Headquarters and on Military Government teams were cooperative members of a single organization."<sup>80</sup> In retrospect, this statement was far too simplistic for it understated not only the frictions between the Army personnel and their Navy confreres, but also the tensions between military government headquarters and civil affairs officers in the field. Such interservice rivalry, however, was probably inevitable in such a large joint operation and, in the end, never really jeopardized the military government mission.

Interservice bickering, insufficient supplies, inadequate transportation, inaccurate refugee estimates, questionable training, confusion in military government field relationships, and clashing priorities with the combat forces all handicapped the civil affairs officers. How well, then, did they do in the circumstances in which they had to operate? After surveying the first three months of military government operations, Headquarters, Tenth Army, concluded that they were "eminently successful."<sup>81</sup> To a degree this conclusion was justified, since military government, despite all the inherent problems, performed its primary mission successfully. Lt. Clellan S. Ford, USNR, agreed with that judgment by characterizing his and others' experiences as "a job rather well done." But Capt. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, the chief of the Military Government Headquarters Operations Branch, concluded in July 1945 that "the story of military government on Okinawa is one of mismanagement, stupidity, and injustice. . . ."<sup>82</sup>

The truth, however, was somewhere in between these judgments. Whatever military government's limitations during the campaign for Okinawa, the surviving civilian population emerged in remarkably good condition considering the destruction their island underwent. Moreover, the primary military government mission was accomplished: the tactical forces verified the fact that civilians seldom got in the way of military operations, civilian casualties were minimized, and the Okinawan population was fed, clothed, and housed through the efforts of the military government teams. What remained to be seen was what shreds of idealism remained to inspire rehabilitation measures once the guns finally fell silent.

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<sup>80</sup>(Conclusion) Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. I, p. 11–XXVII–6. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>81</sup>Tenth Army Action Rpt. Ryukyus, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, Vol. I, p. 11–XXVII–5. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>82</sup>Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," p. 182; Watkins working note directly quoting Capt Woodyard, 17 Jul 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.





## CHAPTER III

# Apathy and Neglect

American forces in the Ryukyus settled into the garrison phase of operations in September 1945. By then most enemy holdouts had been captured, and the wholesale movement of citizens necessitated by the command's base development plan had ceased. Extensive relief efforts conducted by military government units had averted the threat of starvation and epidemics among civilians. Now that there was time for reflection and assessment, civil affairs officers on Okinawa began to rethink the mission of military government in broader terms. Despite problems and discouragements encountered during the assault phase, many of these men had retained more than a small measure of idealism; given the opportunity and resources, they would eagerly attempt to recreate a peaceful Okinawan society. To that end they began to look beyond the post-assault relief measures toward a return to prewar social and economic normalcy.

It was obvious that any restoration would be closely linked to military concerns. During the postwar years American military interest in the islands underwent several permutations. Although Okinawa remained important in all American strategic planning, the government's economic commitment to the Ryukyus was not so constant, and the military government effort there suffered severely from austere postwar military budgets. A stepchild of the Far East Command, the Ryukyuan command's physical and manpower needs tended to receive a lower priority in an organization where units in Japan and Korea took precedence. In the same time period, the command watched its university-prepared military government personnel depart. Those who had not only participated in the planning for the campaign but had also organized the rehabilitation of civilian society were rapidly being demobilized. They were replaced by individuals who had neither the intellectual commitment to the job nor the singular advantages of their predecessors in education and training. These postwar manpower realities combined with strategic, economic, and social considerations to create formidable tasks for military

government during a period that might accurately be described as the nadir of American interest in the Ryukyus.

### *Okinawa and Postwar Strategy*

In the weeks following the collapse of Japan, the Joint Planning Staff looked at the world-wide base sites and divided them into several categories. Some it decided were “primary base areas,” those essential to the security of the United States and its possessions or necessary to projected military operations; others it classified in lesser categories. The Joint Chiefs accepted their staff’s definitions and coordinated their discussion of bases with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as part of the process of negotiating with foreign governments to secure the needed sites.<sup>1</sup> As for the Ryukyus, the Joint Chiefs, from the first, included the islands in their list of primary base areas, assuming continued American control over the islands either by direct sovereignty or at the very least through United Nations trusteeship.

The Department of State questioned this assumption. Secretary James F. Byrnes passed on to the new president, Harry S. Truman, his department’s conclusion that “political and diplomatic considerations” made it necessary to consider the Ryukyus “minor islands which should be returned to Japan and demilitarized.”<sup>2</sup> The secretary’s concern for diplomatic considerations stemmed from the ambiguous status of the Ryukyus at the conclusion of World War II. On 26 July 1945 the United States, Great Britain, China, and, later, the Soviet Union, agreed at the Potsdam Conference that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”<sup>3</sup> In its formal surrender on 2 September 1945 Japan accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. Its Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama Gunto and surrounding islands, ceased to exist. But the ultimate status of Okinawa remained unclear, and the vagueness of the phrase “such minor islands as we determine” contained the seeds of potential territorial discord among the interested nations. The military potential of Okinawa’s bases notwithstanding, Secretary Byrnes sought to minimize the chances of

<sup>1</sup>JCS 570/40, 25 Oct 45, CCS File 360(12–9–42) Sec. 9, and memo, SWNCC to SecState, 7 Nov 45, sub: Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights, CCS File 360 (12–9–42) Sec. 11, RG 218. Actually, the JPS also offered definitions for secondary, tertiary, and even lesser categories of base sites.

<sup>2</sup>DOS Study, encl. to SWNCC 59/1, 24 Jun 46, ABC File 093 (28 Jul 44) Sec. 1B, RG 165.

<sup>3</sup>Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*. Vol. II, Document 1382 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1475. *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes cited hereafter as *FRUS*.

international disputes by demilitarizing the Ryukyus and returning them to Japanese control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted quickly and negatively to the Department of State's position. Acting through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, they urged the secretary of state to inform the president of their contrary assessment. On 10 September 1946 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed the president of the military leaders' "grave concern" over the proposed return of the Ryukyus to Japan and urged Truman to review the matter further.<sup>4</sup>

Continuing the argument, State officials pointed out to the president that retaining possession of the Ryukyus could create diplomatic and political problems and would in any event certainly be an economic drain on the United States. The military chiefs contended, on the other hand, that the secretary of state underestimated the military value of the Ryukyus, especially Okinawa, and that the cost of maintaining the islands was minimal compared to the lives and treasure expended in capturing Okinawa—or to the cost of recapturing the island again from a hostile power.<sup>5</sup>

The debate would take several curious twists and turns as the basic assumptions that supported it changed abruptly in the immediate postwar years. Both the Joint Chiefs and the Department of State assumed that international affairs in Asia would revolve around a democratic China controlled by the Nationalists and assisted by American aid and support; that America and the Soviet Union would continue to work in approximately the same sort of international cooperation that had characterized their wartime partnership; and that decolonization of South and Southeast Asia would come quickly and easily with a number of independent democratic nations emerging. All these assumptions proved incorrect, although it was not until the late 1940s that the new, harsh realities would be fully appreciated.<sup>6</sup>

Disagreement over the near- and long-term disposition of Okinawa persisted, but remained low-key and generally went unpublicized. The secretary of state tended to focus attention on the Japanese question, and until 1951 the issue of Okinawa's status remained a corollary to the larger

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<sup>4</sup>Memo for the President, encl. to JCS 1619/9, 10 Sep 46, ABC File 093 (28 Jul 44) Sec. 1B, RG 165; See also James E. Schnabel, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, Vol. 1 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979), pp. 299–310.

<sup>5</sup>JCS 1619/19 encl., 18 Oct 46, CCS File 360 (12–9–42), sec. 28, RG 218.

<sup>6</sup>Robert Scalapino, *American-Japanese Relations in a Changing Era* (New York: The Library Press, 1972), Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Papers Series*, No. 2, p. 56.



issue of a peace treaty between Japan and her former adversaries.<sup>7</sup> The Department of State was content to let the War Department administer occupied territories. For their part, the Joint Chiefs concentrated on the emerging military realities of the postwar period that included America's expanded global responsibilities and the potential threat from long-range air power. By retaining existing overseas bases and by securing others, they hoped to provide a defense perimeter, as an Army spokesman put it to a congressional audience in 1946, "surrounding ourselves with a cordon of bases from which our forces may intercept attacking units and from which we may launch immediate . . . counterblows."<sup>8</sup> As a large Far East outpost, Okinawa was a strategic link in this "cordon of bases." To harden this link the Joint Chiefs committed a large occupation force and drew up elaborate base development plans for the island, although the particulars of these plans and the size of the force would vary from year to year with the ebb and flow of international events.

### *Postwar Military Organization*

The last months of the war ushered in a period of rapid change in the organization of military forces on the Ryukyu Islands. The Joint Chiefs originally assigned both operational control and military government responsibility for the islands to the Navy, but the fact was neither the Army nor the Navy wanted to assume responsibility for the region.<sup>9</sup> Admiral Nimitz argued that since the Tenth Army had invaded Okinawa to stage the planned invasion of Japan, it should assume these responsibilities. Bowing to the Pacific commander's request, the Joint Chiefs, on 18 July 1945, ordered control of the islands, excluding certain naval facilities, turned over to the Army. This transfer of command, they noted, was to be a temporary expedient; once the invasion of the Japanese home islands was accomplished, command of the Ryukyus was to be returned to the Navy.<sup>10</sup> Effective 31 July, Headquarters, Island Command, Okinawa, was reconstituted as Headquarters, Army Service Command I (AS-

<sup>7</sup>Johannes A. Binnendijk, "The Dynamics of Okinawan Reversion: Case Study of a Political Process," PhD dissertation, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1972, p. 311; Albert Seigal, "United States Policy Toward Okinawa, 1945–1972: A Study of Organizational Interaction in Policy-Making," PhD dissertation, West Virginia University, 1978, pp. 63–64.

<sup>8</sup>Testimony of Gen Thomas Handy (Acting Chief of Staff) in U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill of 1947*, 79th Congress, 2d session, pp. 29–30.

<sup>9</sup>JCS 819/5, 8 Jun 44, CCS File 383.21 (4–12–44), Sec. 1, RG 218.

<sup>10</sup>Msg, JCS to CINCAFPAC & CINCPAC, Nr. V73 DTG 181409Z, 18 Jul 45, and memo, Fleet Adm E.J. King to Adm Nimitz, Serial 002009, 13 Aug 45, sub: Command of the Ryukyus, both appended to JCS 819/11, CCS File 383.21 (4–13–44), Sec. 2, RG 218.



GENERAL MACARTHUR AND ADMIRAL NIMITZ

COM I), and assigned to Army Forces, Western Pacific.<sup>11</sup> At that time the command's military strength totalled some 259,000 officers and men (see Table 1). The Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, General MacArthur, assumed responsibility from his headquarters in Manila for military government in the Ryukyus, although he continued to direct what had been for some time a joint service operation with the preponderance of its manpower in naval uniform. In July civil affairs personnel in the islands included about 2,600 naval officers and men (including Seabees) and 279 Army officers and men.<sup>12</sup>

These arrangements lasted only seven more weeks. The abrupt surrender of Japan found the Army ill-prepared to exercise its responsibility for military government on Okinawa. Its few hundred civil affairs officers on the island were desperately needed for occupation duty with the Tenth

<sup>11</sup>Memo for record, Maj Gen S.J. Chamberlin & Rear Adm Forrest Sherman 23 Jul 45, sub: Control of U.S.-held areas in the Ryukyus, ABC File 384 Ryukyus (18 Jul 44), Sec. 1A, RG 218; HQ ASCOM I, General Orders No. 1, 31 Jul 45, sub: Change of Designation of ISCOM, Okinawa Base Command, File 98-BC6-0.2, RG 407.

<sup>12</sup>Cmdr Paul H. Skuse, USNR (Ret), The United States Navy on Okinawa, unpublished narrative, 31 Dec 59, p. 4, Skuse Papers.

TABLE 1 — U.S. ARMY FORCES STRENGTH IN THE RYUKYUS  
31 AUGUST 1945–31 AUGUST 1949

Date	Officers	Enlisted	Nurses	Warrants	Total
August 1945. . . . .	20,502	236,320	866	1,312	259,000
August 1946. . . . .	1,332	18,561	64	59	20,016
August 1947. . . . .	1,378	15,054	46	45	16,523
August 1948. . . . .	703	9,748	—	—	10,451
August 1949. . . . .	919	11,538	—	—	12,457

Source: DA, *Strength of the Army* (STM-30), 1 Sep 45, p. 4; 1 Sep 46, p. 24; 1 Sep 47, p. 10; 1 Sep 48, p. 13; 1 Sep 49, p. 12.

Army in Korea and with the Eighth Army in Japan. Consequently, the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, advised the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, that military government would be a permanent Navy responsibility.<sup>13</sup> On 21 September 1945 the Navy assumed complete accountability for military government although the Army retained operational control of the islands. Fleet Admiral Nimitz designated the Commanding Officer, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, Rear Adm. John D. Price, as Chief Military Government officer while Col. Charles I. Murray, USMC, continued in his capacity as Deputy Commander for Military Government.<sup>14</sup>

The Navy accepted responsibility for military government based on the assumption that Okinawa was desirable as a naval base and that the Navy would soon be given operational control, since the Army's tenure in the Ryukyus was merely temporary. Both assumptions proved false. The surrender of Japan not only curtailed Army Service Command I's base development plans, it also obviated most of the rationale for development of Okinawa's naval facilities. Moreover, by early 1946 the Navy had more closely examined the anchorages in Buckner Bay and found them less desirable than originally thought.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, the Navy lost interest in the Ryukyus except as a location for minor facilities. In March 1946 the Chief of Naval Operations recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Army not only retain operational control of the Ryukyus, but also assume responsibility for military government. Later the same month the Army's Chief of Staff concurred with that recommendation, asking only that Navy civil affairs officers continue to serve until suffi-

<sup>13</sup>Watkins War Diary, entry for 17 Aug 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200; msg, CNO to CINCPAC, DTG 302110Z Aug 45, appended to JCS 819/11, CCS File 383.21 (4-13-44), Sec. 2, RG 218.

<sup>14</sup>GHQ CINCPAC, Summation No. 1, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Months of July–November 1946, p. 3, copy in CMH Library; HQ USN MG Unit Okinawa, Memo No. 7, CO to Distribution "A", 29 Sep 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>15</sup>Nakagasuku Bay was renamed Buckner Bay by the occupation forces in honor of Lt Gen Simon B. Buckner, Jr., CG, Tenth Army, who was killed during the Okinawa campaign.



cient Army personnel became available.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, on 1 July 1946 the Navy surrendered all administrative authority in the Ryukyus to the Army. The Okinawa Base Command became the Ryukyus Command with Brig. Gen. Frederic L. Hayden, senior military officer in the Ryukyus, commanding. Col. William H. Craig, USA, replaced Colonel Murray as the Deputy Commander for Military Government.<sup>17</sup>

In preparation for the transfer of military government responsibility, Army civil affairs officers began arriving on Okinawa in late May 1946. By the end of the month 73 officers, mostly second lieutenants, had reported. These officers, all of whom were from military government assignments in Japan, had a measure of on-the-job training, but little or no formal instruction in civil affairs.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, the transition proceeded smoothly. On 1 July the administration of military government in the Ryukyus south of 30 degree north latitude passed from the Navy to the Army.

A comprehensive reorganization of American forces would soon affect these command arrangements. As the result of a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision in December 1946 to create more unified commands in areas of strategic importance, responsibility for all American land, naval, and air military operations within the Far East area fell to General Douglas MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE). The Far East command superseded U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, as the command responsible for military government in the Ryukyu Islands, as well as in the other areas assigned to it. General Headquarters, Far East Command, and General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), were physically combined in Tokyo, and the same staff served for both headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff divided authority and responsibility on the basis of geography and function. MacArthur's authority as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers remained limited to the four main islands of Japan and a few minor outlying islands where he was responsible for a variety of nonmilitary activities. As Commander

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<sup>16</sup>Memo, CNO to JCS, 6 Mar 46, sub: Mil. Govern. Administration in the Ryukyu Islands, and memo, U.S. Army CoS to JCS, 22 Mar 46, same sub., both parts of JCS 819/11, 819/12, CCS File 383.21 (4-13-44), Sec. 2, RG 218.

<sup>17</sup>HQ USAFWESPAC, General Orders No. 162, 18 Jun 46, File 98BC6-0.2, RG 407; James T. Watkins, IV, personal diary, 4 Jul 1946. changes in organization reflected the Army's changing role in the Ryukyus: Island Command became ASCOM I on 31 Jul 45. ASCOM I became Okinawa Base Command (OBASCOM) on 15 Oct 45, the same day that Headquarters, Tenth Army was inactivated on Okinawa. OBASCOM was redesignated Ryukyus Command (RYCOM) on 1 Jul 46 as a subordinate command under AFWESPAC, which itself was redesignated the Philippines-Ryukyus Command (PHILRYCOM) on 1 Jan 47.

<sup>18</sup>Memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB, Okinawa, 31 May 46, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for May 1946, RG 38; interview, Edward O. Freimuth with the author, 29 Oct 80.

in Chief, Far East, however, he was responsible primarily for military affairs, but for a much broader geographic area.<sup>19</sup>

As of 1 January 1947 the Commander in Chief, Far East, assumed the responsibility formerly held by the Commanding General, Army Forces Western Pacific, for military government of the Ryukyu Islands. MacArthur designated the Commanding General, Philippines-Ryukyus Command as Military Governor of the Ryukyus. Initially, civil affairs matters were coordinated with MacArthur's headquarters through SCAP's Korean-Ryukyus Division, which, under MacArthur's deputy chief of staff, also coordinated civil affairs activities in Korea. Ryukyuan matters, however, quickly assumed a greater importance within the division and economic rehabilitation plans began to emerge. By contrast, military government affairs in Korea became less important as that country moved toward the establishment of a republic.<sup>20</sup>

Responding to these realities, MacArthur's headquarters reorganized its command structure during 1948. On 1 August the Philippines-Ryukyus command was split into the Philippines Command and the Ryukyuan Command.<sup>21</sup> On 6 September MacArthur established the Ryukyus Military Government Section of the Far East Command under Brig. Gen. John Weckerling with personnel from the old Korean-Ryukyus Division forming its nucleus.<sup>22</sup> The Ryukyus Military Government Section in Tokyo assisted the administration in the Ryukyus in economic planning, including helping to prepare budget requests for military government, and in providing political advice when requested.

While early relief efforts—principally in the hands of Navy civil affairs officers—were paramount, there was no time to be concerned with budgetary matters. When the Army assumed responsibility for military government on 1 July 1946, however, the initial impetus toward rehabilitation had begun—a shift in scope and emphasis that required a considerable amount of new funding. Recognizing this shift in occupation responsibilities, Congress established a Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) fund to assist civilians in the Ryukyus, as well as in occupied Japan, Germany, and elsewhere. The initial enactment

<sup>19</sup>*The Far East Command, 1 January 1947–30 June 1957*, Office of the Military History Officer, HQ AFCE/Eighth Army (Rear), 1957, p. 6, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>20</sup>GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Staff Memo No. 52, AG 014,1 (20 Nov 46) GA, 2 Dec 46, sub: Military Govrn. in the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers; HQ AFCE, *The Far East Command*, p. 12, and GHQ SCAP & FECOM, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan*, June 1950, p. 199, File: FECOM, Printed Materials, RG 6, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>21</sup>GHQ FECOM, General Orders No. 18, 9 Jul 48, and No. 21, 23 Aug 48, File: FECOM, General Orders, RG 6, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>22</sup>HQ AFCE, *The Far East Command*, p. 12, GHQ FECOM, General Orders No. 22, 6 Sep 48, File: FECOM, General Orders, RG 6, MacArthur Archives. General Weckerling served in that capacity until 8 Aug 49 when Col Robert F. Gleim assumed command of the section.

was for fiscal year 1947, with appropriations renewed in each of the next ten years. Total appropriations for the Ryukyus under the terms of the fund ultimately reached \$164.5 million.<sup>23</sup> Congress intended this money not only for the general rehabilitation of Ryukyuan society, but also, as in the case of American relief programs in the 1930s, to stimulate the economy with pump-priming projects. Therefore, programs as diverse as building roads and hospitals, underwriting the establishment of industries, supporting higher education, and funding central banks all fell within the scope of the fund. Initially some \$6 million annually, the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas monies for the Ryukyus, which came through MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, rose in later years to \$12 million. Contrary to the normal trend, the spending of these large sums was carried out without benefit of an ever-expanding bureaucracy. Administrative costs, largely in the form of salaries for Ryukyuan employees, remained modest. During the years 1947–1949, for example, such expenses amounted to a mere \$6,836.<sup>24</sup>

MacArthur required the military government headquarters on Okinawa to keep him advised of significant civil affairs developments.<sup>25</sup> But for the most part, Tokyo practiced a policy of “salutary neglect” toward military government in the Ryukyus. Gradually, reporting requirements were eased, and at no time did Tokyo ever attempt to assume control of day-to-day civil affairs activities in the Ryukyu Islands.

This lessening of administrative interest in the Ryukyus from above was paralleled by a decrease in support for military construction activity on the islands. The early postwar years saw a reduction in the scope and military significance of engineers' activities along with the number of units and men. February 1946 marked the beginning of a new era in the organization of and manpower levels for construction troops in the Ryukyus. Initially the Army engineers augmented by Navy Seabees had operated in units under the direct supervision of the Ryukyus commander, providing nearly all the base construction and civilian rehabilitation projects carried out in the islands. This organization, however, had proven inadequate in the face of construction difficulties brought on by storms and other natural disasters occurring early in the postwar period, and in February, therefore, the Corps of Engineers assumed command of all

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<sup>23</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, p.1, copy in CMH Library; ODCSOPS, International and Civil Affairs Directorate, Ryukyuan Affairs Division, *The General Fund of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands*, 15 Mar 69, p. 1, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>24</sup>High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), *Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands for the Period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967*, Vol. XV, p. 271. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>25</sup>Msg, CINCFE to CG RYCOM, 11 Mar 47, File: Messages, PHILRYCOM March 1946, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.



engineering troops. The Army Staff organized the Okinawa Engineer District as one of three (the others included the Philippines and the Marianas-Guam districts) in the Western Ocean Division with headquarters in California, an arrangement that would last until 1949 when the engineer units on Okinawa would revert to control of the Chief Engineer, Far East Command. The new engineer district began administrative operations with just 6 officers, 20 enlisted men, and 197 civilians.

The command reorganization coincided with a general demobilization of engineer units on Okinawa. Manpower levels declined quickly from a pre-February 1946 high of almost 30,000 Army engineers and Seabees. In February some 2,000 engineering officers and men demobilized; the following month sixteen engineer units left for Japan or rotated back to the United States. By late spring Okinawa was left with twelve engineer units, only four of which were actually engaged in construction activity. The rest served in headquarters, maintenance, or utility operations. In less than eight weeks the Ryukyuan command lost the greater part of its engineer personnel. And the only equipment and construction material available to the remaining units was that left by units departing for the United States.<sup>26</sup>

Construction rehabilitation continued, but necessarily at a curtailed rate. For several months the main construction effort centered on Naha harbor, which soon was 92 percent rehabilitated: ships were salvaged; five new berths constructed; and the harbor dredged.<sup>27</sup> After April the military significance and scope of construction declined dramatically. During the next year the command stressed construction associated with military personnel and their dependents. At first they emphasized dependency housing, constructing 190 units by June. They also built a soft drink plant. In November they erected a new Ryukyus Command officers' club and mess and an auxiliary power plant for Ie Shima. In March 1947 they reported completing a "swap shop" at the Awase housing area, the only new construction of the quarter.<sup>28</sup> As later events demonstrated, the command's interest in such construction was a prudent step and rightly vied in importance with the more conventional building activities.

The military construction on Okinawa—or the lack of it—had an immediate and profound impact on military government rehabilitation efforts. Once the islanders had been fed, clothed, and resettled, it re-

<sup>26</sup>History of the Okinawa Engineer District, Aug 66, pp. 1–2, and Information Bulletin: Okinawa District Engineer, 20 Jul 45, p. 1, in Ofc of History, C of E, File 12 (Occupation of Japan, Korea, and Okinawa); OBASCOM, Historical Record February 1946, p. 4, RG 407.

<sup>27</sup>OBASCOM, Historical Record February 1946, p. 5, March 1946, pp. 3–4, and April 1946, p. 3, RG 407.

<sup>28</sup>OBASCOM, Historical Record June 1946, pp. 2–3, and RYCOM, Historical Record November 1946, p. 3, and March 1947, p. 3, RG 407.

maintained necessary to secure employment for them. In the immediate post-war years the Okinawans had nothing to sell except their labor, which the American forces were more than willing to use, provided there was construction to be undertaken. Even strictly military construction, such as airfields and ammunition dumps, therefore, had a direct impact on the civilian economy with each and every job generated. Some jobs associated with base construction proved to be especially important to the indigenous economy. In the case of Kotaro Kokuba, a successful local contractor before the war, American base development enabled him to reestablish his firm. By 1949, he was successfully bidding for military construction contracts, thus ensuring additional jobs for Okinawans; jobs that would otherwise have gone to Japanese or Filipino firms more likely to hire and import their own nationals.<sup>29</sup>

A fair amount of American military construction in the Ryukyus did double duty in terms of the local economy. Newly-built roads, bridges, and piers, and a re-dredged Naha harbor not only meant jobs, but also represented facilities that civilians as well as the military could use. If the funding remained intact, therefore, and construction continued, rehabilitation of the islands' economy would proceed accordingly.

The funds available for base construction worldwide dwindled throughout the period 1946–1948, however, and projects for Okinawa suffered accordingly. In February 1946, Headquarters, Army Forces, Western Pacific, estimated that \$93 million would be needed to build permanent base facilities in the Ryukyus. The War Department pared this figure down to \$44 million, and Congress actually provided only \$31 million. Entreaties for additional funding met with discouraging results. In May 1947 MacArthur revised his construction program downward, requesting \$77 million for fiscal year 1948, only to be advised that Congress had failed to authorize *any* additional construction funds for Okinawa. Although Headquarters, Army Air Forces, notified the Chief of Engineers, Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, in July 1947 that construction of temporary air defense installations could proceed, prospects for congressional appropriations were so meager that the outlook for constructing permanent air defense installations on Okinawa was dim.<sup>30</sup>

The tropical storms that seemed so much a part of Okinawan life also figured in construction estimates. In an effort to conserve funds, the engineers had elected to carry out temporary base (“tybase”) construction programs in the islands. But it soon became apparent that such temporary construction could not support the American position on Okinawa with-

<sup>29</sup>See Kyoh Katoh, *True Okinawan Spirit: The Life of Kotaro Kokuba* (Tokyo: Sanshu Shobo Co., Ltd., undated).

<sup>30</sup>Encl. to Ltr, HQ, AAF-AFDIN to OCE, 21 Jul 47, Ofc of History, C of E, File 600.9 (Okinawa).

out what the engineers judged to be excessive losses from typhoon damage. Efforts were made to find transferable funds in other engineer districts, but by the spring of 1948, it was clear to the command that unless supplemental congressional funding was approved, the Okinawa Engineer District would be forced to cease operations entirely by August or September.<sup>31</sup>

The resultant efforts to economize often ended in fitful starts and stops in construction, with a corresponding negative impact on the local economy. Contractors found themselves being mobilized only to be quickly demobilized. Shifts of resources from permanent to temporary base programs, combined with losses in temporary structures to typhoons and the constant redesigning of construction programs, produced cost overruns in the Western Ocean Division and the Okinawa Engineer District. The whole situation confounded the Army Staff and frustrated a money-conscious Congress in Washington.<sup>32</sup>

The decline in military construction was worldwide, but the particularly dramatic curtailment of funds for Okinawa reflected the lowered priorities that characterized American policy toward the Ryukyus during the 1946–1948 period. These reduced priorities were further manifested in the sharp reduction in the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to the island. In August 1946, for example, in the wake of the wholesale demobilization of the immediate postwar period, American servicemen in the Ryukyus numbered 21,016 officers and men (including 512 assigned to military government duties, 4,200 to engineer construction activities, and a small contingent of naval personnel). In just two years that figure had been halved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed inclined to focus their attention in the Far East on base requirements in Japan and the Philippines, the latter's newly-acquired independence providing an added reason for their interest. For its part, the Department of State continued to treat Okinawa in the larger context of Japanese-American relations and concentrated on the future legal status of the islands. It declined to interject itself in

<sup>31</sup>Memos, Asst Chief of Engineers for Mil. Construction to DCSLOG, 0064 28 Apr 48, sub: Construction on Okinawa, Chief, Construction Ops. Div. Military Construction, OCE, to Army Comptroller, 4 Jun 48, sub: Transfer of Funds from Alaska to Okinawa, and DCSLOG to Army Comptroller, CSGSP/C2 25532, 11 Jun 48, sub: Transfer of Funds from Alaska to Okinawa, in Ofc of History, C of E, File 12; msg, CG PHILRYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. S 48037 GSCEO, 10 Jan 48, File: PHILRYCOM January 1948, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>32</sup>Ltr, Brig Gen L.D. Worsham to Office of the Engineer (Brig Gen H.B. Leper), 22 Oct 47, memo, Col R.M. Levy, AGD, to HQ FECOM, AG 600.12 (28 Oct 47) CE, 24 Nov 47, sub: Master Plans and Construction Programs, msg, CINCFE to DA, CS 57524, 22 Dec 47, and msg, Maj Gen Hugh J. Casey to DA, CS 58277, 291205Z Jan 48, sub: Construction Situation on Okinawa, in Ofc of History, C of E, File 12.



administrative matters, leaving Okinawa in the quiet backwaters of Army concerns.

*Ambassadors in Uniform?*

But quiet backwaters can stagnate. In Okinawa the decline in military construction was paralleled by a decline in the overall quality of service life in the islands. Between 1946 and 1949 the absence of a meaningful occupation, the intense boredom, unrelenting humidity, substandard quarters, and dearth of recreational facilities all took their toll on the island's garrison. Throughout the Army, among officers and enlisted men, the impression developed that only the worst were sent to duty stations on Okinawa. In the later 1940s the islands became, as bitter Army officers put it, "the end of the Army's logistical line," a junk heap of discarded World War II equipment and human cast-offs from the Far East Command. Another observer characterized Okinawa during this period as "a place of exile from GHQ (SCAP) and Japan proper, and for ambitious civilians with the Army a 'no man's land.'" <sup>33</sup> Indeed, a special report by MacArthur's headquarters in March 1949 reaffirmed the rumors, noting that personnel assigned to the Ryukyus reportedly were "of lower caliber than those assigned to Japan. . . ." <sup>34</sup> Taking up the cry, the *Christian Century* fulminated against "Godforsaken Okinawa," while *Time* concluded for its national audience that "as a major American base . . . Okinawa is no credit to America." <sup>35</sup> Such personnel were clearly a potential source of trouble, particularly when assigned to garrison duty in an area where close proximity to an unsophisticated, third-world population was unavoidable. Indeed, the spirit and caliber of American forces serving in the Ryukyus during most of this period—those "depressed and sullen troops" as one senior Army official characterized them—proved more of a burden to civil affairs officers than Washington's relative lack of interest. <sup>36</sup> The archipelago was a relatively constricted arena in which military government planners could develop their program for reconstruction. Success depended not only upon the dedication of the civil affairs personnel, but also upon the good behavior of all American servicemen on Okinawa. Then, as now, any uniformed American soldier overseas becomes an am-

<sup>33</sup>The first quote is from *Time* 54 (28 Nov 49): 24; the second is from Kerr, *An Island People*, p. 5.

<sup>34</sup>George Pollock, Western North Pacific Trust Territory, special SCAP study, 24 Mar 49, Freimuth Papers; see also, Morris, *Tiger by the Tail*, p. 81.

<sup>35</sup>T.T. Brumbaugh, "Godforsaken Okinawa," *Christian Century* 67 (7 Jun 50): 700-701; "If Okinawa is not to be Godforsaken," *Christian Century* 67 (16 Aug 50): 965-967; and *Time* 54 (28 Nov 49):24.

<sup>36</sup>Quoted in Frank Gibney, "Okinawa: Forgotten Island," *Time* 54 (28 Nov 49):24.

bassador for his country, whether or not he is conscious of that fact. On a fairly small island, such as Okinawa, a handful of undisciplined servicemen could easily undermine a disproportionate share of military government's efforts by generating apprehension and disgust among the islanders, instead of the necessary trust and cooperation.

Unfortunately, a small minority of the troops began to torment the civilian population almost as soon as the American forces came ashore, with sexual assaults especially prevalent. In early May 1945 the Commanding General, Island Command, General Wallace advertised the death penalty for offenders in a vain attempt to curb the instances of rape.<sup>37</sup> One week after General Wallace's announcement, two soldiers from the 293d Port Company were arrested for attempting to rape three Okinawan women. Other incidents followed. In November 1945 an Okinawan policeman, Koki Sakihara, was shot to death by one of three servicemen sought by civilian and military police personnel for abducting an Okinawan girl.<sup>38</sup>

Reports of serious crime continued to plague the command until near the end of the decade. Commenting on what they termed "the shameful mess" in the islands, *Life* magazine reported that during the six months ending in September 1949 American servicemen murdered 29 Okinawans and raped 18 others. In that same period, soldiers were also convicted of 16 robberies of civilians and 33 assaults.<sup>39</sup> Rumors and allegations of corruption also began to circulate in the command. Some officers and civilians stationed on Okinawa, including some of those in civil affairs, participated in a variety of illegal activities. Most engaged in relatively petty crimes involving the diversion of Army equipment and tools for their private use or profit. One such individual, a civilian employee of the Okinawa Engineer District charged with misappropriating government property, fled to Shanghai in February 1948, but Chinese authorities apprehended him and extradited him to Okinawa. Others became involved in illegal land acquisitions, usually by entering into bogus marriages with local women or by working through Okinawan intermediaries.<sup>40</sup>

The American military's racial policies further complicated this do-

<sup>37</sup>Minutes of Brig Gen W.E. Crist's staff officers conference, 8 May 45, Sgt J. Bloch files at MG HQ, RG 407; working note on staff meeting, 8 May 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>38</sup>Memo, 27th Div. Provost Marshal to 27th Div. Judge Advocate, 14 May 45, sub: Rpt. of Investigation, RG 407; Funakoshi Police Rpt. No. 23 (Nov 45) to chief, Chinen Police HQ, sub: Death of a Police [sic] in Line of Duty, Rpt. of, Skuse Papers.

<sup>39</sup>"Okinawa Junk Heap," *Life* 27 (19 Dec 49): 19–23; see also *Time* 54 (28 Nov 49): 24.

<sup>40</sup>Msg, CG RYCOM to CG PHILRYCOM, Nr. E 20141 AIB, 27 Feb 48, File PHILRYCOM February 1948, RG 9, MacArthur Archives; Mikio Higa, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963), p. 7; interview, Freimuth with the author, 8 Sep 82.

lorous situation. The Tenth Army had contained a large number of black units. Army and Marine Corps divisions that assaulted Okinawa had segregated port and amphibious truck companies attached. Although no black combat units participated in the invasion, the all-black 24th Infantry arrived in the Kerama Retto from Tinian and Saipan in early August 1945. These soldiers participated in mopping up operations in the Keramas, and then remained to help garrison the occupied Ryukyus when the Tenth Army redeployed to Korea. The 24th Infantry was one of seven infantry regiments on Okinawa. It swelled the command's number of minority troops, who also served in ten amphibious truck companies and five port companies. Other blacks served in three Army Air Forces Corps of Engineers aviation battalions and one aviation utility company.<sup>41</sup>

In addition to the boredom and substandard conditions suffered by all American troops in the islands, these men also endured the physical and psychological isolation imposed by racial segregation. Segregation, in turn, imposed certain constraints on the commands in the field. Bound by the Army's racial policy, field commanders were forced to concentrate large numbers of black troops, who neither by aptitude nor training belonged in the service, into the small number of black units where their impact overwhelmed the able black soldiers whose abilities and ambitions were most often overshadowed. The always larger number of substandard white troops, on the other hand, could be scattered without undue harm throughout the many white formations serving in their commands. The reputation for crime and misconduct earned by black units in the Ryukyus, therefore, could be traced to the substandard character of these units formed by the Army's racial policies. Certain individuals from these units accounted for a disproportionately high percentage of the crimes committed against civilians. In April 1946 the Director of General Affairs for military government, Lt. Comdr. James Watkins, IV, USNR, noted that "extreme ill will" had developed between the blacks and the islanders and said that "fear of cruelty, rape, and violence replaced respect for American authority." He admitted that black troops were "by no means the only offenders," but in his opinion they accounted for such a large number of violent acts that he recommended the withdrawal of the blacks "to avoid further compromising the American position in the eyes of the Okinawans."<sup>42</sup>

Watkins' recommendation could not have come at a more inappro-

<sup>41</sup>*Directory of the Army of the United States (Outside Continental Limits of the United States)* (Section II) AG 461 (1 Aug 45) OB-I-M, pp. 58, 213-220, 223, 281-284. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>42</sup>Memo, Director of General Affairs to Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern., 6 Apr 46, sub: Negro Troops—Withdrawal from Okinawa of, Watkins Papers, RG 200.



prate time. The War Department was struggling with the problem of how an increased number of black servicemen could be absorbed into the Army. Because of the system of segregated units, the Army Staff was forced to impose substantial quotas on the major overseas Army commands.<sup>43</sup> Far East Command, including Okinawa, would have to accept more, rather than fewer blacks.

During August of 1946 the number of black servicemen on Okinawa increased by 1,000. The Director for Public Safety linked their arrival to a sharp increase in serious crimes on the island. Although there is no proof that the new arrivals were the perpetrators, he stated that every case of murder, kidnapping, rape, and attempted rape during August involved black troops. The same situation prevailed in October when the civil police alleged that black soldiers had committed all violent crimes that month. In most instances the guilty party could not be identified by the Okinawans, and most were not apprehended.<sup>44</sup>

The Okinawa Base Command did very little to provide opportunities for positive social contact between the servicemen and the civilians. In fact, civil affairs personnel sought to alleviate the friction by keeping the Okinawan population and the garrison forces as separated as possible. They restricted civilian resettlement in areas where American troops were bivouacked, and strictly enforced non-fraternization rules.<sup>45</sup> Living space, however, was painfully finite, and a degree of close contact could not be avoided. Moreover, military police units on the island were understrength and were not always successful in keeping the Okinawans insulated from the soldiers. In the northern third of Okinawa, where military police and military government roadblocks during 1946 had effectively curbed the unauthorized circulation of servicemen, crimes against Okinawans had dropped dramatically. Similar efforts by the undermanned and overworked military and civil police authorities were far less successful in the more populated central and southern regions of Okinawa.<sup>46</sup>

Complaints against black soldiers diminished as many of the segregated units were gradually withdrawn from Okinawa in 1946 and 1947.

<sup>43</sup>For a detailed examination of this problem, see Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*, a volume in the DEFENSE STUDIES SERIES (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Center of Military History, 1981), chapter 7.

<sup>44</sup>Memo, Director of Public Safety to Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern., 3 Sep 46, sub: Rpt. of Public Safety Dept. for the Month of August 1946, Skuse Papers; memo, Director of Public Safety Dept. to Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern., 31 Oct 46, sub: Rpt. of Public Safety Dept. for the Month of October 1946, RG 407. For an examination of the causes and effects of black crime rates in occupied areas, see MacGregor, *Integration*, pp. 208–215, 219.

<sup>45</sup>Rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB Okinawa and Chief MG Officer, Ryukyus, 1 Jul 46, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for the Period From 1 Apr 45 to 1 Jul 46, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>46</sup>Lawrence/Watkins MS, Rehabilitation: Economic, undated, Watkins Papers, RG 200; address by Lt Comdr Paul Skuse to an Intelligence Officer conference, 15 Jan 47, Skuse Papers.

The Far East Command inactivated the 1st Amphibious Truck Company (Provisional) in November 1946 and in March 1947 redeployed the 24th Infantry, the largest concentration of black soldiers in the Ryukyus, to Osaka, Japan. A number of black servicemen remained on the island, however, in about a dozen truck and aviation utility companies.

Ironically, considering its assumptions about black servicemen, military government headquarters soon discovered that the departure of large numbers of black soldiers did not solve the problem of civil-military conflict. Indeed, conflicts between the islanders and members of the replacement units from the Philippines proved to be just as numerous. The 44th Infantry (Philippine Scouts) arrived at Naha on 23 January 1947; other Philippine Scouts soon arrived with the 532d AAA Gun Battalion, the 1261st Construction Company, and the 3351st and 3352d Utility Detachments (1,500 men each). The Philippine Scouts were stationed throughout Okinawa, and within a short time the civil police made the same charges against them as had been directed at the black servicemen. One week after the 44th Infantry arrived, the Okinawan civil police commissioner reported to military government officials that the regiment's commanding officer had insulted uniformed Okinawan police officers and that the 44th Infantry was "extremely undisciplined. Police members and inhabitants alike feel anger toward these Filipinos trespassing into civilian areas at all times."<sup>47</sup> It was a lament that would often be repeated as the Filipinos replaced the black servicemen in the islanders' perceptions as their principal tormentors.

If this behavior was unjustifiable, it was to some extent understandable. Many of the Filipino servicemen had experienced, or at least witnessed, atrocities committed by the Japanese in the Philippines during the war. It proved difficult for some of these men to curb their resentment toward all Japanese citizens, a resentment that often translated into violence against the docile and cooperative Okinawans. This vindictive behavior also served to instill resentment among the local citizens toward all the occupying forces.<sup>48</sup>

Throughout the two years they remained on Okinawa, the Philippine Scouts were accused of numerous crimes against the civil population, ranging from unauthorized searches and harassment to rape and assault. The *chiji* (governor) of Okinawa Gunto, Koshin Shikiya, accused the Filipinos—alone or in concert with black servicemen—of 46 violent crimes during the period March–May 1947, and he urged that all Filipino troops

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<sup>47</sup>Memo, Okinawan Police Dept. Commissioner to Director, Public Safety, MG, 29 Jan 47, sub: An American Field Officer's Insult to CP on Duty—Rpt. of., Skuse Papers.

<sup>48</sup>Telcon, Cmdr Paul Skuse with the author, 7 Dec 81.





*TYPHOON DAMAGE. Typhoon “Libby” destroyed the roof of this local government building in October 1948.*

be withdrawn from the island.<sup>49</sup> For the period January–July 1948 the chiji reported another 68 violent incidents involving the Philippine Scouts, and in late 1949 the Okinawan police commissioner, Kemshin Nakamura, reported that since November 1945 four civil policemen had been killed on duty by black or Filipino servicemen.<sup>50</sup> The American Director of Public Safety noted that the crime statistics for the Filipinos were worse than those for the black troops they replaced, and he characterized the deployment of the Scouts to Okinawa as the biggest mistake the Army made in the Ryukyus in the late 1940s.<sup>51</sup>

The friction generated between the Filipino servicemen and the civilian population remained a severe hindrance to the orderly reconstruc-

<sup>49</sup>Memo No. 187, Chiji, Okinawa Gunto to Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern., 3 Jun 47, sub: Rpt. on Forcible Entries into Civ. Settlements Made by Filipino Servicemen and Recommendations on Countermeasures thereof, Skuse Papers.

<sup>50</sup>Memos, No. 186, Chiji, Okinawa Gunto to ACofS, RYCOM, 15 Nov 48, sub: Incessant Offenses on Okinawans Committed by Filipino Soldiers, and No. 1314, HQ Okinawa Police Dept. to MG Director of Public Safety, 14 Oct 49, sub: Rpt. in regard to police members killed in the pursuit of their duties, Skuse Papers. The latter rpt. mentions no killings by white soldiers.

<sup>51</sup>Telcons, Cmdr Paul Skuse with the author, 7 Dec 81 and 29 Mar 82.





TYPHOON "LIBBY" destroyed this building on Okinawa in October 1948.

tion of Okinawan life until the Philippine Scouts left the islands.<sup>52</sup> Inactivated in May 1949, the 44th Infantry was replaced by the 29th Infantry, and all Philippine Scouts were returned to the Philippines for discharge.

### *Adding Injury to Insult*

The capricious forces of nature seemed to underscore the malaise that had settled upon the American military in the Ryukyus. Successive typhoons in each of the first four postwar years took an enormous toll on native industry, the American occupation, military government reconstruction projects, and—in particular—military housing.<sup>53</sup> In September 1945 American forces on Okinawa experienced their first typhoon, which

<sup>52</sup>Memo for record, Plans & Ops. Div., GSUSA (Maj W.O. Foster), 24 May 49, sub: Rpt. of Annual General Inspection, HQ RYCOM, FY 1948, file P & O Pacific (Section I, Case I) 1949, RG 319, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD; msg, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. C-17839 AIAIX, 11 Feb 49, File: RYCOM October 1948–July 1949, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>53</sup>See "U.S. Officers on Okinawa Make Huts Out of Packing Cases," *U.S. News and World Report* 27 (9 Dec 49):32.

severely damaged quarters, post exchanges, hospitals, and dispensaries. At the same time it destroyed 15 percent of the island's crops. Three weeks later typhoon "Louise"—with 120 knot winds—caused heavy damage even to reinforced structures, while destroying 95 percent of the island's tentage.<sup>54</sup> During the years 1948–1949 five particularly powerful storms struck the Ryukyu Islands, at times with wind gusts up to 200 miles per hour. Typhoons "Libby" (October 1948) and "Della" (June 1949) together destroyed more than one-half of the fishing fleet and caused extensive damage to military and civilian structures alike. Few reinforced buildings existed on the island, and the various prefabricated structures were designed for much less severe conditions. Aircraft hangars, although stronger, could resist, at the most, gusts of 50–70 mph.<sup>55</sup> Of the three major typhoons that ravaged Okinawa in 1949, "Gloria" was by far the worst storm to strike the Ryukyus since the islands had come under American control. The storm hit the islands on 22 July with steady winds of 175 mph, severely damaging half of all buildings on Okinawa and destroying 25 percent of the Army's quonset-type barracks and 50 percent of the similarly-constructed dependent housing. It also thoroughly interrupted Air Force communications and even destroyed several hangars and the control tower at the Kadena Air Force Base.<sup>56</sup> Twenty-seven civilian fishing craft were sunk, and another twenty-five were beached and damaged. Nor was destruction limited to inanimate structures: nearly 50 military and civilian personnel were killed and over 200 seriously injured. It would be difficult to overstate the damage done by these frequent and deadly visitors. "Libby," "Della," and "Gloria" collectively destroyed nearly \$2 million in imported foodstuffs and dealt a near fatal blow to the struggling economy.<sup>57</sup>

American civil affairs officers had to perform against this depressing postwar backdrop of official apathy, curtailed funding, decreasing personnel, racial tensions, and the violent forces of nature. Their task was not an easy one; but mustering whatever remained of their initial idealism, these men began the restoration of Okinawan society.

<sup>54</sup>IsCom, Historical Record September 1945, p. 1, and msg, ComGenTen to CINCAFPAC ADV, 110120Z Oct 45, no sub., IsCom File 98BC6–0.2, RG 407; Watkins War Diary, entry for 12 Oct 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>55</sup>Karl C. Dod, "Military Activities of the Corps of Engineers in the Cold War," chapter V, unpublished MS, Ofc of History, C of E, cited hereafter as Dod MS.

<sup>56</sup>Historical Data, Twentieth Air Force (Far East Air Forces), July–December 1949, Vol. I, pp. 196–17, 203. Copy at Office of Air Force History, microfilm A7723, index 1165. See also Dod MS, chapter V.

<sup>57</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 4–5, copy in CMH Library; O'Flaherty MS, Chapter VI.

## CHAPTER IV

# Social and Political Rehabilitation

From the Japanese surrender in 1945 until the Berlin Blockade and the communist victories in China in 1948, America's interest in Okinawa as a strategic base waned. This lack of interest, both in Washington and at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, manifested itself in greatly reduced manpower levels and appropriated funding for the Ryukyus. Throughout the Far East Command, apathy, questions, and doubts about America's role in the Western Pacific replaced the earlier sense of purpose that had characterized the months of base development before Tokyo's sudden capitulation. These reductions made the military government mission all the more difficult, particularly as the more experienced military governors departed, leaving their mission and some of their sense of idealism in the hands of untested junior civil affairs officers.

Despite these handicaps military government officials managed to launch a program for reconstructing Okinawan society. It was an ambitious undertaking, for it would have to be executed in the face of fiscal and material shortfalls and, at times, the indifference of military commanders. Practical necessity dictated that economic rehabilitation be the primary goal, yet it was political and social development, including education, that lay closest to the hearts of many civil affairs personnel. Feeding the islanders was not enough; these men came to the Ryukyus to inculcate the inhabitants with the principles of democracy, nothing less.

### *Resettlement and Repatriation*

Before long-range social and political reforms were possible, military government headquarters had to convince the operational units to release land so that the refugee camps would be dismantled and the population



could be resettled into communities.<sup>1</sup> When hostilities against Japan ceased, military government personnel in Okinawa had under their control some 320,000 refugees divided among seven district camps.

On 20 September 1945 the island commander, General Wallace, authorized military government headquarters to submit recommendations for the resettlement of the population. At that time 250,000 civilians were encamped north of Route #6 (the Ishikawa-Nakadomari highway)—an area that prior to the war contained, at most, 40,000 people. Accordingly, military government requested the Navy to release 6,800 acres and the Army 4,856 acres south of Route #6. The Navy turned over 5,352 acres; the Army, 2,792. Relocation began in late October 1945. By the end of December resettlement of civilians among the five military government districts of northern Okinawa (*see Map 5*) was substantially completed, and 46,500 civilians had been relocated south of Route #6. Another 125,000 persons were still waiting to be resettled in the south.<sup>2</sup>

Since the great majority of the land records were destroyed during the battle for Okinawa, it was not always possible to return civilians to their own specific plot of land. Military government's objective, rather, was to return refugees to their home districts and provide them with at least temporary shelter and some land to cultivate. Although civil affairs officers wanted to complete the resettlement program by 1 January 1946, this goal simply could not be accomplished.<sup>3</sup> Not only was there a shortage of land, housing, and transportation, but the resettlement on Okinawa of civilians from offshore islands added thousands more to the number of dislocated individuals and families.

The progress of resettlement depended not only upon the availability of land no longer needed by the military, but also upon the availability of renovated or newly-constructed housing for the islanders. By the end of March 1946 enough civilians had been resettled that three camps (Jinuza, Ishikawa, and Maebaru) were closed and their remaining welfare functions were assumed by Military Government's General Affairs Department. Headquarters closed the four remaining camps by June.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>HQ IsCom, Historical Record-IsCom, Okinawa Gunto, Ryukyus, July 1945, 1 Dec 45, RG 407; memo, Deputy Commander for MG to CG ASCOM I, 19 Sep 45, sub: Administrative and Economic Measures for Okinawa—Proposals for, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>2</sup>Rpts, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB, 31 Dec 45 and 28 Jan 46, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for November 1945 and December 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>3</sup>HQ USN MG Okinawa Directive No. 29, 23 Oct 45, sub: Resettlement Plan and Policy, File A17-10/EF37, Operational Archives, Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard.

<sup>4</sup>Rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB and Chief Mil. Govern. Officer, 31 Mar 46, sub: Rept. of Mil Govern. Activities for March 1946, Watkins Papers, RG 200; MG HQ Memo No. 2, 1 May 46, sub: Dissolution of MG Camps at Koza and Chinen, and MG HQ Memo No. 8, 11 May 46, sub: Dissolution of MG Camps at Itoman and Taira, RG 260, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD.

Some 900 people within the camps became a special problem for military government headquarters when they claimed citizenship other than Japanese. Given the long Ryukyuan history of emigration from the archipelago, the presence of these foreign visitors who had returned to their island of origin and had been caught by the war should not have been such a surprise. Nevertheless, the civil affairs teams had no prior instructions about how to handle citizenship claims. Headquarters finally promulgated guidelines for processing such claims in early March 1946, nearly a year after the American invasion of Okinawa.<sup>5</sup> The largest number of claims were for Filipino (286), Peruvian (247), or American (206) citizenship, but smaller numbers were received for such widely-separated nations as Cuba (4) and the Netherlands (6). The policy issues raised by the claims for American citizenship eventually reached the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. The committee urged the Secretary of State to repatriate—at their own expense—all Okinawans who could prove American citizenship.<sup>6</sup>

Processing these claims took valuable time away from what the civil affairs officers perceived as higher priority objectives, most notably the continuing resettlement effort. On 1 July 1946, for example, 68,000 Okinawans were waiting to be returned to their former villages. Meanwhile, 50 percent of the land south of Route #6 remained reserved for military use and therefore closed to resettlement.<sup>7</sup> Gradually, as land and resources permitted, the remaining refugees were relocated during the rest of 1946.

Military government officials soon redirected their energies from the problem of resettling domestic refugees to the task of absorbing thousands of repatriated Okinawans from overseas. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, many Ryukyuans, especially Okinawan fishermen and farmers, had left to seek a better life in the Japanese Mandated Islands. During the war another 15,000 Okinawans had been conscripted into the Japanese armed forces. These conscripts found themselves stranded in Taiwan or the Japanese home islands at the end of the war. Those in Japan had been joined by some 160,000 Okinawans who had been transported to the home islands prior to the American invasion of Okinawa.

In late September 1945 the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral

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<sup>5</sup>HQ U.S. Naval MG, Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 122, 5 Mar 46, sub: Citizenship Claims—Filing Procedures for claims of U.S. Citizenship, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>6</sup>SWNCC 300/1, 23 Jul 46, sub: Policy on Repatriation from the Ryukyus of Persons Claiming U.S. and Other Foreign Citizenships, RG 335, Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, DC.

<sup>7</sup>CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 1, US Army MG Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Months of July–November 1946, p. 47, copy in CMH Library; rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB Okinawa and Chief MG Officer, 1 Jul 46; sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for the Period From 1 Apr 45 to 1 Jul 46, RG 260, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD.





REPATRIATES BEING SPRAYED WITH DDT

King, set forth his program for the civil administration of the former Mandated Islands in the Pacific. He proposed that non-Japanese foreign civilians, including Okinawans, be allowed to remain. On 1 October, however, Admiral Nimitz recommended to King that all aliens in Micronesia be repatriated, not only for security reasons, but also for economic considerations and for administrative convenience. The Chief of Naval Operations referred the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. On 22 December 1945 that committee decided that Ryukuans were to be considered Japanese, and that all aliens who had lived in the Mandated Islands less than ten years should be repatriated, except in individual cases recognized by Admiral Nimitz. The repatriation process was to begin in January 1946.

An estimated 23,500 Okinawans then lived in Micronesia. The immediate repatriation of so many people would have hopelessly overburdened both the island's resources and military government's capacity to handle such an influx. The Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, Admiral Price, therefore, requested that the repatriation be delayed until March. The Commander, Marianas, did not concur, however, and





COMING HOME. *Former Japanese destroyer returning Okinawan repatriates.*

Admiral Nimitz supported the latter's desire for the earliest possible repatriation from Micronesia.<sup>8</sup> As the repatriates from Micronesia began arriving at Buckner Bay (20,007 in February from the Marianas alone), military government headquarters feared that Army commanders in Japan and Korea would follow the Navy's example. Repatriation from those countries would swell the population of already overcrowded Okinawa by one-third.<sup>9</sup>

In December 1945 MacArthur reluctantly agreed that Okinawa could not handle the thousands of repatriates, but he directed that Ryukyuans from islands other than Okinawa be repatriated without delay.<sup>10</sup> Later the same month the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee stipulated that no repatriates could be sent to the Ryukyus from Japan until military government was prepared to receive them.<sup>11</sup> MacArthur reiterated his determination to send back citizens from Ryukyu islands other than Okinawa, but he did continue to preclude Okinawans such repatriation.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup>Richard, *Naval Administration—Pacific Islands*, Vol. II, pp. 34–39.

<sup>9</sup>Watkins, personal diary, 11 Jan 46.

<sup>10</sup>SCAPIN 455, 17 Dec 45, sub: Repatriation to Ryukyus, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>11</sup>Msg, War Dept. to CINCPAC, SCAP, CINCPAC, DTG 220301Z, 22 Dec 45, CINCPAC Files, RG 38.

<sup>12</sup>SCAPIN 558, 5 Jan 46, sub: Repatriation to Ryukyus, and SCAPIN 655, 26 Jan 46, sub: Okinawans in Reception Center at Kagoshima, Freimuth Papers.

Since the more numerous Okinawans remaining in Japan represented a significant social and economic burden, MacArthur hoped to return them to their native island as soon as possible and he made repeated representations to Admiral Nimitz to begin accepting those individuals. Nimitz, with considerable justification, continued to refuse Okinawan repatriates on the grounds that insufficient food and shelter awaited them on the main island. So long as the Navy directed civil affairs activities on Okinawa, MacArthur had no success in ridding himself of this “burden” in occupied Japan. When the Army took over military government responsibilities in the Ryukyus on 1 July 1946, however, MacArthur’s headquarters hastily summoned a repatriation conference at Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific. The Deputy Commander for Military Government on Okinawa, Colonel Craig, and three other representatives of the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, attended the conference. The conferees hammered out a repatriation schedule, the goal of which was complete Ryukyuan repatriation from Japan by 26 December 1946.<sup>13</sup> Repatriation was to begin on 5 August at the rate of 4,000 per week until 26 September, and at 8,000 per week thereafter until the program was completed.<sup>14</sup>

The first repatriates arrived in August at Buckner Bay. Military government established two camps to attend to the arrivals’ immediate needs: the camp at Kuba-Saki, near the landing area, and Camp Costello, about three and one-half miles north of Kuba-Saki. Some 139,500 Ryukyus were repatriated from Japan by December 1946, the scheduled date for completion of the program. Additional repatriates continued to materialize, however, until the repatriation from Japan totaled 150,388 one month later. The program was then terminated, but the end of the program did not mean an end to the problem.<sup>15</sup> Ryukyus desiring repatriation from Japan continued to appear throughout 1947 and 1948. By the end of December 1947 the number of Ryukyus repatriated had risen to 173,483. Thereafter the monthly totals decreased considerably, yet still averaged over 200. Military government headquarters, for example, reported 291 repatriates from Japan during December 1948. Feb-

<sup>13</sup>Memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to CG RYCOM, 27 Jul 46, sub: Rpt. on Ryukyus Repatriation Conference at AFPAC, and Annex III (10 Sep 46) to SCAPIN 927, 7 May 46, sub: Repatriation, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>14</sup>Reports of General MacArthur, *MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase*, Vol. I Supplement (Washington: Government Printing Office, n.d.), pp. 169–70.

<sup>15</sup>Military Government Headquarters prepared a final report on the program for MacArthur. See Rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to SCAP through CG RYCOM, 9 Jan 47, sub: Final Rpt. on Ryukyuan Repatriation Program (Freimuth was the originator of this rpt.), and CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 3, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of January 1947, Freimuth Papers.





*CAMP COSTELLO was one temporary home for Okinawa's repatriates.*

ruary 1949 was the first month in which there were no repatriates from the Japanese home islands reported.<sup>16</sup>

Repatriating these Okinawans from refugee camps to their home areas was a major accomplishment and a forward step in the social rehabilitation of Okinawan life. The program was a success in that its objectives were accomplished: thousands of Okinawans were repatriated from overseas with few mishaps. Only seventeen islanders died from various causes during transit; thirty-two were born en route. But unlike the resettlement program, the repatriation program initially had a distinctly negative impact on Okinawa's economic recovery. The repatriated islanders brought very little back with them in terms of material goods. The clothing, medical attention, housing facilities, and—especially—food required by a population swollen with repatriates was significant. Military government met the needs through an extensive relief program supported by food and lumber shipped from Far East Command sources in Japan. Only after the impact of assimilating so many people had been absorbed could military government fully turn to the rehabilitation of Ryukyuan society.

<sup>16</sup>HQ Eighth Army, Mil. Govern. Section, Repatriation Div., Historical Rpt., December 1947 and CINC USAFPAC, Summations No. 26 & 28, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Months of December 1948 & February 1949, RG 407.





REPATRIATION. *Newly returned Okinawans await transportation.*

### *The Revival of Education*

Once a modicum of village life had been restored, civil affairs officers sought to revive Okinawa's educational system. During the war, education had suffered earlier and more pronounced physical and psychological disruption than most of society's activities. A year before the American invasion the Japanese *32d Army* had appropriated many of the larger schools to use as headquarters buildings and barracks. School buildings were the best constructed buildings on Okinawa—and also the most conspicuous. Requisitioned schools suffered heavy damage from American preinvasion bombings and from the subsequent fighting. Moreover, many of the older male students were withdrawn from school to serve in some military capacity, while hundreds of older girls were withdrawn to train as nurses. Not only buildings, therefore, but also many individual educations were shattered by the war. Restoration of the educational system meant more than building schoolhouses: it also meant providing the teachers and teaching materials necessary for students to resume their studies. Military government officers also knew that during the war Japanese schools were instruments of imperial indoctrination. Very few

Americans on Okinawa in 1945 understood the Japanese language. Although many Okinawan teachers volunteered, senior military government officials believed that such individuals might teach subversive, anti-American sentiments if classes were resumed. Because of this fear—which proved to be unfounded—and the lack of supplies and facilities, school activity was minimal during the earliest days of the occupation. Nevertheless, Okinawan regard for education was well known, and the civil affairs teams working among the people understood that a restoration program could not be successful until an education system was established. The task of reviving the system would be a formidable one, with physical, cultural, and financial obstacles to surmount. By overcoming these problems within a matter of months, the civil affairs officers demonstrated their determination to revitalize Okinawan education as quickly as possible.

Reconstruction began with the swarming throngs of refugee-camp children, since their undirected presence was a nuisance and in some areas a major problem. Some form of directed educational activity was the most obvious way to reestablish discipline.<sup>17</sup> To help keep the children off the local roads, the commanding officer of a “B” team at Ishikawa as early as 1 May 1945 authorized the construction of a playground. He detailed 150 Americans and Okinawans to build it. When it opened just three days later, over 1,000 children ages four through eight turned out to use it.<sup>18</sup> Following this modest beginning, military government headquarters directed that district commanders establish recreational programs for all children of elementary school age; classes would be conducted at these recreational facilities and would stress the fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as handicrafts and group play.<sup>19</sup>

In August 1945 Island Command established a Military Government Education Section to determine policy, to develop and coordinate the educational program, to furnish shelter for classes, and to provide school materials. Although sufficient local instructors volunteered, school supplies were chronically short throughout 1945. Camp *honcho*, or section leaders, selected qualified Okinawan teachers, who were then cleared with counter-intelligence. The actual operation of schools remained a function of the Education Section until 2 January 1946 when military government

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<sup>17</sup>Hanna/Watkins, *Rehabilitation: Social*, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 1, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Months of July–November 1946, p. 53. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>18</sup>Memo, Economics and Industries Officer (B–8) to Public Welfare Officer, IsCom, 9 May 45, sub: Ishikawa Playground—Winder Park, establishment of, RG 407.

<sup>19</sup>MG Circular No. 16, 15 May 45, sub: A Preliminary Welfare Program: District Education and Recreation, Watkins Papers, RG 200.





*RUDIMENTARY SCHOOL FACILITIES being inspected by military government officers.*

established the Okinawan Department of Education with full administrative authority under the supervision of the military government education officer. Atsuo Yamashiro, a leading prewar educator on the island, became director of the Department of Education—the first Okinawan administrative department created by military government.<sup>20</sup>

The school system expanded as rapidly as the availability of teachers and facilities would permit. By 1 October 1945 military government officers had established 72 schools, first through sixth grade, operating on a part-time basis with 1,300 teachers and 40,000 pupils. Less than a year later the system had expanded to prewar levels: 84 kindergartens (15,400 pupils), 122 eight-grade primary schools (85,600 pupils), and 18 four-year high schools (7,200 students). By December 1948 the school population of the Ryukyus reached 210,000 students. At the secondary level these pupils could participate in a number of programs, depending upon their interests and locality. In November 1945 the 137th Naval Construction Battalion had turned over its camp near Gushikawa in the Maebaru Dis-

<sup>20</sup>Hanna/Watkins, *Rehabilitation: Social*, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200.



trict to military government. Civil affairs officers promptly converted most of its intact quonsets, shops, and equipment into five training schools: a teachers normal school, an English-language teachers school, a police training school, a mechanical training school, and a cooks and bakers school.<sup>21</sup> At first, expedited courses lasting four to six months were offered, but the schools quickly evolved into full-scale secondary institutions. The military government Education Section converted another former Seabee camp into a secondary boarding school and established an agricultural school at Nago on the Motobu Peninsula. Small fishing schools were also constructed at the fishing communities of Itoman and Toguchi.

By September 1947 approximately 90 percent of the school-age children were receiving some type of formal instruction in over 500 schools. Many of these buildings, however, were temporary structures of very rude construction.<sup>22</sup> The quality of both the instruction and the physical condition of the schools gradually improved throughout the late 1940s, but the total number of schools had not dramatically changed by the end of the decade. In March 1949 military government headquarters initiated a scholarship program to send qualified Ryukyuan students to various Japanese universities. The candidates pursued degrees in such areas as medicine, law, and engineering. Later the same year, with the assistance of additional Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funding, headquarters inaugurated a similar program of scholarships to send islanders to a number of American colleges and universities. On 22 May 1950 military government officers established the first university in Ryukyuan history. The University of the Ryukyus was organized to resemble an American university, and academicians from the Michigan State University, at the Army's behest, agreed to come serve as advisors. The institution consisted of twenty-six buildings, erected by a local Okinawan contracting company, Kokuba-Gumi, with Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds, on the site of the former castle at Shuri. Its first entering class numbered some 560 students. Designed to be the teacher-training center for the archipelago, the university also became a source of pride for the Ryukyuan people.

All academic instruction under American auspices in the Ryukyus, whether in kindergarten or, later, the university, was conducted in the Japanese language. This was true despite the fact that in December 1945

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<sup>21</sup>US MG Directive No. 49, 19 Nov 45, sub: Civilian Training Schools, Establishment of, RG 260.

<sup>22</sup>GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [*sic*] Islands for the Secretary of War, 11 Oct 47, p. 6, File: SCAP, Government Section, Occupation Reports Japan and Ryukyus, RG 6, MacArthur Archives.



UNIVERSITY OF THE RYUKYUS

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Nimitz's successor as Pacific Commander, issued a directive for military government in the Pacific which stated in part that "instruction in the English language for natives of all ages is a prime necessity, but this is not to be construed as discouraging instruction in native languages and culture."<sup>23</sup> Whatever may have been Spruance's motivation for such an order, the practical realities of not having sufficient bilingual Japanese-English instructors, instructional materials, or interested students precluded an all-out effort to offer instruction in English, even if the civil affairs officers had been of one mind on the desirability of such instruction.

In point of fact, military government officers debated the importance of teaching the English language as a required subject; all understood the obvious political as well as practical and cultural implications of promoting the use of English in the schools.<sup>24</sup> If adopted for general use in

<sup>23</sup>Ltr, CINCPAC-CINCPA to Distribution, Serial: 53855, 12 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval Mil. Govern., Pacific Ocean Areas, File A17-10/A-1(10), RG 38.

<sup>24</sup>See Gordon Warner, *History of Education in Postwar Okinawa* (Tokyo: Nihon Bunka Kagakusha Co., Ltd., 1972).



the islands, English could serve as a common bond between the American and Ryukyuan peoples, as well as a conduit for American ideals. On the other hand, was this role desirable if the United States did not envision long-term retention of the islands? In the period 1945–1950 no one was entirely certain what form the American-Ryukyuan relationship would take. Until that relationship was defined, military government in the Ryukyus tried to cope with the practical problems of language instruction. As two civil affairs officers wrote in the late 1940s:

The whole problem of language is one which on Okinawa is particularly difficult. The language of the schools remains Japanese, which means, naturally, that ties with Japan remain strong. The retention of the Japanese language . . . may or may not in the long run prove desirable. But there was no alternative, since revival of Ryukyuan at this late date would be without point, conversion to English impossible without extensive teacher training programs, and ill advised without definite commitment as to the future of the island.<sup>25</sup>

Military government officers did make an effort to train native instructors in the English language by establishing the Foreign Language (English) School in January 1946 at Gushikawa. By December 1948 four branches of the school were operating throughout the island, but the authorities lacked sufficient instructors to train the potential teachers. Trained bilingual experts were always needed elsewhere, especially at General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. Moreover, the Ryukyuans did not exhibit much enthusiasm for English instruction so long as the future political status of Okinawa remained unclear. The English-language school never had more than 200 trainees enrolled at any one time, and most of these were enrolled in short courses to become qualified as interpreters, rather than teachers.<sup>26</sup>

Whatever may have been Admiral Spruance's wishes, Okinawa simply did not have enough bilingual teachers to initiate general study of the English language on the island.<sup>27</sup> Even if sufficient numbers of Japanese-speaking English instructors had been available, there remained another formidable obstacle to the mastery of English by the population: many Okinawan children, whose native tongue was Luchuan (Ryukyuan), would first have to master Japanese as a second language before they could begin studying English.

Even without an emphasis on English instruction, the educational system of postwar Okinawa certainly prepared the civilian population to be a healthier, better educated, and more productive citizenry—no matter what political status the Ryukyuans might ultimately achieve. The re-

<sup>25</sup>Hanna/Watkins, *Rehabilitation: Social*, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>26</sup>O'Flaherty MS, Chapter VII.

<sup>27</sup>Interview, Freimuth with the author, 29 Oct 80.



creation of a civilian educational system, therefore, represented a major step in reestablishing an orderly, settled existence for the population.

### *Political and Judicial Rehabilitation*

Given the scope of the civil affairs mission and the smaller number of officers to execute it, headquarters endeavored to shift the burden of administering the islands as much as possible into native hands while retaining ultimate control. Admiral Nimitz clearly expressed this objective in his basic directive to military government:

. . . you will provide for the continuance of essential governmental functions, using local inhabitants insofar as feasible and making use of the local governmental machinery so far as such use advances . . . the objective of military government.<sup>28</sup>

This statement could have been interpreted as a mandate to revitalize political life in the Ryukyus. Some of the more liberal-minded officers interpreted it as an opportunity to initiate programs in self-government, but a more limited conception prevailed in Tenth Army's Military Government Section during the planning phase of ICEBERG and through the summer of 1945. General Crist supported a narrower view of the proper role for civilian government in areas under military occupation; in such cases, he believed that the concept of local government could be applied only to small municipalities and lesser units, and he consistently preached this philosophy to his staff officers.<sup>29</sup> Even after Crist's departure, his viewpoint permeated the atmosphere at the Military Government Section for some months, thereby depriving the command of the potential advantages that derive from "indirect control" of occupied areas. Given this attitude, it is not surprising that the first steps toward local administration on a camp-wide level came not from headquarters, but from the military government teams in the field.

The initial step toward political rehabilitation, though perhaps not perceived as such, was the appointment of the first honcho in the camps. These men, refugees themselves, were made responsible for groups of 60 to 100 of their fellows. Their appointments sprang from battlefield necessity, because of the lack of sufficient civil affairs personnel and interpreters. As the tactical forces turned civilians over to the teams, military government officers designated—often on sight—the more energetic or authoritative Okinawans to oversee such matters as registration, rationing, and labor detailing. Their range of activity varied, depending upon

<sup>28</sup>CINCPAC MG Directive of 1 Mar 45. See also Leonard Weiss, "U.S. Military Government on Okinawa," *Far Eastern Survey* 15 (Jul 46): 234.

<sup>29</sup>Comdr James Watkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

local needs and the inclination of the team commanders. As civilian camps were established, many honcho emerged as appointed “mayors,” responsible for enforcing proclamations on everything from sanitation to cultivation, and for resolving the surprisingly few disputes that erupted among the Okinawans.<sup>30</sup>

Military government officers had difficulty finding qualified islanders to help administer the growing number of civilians under their care. In most *mura* (villages, or townships) in the Ryukyus, local officials had been fiercely loyal to the government in Tokyo, or in some larger townships, were home-island Japanese. Many of these local officials had been withdrawn to Japan in October 1944, but others had remained and sullenly refused to cooperate with the American forces.<sup>31</sup> Because of the shortage of qualified local leaders, military government officers often made use of those former officials who remained—regardless of their personal loyalties. This practice was especially true for the islands off Okinawa, where the administrative and political machinery remained far more intact than on Okinawa itself. Even on Okinawa, former officials were utilized to a large degree; for example, the postmaster of Kin mura, Mr. Tokeshi, was appointed mayor when the former mayor proved uncooperative.<sup>32</sup>

Perhaps the most striking example was the postwar career of Jugo Thoma. During the war Thoma, a native-born Okinawan, headed the islands’ chapter of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. In occupied Japan, a Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction excluded certain groups of nationalistic citizens, including those active in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association from participation in government service.<sup>33</sup> But such instructions, directed to the civilian government in Tokyo, did not apply to the Ryukyus. In certain instances General

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<sup>30</sup>CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 1, US Army MG Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Months of July–November 1946, undated, p. 12, copy in the CMH Library; rpt, CO, Det. B–10 to CO, 27th Div., 3 May 45; sub: Mil. Govern. Activities (From 091330 April to 011400 May), RG 407.

<sup>31</sup>Memo, IsCom MG HQ to CG, IsCom, 31 Jul 45; sub: Hist. of Mil. Govern. Operations on Okinawa, 1 Jun to 30 Jun 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200; memo, Lt Col James I. Martin to Col F.B. Wiener, MG HQ, 8 May 45; sub: Notes on Occupation and MG Organization of Kin Mura, RG 407; Morris, *Tiger by the Tail*, p. 56.

<sup>32</sup>Memo, IsCom MG HQ to CG, IsCom, 31 Jul 45, sub: Hist. of Mil. Govern. Operations on Okinawa, 1 Jun to 30 Jun 45, circular, MG HQ IsCom, MG Circular No. 80, 23 Jun 45, sub: Selected Okinawan Civilians for Assisting Mil. Govern., and Watkins/Lawrence, Disaster Relief Administration: Organization and Methods, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; rpt, HQ MG Det. B–9 to CO, Tenth Army, undated, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities in Kerama Retto from 27 Mar to 27 Apr 45, RG 407.

<sup>33</sup>SCAPIN 550, 4 Jan 46, sub: Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office. Copy in *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, Report of Government Section, SCAP (Washington: Government Printing Office, n.d.), Vol. II, Appendix B, p. 482. See also *Memoirs of Jugo Thoma*, Jugo Thoma Memoirs Publishing Assn. (Naha: Hoshi Printing Co., 1969), p. 1.

MacArthur's headquarters questioned the propriety of employing former officials such as Thoma in positions of authority on Okinawa; nevertheless, military government officials believed that the shortage of available trained Okinawans necessitated using anyone with proven administrative skills. Thoma, therefore, became mayor of Naha, a position he held in prewar Okinawa.<sup>34</sup>

American preconceived impressions about the islanders often colored the relations between the military government officers and those Okinawans who assisted them in administering the island. Having trained with handbooks based on biased Japanese sources, civil affairs personnel often had low expectations for their Okinawan assistants. Fortunately, these negative impressions were soon proved unfounded. Most appointed Okinawans performed well, grew more effective as time passed, and thus saved the military government teams a considerable amount of time, energy, and frustration.<sup>35</sup>

Cooperating with the American invaders, however, was often dangerous to these islanders. The remnants of the *32d Army* in the hills of northern Okinawa considered dealings with the Americans treasonous. Japanese soldiers retaliated with a reign of terror against civilian collaborators which featured burnings and decapitations. These punishments were often meted out in villages indiscriminately, and many uninvolved civilians suffered. The contrast between the avenging Japanese soldiers and the Americans rendering medical assistance on a large scale was not lost on the Okinawans, much to the further frustration of the Japanese guerrillas.<sup>36</sup>

On 2 July 1945 the Ryukyus campaign officially terminated, and one day later Col. Charles Ira Murray, USMC, relieved General Crist as Deputy Commander for Military Command, therewith initiating a new phase in political reconstruction.<sup>37</sup> Colonel Murray, who had previously served as Deputy Chief Military Government Officer in Guam, had some ex-

<sup>34</sup>Interview, Freimuth with the author, 29 Oct 80. In 1952 Thoma became chief justice for the island, and in 1956 he became chief executive of Okinawa.

<sup>35</sup>Watkins/Lawrence, Disaster Relief Administration: Organization and Methods, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; memos, Lt C.S. Ford, USNR, to CG MG HQ IsCom, undated, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, and Political Officer (Capt George Hopkinson, AUS) to CO, B101X, 10 Aug 45, sub: Progress of Military Government: Political Organization, Public Welfare, Religion, and Schools, Rpt. of, RG 407; Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," pp. 179–180.

<sup>36</sup>HQ IsCom Okinawa, Action Rpt. IsCom, Okinawa, 13 Dec 44–30 Jun 45, 30 Jun 45, and Lt Col John Stevens and MSgt James M. Burns, Okinawa Diary (March–14 May 45), 14 May 45 entry, RG 407; Watkins working notes re: civilian casualties, 25 May–21 Jul 45, and memo, Lt (jg), R.F. Pence, SC, USNR to Col F.B. Wiener, 24 May 45, sub: Japanese Atrocities on Civilians, Effect of, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>37</sup>HQ IsCom, General Orders No. 55, 3 Jul 45, Murray Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.



perience, albeit limited, in politically rehabilitating occupied areas. Under Murray, military government headquarters began to devise a tentative plan for governmental development. At first, this effort was directed by Capt. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, as a function of the Operations Branch. In late August this branch was reorganized as an expanded Government Department (after 29 September, the Civilian Affairs Department) under Lt. Comdr. George P. Murdock, USNR, who as a peacetime anthropology professor at Yale University had prepared the *Handbook* on the Ryukyus (OPNAV 13-31).

In July 1945 military government summoned about 125 prominent Okinawans to serve in a Provisional Advisory Assembly. Shikiya Koshin, a locally well-known educator, was elected chairman of this assemblage. In August the Assembly selected a fifteen-member Okinawan Advisory Council to assist and advise the Deputy Commander for Military Government. Of the fifteen islanders chosen, one had been a prominent police official before the war, one was the former managing editor of the island's principal newspaper, and one a past president of the Naha bar. Five were teachers and seven had been members of the preinvasion prefectural assembly. Koshin Shikiya chaired the council. Once the Advisory Council was established, the Provisional Advisory Assembly was dissolved. Some of its members, as individuals, remained influential advisors to various military government departments.

As more and more civilians returned to their former home areas, civil affairs officers could re-establish the local *shi* (city), *cho* (town), and *mura* (village) as the basis for administration. Although military government's goal was to return as soon as possible to the traditional *mura* basis for local government organization, it was not feasible to re-establish the more familiar *mura* system until more citizens returned and local land claims were settled. At the top of the administrative structure were sixteen military government districts, twelve on Okinawa and four on the outlying islands.<sup>38</sup> These last four districts represented military government's token presence in the southern and northern Ryukyus. Because of the shortage of civil affairs personnel and because the southern Ryukyus experienced relatively minor military actions, Tenth Army did not at first dispatch teams to Miyako and Yaeyama. It would be December 1945 before military government established a liaison office on Miyako, and March 1946 before a resident detachment was established in the southern

<sup>38</sup>CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 1, US Army MG Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Months of July–November 1946, undated, pp. 3, 14, copy in CMH Library; Watkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, circular, ASCOM I, MG HQ Okinawa, MG Circular No. 192, 30 Aug 45, sub: Okinawa Advisory Council, and ASCOM I, MG HQ General Orders No. 13, 30 Aug 45, sub: Organization of MG Okinawa, Watkins Papers, RG 200; Karasik, "Okinawa; Problem in Administration," p. 260.

Ryukyus. Amami Oshima and the smaller islands of the Amami Gunto, situated to the north of Okinawa, were not part of the prewar Okinawa Prefecture of Japan. When the Japanese surrender ultimately came, however, the Allied Powers removed Tokyo's administrative authority over islands south of 30° north latitude, thus placing the Amami Gunto within the American-administered Ryukyus. As was the case with the southern Ryukyus, Tenth Army initially was unable to spare civil affairs personnel for Amami Oshima. That island was administered from Tokyo by Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as part of the Kagoshima Prefecture until 13 March 1946 when a military government team from Okinawa finally assumed responsibility.<sup>39</sup> Once all twelve districts on Okinawa (later expanded to sixteen) began functioning on 1 September 1945, they superseded the military government field detachments, which were then abolished.

In mid-September, while the Okinawan Advisory Council was undergoing orientation, a comprehensive plan for a civilian administration emerged at headquarters. Prepared by the Labor Officer, Lt. John T. Caldwell, USNR, the plan outlined not only political rehabilitation, but also detailed how the stability of a civilian administration would contribute to the economic revival of Okinawa.<sup>40</sup> Caldwell's memorandum was well received at military government headquarters—except by Commander Murdock, whose personality and ambitions clashed with Caldwell's. Colonel Murray was not entirely convinced that his headquarters had the necessary authority to implement Caldwell's far-reaching proposals. Consequently, Murray sought guidance from the Commanding General, Army Service Command I.<sup>41</sup> Before General Wallace could respond to Colonel Murray's inquiry, the Navy assumed sole official responsibility for military government on Okinawa (21 September 1945). Consequently, the Deputy Commander for Military Government's request was forwarded by Army Service Command I to the Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa. The resultant delay in implementation meant not only that Okinawa's political and economic rehabilitation was delayed, but also that political restructuring would begin under Navy rather than Army direction.<sup>42</sup>

Whatever organizational details might ultimately emerge, headquarters had made a fundamental decision to expand the civilian administration. On 19 September, just two days before the Navy assumed military

<sup>39</sup>O'Flaherty MS, chapter IV; Richard, *Naval Administration—Pacific Islands*, Vol. II, p. 39.

<sup>40</sup>A copy of Caldwell's ten-page memo of 12 Sep 45, "A Political and Economic Plan for the Rehabilitation of Okinawa" is among the Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>41</sup>Island Command was redesignated Army Service Command I on 31 Jul 1945.

<sup>42</sup>Watkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

government responsibility for Okinawa, Colonel Murray concluded that military government "has progressed to a point where significant improvements require . . . the establishment of a native administration . . ."<sup>43</sup> Although Colonel Murray was prepared to move toward such a civil Okinawan administration, he continued to make a clear distinction between "administering" and "governing."

The Navy accepted responsibility at a time when many experienced reserve officers were being demobilized and returned to the United States. Military government headquarters was no exception. Commander Murdock completed his tour of duty and departed from Okinawa in October 1945. Lt. Comdr. Francis E. Street succeeded him as director of the Civilian Affairs Department. There followed a two-month hiatus in long-range planning until Street was demobilized and replaced by Lieutenant Caldwell. Caldwell was then in a position to implement his blueprint for political and economic rehabilitation. Although he was eligible for detachment and return to the United States, he agreed to remain on Okinawa provided (1) that military government organization move toward centralization, and (2) that military government transfer as quickly as possible to Okinawans the responsibility for their own affairs. The original architect of Okinawa's political rehabilitation was not the principal civil affairs officer on the island, therefore, but a reserve Navy lieutenant.<sup>44</sup>

Caldwell's recommendations stemmed from his stated assumption that the islanders ". . . have demonstrated convincingly that they possess sufficient indigenous leadership to manage their own affairs in much larger degree than is allowed them at present."<sup>45</sup> He proposed that the Deputy Commander for Military Government appoint an Okinawan civil governor, to be vested with all powers formerly held by the prewar governor, except those expressly suspended because of military necessity. The governor would in turn appoint, subject to military government confirmation, a central administration, which would gradually replace the existing Advisory Council—although Caldwell assumed that many council members would become department heads under the new administration. Once the new central administration was functioning, local governmental organization should then be established along prewar lines, thus setting the stage for the withdrawal of all military government personnel from the districts. Thereafter, military government policies would be enforced

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<sup>43</sup>Memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to CO, ASCOM I, 19 Sep 45, sub: Administrative and Economic Measures for Okinawa—Proposals for, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>44</sup>Watkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>45</sup>Caldwell's proposal, "A Political and Economic Plan," is quoted from Watkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG. 200



through the governor and his administration. Caldwell believed that his proposals could be enacted within a period of less than three months.

For the remainder of the Navy stewardship the devolution of political functions to the islanders proceeded steadily, if unevenly. Demobilization continued to drain away commanders and lieutenant commanders who were graduates of the Navy civil affairs schools, thus leaving military government increasingly in the hands of untrained replacement ensigns.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, Caldwell's program encountered opposition from officials at both headquarters and district levels. Some officers who, according to one observer, were jealous of their powers, opposed any shifting of administrative functions to the Okinawans.<sup>47</sup> Their resistance was effectively squelched, however, in December 1945 when Admiral Spruance announced to military government units throughout the Pacific Ocean Area a civil affairs policy to be in effect until the establishment of a permanent civil government. Most importantly, Spruance specifically directed "the early establishment of self-governing communities."<sup>48</sup> Lieutenant Caldwell recognized that a greater degree of administrative autonomy for the islanders was possible only if the military government district functions decreased. Indeed, he looked forward to the time, early in 1946, when it would be possible to abolish the district structure and to return all military government officers to headquarters.

In late September 1945 headquarters organized and conducted elections for councilmen and district mayors in the sixteen military government districts. All Ryukyans—including women for the first time—twenty-five years of age or over were eligible to vote. On 2 January 1946 the Okinawan Department of Education, the first Okinawan civil department, was created. It emerged from one of the standing committees of the Okinawan Advisory Council, as did the other twelve departments developed by military government during the first four months of 1946. These months were a landmark time for Okinawan political evolution. Effective 1 April military government headquarters dissolved its local districts and on the following day implemented the mura-based administration, replacing not only all civil affairs district personnel, but also the shi and cho basis for local administration. Reflecting a trend toward greater centralization of civil affairs, the General Affairs Department

<sup>46</sup>At the end of January 1946 there were only nineteen MG officers on Okinawa above the rank of ensign, Watkins, personal diary, 24 Jan 46.

<sup>47</sup>Watkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Paper, RG 200.

<sup>48</sup>Ltr, CINCPAC-CINCPA to Distribution List, Serial 52855, 12 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval Mil. Govern., Pacific Ocean Area, File A17-10/A1-1(10), RG 38.



KOSHIN SHIKIYA, *first appointed chiji of Okinawa (1946).*

served to oversee the new mura administration; the shi and cho system had been directed on the district level.<sup>49</sup>

The capstone of Caldwell's program for progressive self-government was to be the appointment of a civilian governor, or chiji. In mid-April headquarters personnel summoned the Okinawan Advisory Council and the recently-elected mayors to serve as a nominating committee. These men were asked to propose the names of three individuals who were qualified to serve as chiji of Okinawa Gunto. Colonel Murray emphasized the advisory nature of their recommendations; he would not be bound by their selections. The Deputy Commander for Military Government was pleased with the committee's first choice, Koshin Shikiya, who was duly appointed chiji on 24 April. Kowa Matayoshi was selected as fuku chiji (vice governor). At the same time Colonel Murray introduced the Central Okinawan Administration to be headed by the chiji. Within the administration were executive departments, a court system, city, town,

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<sup>49</sup>HQ USN MG, Directive No. 130, 18 Mar 46, sub: Dissolution of MG Districts on Okinawa, memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Distribution "A," 2 Apr 46, sub: Mura Administration, and HQ USN MG, Directive No. 58, 4 Dec 45, sub: Township (mura) Administration—Organization of, Watkins Papers, RG 200.





OKINAWA ADVISORY ASSEMBLY, with *Chiji Shikiya* and *Lt. Comdr. James T. Watkins IV*.

and village administrations, and an advisory body to replace the Okinawan Advisory Council. The *chiji* was directly accountable to the Deputy Commander for Military Government for the administration of all governmental functions within the Okinawa Gunto in accordance with military government policies and directives. The functions previously performed by the Okinawan Advisory Council were thus transferred to the *chiji* and his department heads, all of whom had been members of the now defunct Advisory Council.

The final step in the Navy's plan for political recovery was to revive the preinvasion Prefectural Assembly. It was reconstituted to serve as an advisory body to the *chiji*. No new election was held for this new Okinawa Assembly; most of the members elected to the last Okinawa assembly (1942) had survived the war and were permitted to serve again. Military government headquarters appointed others to fill any vacancies. The five representatives from Miyako and Yaeyama were excluded, since those islands were still being administered separately. The reconstituted assem-



bly consisted of twenty-five members.<sup>50</sup> It convened in Higashionna, southeast of Ishikawa near Okinawa's east-central coast, on 23 May. Although the assembly was merely an advisory body, the delegates demonstrated enthusiasm and determination as they and the *chiji* discussed reconstruction plans. Most of the discussion focused on agricultural concerns and on the need to increase farmer productivity.<sup>51</sup>

With the convening of the Okinawa Assembly, Lieutenant Caldwell's plan was implemented successfully, although not as smoothly and logically as it might appear in hindsight.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, by 1 July 1946 the Ryukyus had a sound foundation for future political and economic development. The Navy civil affairs achievement should not be underestimated. When the Army assumed sole responsibility for military government on Okinawa (1 July 1946), the new staff tended to accept the existing administrative machinery and political programs.<sup>53</sup> One naval military government officer marveled at the "matter-of-course" manner in which the Army accepted without question the civil political structure that Lieutenant Caldwell and his assistants had begun.<sup>54</sup>

As the evolution of political reforms continued under Army auspices, Ryukyans and military government officers both realized that a centralized civilian government was desirable, but would be difficult to achieve because of economic disparity among the islands. In the late 1940s the Ryukyus were divided geographically and politically into four provisional governments: one in the Northern Ryukyus, one in Okinawa Gunto, and two in the Southern Ryukyus (Miyako Gunto and Yaeyama Gunto). In the Northern Ryukyus, the provisional government was largely self-supporting in that their economy enabled revenues to nearly cover the cost of government. In the Southern Ryukyus, where war damage was minimal, the provisional governments were entirely self-supporting. In Okinawa Gunto, where virtually all revenue-producing facilities were destroyed, only a small fraction of government's costs was met locally.<sup>55</sup> Clearly, it would be necessary for the occupation forces to repair the war damage to public buildings, schools, roads, etc., and ameliorate the fiscal

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<sup>50</sup>HQ USN MG Directive No. 156, 22 Apr 46, sub: Central Okinawan Administration; Creation of, Watkins Papers, RG 200; rpt, MG Government and Legal Div.—Okinawa MG Team, undated, sub: Popular Election in Okinawa Gunto, September 1950 [*sic*], Freimuth Papers.

<sup>51</sup>Working note, The First Session of Okinawa Assembly was held, 10 Jun 46, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>52</sup>Watkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; interview, Freimuth, with the author, 5 Dec 81.

<sup>53</sup>Interview, Freimuth with the author, 29 Oct 80.

<sup>54</sup>Lt Comdr James Watkins, working note, undated, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>55</sup>CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 4, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of February 1947, Freimuth Papers.



ELECTION CAMPAIGNING

disparities among the provisional governments before further steps toward further centralization could be undertaken.

Once the appointed Central Okinawan Administration (redesignated the Okinawan Civilian Administration in December 1946) began to function, the next logical step toward greater civilian self-administration was to move beyond appointed officials to duly-elected assemblymen. A general election for local officials had been held throughout the Northern Ryukyus in July 1946; at that time no political parties were evident in that area. However, the political picture was far more complex on Okinawa, and the wartime impact on its institutions had been greater. Consequently, preparations for elections were slower and more deliberate, although there was no opposition to elections from any quarter. In May 1947 a representative from General MacArthur's Local Government Division visited Okinawa to assist representatives of the *chiji* and the local military government General Affairs Department in restructuring the political process.<sup>56</sup> As a result of this visit and of subsequent meetings,

<sup>56</sup>CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 7, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of May 1947, Freimuth Papers.



including two sessions with the Okinawa Assembly, military government and civilian officials devised new laws for the election of mayors and assemblymen. Recognizing the need to establish a procedure familiar to the people while preserving strict democratic principles, the drafting officials studied prewar and postwar Japanese law as well as American law. The resultant electoral law for the Ryukyus effectively combined these three sources.<sup>57</sup> Military Government Directive No. 4 of 12 January 1948 outlined the electoral law. This directive set 1 February 1948 as the date for electing mayors, and 8 February as the date for selecting assemblymen. Elections in the Southern Ryukyus were slated for March.

In anticipation of the forthcoming popular elections, a number of Ryukyuan political parties emerged during 1947 to represent various interest groups and ideologies. Five parties were formed on Okinawa: the Okinawa People's Party (a leftist, labor party), the Okinawa Democratic Union (conservative), the Ryukyus Socialist Party, the Okinawa Socialist Party (which soon merged with the Ryukyus Socialist Party to become the Socialist Party), and the Youth Democratic League. No parties emerged in the Northern Ryukyus, but two arose in Miyako in the Southern Ryukyus: the Young Men's Party (or, the Youth's Party), and the Social Party—which hoped to shape the Ryukyus' future within the context of continued American administration. Nevertheless, the majority of the candidates for mayor and assemblyman ran as independents.

The people of Okinawa Gunto responded positively to this opportunity to vote. Eighty-eight percent of the eligible men and eighty-one percent of the eligible women voted. The elections were orderly, and no unusual incidents intervened. Twenty-eight cities, towns, and villages held elections for assemblymen; twenty-seven had just enough eligible candidates to fill the vacancies without opposition. In twenty-one mura there were no mayoral elections, the incumbents were unopposed. All those elected were to serve until the next general election in the gunto, tentatively set for September 1950. Of the fifty-five vacancies for mayor, party members filled only six; three affiliated with the Okinawa People's Party, and three with the Okinawa Democratic Union. Of the 1,192 vacancies for assemblymen, party members filled only four. Four women were elected to assemblies, but none to the office of mayor.


Military government observers noted two significant features of the 1948 elections: the orderliness with which they were carried out, and the enthusiasm of the newly-enfranchised women.<sup>58</sup> These elections, and the

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<sup>57</sup>Rpt, Government and Legal Div.—Okinawa MG Team, "Popular Elections in Okinawa Gunto September 1950," Freimuth Papers.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.; CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 16, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of February 1948, RG 407.





OKINAWAN WOMAN VOTING

subsequent ones in Southern Ryukyus (March) and Northern Ryukyus (June) gave the Army civil affairs officers reason for hope that the Ryukyuan population could indeed effectively administer their own affairs within a framework of general American supervision.

Although political parties played a very minor role in the 1948 elections, a number of individual politicians emerged at that time as influential figures. In March 1948 five of these politicians—Genwa Nakasone, Ibi Nakamoto, Kamejiro Senaga, Kanjin Higaonha, and Seiko Isei, the last three with leftist leanings—attempted to embarrass the American authorities and the civilian administration they had created by persuading the Okinawa Assembly to resign en masse. The assembly had met only sporadically during 1947, and its members concluded that they were being ignored since the *chiji* and military government officers made all the decisions affecting life on Okinawa. To a great extent, of course, their perception was correct: headquarters still differentiated between native administration and self-government. Nevertheless, the decision to hold

free elections and the popular response to that decision inspired some of Okinawa's more ambitious politicians. Many of these individuals realized—even at this early stage in the occupation—that needling the American administration could have its political rewards.

The deputy Commander for Military Government, Brig. Gen. Fred-eric L. Hayden, was willing to consider individual resignations, but refused on principle to accept the collective resignation of the Okinawa Assembly. After some discussion, the assembly members decided not to resign. Thereafter, the assembly met on a monthly basis until October 1949 when Hayden abolished it to make way for the Provisional Government Assembly.<sup>59</sup> Senaga Kamejiro and his allies failed in their initial attempt to disrupt the rehabilitation of civilian government. This missed opportunity, however, marked the beginning rather than the end of political contention between the military government administration and a growing number of vocal Okinawan political figures.

The emergence of factions critical of the American administration inspired military government officers to begin carefully monitoring political developments. Beginning in late 1948 Ryukyus Command's weekly intelligence analysis to CINCFE Intelligence (G-2) concentrated on reporting any possible leftist activity. This newly awakened concern about potential subversives marked the beginning of a tendency by the command headquarters to characterize those Okinawans most critical of the American administration as communists.<sup>60</sup>

Before the elections for mayors and assemblymen in the Okinawa Gunto (February 1948) and the Southern Ryukyus (March 1948), civil affairs officers had contented themselves with the modicum of municipal and provincial political progress already achieved since 1945. During the popular elections of 1948, however, the emergence of leftist political groups began to shake whatever complacency existed at military government headquarters concerning political progress. During 1949 and 1950 members of the Okinawa People's Party and the Democratic Alliance Party became more outspoken in their attacks on the American administration. These politicians found instances of disenchantment among the

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<sup>59</sup>The title of this new political formation is significant. By late 1949 the American command was thinking about a possible future change from a local "administration" to a more autonomous native "government." By describing the new assembly as "provisional," however, military government signaled to all concerned that although the new body was a step toward that goal, its existence was only temporary; further political evolution would follow.

<sup>60</sup>Msgs, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 20948 AIB, 2 Nov 48, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E20965, AIMG-G, 3 Nov. 48, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 20981 AIB, 9 Nov 48, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 21050 AIB, 28 Nov 48, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 21083 AIB, 5 Jan 49, CINCFE to CG RYCOM, 25 Apr 49, and CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. Y 40291, 24 Jun 49, in Files: RYCOM November–December 1948, RYCOM January–February 1949, RYCOM March–April 1949, and RYCOM May–June 1949, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.



Ryukyans, and they addressed these frustrations. In July 1949 a concerned State Department official reported that “all is not well among the native population.” Far Eastern intelligence sources reported anti-American sentiment on the rise in the northern Ryukyus. The political situation had deteriorated to the point where officials of the provisional government in Amami Oshima were preparing to submit their resignations to the military government.<sup>61</sup>

Faced with the next round of elections scheduled for the autumn of 1950, members of the Okinawan Civil Administration began holding meetings throughout that gunto to inform the voting population and to correct perceived distortions in what the leftist politicians were saying.<sup>62</sup> Although these nascent political parties were small and still of minor influence, about a half-dozen leftist politicians were becoming popular. The American authorities were not inclined to underestimate their potential to stir up trouble for the military regime.

Civil affairs officers prepared for the 1950 elections with a program of political education including the use of press and radio. They advised the islanders of their rights and responsibilities as voters and made certain that the electorate had every opportunity to become familiar with the individual candidates. They also began the mundane tasks of drafting election procedures, establishing expanded governmental structures, mapping districts, and setting election dates.

On 20 January 1950 military government took a concrete step toward a centralized native administration by establishing the Interim Ryukyus Advisory Council. The gunto governors and the four gunto assemblies chose, with the approval of military government headquarters, the eleven members of the council—one member for each 100,000 population. This advisory body was the first instance of legislators collaborating on an archipelago-wide basis in the postwar Ryukyus. The Deputy Commander for Military Government, Brig. Gen. Harry R. Sherman, dictated which items were presented to the council for its advice. He selected agenda items for their bearing on the Ryukyus as a whole, rather than on any single gunto.<sup>63</sup>

In September 1950, elections were held on Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama for gunto assemblymen and governors. Before the war, males twenty-five years of age and older could vote for their prefectural assem-

<sup>61</sup>Ltr, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, DOS, to Deputy Asst. Sec. Army, 29 Jul 49, *FRUS* 1949, Vol. VII *The Far East and Australia*, part 2, p. 815.

<sup>62</sup>CINC USAFPAC, Summation No. 28, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of February 1949, Summation No. 31 (May 1949), and Summation No. 32 (June 1949), RG 407.

<sup>63</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyus Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 117–118. Copy in CMH Library.



blymen, but never before had the Ryukyans been permitted to elect their prefectural leaders.<sup>64</sup> As was the case in 1948, voter turnout was heavy. Tatsuo Taira was the first postwar elected governor of Okinawa Gunto. He would preside over the Okinawa Gunto Government, which replaced the former Okinawan Civilian Administration. It is important to bear in mind the semantic exercise that often accompanied the evolution of these early postwar political forms. In the Okinawa Gunto in 1950, for example, the change in terminology from an "administration" to a "government" was not accidental, but was intended to convey to the civil population a momentum toward a greater degree of self-government. Once elected, the four gunto governors and assemblies functioned according to military government direction.<sup>65</sup> Generally speaking, these area governments had broad authority and considerable latitude in their activities, so long as their operations remained consistent with military government directives and ordinances. The deliberations of the gunto assemblies appeared to hold promise for the furthering of democratic government in the Ryukyus. Still, the assemblymen, however distinguished in local society, were not without their limitations. Some members in particular lacked individual initiative. Consequently, it was often difficult to maintain a clear separation of the executive and legislative powers, as the assemblies frequently became little more than a stamp of approval for the gunto governor.<sup>66</sup>

By 1950, five years after the invasion of Okinawa, military government officers had made significant progress toward the political rehabilitation of all the Ryukyu Islands. They succeeded in creating a democratic political edifice, yet one that was consistent with Okinawan prewar experiences. Political life was restored on the municipal and provincial levels, and a trend toward creating a centralized native administration was begun. On 5 December 1950 General MacArthur left no doubt in Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure's mind that this future step was to be a priority objective for the Ryukyu Command. MacArthur ordered that "At the earliest practicable date provision will be made for the establishment of a central government."<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>MG Special Proclamation No. 37, 30 Jun 50, sub: Election of Governors and Assemblymen for the Gunto Governments, and MG Ordinance No. 17, 7 Jul 50, sub: Election Law for Assemblymen and Mayors of Cities, Towns, and Villages, Revised, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>65</sup>MG Ordinance No. 22, 4 Aug 50, sub: The Law Concerning the Organization of the Gunto Governments, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>66</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 120. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>67</sup>Maj Gen McClure became military governor of the Ryukyu Islands on 27 Jul 50, but with the establishment of USCAR, he became the deputy governor. Brig Gen Harry R. Sherman assumed that title on 6 December in an interim capacity, and on 9 December Maj Gen Robert S. Beightler became deputy governor.

Political forms in the postwar Ryukyus evolved as democratic institutions, yet military government officers kept in mind Okinawa's past political experiences. In much the same way postwar jurisprudence developed as a curious amalgam of American military and civilian law, Japanese statutes, and Okinawan law and tradition.

The battle for Okinawa had thoroughly dislocated the island's legal system. Admiral Nimitz's first proclamation as Military Governor retained the extant Japanese statutes, but terminated the island's court system.<sup>68</sup> Military government headquarters drew upon the training and skills of the civil affairs officers within the Public Safety and Legal Departments to establish both a local judiciary and a democratic police constabulary. Because of the shortage of indigenous judges, headquarters personnel reconstituted only four courts, called Local, or Municipal, Courts, by early 1946.<sup>69</sup> These courts began to enforce the existing Japanese laws, while the civil affairs officers planned military government courts to enforce its directives and proclamations. Since the civilians quite properly enjoyed a reputation as law-abiding people, the number of criminal incidents within Okinawan society remained small, a remarkable fact considering the island's wretched condition in the summer and autumn of 1945. Soon after the American invasion, however, a considerable number of petty larcenies involving clothing and food occurred at Army supply installations. Since thefts of Army property constituted offenses against the American military government, headquarters established courts to cope with the civilian offenders.<sup>70</sup>

Military government headquarters created three types of courts to deal with various degrees of offenses. The lowest level was the Summary Provost Courts, which tried misdemeanors (petty larceny, curfew and traffic violations, blackmarketeering, and prostitution cases involving military personnel) and meted out sentences up to one year. During the years 1945–1947 these courts averaged more than two hundred cases each month. An investigator from military government's Public Safety Department personally handled each case and prepared the charge sheets. Lawyers for the Summary Provost Courts came from military government's Legal Department. The second tier of the judiciary was the Superior Provost Court, which tried felony cases and imposed sentences from one to ten years. The third and highest court was the Military

<sup>68</sup>Navy MG Proclamation No. 1, undated, Freimuth Papers. The original ten so-called "Nimitz Proclamations" were undated. MG officers dated each as it was posted in each locale as the American forces advanced across Okinawa.

<sup>69</sup>MG Proclamation No. 5, 25 Feb 46, effective 1 Mar 46, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>70</sup>I.H. Rubenstein, "Magistrate Courts in Okinawa: A Contribution to Justice in the Ryukyus," *American Bar Association Journal* 36, No. 12 (Dec 50): 1011.

Commission, which tried only the most serious felonies and which could impose sentences from ten years up to the death penalty.

Initially, the military government courts dealt with all cases involving Okinawans who committed criminal offenses against American military or civil personnel and property, no matter how minor the infraction.<sup>71</sup> If the long-range objective of creating a self-sufficient, independent Ryukyuan court system was to be realized, the islanders had to become responsible for adjudicating most of the criminal cases. The existing Local Courts were too limited in scope and too few in number to insure prompt trials for all those who might be accused of petty violations. By 1947 civil affairs officers had concluded that a more comprehensive native court system must be established by the American administration.

The acting director of military government's Legal Department, I.H. Rubenstein, conducted a study of pertinent Japanese statutes and held discussions with the director of Public Safety and with representatives of the Okinawan Civilian Administration. The result of these efforts was a proclamation establishing a new arrangement of Magistrate Courts with jurisdiction over all Okinawans and empowered to impose sentences not exceeding six months or a fine of ¥1,000, or both.<sup>72</sup> These courts, staffed by magistrates recommended by the Okinawan Civilian Administration's Department of Justice, were to try all misdemeanor cases on Okinawa, all petty violations of military government directives, and all violations of the Police Offense Regulations as set forth in the 1908 Japanese Home Department Ordinance No. 16. Only indigenous Japanese and Okinawans fell under the jurisdiction of these courts; citizens of the United States and its allies were specifically excluded by the military government proclamation.


The original Magistrate Courts, located in the largest towns of Okinawa's eleven police districts, began proceedings on 25 August 1947. In September military government headquarters expanded the program, appointing another five magistrates for the Southern Ryukyus. Very soon these courts were averaging over 500 misdemeanor cases and collecting ¥45,000 in fines each month. Over 90 percent of those accused of petty crimes were tried within twenty-four hours of arrest, and more than 15 percent were acquitted. The efficient and expeditious manner in which the island magistrates carried out their responsibilities enabled the Legal Department and Public Safety Department to devote more time to the more serious offenses. The average case load of the Summary Provost

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<sup>71</sup>Memo, Capt Richard E. Haughton, CAC, to Historical Subsection, ACofS, G-2, RYCOM, 8 Mar 47, sub: Rpt. of Activities of Military Govern. Ryukyus, during January 1947, File: 98BC6-0.2 RYCOM, RG 407.

<sup>72</sup>MG Special Proclamation No. 19, effective 18 Jul 47, sub: Magistrate Courts, Freimuth Papers.





EXECUTIVE BUILDING, GOVERNMENT OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS (1953 photograph).

Courts fell from two hundred a month to only twenty-five. Encouraged by the success of the magistrate court system, civil affairs officers turned to the problem of higher courts. In July 1950 headquarters expanded the judicial system by establishing a series of circuit courts and a court of appeals. It also formed a bar for the Ryukyuan legal profession and set up the Ryukyuan Bar Association, thereby completing the evolution of the judicial structure under military government auspices.<sup>73</sup>

Although a few military government pioneers remained on Okinawa after 1950—some in a civilian capacity—the great majority of those who began Okinawa's political and judicial rehabilitation were gone before the Government of the Ryukyu Islands came into being. They had departed from the islands, but their legacy remained. For the most part they left a sound, yet flexible foundation, serving both the civil administrators and the Okinawan population reasonably well until the American return of administrative authority to Japan in 1972.

<sup>73</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 128–29, copy in CMH Library. The formation of the circuit courts and the court of appeals was announced in MG Special Proclamation No. 38, 13 Jul 50.

## CHAPTER V

# Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation

The evolution of postwar political forms in the Ryukyu Islands was closely linked to progress in rehabilitating the economy. Military government's economic mission was initially a very narrowly defined one: to prevent disease and unrest detrimental to military operations, Tenth Army would make food and supplies available for civilian use. Admiral Nimitz had directed military government to exploit available local resources and productivity to the fullest in order to minimize the importation of civilian supplies.<sup>1</sup> This directive assumed that production capabilities would survive the invasion. While this assumption was largely true for the northern and southern Ryukyu Islands, it was not true for Okinawa with its extensive destruction.

In December 1945, the Pacific commander liberalized the economic policy for the Ryukyus. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance directed the military government to provide for the repair and restoration of damaged properties and facilities and to devise a plan for the economic development of the Ryukyus.<sup>2</sup> Early in 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that providing minimal food, clothing, shelter, and medical care was insufficient to discharge the American long-term responsibility to the Ryukyans. Moreover, such a limited policy was potentially detrimental to extended American strategic interests in the region. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs endorsed the concept of economic revitalization for the islands and established a goal in March 1946—military commanders were

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<sup>1</sup>CINCPAC Directive of 1 Mar 45, Freimuth Papers; Lawrence/Watkins, Rehabilitation: Economic, unpublished MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. Unless otherwise noted the following four subsections dealing with the restoration of agriculture, industry, fishing, and fiscal planning are based on these documents.

<sup>2</sup>Ltr, CINCPAC-CINCPA to Distribution, Serial 52855, 12 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval Mil. Govern., POA, RG 38; USN Mil. Govern. Okinawa, Memo No. 154, 21 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval Mil. Govern., POA, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

to restore a standard of living to the occupied islands equal to the standard existing before the war.<sup>3</sup>

Rehabilitation would not be an easy task. Okinawa's natural resources were meager at best, and most means of production—including agricultural land—had been devastated by the fighting or the immediate post-invasion base development. Little remained besides the people themselves, who were eager to return to some sort of constructive activity that would help rebuild their shattered society. The salvaging of crops, rebuilding of homes, and construction of roads and dams all had to be accomplished. The many competing demands for available labor, however, prompted civil affairs officers to establish and enforce labor regulations, registering and assigning laborers according to posted priorities. Because of the relative scarcity of able-bodied men, women and the elderly played a major role in the revival of civilian labor.<sup>4</sup>

### *Restoration of Agriculture*

Faced with a largely agrarian economy, military government's first economic goal was the maximum utilization of land resources to promote self-sufficiency in food production. Prior to the American invasion, production had been carefully organized by an agricultural organization directed largely by the Japanese central government through the prefectural authorities. This association, as was the case with all other organizations on Okinawa, had disintegrated during the American invasion. Consequently, agricultural activities initially became the responsibility of the local civil affairs team. Once military government districts were formed, the district commanders assumed responsibility, and each district had an assigned agricultural officer.

Military government teams and districts sought to organize agricultural production as soon as possible. This task was easier in northern Okinawa where many inhabitants remained on their own land, sometimes along with refugees from the south who could assist them with the farming. Most farming on Okinawa during the period 1945–1946 was on a communal basis. At military government's direction, area rationing boards were established to receive all agricultural products for redistribution on the basis of need. When local governments were organized in

<sup>3</sup>Msg, WARX 80815 to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC-CINCPA, 16 Mar 46, CINCPAC Files, RG 38.

<sup>4</sup>Memos, IsCom MG HQ to CG, IsCom, 10 Jun 45 and 31 Jul 45, sub: Hist. of MG Operations on Okinawa, 1 May to 31 May 45; MG Circular No. 132, 21 Jul 45, sub: Local Industry; memo, HQ ASCOM I to Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern., 383.7 TDGAP, 20 Sep 45, sub: Placement of Native Civilians; HQ ASCOM I, Memo No. 31, 29 Aug 45, sub: Procedures for Allocation of Civilian Labor. All documents in Watkins Papers, RG 200.



September 1945, military government appointed Okinawan agricultural officials to direct planting, harvesting, and distribution under the supervision of district agricultural officers. Many farmers resented the compulsory redistribution of their crops and tried to evade this requirement. Other islanders complicated military government agricultural planning by engaging in nocturnal pilfering of crops, primarily sweet potatoes.

To reduce as quickly as possible the necessity for importing American agricultural products, military government headquarters directed in January 1946 that all agricultural activities be placed under the centralized control of its Agriculture and Industry Department.<sup>5</sup> Centralized control meant better utilization of available land and tools. In March 1946 headquarters organized an Okinawan Department of Agriculture to integrate agricultural activities island-wide. Previously, American agricultural experts had served both as supervisors and operators of agricultural activities. Demobilization necessitated the change to a system where Americans supervised, but Okinawans implemented the military government program. Gradually, local agricultural associations emerged as non-profit cooperatives in each *mura*. In June 1946 military government headquarters chartered the Central Okinawan Agricultural Association to centralize the distribution of agricultural products.<sup>6</sup> In addition, the association manufactured simple farm machinery, loaned or rented this machinery, transported agricultural products, and conducted land reclamation projects on a limited scale. Although membership in the association was voluntary, the benefits were so obvious that most Okinawan farmers joined.

Okinawa's staple crop remained the sweet potato. Both man and beast depended upon this hardy plant, which could produce two or three crops annually and could be planted almost any time of the year. Under military government direction, approximately 35 percent of the available agricultural land was devoted to it.

Rice, the most important cereal, yielded two crops a year but production met only about 30 percent of Ryukyuan rice needs. The battle of Okinawa had destroyed many of the paddies and irrigation systems necessary for rice cultivation, and these took time to restore. Population shifts in the summer of 1945 further disrupted rice production. In July military government headquarters reported to Army Service Command I that rice had been planted in the Chinen Peninsula, even though the area would almost certainly have to be evacuated before the next harvest.

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<sup>5</sup>HQ USN Mil. Govern., Okinawa, Directive No. 108, 23 Jan 46, sub: Agriculture—Central Control of, RG 260.

<sup>6</sup>USN Mil. Govern., Okinawa, Directive No. 10, 3 Jun 46, sub: Central Okinawan Agricultural Assn., Watkins Papers, RG 200.



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The planting had been encouraged “partly to keep the civilians busy and to avert the unrest which would follow an order not to plant.”<sup>7</sup> As a result of the destruction and dislocation, the first rice harvest after the American invasion was not gathered until December 1945.<sup>8</sup>

Historically, the Ryukyus had failed to produce enough soybeans, wheat, or barley. Before the battle of Okinawa the islanders had imported one-half the soybeans and one-quarter of the wheat and barley they consumed. Military government emphasized the planting of soybeans, not only because they were a good source of protein and fat—both sadly lacking in the Okinawan diet of sweet potatoes—but also because soybeans restored nitrogen to the soil, thus reducing the need to import fertilizer. Despite military government’s best efforts to stimulate sweet potato, rice, and soybean production, the Okinawans simply could not produce enough food on the available acreage to become self-sufficient. Imports of American foodstuffs remained a necessary burden for the island’s administrators.

Potentially, the most important commercial crop on Okinawa was

<sup>7</sup>Memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to CG, ASCOM I, 31 Aug 45, sub: Hist. of Mil. Govern. Operations on Okinawa, 1 Jul to 31 Jul 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>8</sup>Rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB Okinawa, Serial 314, undated, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for December 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

TABLE 2—LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

Livestock	1940	1946	1948
Cattle	22,000	112	3,542
Horses	25,500	899	2,747
Swine	108,426	1,165	26,969
Goats	106,257	1,647	14,838

sugar cane. During the war the Japanese government had required the Ryukyans to produce sugar to convert into alcohol for wartime use. As a result, the islands produced 900 percent more sugar than the native diet required. The American military government ordered an immediate curtailment of production to a level adequate to meet the population's dietary requirements. The remainder of the land used for sugar cane cultivation was then devoted to raising green vegetables. Sugar cane acreage remained negligible until military government made an effort to revitalize Okinawa's sugar cane industry as a commercial venture in 1951.<sup>9</sup>

The livestock reserves on Okinawa were even more meager than the sparse supply of crops. A comparison of prewar and postwar livestock inventories reveals considerable losses (*see Table 2*).<sup>10</sup> These severe reductions in the livestock population adversely affected not only the meat and milk supply, but also the availability of sorely-needed fertilizer. Military government agricultural officers recognized the immediate need for a breeding program based on the importation of hearty stock. By the end of August 1946, 45 Hampshire and Berkshire hogs, 33 cattle, and 1,100 chickens were imported from the United States. Some of these imported animals came through the efforts of private charitable organizations such as the Hawaii rengo Okinawa kyusai kai (Association in Hawaii for United Assistance to Okinawa) which raised \$47,000 to purchase and ship 50 boars and 500 sows to Okinawa.<sup>11</sup> Within two years, continued imports plus a successful breeding effort had led to a dramatically higher livestock population.

Although the number of draft and food-producing animals increased

<sup>9</sup>ODCSOPS, Ryukyuan Affairs Div., Directorate of International & Civil Affairs, Economic Plan for the Ryukyu Islands (rev. copy), 5 Feb 52, file 1602-09, RG 319.

<sup>10</sup>Rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB Okinawa, and Chief MG Officer, Ryukyus, 1 Jul 46, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for the Period from 1 Apr 45 to Jul 46, Watkins Papers, RG 200; HQ RYCOM, Summation No. 23, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of September 1948, RG 407.

<sup>11</sup>Ruth Adaniya, "United Okinawan Association of Hawaii," *Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii*, Ethnic Studies Program (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1981), p. 326.



dramatically, military government's agricultural program was very much a mixed success in the early postwar era. Civil affairs agricultural officers studied farming conditions, developed an agricultural plan, established experimental farming and animal husbandry stations, and imported seeds, fertilizer, and breeding stock.<sup>12</sup> Despite this effort, the Ryukyus were still not close to self-sufficiency in food at the end of 1948. The reasons for this deficiency, many of which were beyond the control of military government officers, included the finite amount of arable land, the unsuitability of Okinawan land for American mechanized farm machinery, the ever-growing population, and the frequent typhoons—one of which destroyed 15 percent of Okinawa's already limited crops in the fall of 1945.

Another problem arose from within the military government organization itself, specifically, the parochial attitudes of most district commanders during the Navy's period of control. Each commander seemed concerned only with his own military government district. If headquarters tried to enforce a coordinated agricultural program for the entire island, the district commander viewed the effort as an infringement on his autonomy. When headquarters finally perceived this problem, it eliminated the district structure, thus centralizing agricultural policy and opening the way for Okinawan civilian participation on an island-wide basis.

The principal hindrance to increased farm output, however, was the fact that military government agricultural policy did not harmonize with other Army objectives on Okinawa during the postwar period. In keeping with its overriding military mission, the Ryukyus Command gave priority to transportation, utility construction, and base construction over farming. Land, equipment, and available civilian labor, therefore, were all channeled into these efforts. Agriculture—apart from the earliest crop salvaging efforts—received a lower priority. Moreover, as additional acreage was absorbed for bases, the agricultural picture became ever bleaker.<sup>13</sup> Despite these realities, agriculture was so basic to the society that military government headquarters was determined to revitalize farming. No American program to reconstruct a viable economy in the Ryukyus during the 1940s could succeed without at least a partial restoration of prewar agricultural output.

Relying largely upon their faith in American technology and in their own training, military government officers developed optimistic postwar

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<sup>12</sup>HQ USN MG Okinawa, "The Agricultural Program for Okinawa," 15 Jan 46, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>13</sup>Shannon McCune, *Geographical Aspects of Agricultural Change in the Ryukyu Islands* (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Social Sciences Monograph No. 54, 1975), p. 16. Cited hereafter as McCune, *Agricultural Change in the Ryukyu Islands*.

goals for Okinawan agriculture. In the autumn of 1947 MacArthur's headquarters reported to Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall that:

At present it is estimated that the accomplishments to date and the fulfillment of future requirements will make it possible for the first time in its known history for Okinawa to reach 90 to 100 percent self-sufficiency in food within the next five years.<sup>14</sup>

The expectations were unrealistic given the actual conditions. The program to restore the livestock population made great strides, but farm animals numbered only a fraction of prewar levels.<sup>15</sup> The crop situation was even worse. By 1949 Ryukyuan farm output was at its lowest ebb.<sup>16</sup> Four years after the American invasion the islands were still far from self-sufficient in food production, and the population remained under a rationing system which clearly would not permit any civilians to become obese. Military government headquarters kept a close eye on available food reserves, which were stored at the Central Subsistence Warehouse in Tengan. Reserves there were accounted for not only in terms of weight, but also in available calories. For example, in January 1949 the reserve amounted to 18,615 metric tons, or some 62 billion calories.<sup>17</sup> The average ration per person per day was about 2,000 calories.

In September 1949 Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees arranged for agricultural economist Raymond E. Vickery to visit the Ryukyus on an inspection mission. Accompanying Vickery were two additional agricultural economists, an agricultural engineer (soil conservation) from the Department of Agriculture, a nutritionist from Voorhees' office at the Department of the Army, and an agronomist from the University of California. Their report was extremely critical. They noted that Okinawa was in a "particularly deplorable state" agriculturally, with approximately one-fifth of its arable land being used for military purposes. Charging that the services had used farm land "arbitrarily" and with no regard for its economic value, they concluded that postwar agricultural reconstruction had been extremely slow, in part because it had been hampered by a lack of adequate policies.<sup>18</sup> Although certain of their conclusions affected areas other than farming, the Vickery group's focus always remained on food production. To redeem the agricultural potential of the archipelago, the group made nine specific administrative recommenda-

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<sup>14</sup>GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [*sic*] Islands for the Secretary of War, 11 Oct 47, p. 10, File: SCAP; Government Section, Occupation Reports, Japan and Ryukyus, RG 5, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>15</sup>Agricultural Mission to the Ryukyus, Agricultural and Economic Reconstruction in the Ryukyus, A Report, November 1949, p. 1, Freimuth Papers. Hereafter cited as Vickery Report.

<sup>16</sup>McCune, *Agricultural Change in the Ryukyu Islands*, p. 16.

<sup>17</sup>HQ RYCOM MG, Summation No. 27, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of January 1949, RG 407.

<sup>18</sup>Vickery Report, p. 1, Freimuth Papers.

tions to the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, Maj. Gen. Josef R. Sheetz:

- form an indigenous central government, and reduce the autonomous power of the local civilian governments;
- reorganize military government to provide counterparts for each department of the native government, including a competent civil administration;
- re-value the Ryukyuan yen and establish trade channels with Japan and other nations;
- increase land ownership on Okinawa and provide safeguards to prevent eviction and excessive rent;
- modify the “one-mile limit” barring native construction near American billets;<sup>19</sup>
- arrange for the organized migration of islanders, on a volunteer basis, to areas outside the Ryukyus;
- establish a reconstruction finance corporation;
- establish a farm credit administration;
- revise the food shipment pattern among the islands and establish a new basic ration to replace the 1945 “tentative ration” still in effect.

These recommendations found a sympathetic audience at military government headquarters, but their implementation proved to be a slow and painful process. Some of the delay could be blamed on the fact that several of the proposals transcended the powers of the local civil affairs authorities. Despite the Vickery team’s thorough research and convincing arguments, the Army gave relatively low priority to implementing its recommendations. Its proposals fell victim to bureaucratic inertia and came to fruition only after considerable delays. When the Ryukyus Command established the United States Civil Administration for the islands in the months following the Vickery Report, it included provisions for counterpart departments in a centralized indigenous government. But the Government of the Ryukyu Islands did not materialize until 1952.

In other areas, however, military government officials introduced the necessary reforms more quickly. The first step toward a native central government came with the creation of the Ryukyuan Food and Agricultural Organization in December 1949.<sup>20</sup> Not surprisingly, therefore, the

<sup>19</sup>For a discussion of the “one-mile limit” and the problems it engendered, see Chapter VI.

<sup>20</sup>MG Directive No. 26, 19Dec 49, sub: Formation of Ryukyuan Food and Agriculture Organization, RG 260; USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 99, copy in CMH library.



first step toward archipelago-wide political cohesion focused on agricultural issues. This organization, which included an Agricultural Administration Bureau and an Agricultural Improvement Bureau, began operations on 1 April 1950. That same month military government headquarters also established the Ryukyuan Reconstruction Finance Fund to provide loans for a variety of enterprises, including agricultural ventures.

In addition to its more complicated administrative recommendations, the Vickery Report put forward twelve technical recommendations concerning agricultural development. The report urged, among other things, that irrigation and drainage projects be undertaken and that much more fertilizer be introduced into the island's farming. Most of the technical recommendations could be quickly implemented if the necessary funding could be found. In most instances, it was. Money was found, for example, to foster water resources management. Because Okinawa is totally bereft of large rivers and lakes from which to draw water, all irrigation must begin with man-made reservoirs, dams, and canals. In the wake of the Vickery Report, military government began a series of seventeen land development/water resources projects. By the end of 1952 these efforts resulted in a 5 percent increase in the area of paddy land for producing irrigated rice.

Increasing production on the finite acres of arable farmland, however, meant getting more yield per available acre through the use of fertilizers. Okinawa's capacity to produce natural fertilizer had been seriously reduced, primarily because of the loss of so many farm animals during the battle for the island. Some potash could be obtained from ashes, but the burning of grassy areas to obtain the necessary ash reduced the water-holding capacity of the land, thus resulting in a net loss in farming efficiency—despite the potash produced. Another natural source of fertilizer was the ready supply of “night soil” from the people themselves. Initially, military government officers discouraged the use of this traditional fertilizer source, but they soon came to realize that its employment, whatever the hazards, would have to be tolerated if many small family plots were to be productive at all.<sup>21</sup> Given the inadequacy of local sources, considerable amounts of chemical fertilizer had to be imported. Headquarters, Far East Command, recognized this need and estimated that \$6,113,600 would be needed for fertilizer over the three fiscal years beginning in 1950.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup>GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [*sic*] Islands for the Secretary of War, 11 Oct 47, p. 10, File: SCAP; Government Section, Occupation Reports Japan and Ryukyus, RG 5, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>22</sup>FECOM, Estimates for Economic Rehabilitation of the Ryukyus Fiscal Years 1950–1953, 1949, p. 15, TAGO Administrative Services Div., Operations Branch, Occupied Area Reports 1945–1954, File: Rehabilitation Ryukyus, 1949–1953, RG 407.



HULLING RICE, FEBRUARY 1949

These efforts to enhance agricultural production met with a modicum of success. During 1950, the last year of the military government regime, the Ryukyu Islands produced 598,900 metric tons of food crops:<sup>23</sup>

Sweet potatoes	510,000 M/T
Rice	28,500 M/T
Green vegetables	26,400 M/T
Black (cane) sugar	11,500 M/T
White potatoes	10,000 M/T
Small grains	5,000 M/T
Soybeans	4,500 M/T
Other legumes	2,000 M/T
Millet	1,000 M/T

<sup>23</sup>Msg, Deputy Gov. Ry. Civil Admin. RYCOM to DEPTAR (SAOOA FAOA) Wash., Nr. R 03712, 4 Apr 51, File: Messages RYCOM April 1951, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.



These were not inconsequential figures, but neither were they of such magnitude that the Ryukyus Command could anchor an economic revival in them. Imported food continued to arrive in the Ryukyus, not only from the United States, but also from Asian exporters of rice and soybeans such as Thailand and Burma.

Because of the large number of Ryukyuans repatriated from Japan, Korea, and the Mandated Islands of the Pacific, the human pressure on the available farm land, especially on the main island of Okinawa, remained heavy. An agricultural survey revealed that in 1951 there were 37 farm households for every square kilometer in the Ryukyus, a comparable prewar figure, for the year 1937, was 38.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, no matter how much fertilizer and irrigated water could be supplied to a given plot of farm land, a point of maximum productivity was soon reached. Reality prevailed after 1950, and the Civil Administration admitted that "by 1958 a relative (agricultural) production plateau will be reached."<sup>25</sup> Staple food production could be expected to keep pace with population increases, anticipated at 2 percent per year, but absolute self-sufficiency in foodstuffs would not be possible.

After 1950 agricultural productivity as a whole rose gradually from its low point in the late 1940s. The Civil Administration demonstrated its commitment to development not only through various irrigation and fertilization programs, but also by more effective crop management, and more experiments with new seeds, breeds of livestock, and farm implements. Gradually at first, then more and more quickly, the nature of Okinawan agriculture changed. For example, sugar cane production, actively discouraged by military government during the later 1940s, as well as by the Vickery mission, became a key export item to be encouraged. There were two reasons for this dramatic change: the Civil Administration's willingness to temper the hopeless quest for food self-sufficiency, thereby making more land available for cane production; and the Japanese government's sugar liberalization policy, beginning in 1952, which labeled Okinawa sugar as a domestic entity in terms of production and sales to the Japanese home islands. The combined impact of these policies was a dramatic rise in sugar exports from the Ryukyus from 5,465 metric tons worth \$1.3 million in 1952, to 116,310 metric tons worth \$27.5 million ten years later. And by 1965, 87.5 percent of all Ryukyuan farm families were engaged in some activity related to sugar cane cultivation.

Ryukyuan agriculture changed in other significant ways never envisioned by headquarters staff when they set out to rejuvenate farming in

<sup>24</sup>McCune, *Agricultural Change in the Ryukyu Islands*, p. 19.

<sup>25</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 102. Copy in CMH Library.



the archipelago. Agriculture, for so many years the most important enterprise in the islands, declined in scope and significance. Where there had been 37 farm households per square kilometer of total land area in 1951, that figure decreased to 32.4 families by 1964, and to 25.9 families in 1971 on the eve of reversion. At the same time only 31 percent of these families were engaged in full-time farming; 69 percent pursued it only part-time. A growing number of families tended only token plots of land—a form of nostalgic farming. As the level of farm activity steadily declined, so did its significance to the Ryukyuan economy. Agriculture, the backbone of Ryukyuan economic life before 1946, contributed only 13.7 percent of the archipelago's gross national income in 1964.<sup>26</sup>

In 1945 military government headquarters had hoped to restore the family farm to the center of Okinawan economic life. Four years later this goal, as noted by the Vickery Report, had not been reached. Faced with the discovery of these realities, the Civil Administration substantially altered the military government agricultural programs and expectations. In the agricultural community, a pattern of more concentrated farm production developed, with most family farms remaining small. Subsistence farming declined dramatically, and farm households turned increasingly to cash crops such as sugar cane or pineapples—two exportable commodities again in demand in the Japanese home islands. While the Okinawan regard for the soil remained intact, the changing economic realities meant that most Okinawans who continued to till the land were farmers only in a sentimental sense of the word. Parents and older children alike turned in ever greater numbers to new occupational opportunities either directly or indirectly associated with the large and seemingly permanent military presence in the islands.

### *The Fishing Industry Transformed*

Fishing, as was the case with agriculture, had been a traditional Ryukyuan occupation, though perhaps not so much as one might have imagined. It is estimated that never more than 9 percent of the Ryukyuan population ever engaged in full-time fishing. Before World War II, Japanese fishermen, chiefly from Kyushu, had dominated the best fishing areas in the Ryukyu Islands. With a few notable exceptions, such as the town of Itoman on Okinawa, Ryukyuan fishermen traditionally limited their efforts to the coastal zone around their islands not only because of the size of their boats, but also because of their lack of refrigeration. Ice-

<sup>26</sup>McCune, *Agricultural Change in the Ryukyu Islands*, pp. 21, 26–27, 36, 55, 58, 69. In 1970 the gross national income of the islands had increased by more than 250 percent over the 1964 figure, but agriculture's share dropped further to a mere 7.66 percent.



TWO FISHING BOATS *aboard former Navy landing craft.*

making facilities in prewar Okinawa were very limited; most fishermen had to stay close to shore so as to return immediately with the day's catch of tuna and bonito. Fishermen had compensated for the lack of refrigeration before the war by drying and smoking the greater portion of their catch. But this method of preservation had its limitations, since without sufficient quantities of carbon disulfide the dried fish tended to become wormy after a short time. Nevertheless, Okinawan fishermen were often able to produce a modest, exportable surplus of smoked skipjack and bonito in the form of *katshobushi*. Some 100 motorized sampans, of 10–20 tons, produced 75 percent of the catch, with some 1,500 inshore boats—wooden, fifteen feet long, with a sharply raked bow and a raised square stern, and powered only by oars—accounting for the remainder.

The battle for Okinawa temporarily obliterated Okinawa's commercial fishing industry. All motorized boats and 71 percent of the smaller, oar-powered boats were destroyed. Headquarters, Island Command, fearing enemy infiltration by sea, banned the use of the remaining craft. The wooden boats deteriorated out of the water, and fishing line rotted in the sun. During the months of the assault phase, therefore, fishing could not and did not help to alleviate the worsening food supply situation.

With the campaign for Okinawa concluded and the danger of enemy



infiltration reduced, military government officials began to concentrate on the fishing situation. In July 1945 they advised the Island Commander, General Wallace, that fishing provided the principal source of animal protein in the islanders' diet and that a deficiency now existed. They requested that he authorize the use of military-government-registered boats, powered only by oars, for fishing.<sup>27</sup> An American fisheries officer arrived that same month, but it was not until August that Island Command permitted fishing from inshore boats, and then only along a five-mile stretch of the northeastern coast. No motor or sail-powered boats were authorized until November 1945, and Island Command did not grant permission to fish the island's primary fishing grounds until April 1946.

Because of the destruction of fishing craft during the fighting, and the subsequent deterioration of the remaining inactive boats, military government officers began negotiations with the Navy to secure replacement craft. Twenty-four small landing craft, LCVPs, were released to military government in November 1945, and an additional fifty craft—mostly of the same type, but also a few larger landing craft, LCMs—in January 1946. Military government also secured the use of the former torpedo patrol boat base at Toguchi in November. Here, the Navy's landing craft were converted for fishing purposes. In November 1945 military government officers established a central warehouse at Ishikawa to control the distribution of fishing supplies. Reefers, an ice-making capability, and fish-drying facilities were established at Toguchi, which became a major fishing center.

Military government headquarters endeavored to create an organized fishing program for Okinawa, much as the centrally-directed agricultural design for the island. But a comprehensive program did not evolve until the first half of 1946.<sup>28</sup> In March, an Okinawan Department of Fisheries was created to administer the central supply warehouse. At the same time military government organized the Fisheries Association to license power boats and operators and to assist in developing the industry. By the end of June 1946 native crews under military government supervision were operating 65 various converted Navy landing craft and eight reconditioned motorized sampans. By October 1947 nearly 2,000 canoes had been constructed by the islanders in response to the easing of fishing restrictions. Another 273 powered boats, former American landing craft

<sup>27</sup>Memo, Col C.I. Murray, USMC, to CG, IsCom, 680.421 (TDCIV), 24 Jul 45, sub: Request for Permission to Engage in Fishing Operations, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>28</sup>HQ USN MG Okinawa, Memo No. 170, 2 Jan 46, sub: Fisheries, Centralization of, and HQ USN MG Okinawa, "The Fisheries Program for Okinawa," 15 Jan 46, Watkins Papers, RG 200; USN MG Directive No. 7, 11 May 46, sub: Fishing, USN MG Economic Administrative Order No. 11, undated, sub: Fishing, RG 38.




converted for fishing at military government direction, were in operation. Although readily available, these craft had their limitations as fishing vessels. Not only were their sides too high in many cases for effective angling, but also their Gray marine diesel engines did not lend themselves well to the very slow speeds necessary for deep-sea trolling.

Despite the limitations of the ad hoc fishing fleet, the catch rose dramatically in the Okinawa Gunto from 409,104 pounds in July 1946 to 1,565,280 pounds in July 1949. During 1950 the hopes for even greater success rested on 65 new fishing vessels constructed with Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds. The boats, built with the needs and experiences of the Ryukyuan fishermen in mind, relied not on high-speed American diesel engines, but on a much slower, but more economical Japanese version. Other reasons for the encouraging statistics were military government's success in constructing ice-making plants throughout the Ryukyu Islands to supply the fishing boats and the availability of explosives, which the islanders successfully employed to stun and raise fish from the depths.

By 1950 the greatest challenge military government headquarters faced concerning the fishing industry was neither a question of vessels nor of refrigeration facilities, but one of education and training. The traditional coastal fishing techniques and opportunities offered no real future for the native industry; Okinawans had to learn new skills in order to exploit the opportunities for off-shore fishing formerly monopolized by the home-island Japanese. Military government's commitment to restoring the industry, therefore, was a legacy that went beyond mere boats and equipment. Under Civil Administration auspices, Japanese experts were imported to provide the native fishing industry with technical and business guidance. Ryukyuan had to be trained, not only to operate the new, larger off-shore boats, but also the expanded shore installations supporting the fishing fleet. Fishermen accustomed to going to sea in the morning and returning before nightfall hesitated about staying afloat for weeks.

The prime mover in fostering this new and expanded concept of fishing was the Ryukyuan Fisheries Company, Ltd., created in 1951 at the instigation of the Civil Administration. Capital and management personnel for this enterprise came from the various regional fisheries co-operatives and associations throughout the archipelago. The company performed a variety of services, all designed to revitalize and transform the industry. In addition to managing the new reefer plants ashore and the islands' two new 150-ton refrigerated vessels, the company handled the contracting details for obtaining Japanese technical experts, encouraged the construction of new vessels, and sought ways to develop the



TWO 150-TON REFRIGERATED FISHING VESSELS *ready for sailing to the off-shore fishing grounds.*

overseas market for the Ryukyuan catch. But the company's most important task was to reorient the traditional thinking of the local fishermen. They now had to look beyond in-shore subsistence fishing to the deep-sea commercial potential around their island home and in the seas beyond. As the Civil Administration summarized both the problem and the opportunity: "The resources of the Ryukyu Islands are few and meager. Fisheries offer the greatest hope for the future."<sup>29</sup> Fishing, therefore, like agriculture, was to undergo a fundamental transformation—an extensive modification that had its roots under military government auspices as early as 1947.

Fishing made a valuable contribution to a more viable Ryukyuan economy, but the endeavor would never employ more than a small fraction of the native work force. Indeed, as American technicians introduced more improved techniques and motorized craft, fewer and fewer Ryukyans were needed to bring in a sizable fish catch.<sup>30</sup> The great majority

<sup>29</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 102–104, copy in CMH Library. See also GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [*sic*] Islands for the Secretary of War, 11 Oct 47, pp. 11–12, File: SCAP; Government Section, Occupation Reports Japan and Ryukyus, RG 5, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>30</sup>For a detailed analysis of the fishing industry on Okinawa, see Shannon McCune and Masaki Yamaoka, *Fishing Activities in the Ryukyu Islands* (University of Florida, Ryukyu Islands Research Project, Research and Information Paper No. 17, December 1972).



of the civilians would seek and find employment outside of Okinawa's two traditional occupations in areas more directly related to the American military establishment on the island.

### *Industry and Commerce*

If food production from land and sea sources challenged military government headquarters, the prospects for industrial development were even less hopeful. Okinawan industry had progressed little beyond the handicraft stage before the American invasion. The great majority of Ryukyuans not engaged in farming or fishing participated in a variety of cottage industries producing goods for local consumption, such as simple wooden furniture, pottery, roofing tiles, textiles (*tsumugi*, *bingata*, and *kasuri*), straw hats and mats, and lacquerware. Prewar industrialization in the Western sense of the term emerged only in sugar and salt processing and in alcohol production for Japanese military purposes. The battle for Okinawa brought a sudden and complete halt to all medium and large-scale industry. With the surrender of Japan, the market for Ryukyuan sugar and alcohol disappeared. Military government demonstrated no interest in reviving sugar and alcohol production, but did make every effort to encourage salt reduction works, as well as all forms of handicrafts such as rope making, sewing, and blacksmithing.

During 1945–1946 the task of revitalizing industry on the island was a particularly difficult assignment—population concentrations in areas not suited for industry, the lack of buildings and equipment, and the shortage of raw materials. Such obstacles influenced business activities throughout the Ryukyus. In a typical report, in September 1945, the Hentona District summarized the enterprises within its boundaries: blacksmith shops, barbers, a few sewing projects, some rope making, a single tinsmith, some mat-weaving, three clock repair shops, and an unspecified number of salt reduction efforts under construction.<sup>31</sup>

In June 1945 a special inspection team from military government headquarters investigated the incipient efforts at production and called attention to the haphazard, small-scale, and decentralized manufacture of consumer articles in the face of growing consumer needs. Civil affairs officials established priorities, channeling available labor and resources to various industries. Rehousing programs—thatch, rope, and siding—received highest priority; mat-making, clothing production, sewing projects, and tool and furniture crafting were next in importance, and sou-

<sup>31</sup>Rpt, Hentona District to MG HQ, 22 Sep 45, sub: A Rpt. of Industrial Development in this District, Watkins Papers, RG 200.





OKINAWAN POTTER

venir production was in the lowest category.<sup>32</sup> Most laborers were assigned to priority projects, yet attempts to revive industry remained small-scale and erratic throughout the period. Gradually, as civilian resettlement progressed, control of industrial activity moved from the camp to the district level. Since the opportunities for industrial rehabilitation were even fewer than for agricultural production and the need less acute, military government headquarters moved more slowly toward centralized direction of industry. In November 1945 the Okinawan Advisory Council's industry representative assembled the available Okinawan experts, analyzed data on the island's industrial potential, and recommended that military government assist in rehabilitating the following modest industries: textiles, dyes (indigo), native cement, wood products (furniture, looms), mat-weaving, metal products, chemical products, and lacquer-

<sup>32</sup>HQ IsCom MG, Inspection Team Staff Study, 13 Jun 45, sub: Manufacture of Essential Consumer Goods, memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Chief of Industry Branch, 14 Jun 45, sub: Manufacture of Essential Consumer Goods, and MG Circular No. 132, 21 Jul 45, sub: Local Industry, Policy, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

ware.<sup>33</sup> Some council proposals called for reconstruction on a larger scale than was then practicable, but most were constructive because they were limited in scope and, therefore, realistically attuned to the island's physical and human resources. In March 1946 the Okinawa Base Command established the Okinawan Industry Department to channel military government assistance. Scrap metal from discarded war material greatly assisted Okinawa's metal shops and blacksmiths, as, for example, in the production of plows.

Despite shortages of tools, transportation, and firewood for fuel, the islanders were producing measurable quantities of numerous useful items by July 1946, especially pottery, cloth, and cooking utensils. One year later, licensed industries of various kinds in Okinawa Gunto numbered more than 250, although, because of shortages of raw materials and vehicles for transportation, only half were actually producing.<sup>34</sup>

By the end of 1947 military government headquarter's efforts had revived a number of cottage industries, but MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo warned Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall not to be overly optimistic about industrial development:

The lack of raw materials, particularly fuel, makes impossible substantial industrial expansion. . . .

It should be stressed again that the Ryukyus as a group have never been completely self supporting, and that if the U.S. desires to use [as] much facilities as exist on the island chain . . . it will have to be prepared to support to a considerable extent the economy of the Island.<sup>35</sup>

This assessment was intended to be matter-of-fact rather than pessimistic. While pointing out the limitations on Ryukyuan industrial expansion, the report noted the potential for progress in two general areas—items for local consumption and items with export potential. As might be expected, military government focused first on those modest items produced for local consumption. In some areas they registered considerable successes. The very necessary production of salt, for example, rose dramatically between 1947 and 1949.<sup>36</sup> The record was less impressive in

<sup>33</sup>Rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB, Okinawa, and Chief MG Officer, Ryukyu, 1 Jul 46, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for the Period from 1 Apr 45 to 1 Jul 46, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>34</sup>CINC Far East, Summation No. 9, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of July 1947, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>35</sup>GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [*sic*] Islands to the Secretary of War, 11 Oct 47, pp. 16–17, RG 5, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>36</sup>HQ RYCOM, Summation No. 35, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of September 1949, Freimuth Papers. In October 1947 the Ryukyus produced salt at the rate of 450,000 pounds annually, a 100 percent improvement over the rate a year earlier, but still a fraction of the estimated 8.4 million pounds required annually for food and industrial needs. The next year salt production throughout the archipelago reached 387,034 pounds just for the month of September 1948.





SALT PRODUCTION FROM SEA SALT

the construction related fields. The quality of Okinawa's clay was very good, but without imported presses it would not be possible to produce bricks with sufficient tensile strength for permanent buildings. Woodworkers, although hampered by the shortage of lumber, were producing some furniture, principally school desks and chairs. Unfortunately, most of the wood for these activities had to be imported from the Japanese home islands. *Sake* production resumed in 1947 as a government monopoly. Using only food products that had spoiled beyond possible human or animal use, licensed Ryukyuans produced 3,000 gallons per month by the autumn of 1947. Military government encouraged sake manufacturing because the production costs were very low, while the considerable proceeds from its sale helped defray the cost of local government administrations in the islands.<sup>37</sup> Other significant, albeit small in scale, industrial efforts were underway by 1947 in such areas as food processing, ceramics, charcoal production, weaving, and metal casting. This last enterprise involved the adaptation and use of scrap aluminum from wrecked aircraft. A number of small casting shops produced aluminum pots and pans for local use.

<sup>37</sup>Military government received no benefit directly from the sake revenues.



The ravages of both war and nature provided Okinawan salvage workers with far more than just aluminum. The battle for the island left the landscape strewn with hundreds of shattered tanks, jeeps, and field pieces. The attack also left the port of Naha clogged with half-sunken vessels. The autumn of 1945 brought a new typhoon season with even further destruction. A large number of American ships and landing craft soon lay broken along Okinawa's eastern coast. To these victims of conflict and storm, Headquarters, Far East Command, soon added—however inadvertently—hundreds of other damaged vehicles which MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo dumped on Okinawa for ultimate transshipment to the United States. Many of these trucks and jeeps were soon forgotten, shipping documents were lost, and the ravages of the Okinawan climate soon took their toll on the internal and external metal. The resultant opportunity for salvage from all of these sources, not only for scrap iron, but also for brass and other nonferrous metals as well, meant a potential boom for local native entrepreneurs and scavengers.<sup>38</sup>

Military government headquarters hoped to exploit this opportunity as a means to stimulate local industry, only to be frustrated by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. In December 1946 that office articulated a policy requiring that all sales abroad of Army-owned ferrous and nonferrous scrap be made to individuals willing to ship the scrap metal back to the United States. One exception applied to the Ryukyu Islands: all scrap metal generated within the Ryukyus Command first had to be offered to China under the terms of the China Bulk Sale Agreement. In November 1948 Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles, Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, advised MacArthur's headquarters that Ryukyuan scrap was piling up in Shanghai in excess of Chinese needs. He requested that the remaining surplus scrap within the command be released to military government for the use of local industry, and he noted that if the approximately 35,600 metric tons of steel and iron and 8,000 pounds of aluminum alloy were shipped back to America, "only ridiculously small revenue will accrue to the U.S."<sup>39</sup> The Far East commander, in turn, relayed Eagles' thoughts to Washington, and in December the Acting Secretary of the Army, William H. Draper, Jr., urged the White House to permit the release of Army-generated scrap metal in the Ryukyus Command to the indigenous economy. John R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, approved the request on 27 December 1948 on behalf of Pres-

<sup>38</sup>Interview, Freimuth with the author, 8 Sep 82.

<sup>39</sup>Msg, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 20991 AIMG-E, 10 Nov 48, File: Messages RYCOM October 1948–July 1949, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.

ident Truman.<sup>40</sup> Although this decision did nothing initially to improve Okinawa's nascent export program, it was a considerable boost to the domestic economy as native metalworkers began using the scrap metal to produce such items as farm tools, rice cleaning and rice polishing machines, and small hardware items.

Military government headquarters was under no illusions about the significance of such industrial efforts. Important as they were to the local welfare, these various industries were not a basis for long-range economic development. For example, by July 1948 considerable progress had been made in rehabilitating industry. In that month in Okinawa Gunto a number of industries were in operation, including iron works, casting factories, woodworks, and tin works. Collectively they employed 1,288 people.<sup>41</sup> In September 1949 these employment figures had risen only to 2,058 individuals, 990 in metalworking and 1,068 in woodworking, but these figures were for the Northern and Southern Ryukyus as well as for Okinawa Gunto. Military government officers, therefore, made every effort to encourage the production of exportable commodities by the industrial sector. Military government's decision not to revive sugar cane production on a mass scale—a decision reversed after 1950—created a void in the export picture. In 1947 the most promising candidate to fill the gap was phosphate rock mined in the Daito Islands. After the rock was shipped to Japan, a portion was returned as partial payment in the form of badly-needed superphosphate fertilizer. For the next three or four years phosphate rock remained the principal export supporting the island's importation needs. Other exportable items included coral, cycad leaves, and shell, the last of these shipped to Japan to make buttons which were then re-exported to the United States. Military government encouraged another traditional re-export item, woven hats made from the adamba leaf. These hats, similar to the so-called "panama hats" from Latin America, were produced locally in the Ryukyus, finished in Japan, and then distributed to other world markets. Unfortunately, a shortage of necessary bleaches on Okinawa made expansion of production difficult.<sup>42</sup>

Far East Command's projections for the Ryukyu export program for fiscal years 1950 through 1953 listed nine export items ranging from

<sup>40</sup>Ltrs, Draper to Steelman, 21 Dec 48, and Steelman to Draper, 27 Dec 48, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library.

<sup>41</sup>HQ RYCOM Summation No. 21, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of July 1948, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>42</sup>CINCFE, Summation No. 9, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of July 1947, and HQ RYCOM, Summation No. 34, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of August 1949, RG 407.





SCRAP METAL COLLECTED FOR EXPORT

phosphate rock to lily bulbs, but not scrap metal.<sup>43</sup> Quantities of scrap metal continued to accumulate on Okinawa during the late 1940s from salvage operations in the coastal waters. Initially, this metal resource was available only for domestic use. Because of restrictions imposed by Washington, none of it was available to the Ryukyus Command as an exportable commodity. This picture changed dramatically after 1950 as the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion eased the restrictions. The Ryukyus Command exported no scrap between 1946 and 1950, 2,550 metric tons in 1951, and 689,560 metric tons in 1953. By 1955 ferrous and nonferrous scrap stood second and third respectively behind sugar in importance as export products.<sup>44</sup> In just three short years, the by-products of modern warfare became a significant resource in Okinawa's export program.

<sup>43</sup>FECOM, Estimates for Economic Rehabilitation of the Ryukyus Fiscal Years 1950–1953, 1949, p. 17, TAGO, Administrative Services Div., Operations Branch, Occupied Area Rpts. 1945–1954, File: Rehabilitation Ryukyus, 1949–1953, RG 407.

<sup>44</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1953*, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 21–22. Copy in CMH Library.



*Changing Employment*

Military government figures began to register fundamental changes in Ryukyuan society in the late 1940s. The monthly figures for September 1948, for example, show that unemployment within Okinawa Gunto stood at 1,284, while the total number of persons employed, including those as farmers and fishermen, was 219,588. Of these, 39,569, slightly more than 18 percent, worked directly for agencies of the United States government. A great majority of the remainder worked as construction workers, grounds-keepers, drivers, domestics, and concessionaries in jobs indirectly yet closely related to American military housing and base construction and operation. Apart from subsistence farmers, relatively few Okinawans were engaged in traditional native trades: 605 in woodworking, 348 in metalworking, and 148 in ceramics.<sup>45</sup> These statistics, typical for the years 1947–1950, underlined the fact that the sustained American military presence was changing the economic life in the islands dramatically from its prewar configuration. Fewer Okinawans made their livelihood in agriculture and traditional island trades, while more had become employed in light industry and service positions associated with the military facilities. This trend continued well into the 1950s, not merely because it made economic sense to the employees, but also because it made economic sense to the Department of the Army.

In November 1948 General MacArthur advised the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of employment realities on Okinawa. Noting that labor was all the Ryukyans had to sell, he continued:

... there are at present several thousand nonindigenous civilians, mostly Filipinos, employed in the construction, maintenance and operation of military installations at a heavy dollar cost to the U.S. far in excess of native labor costs.

... if most of these foreign employees were replaced with native labor paid in yen purchased with appropriated funds, it would not only result in substantially lower dollar outlay by the U.S., but would enable the purchase of necessary consumer goods with dollars thus stimulating all branches of the economy and within a few years reduce substantially the necessity for support under the GARIOA program.<sup>46</sup>

The logic of MacArthur's message was patent, and his suggestion became policy, albeit a policy not all that easily implemented. The problem was

<sup>45</sup>HQ RYCOM, Summation No. 23, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of September 1948, RG 407.

<sup>46</sup>Msg, CINCFE to DA (CSAD), Nr. 65578, 20 Nov 48, sub: Employment of native labor by Military Forces in Ryukyus, Office of Asst. Sec. Army, Office of Occupied Areas, GARIOA files 1949, RG 335. Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) funds derived from a special appropriation Congress had established in the summer of 1946 when military government in the Ryukyus was transferred from the Navy to the Army. The monies provided supplies and services needed to prevent starvation, disease, and unrest among the civilians of American-occupied areas around the world.

primarily one of training, including language training; it was simply faster and easier for the American forces to import Filipino nationals already trained on everything from construction equipment to dry cleaning machinery than it was to train indigenous operators. This meant that within the Ryukyus Command even some positions that might easily be filled by Okinawans, such as barber and snack bar employee, were occupied instead by Filipinos or Chinese. In January 1948, for example, the Commanding General, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, reported to MacArthur that the concessions on military posts within the Ryukyus Command employed approximately 600 native Okinawans, but also 134 foreign nationals.<sup>47</sup> To put it another way, military government recognized that these foreigners—mostly Filipinos—were occupying nearly 20 percent of the jobs within the concessions system; jobs that otherwise would be held by Ryukyuans.

During 1948 the various components of the Ryukyus Command made a sincere effort to train Okinawans as replacements for the foreign employees. The command put a special emphasis on heavy construction jobs, as well as on administrative skilled and semi-skilled positions. The process was a slow one. In March 1949 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations asked General MacArthur for a breakdown of employment figures between foreign and indigenous workers, and further asked “is it intended to replace Philippino [*sic*] civilians by Ryukyuans. If so what date . . . can this be done?”<sup>48</sup> MacArthur made his intentions clear when he directed that the Army Air Force units within Ryukyus Command be the first to replace all foreign employees with native personnel. The target date for these units was 30 June 1949, but by the end of April MacArthur realized that, despite what he termed “intensive programs” to train Okinawans, the deadline could not be met, and he so informed his superiors in Washington.<sup>49</sup> Gradually, the various training programs began to pay dividends as more and more Okinawans secured jobs formerly held by imported foreign nationals. The training process continued during the Korean War period, by which time it was clear that local labor, rather than any tangible product, was becoming the most valuable Ryukyuan “export”—as MacArthur had earlier perceived it would.

Okinawan labor had become what economists term an invisible export, i.e., without leaving the island it became a commodity available for sale to a foreign purchaser (the American occupation forces). The foreign

<sup>47</sup>Msg, CG PHILRYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. SX 48081 GSASP, 14 Jan 48, File: PHILRYCOM January 1948, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>48</sup>Msg, DA ODCSOPS, Civil Affairs Div. to CINCFE, Nr. WARX 86170, 25 Mar 49, Asst Sec Army, Office for Occupied Areas, GARIOA Files 1949, RG 335.

<sup>49</sup>Msg, CINCFE to DA, Nr. 69550, 26 Apr 49, File: Messages Blue Binder Series, Ryukyus 1–61, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.

exchange returned to the Okinawan economy from its sale was no less real or important than revenue generated from the sale of tuna or scrap metal. The Civil Administration estimated that no fewer than 72,000 islanders worked in positions associated with the occupation, yet never more than 325 Okinawans—a very small percentage of the island's labor force—were directly employed by the Civil Administration itself.<sup>50</sup> These figures underscore the fact that while the Civil Administration consciously tried not to develop a large payroll of local bureaucrats, the American presence created thousands of new employment opportunities. During fiscal year 1953, when the Ryukyuan visible and invisible export total reached a value of \$58,110,000, approximately \$40,610,000 was from the invisible export of labor by islanders working for American individuals or agencies in the Ryukyus.<sup>51</sup> Such figures were typical for the years after 1949. The American occupation had transformed Okinawa's employment picture, and the long-range American military presence meant alternative positions for thousands of islanders who would not or could not return to traditional prewar occupations.

### *Fiscal Planning*

The economic rehabilitation of Okinawan life required not only agricultural and industrial programs, but sound fiscal planning as well. Well before the American invasion General Buckner had established the objectives of military government fiscal planning. These were to control and stabilize currency, to control all financial institutions, to curtail inflation, and to regulate all military government expenditures in the islands.<sup>52</sup>

The legal tender of the Ryukyus, both before and after the American invasion, was the same as that of the Japanese home islands—that is, yen notes of the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Taiwan, and the Bank of Chosen (Korea). Preinvasion fiscal planning assumed that the economy would be disrupted, that no dependable source of currency would exist for use by the invasion forces, and that the civilian economy would rely on military government to act in lieu of a central treasury—now that the islands would be cut off from the central government in Japan.<sup>53</sup> As a

<sup>50</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 30 June 1953*, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 3, copy in CMH Library; USCAR Rpt., Programs and Statistics to the Civil Administrator, "The Potential of the Ryukyu Islands," 31 Oct 51, BC-3024, File 091.3, RG 338, Federal Records Center, National Archives and Records Service, Kansas City.

<sup>51</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 11. Copy in CMH Library.

<sup>52</sup>Operational Directive No. 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General, Tenth Army (short title: GOPER), 6 Jan 45, RG 407.

<sup>53</sup>Lawrence/Watkins, Fiscal Affairs and Resumption of a Monetary Economy, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200.



supplemental currency, ¥75 million in Type “B” military yen, a form of occupation scrip printed in the United States, was imported to Okinawa and declared legal tender on a one-to-one exchange basis with the other yen notes in circulation.<sup>54</sup> Military government served as the custodian and funding agent for the “B” yen, both for the combat forces and for military government programs.

During the first two months of the occupation American servicemen did not need to have currency, since even such items as candy, cigarettes, and toothpaste were issued free of charge. The first “B” yen payment to the troops was made in June 1945.<sup>55</sup> There was also no reason to introduce currency into the civilian sector. With everyone working together, being moved about frequently, and sharing collectively (albeit, sometimes involuntarily), the resumption of a monetary economy on Okinawa would have led to even greater chaos. Consequently, for the first few weeks laborers were paid in kind, usually with K-rations. On the smaller islands, like Iheya and Kume Shima, some money continued to circulate because the economy there was far less disrupted than on Okinawa. Money, however, never played a major role in the subsistence economies of the outlying islands. To the extent that money was used on islands other than Okinawa, the impact was not entirely salutary. Because of the scarcity of goods throughout the Far East, inflation set in across the region. Japan’s growing inflation was felt in the Northern Ryukyus; that of Taiwan in the Southern Ryukyus.

On 1 June 1945 military government experimented by reintroducing a monetary economy on one island, Zamami Shima, in the Kerama Retto. All gainfully employed civilians received ¥1 per day, and were permitted to supplement their food ration with purchases from a central store. Military government officers fixed—and heavily subsidized—prices on basic consumer goods, for example, ¥1 for a gallon of kerosene, and 50 *sen* for a bar of all-purpose soap. Smuggling and black marketeering undermined this effort to some extent.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, the experiment encouraged military government headquarters on Okinawa to begin thinking about an eventual return to a full-scale money economy for the entire Ryukyus.

<sup>54</sup>Memo, Tenth Army AG (Col J.S. Garfield) to CINCPAC, 18 Oct 44, sub: Military Currency Requirements, ICEBERG, Records of War Dept., Civil Affairs Div., RG 165. See also Belmont Faries, “Military Currency: The B-Yen, 1945–1958,” *From the Dragon’s Den: Official Publication of the Ryukyu Philatelic Specialist Society, Ltd.* 12, No. 2 (June 1980): 52–58.

<sup>55</sup>Lawrence/Watkins, Fiscal Affairs and Resumption of a Monetary Economy, MS, Watkins papers, RG 200.

<sup>56</sup>Tenth Army Action Rpt., Ryukyus, 26 Mar–30 Jun 45, pp. 11–XXVII–4 & 11–XXVII–5. Copy in CMH Library; memo, Economics & Industry Officer to CO, MG Det. B–101–X on Kume Shima, 10 Aug 45, sub: Rpt. of Activities, Economics and Industry, Kume Shima, RG 407.

TABLE 3—RETAIL PRICE INDEX, JUNE 1946–JUNE 1948

Item	Jun 46	Dec 46	Jun 47	Dec 47	Jun 48
Rice	100	150	257	252	300
Sweet Potatoes	100	262	250	225	500
Fresh Fish	100	260	280	420	900
Dried Bonito	100	200	242	314	471
Cigarettes	100	333	350	500	433

Source: Bank of the Ryukyus, *Finance and Economics* (Naha: privately published, 1956), p. 128.


In March 1946, in an effort to abolish caches of old yen notes, military government headquarters declared only the “B” yen and the new Japanese yen to be legal tender in the Ryukyu Islands. Old imperial yen, exchanged during April, disappeared from circulation. On 1 May a monetary economy was restored on Okinawa with the dual currency system, but under the strictest of wage and price controls. In the same month military government established a centralized banking facility on the island with the somewhat pretentious title of “The Central Bank of Okinawa.” Its capital was subscribed by the Okinawa Department of Finance and mura governments through a military government loan. Initially this facility did little more than serve as a depository of funds and as an agency of the civilian government for paying employees’ salaries.<sup>57</sup>

Despite the stringent regulation of wage and price controls, including two currency exchanges (April 1946 and March 1947), inflation took hold. In a sense this inflation arrived during the period 1946–1948 in the parcels and bundles carried by thousands of Okinawans repatriated from the Japanese home islands. Repatriates were officially authorized to bring back no more than ¥1,000 per individual, but many smuggled in much larger amounts. Before long too many yen were chasing too few goods, initiating a chaotic inflationary spiral that persisted throughout 1947–1948, even though free trade was still officially prohibited.<sup>58</sup> The inflationary spiral resulted not only in a thriving black market, but also in the fixed retail prices of principal consumer items. (*See Table 3.*)

In 1948 military government officials moved decisively to control the inflation. On 4 May they created the Bank of the Ryukyus to consolidate all existing financial institutions in the Ryukyus, to regulate the money flow, and to provide reasonable loan opportunities for business. The military government administration subscribed to 51 percent of the insti-

<sup>57</sup>O’Flaherty MS, Chapter V.

<sup>58</sup>Bank of the Ryukyus, *Ten Year History of the Bank of the Ryukyus* (Naha: privately published by Matsuda Yushidestu, 1962), pp. 4–5, cited hereafter as *Bank of the Ryukyus*; interview, Freimuth with the author, 13 Nov 80.



BANK OF THE RYUKYUS, *Head Office (1953 photograph).*

tution's capital stock, with the remainder divided among the *guntos* of the archipelago. The bank drew its managerial personnel from each area, so that the citizens of each island group might feel they were sharing in the benefits of the bank. Originally capitalized at ¥10,000,000, the bank performed its functions well, providing the Ryukyus with commercial banking facilities. By 1952 it had expanded to twenty branch offices with a capitalization of ¥20,000,000 and assumed the responsibility for administering not only the domestic banking, but the foreign exchange program as well.<sup>59</sup> In July 1948 military government conducted Okinawa's third currency conversion, which established the Type "B" military yen as the sole legal tender in the Ryukyus. Japanese yen, which could no longer circulate legally, had to be converted under penalty of law.<sup>60</sup> The total amount converted was ¥665,443,283—four times the amount of money originally circulated twenty-seven months earlier. At last the Ryukyus had a unitary currency system. Since Japanese yen could no longer legally circulate, smuggling was made more difficult, although it was not entirely eliminated.<sup>61</sup> These steps, together with the adoption of a balanced yen budget for the administration, gradually brought downward pressure on the inflationary trend. With these policies implemented, mil-

<sup>59</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 74–75, copy in CMH Library; *Bank of the Ryukyus*, p. 6.

<sup>60</sup>MG Special Proclamations No. 29 and 30, 21 Jul 48, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>61</sup>Smuggling had always been a way of life for some Ryukyuans, particularly among those in the Southern Ryukyus nearest Taiwan.



itary government officers felt confident enough to reestablish the free enterprise system in October. They eliminated all price controls and rationing, except on food and certain surplus Army supplies. Their action instantly transformed the black market into a white market, thereby causing some initial confusion within the civil population.<sup>62</sup>

The restoration of free enterprise appears to have motivated the small industrial sector toward greater production. This motivation did not immediately translate into across-the-board increases in production figures because typhoon winds damaged many industries that autumn and winter. Still, business enthusiasm rekindled and inter-island trade slowly reactivated. Between January 1949 and October 1950, a period of less than two years, the native administrators issued approximately 19,000 new business licenses for various enterprises with a combined capital base exceeding five billion yen.<sup>63</sup> Although the shortage of raw materials continued to limit productivity, the civilian population was patently eager to produce and distribute more consumer products. Military government's determination to implement a responsible fiscal program of currency regulation and loan opportunities created an economic atmosphere in which that eagerness could be successfully expressed.

With the resumption of a free market system in the islands, headquarters staff recognized that more than moral support would be necessary if new enterprises were to succeed: the American administration on Okinawa would have to guarantee both the opportunity for business loans in the short term and the likelihood of a sensible tax structure in the future. Military government officers established the Ryukyuan Reconstruction Finance Fund in April 1950. An instrument of military government, and later the Civil Administration, the fund extended loans for between five and ten years for housing, public utilities, agriculture, commerce, and industry. Most of Okinawa's sugar mills and refrigeration plants under construction or planned during this period were built with these loans. The Bank of the Ryukyus, as trustee, administered the fund, which extended loans on a first come, first served basis—usually at 6 or 7 percent per annum interest rates. Capitalization for the fund came from Government and Relief in Occupied Areas Funds. In October 1959 the Civil Administration, recognizing that an era in the rehabilitation of the islands was ending, rechartered the Ryukyus Reconstruction Finance Fund as the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation.

A viable tax structure is an integral part of any sound fiscal policy,

<sup>62</sup>Nobuo Takamura, "Reconstruction and Development of the Okinawan Economy with Emphasis upon Monetary Methods," MBA thesis, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1957, pp. 14–24.

<sup>63</sup>*Bank of the Ryukyus*, pp. 3, 8.

and military government officers were anxious to begin collecting taxes as soon as possible, since the revenue was sorely needed to cover part of the cost of local governmental programs in the archipelago. But the prewar Japanese system of taxation was one of the many casualties of the battle for Okinawa. Economic life on the island had been so utterly devastated that any thought of a cash economy—much less of taxes—was out of the question. On many of the outlying islands, however, physical destruction during the American assault had been considerably less than on Okinawa. To the extent that economic life survived in Amami, Miyako, and Yaeyama Gunto, it was possible to revive some of the former Japanese tax laws as soon as domestic trade resumed. In the Kerama Retto, military government began an early exercise in taxation, not only as a source of revenues, but also as a means of controlling inflation. Beginning in the summer of 1945, civil affairs officers fixed prices and wages, the latter ranging from ¥.80 per day for a common laborer to ¥1.30 for professionals. On 1 September, military government began taxing family income at the rate of 70 percent of income in excess of the cost of living.<sup>64</sup> So successful was this program that taxes were sufficient by the end of September to cover the cost of local government programs within the Kerama Retto.

In April 1947 headquarters believed that the money economy had recovered to the point where a partial tax program could be attempted on Okinawa. With the approval of military government, the civilian gunto government compiled a budget incorporating the anticipated tax revenues, but covering any possible deficits with the proceeds from the local sale of Government and Relief in Occupied Areas imported goods. This arrangement proved to be a prudent precaution. Military government did not record any revenue from taxes on Okinawa until June 1947, and then these funds amounted to ¥494,870—only about twice what the gunto government received that month from court fines. This figure contrasts with the monthly income of ¥12,843,275.17 from the sale of Government and Relief in Occupied Areas trade goods.<sup>65</sup> The monies collected by taxation on Okinawa did not even cover operational expenses for the civilian government until 1952, when a more comprehensive tax program came into effect. Even then only administrative costs could be met; the capital budget for rehabilitation and recovery still depended upon American subsidies.<sup>66</sup>

Initially, military government made no attempt to unify the tax struc-

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<sup>64</sup>Currency exchange rpt., MG Fiscal Officer to CINCPAC MG, 4 Sep 45, RG 407.

<sup>65</sup>GHQ CINCUSAFPAC, Summation No. 8, Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of June 1947, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>66</sup>Takaramura, "Reconstruction and Development of the Okinawan Economy," p. 50.

tures for the four gunto governments. Separate and disparate gunto taxation systems existed until the last months of the military government regime. This delay in unifying the tax structure appears to have been less a matter of bureaucratic inertia than a recognition that the economic fortunes remained different and uneven in the various guntos. In June 1950 military government took the first step toward unifying the tax when headquarters staff imposed uniform tax rates on the sale of designated goods and services throughout the islands. In August headquarters directed that corporate income tax rates be made uniform throughout the archipelago and, in December 1950, decreed the same adjustment be made to individual income tax rates.<sup>67</sup> A significant part of military government's fiscal legacy to the Civil Administration, therefore, was a tested, evenly administered system of taxation.

The economic revitalization of Ryukyuan society in the years following the war must be counted among the most challenging efforts of American military government. Okinawa, in contrast to other enemy territories, was physically devastated and bereft of political and economic institutions to serve as foundations for societal rehabilitation. Yet American civil affairs officers were able quickly to transform this rubble, restoring the islands to a semblance of their prewar condition. Not content with this accomplishment, the military governors then launched an ambitious program to promote economic self-sufficiency in the Ryukyus, something the island people had never enjoyed in the past. Any such program faced intimidating odds. Their work was always of necessity subordinated to the primary military mission and was often the victim of waning American interest, diverted by crises elsewhere. The first military governors had little more than their sense of idealism and a sketchy knowledge of the land and its people to guide them in their task. Later civil affairs officers, however, could draw on economic, agricultural, and fisheries experts for assistance in their planning. The economic measures they initiated in the late 1940s successfully created a fragile but promising base upon which a relatively more self-sufficient economy might be developed.

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<sup>67</sup>USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 65. Copy in CMH Library.



## CHAPTER VI

# Transforming Okinawa

The rehabilitation of Okinawa during the 1940s was one of American military government's most remarkable achievements. It might appear that this transformation occurred along a smooth continuum beginning during the battle for Okinawa and ending with the extensive programs of the American Civil Administration in 1950, but, as described earlier, it did not. Once initial steps had been taken to ease the privations of Okinawa's civilians and to lay a rudimentary foundation for general economic, political, and social rehabilitation, progress in civil affairs came to a virtual halt. By mid-1946 frustrated military government officials had begun to encounter apathy and neglect among political and military leaders in Washington and Tokyo. For more than two years, military government in the Ryukyus was relegated to a "business as usual" status with a corresponding diminution in civil affairs initiatives. Only with the emergence of the Cold War and the rise of communist strength in the Far East did Washington renew its interest in Okinawa as a strategically important forward base. This renewed interest, first manifested in early 1949, had profound implications for military government plans and policies. In the end it enabled civil affairs officials, now armed with the necessary resources, to exceed their earlier, modest rehabilitation efforts and to initiate programs that would truly transform the island's society and economy.

### *America's Expanded Commitment*

Whatever limitations the Ryukyu Islands had in terms of natural resources, the main island of Okinawa possessed one valuable asset—its strategic location. Its capital, Naha, was only 970 air miles from Tokyo, 830 from Seoul, 390 from Taipei, and within easy range of central and southern China—even points in Manchuria. American military forces had fought to take Okinawa in one of the bloodiest battles of World War II specifically because of these geographic realities. Assessments of Oki-

nawa's strategic importance altered dramatically in the immediate post-war years. As the United States began acquiring bases in Japan and Korea, military facilities in the Ryukyus became neglected, and both they and the local economy suffered accordingly. But if the need for strong defenses seemed remote after the war, Okinawa's geographic potential remained unchanged, and events occurring in several parts of the globe in 1948 combined to convince the Truman administration of the continuing importance of strategic air bases in the islands.

The spirit of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Russia did not survive World War II. The Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia marked the lowering of an Iron Curtain across Europe. On the other side of the world, the advance of communist forces across northern China convinced many in the West that the communists sought to extend their hegemony over the Far East. In June 1948 General MacArthur, the Far East commander, warned Washington that communist successes in China raised the specter of Soviet access to air bases from which it could threaten Japan. Reassessing the image of the Ryukyus in the light of this threat, he strongly favored retaining and developing the Okinawan bases.<sup>1</sup> Reiterating MacArthur's dark scenario, U.S. Air Force officials noted that Sino-Soviet air operations from the Shanghai area could easily mount an attack against the now sparsely defended Ryukyus.<sup>2</sup>

Military realities in the Far East were also being discussed in the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that if China fell, Taiwan might also be occupied, thus threatening Japan from a previously safe quarter. In such a situation Okinawa's neglected military facilities, so near to Taipei, took on new significance. In October 1948 the council recommended to President Truman that the United States retain Okinawan facilities on a long-term basis and develop these "and such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands."<sup>3</sup> Significantly, the National Security Council paper, NSC 13/3, which was approved by Truman and became official policy on 6 May 1949, also included a statement that, while not so central to the thinking of the president's military advisors, certainly

<sup>1</sup>Msg, MacArthur to Under Sec. Army (William H. Draper), 711.94–9–1648, 12 Jun 48, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI *The Far East and Australia*, p. 819; msg, CINCFE to DA, Nr. C–65590, 20 Nov 48, sub: Strategic estimate, CCS File 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) Sec. 20, RG 218.

<sup>2</sup>*History of Twentieth Air Force (AF–DS–U3A) 1 July through 31 December 1950*, Historical Office, Twentieth Air Force (Capt Richard Bergman), 24 Mar 51. Copy at Office of Air Force History, microfilm M7004, index 1184; HQ RYCOM, Annual Historical Rpt. for 1950 to CINCFE, Feb 51. AIA 314.7, p. 20, File Historical Report-RYCOM (29th Inf. Regt.) 1950, RG 407.

<sup>3</sup>NSC 13/2, Report By the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan, 7 Oct 48 with separate recommended paragraph 5 submitted on 26 Oct 48. *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI *The Far East and Australia*, pp. 858–62 and 877.

loomed large in the minds of his political subordinates whose concern remained focused on relations with the Japanese and on the political and economic implications of a sustained military presence on Okinawa. The Department of State had accepted the need for military facilities in the Ryukyus for a protracted period, but in order to “establish political and economic security” in the islands, as the wording of its proposed amendment to NSC 13/2 had stated, the United States should “promptly formulate and carry out a program . . . for the economic and social well-being . . . of the natives,” a program that would lead to the “eventual reduction to a minimum” of Okinawa’s deficit economic condition.<sup>4</sup> Officials in the Department of State were driven to insist on this ambitious program for very practical reasons. They, along with their colleagues in the defense establishment, had come to realize that a sustained and expanding military presence in the Ryukyus was incompatible with existing procedures for funding military government efforts in the islands. Unlike the home-island Japanese, whose economic infrastructure had survived the war in far better shape than Okinawa’s, the citizens of Okinawa were in no position to underwrite occupation costs, even if the United States wished to oblige them to do so. True, military government officers had devised a system of income taxes and payroll deductions, administered by local officials, to cover the cost of labor and materials used in local indigenous government programs, but apart from their willingness and ability to supply labor for such projects, the Ryukyuans lacked the capacity in the foreseeable future to materially support their own reconstruction.

Since the surrender of Japan, military officials in Washington had argued that the Ryukyus were Japanese, were a part of occupied Japan, and that the costs of work by American forces, including military government, which benefitted the occupied area should be supported as far as possible by nonreimbursed commodities, materials, and services provided by Japanese themselves through Headquarters, Far East Command, in Tokyo. Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., outlined this position quite clearly in a letter to Assistant Secretary of State Charles E. Saltzman in August 1948:

... U.S. appropriated funds cannot be expended in an occupied area for indigenous materials and labor which are employed for the benefit of any such occupied area. In such cases, the costs of such items constitute occupation costs and, therefore, are chargeable against the indigenous economy. The Department of the Army has, heretofore, considered that the Ryukyu Islands, as a prefecture of Japan, remain a legal responsibility

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<sup>4</sup>NSC 13/3, 6 May 49. The NSC paper is quoted in *FRUS 1949*, Vol. VII *The Far East and Australia*, Part 2, pp. 730–36. See also JCS 1380 series, especially the appendix to JCS 1380/62, 9 May 49, pp. 464–465, file: CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec. 21, RG 218.



of the Japanese Government, and hence has assumed . . . that appropriated funds could not be used to pay for indigenous Japanese materials and labor utilized for the benefit of the Ryukyu Islands.<sup>5</sup>

Although Army officials realized that Tokyo's recovery remained fragile during the late 1940s, they were also convinced that the Japanese were more than able to contribute to the cost of military government. In fact in fiscal year 1951 alone Japan would provide \$297 million for the support of the American occupation forces in the home islands.<sup>6</sup>

Department of State officials, however, were not so concerned with economic matters, but were looking ahead to relations with a soon-to-be sovereign Japan. They were aware that the language in the forthcoming peace treaty would grant the United States administrative control over the Ryukyus for an indeterminate period, while leaving open the question of Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the islands.<sup>7</sup> A sovereign Japan could hardly be expected to provide material support for an American occupation of an area over which it retained only an implied sovereignty at best. The obvious short-term solution was for the United States to assume that portion of the burden now borne by the Japanese citizens. Essentially, the Department of State sought to have this commitment expressed at the highest level when it proposed that the National Security Council endorse a pay-as-you-go policy designed to free occupied Japan from the burden of underwriting Okinawan occupation costs. President Truman approved such a formula on 6 May 1949 as an amended paragraph five to the NSC policy statement on Japan and the Ryukyus:

. . . the United States national policy toward the Ryukyu Islands . . . requires that the United States Armed Forces and other government agencies stationed therein pay their way to the extent necessary and practical . . . that these Islands must then no longer be financially dependent upon or obligated to any other occupied area.<sup>8</sup>

General MacArthur, who was especially concerned with the economic and administrative ramifications of occupation costs, had been espousing a similar position since 1947. His headquarters had been obliged to underwrite the occupation costs for the Ryukyu Islands without reimbursement, an administrative and economic burden on the home islands. The Far East commander always considered that the rehabilitation of Japan was his primary duty, and he sought relief from the drain on the Japanese people imposed by his obligations to the military government efforts on Okinawa. Ideally, MacArthur wanted a new funding policy established

<sup>5</sup>Ltr, Draper to Saltzman, 18 Aug 48, File: P & O 014.1-TS (Section I) (Cases 1), RG 319.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings: Appropriations for Foreign Aid for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1951*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, pp. 489, 539, 543.

<sup>7</sup>The term "residual sovereignty" was first enunciated by John Foster Dulles at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference, but was not included in the treaty itself.

<sup>8</sup>NSC 13/3, 6 May 49.

under which the armed services and other government agencies on Okinawa would seek separate, direct appropriations from Congress for their particular programs.<sup>9</sup> Acceptance of the Department of State's position by the National Security Council, therefore, represented a victory for MacArthur as well as for the economy of Okinawa.

But the Department of State's interests in the island clearly transcended questions of economic policy or MacArthur's administrative burdens. Important political considerations were also involved in a policy that looked to a protracted American presence on Okinawa. State was particularly insistent on achieving the "economic and social well-being" of the occupied islands as a prerequisite for political stability among the population—an environment the president's advisors argued was essential to both the long-term success of the American base policy and American diplomatic relations with Japan. In essence, the Department of State posited and President Truman accepted the proposition that the success of America's Far Eastern policy depended in large measure on military government programs fostering political stabilization on Okinawa. Failure to do so might threaten American bases with social and political upheaval born of Cold War pressures in Asia.

Whatever the limitations of the land with its meager natural resources and of a population with little to sell but its labor, a viable economic and social base would now have to be created that went beyond restoring prewar levels of development. Continued, and expanded, American aid would be necessary to launch such energetic programs. The United States would somehow have to prime the pump, since Okinawa itself—never self-sustaining, even in prewar days—had neither the human nor the material resources necessary to reshape itself into a society along the lines the president, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs felt necessary.

The National Security Council position boded well for the Ryukyuan economy, but it also ushered in a period of intense soul-searching in Washington and the Far East Command over the wholly inadequate physical and economic conditions in the islands. In May 1949 the Department of State sent anthropologist Douglas L. Oliver from its Office of Far Eastern Affairs to survey the situation in both Japan and the Ryukyus. Oliver, though mindful of the strides made by military government programs in the immediate postwar period in the Ryukyus, was extremely critical of the lack of progress during the next three years. He detailed the failures of the command both in terms of military preparedness and

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<sup>9</sup>See msg, SCAP (MacArthur) to JCS, C57842, 8 Jan 48. See also, msg, CINCFE to CG RYCOM, 1 Apr 49, File: RYCOM April 1-15, 1950, RG 9, MacArthur Archives.

the program for social and economic development. Oliver's report moved his superiors at the Department of State to draft a new directive for the command, which they sent along to the assistant secretary of the Army, expressing the hope that such a document, distributed to all echelons of the island's military government, would go far in meeting the need for "steady progress."<sup>10</sup>

The Army leadership in Washington responded to the Oliver report, with its dire tone, by sending Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees in September on an unannounced inspection trip, ostensibly to examine the damage caused by typhoon Gloria. Voorhees was primarily responsible within the department for matters pertaining to occupied areas. He obviously intended to investigate not only physical damage, but also the conditions described by Oliver, by the Army's Inspector General in March 1949, and by the popular media.<sup>11</sup> His inspection confirmed the deplorable state of facilities on Okinawa. Even the rubble generated by the typhoons could not mask the effects of some three years of Washington's relative bureaucratic neglect in practically every area of American endeavor on Okinawa, from military construction to military government economic planning. Voorhees acknowledged that the only real progress made in restoring a prewar standard of economic development on Okinawa had been planned and undertaken some years before with a minimum of financial and material support from the Far East Command in Tokyo. His acceptance of these realities was significant because it indicated that the Department of the Army was ready to accept the Department of State's assessment: something was wrong with the administration of the island bastion and something had to be done to revitalize its defenses and its social and economic base.

Unlike previous investigations, the Voorhees trip and a subsequent visit by Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins in October produced immediate results. Collins replaced the incumbent Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles, with Maj. Gen. Josef R. Sheetz. Sheetz, whose most recent assignment was as chief military government officer in Korea, was well known in the Army and the press as an energetic officer (*Time* described him as a "convivial hustler").<sup>12</sup> He was almost immediately joined by Maj. Gen. Alvin C. Kincaid, who assumed command of the Twentieth Air Force on Okinawa in June and

<sup>10</sup>Ltr, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, DOS, to Deputy to Asst SecA, 29 Jul 49, *FRUS 1949*, Vol. VII *The Far East and Australia*, Part 2, pp. 815–6.

<sup>11</sup>Ryukyus Command and Unit Historical Reports-1949, p. 2, File "Command Rpt.—Ryukyus Command Pt. #1 1949," RG 407. Reporting on conditions in March 1949, the Army's Inspector General, Maj Gen Louis A. Craig, noted that living conditions and recreational facilities for American servicemen on Okinawa were far below accepted Army standards.

<sup>12</sup>*Time* 54 (28 Nov 49):24.



who also enjoyed an activist reputation in military circles. Both men possessed clear mandates to rehabilitate their respective areas of the island bastion.

Sheetz began by recruiting a force of 60 to 80 military government planners from the Far East Command staff in Toyko to assist him. He said he wanted them to act “as a kind of junior SCAP for Okinawa.” To all members of his new command he announced: “you are ambassadors without portfolio of the United States Government.” And to the press he observed: “the United States had more than a strategic interest in the islands. It carries with it the moral responsibility of a Christian people to others.”<sup>13</sup>

Sheetz enjoyed considerable support from MacArthur’s headquarters in Japan and from the Army Staff in Washington. He presided over the initiation of an expanded construction program that included \$22 million for military housing, with procurement of materials and services being made as far as possible in the Ryukyus. He made the stipulation so that the program, although designed for military purposes, would serve to stimulate the civilian economy as well. Sheetz was also able to take advantage of increased appropriations in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds to stimulate economic rehabilitation through expanded military government programs.

Sheetz undertook a number of economic initiatives within his command. He secured a trade agreement with Far East Command under which the Ryukyus might purchase \$9 million of goods in exchange for Japanese purchases of Ryukyuan goods—a measure intended to retain the powerful Far East commander’s support for the program’s particulars by insuring increased economic development in both occupied areas. Sheetz also declared his intention to carry out the recommendations of the agricultural mission led by Raymond E. Vickery and welcomed a financial and general economic team from MacArthur’s headquarters to help him devise a coordinated economic and fiscal plan for the islands. After less than one month on the job Sheetz could report to General MacArthur that:

In my opinion, the conduct of the troops is improving. The local native officials are demonstrating that they can handle the added responsibilities which we are passing to them progressively. The native people are anticipating an improvement in their economic conditions. In short, Sir, although we have barely scratched the surface on the things to be done, I am confident that we are on the right track.<sup>14</sup>

While Department of State officials welcomed Sheetz’s moves, they

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<sup>13</sup>Quoted by Frank Gibney in “Okinawa: Forgotten Island,” *Time* 54 (28 Nov 49):24.

<sup>14</sup>Ltr, Maj Gen J.R. Sheetz to MacArthur, 25 Nov 49, VIP File No. 20-Sheetz, RG 10, MacArthur Archives.

were also pleased to note that a draft directive which had originated in their Far Eastern Affairs Office was being widely circulated.<sup>15</sup> Addressed to the Far East commander on 30 November, the draft directive reaffirmed MacArthur's responsibilities for the administration of the Ryukyus and referred to the proposed "new" government in the area as the "U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands." The directive set forth a number of semantic changes. The title military governor, for example, became simply governor, but the individuals occupying this post and their duties remained unchanged. All principal figures in the island administration continued to be military officers. The Army continued to use the terms military government officer and civil affairs officer interchangeably, further blurring the distinction between the military government years and the emerging concept of a civil administration. The directive spelled out as a general policy the idea that the economic and social progress ordained by the president in May was to be achieved "to the maximum extent by the efforts of the Ryukyuans themselves." The directive also called for broadening the base of self-government "through legislative, executive and judicial organs established in accordance with democratic principles" and for adopting basic laws "promulgated by elected representatives." Finally, the directive looked to a cultural and educational program that fostered the arts and sciences and enlightened civil consciousness "with due regard for the existing culture."

The Department of State officials also called for an "indirect" administration that would operate through Ryukyuan governmental authorities. To that end they listed in some detail the development of civilian government, beginning at the local or municipal level with the appointment of native counterparts to the principal officers of the military government. The directive also outlined the legal, economic, educational, and technical changes needed to transform the Ryukyuans into a modern, democratic society.

In discussing the relationships that were to prevail between the Americans and the islanders, the directive broke new ground. It called for authorizing local police, in the absence of military police, to arrest and detain members of the armed forces when observed in the commission of a felony. It ordered that members of the armed forces and their dependents be made aware of the basic objectives of military government, so that a "mutual feeling of friendship and respect is fostered between the natives and U.S. personnel." To that end and in view of the acute shortage of arable land to support the local economy, it called on the

<sup>15</sup>Memo, Asst. SecState for Far Eastern Affairs to SecState, 12 Dec 49, *FRUS 1949*, Vol. VII *The Far East and Australia*, Part 2, pp. 912–913.

armed forces to keep their use of such land to an “absolute minimum consistent with the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives.”<sup>16</sup>

General Sheetz would use the provisions of this draft directive to guide his military and societal reforms. General MacArthur did not issue a formal directive until 5 December 1950, almost a year later.<sup>17</sup> By that time experiences with military government had dictated minor changes in the draft, but the Far East Command remained true to the basic policies suggested by the Department of State. The command recognized and retained the dual obligation to update and maintain strategically important military facilities while encouraging and supporting the development of the Ryukyuan economy and society. When these obligations fostered mutually exclusive programs, achieving an acceptable balance was the responsibility of the civil affairs officers.

### *Revitalized Construction Efforts*

The Department of the Army recognized that it would take more than energetic military government leadership to rejuvenate Okinawa.<sup>18</sup> Carefully designed military construction programs, especially ones that would provide jobs for and facilities within the civilian sector, and the appropriated funds to carry out these programs were also needed. Under Secretary Voorhees dispatched a number of experts in various fields to devise the necessary plans. One group of skilled Army, Air Force, and civilian engineers, headed by Army Brig. Gen. George J. Nold, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Military Construction, conducted a thorough study of military construction requirements on the island in October 1949. The Nold mission developed a master plan with a special emphasis on typhoon-resistant structures utilizing reinforced concrete and concrete block construction. Typhoon Gloria had convinced the engineers that, given the excessive annual losses from storm damage, the United States could no longer depend on temporary construction in the Ryukyus.<sup>19</sup> Many of the Twentieth Air Force's temporary structures that had not

<sup>16</sup>Proposed directive, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Nov 49, annex to memo, Asst. SecState for Far Eastern Affairs to SecState, 12 Dec 49, *FRUS 1949*, Vol. VII *The Far East and Australia*, Part 2, pp. 913–917.

<sup>17</sup>The Ryukyuan Command was officially redesignated the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands on 15 December 1950. See Memo, JCS to CINCFE, SM-2474–50, 11 Oct 50, File CCS 383.21 POA (1–12–45), Sec. 3, RG 218. The memo derived from JCS 1231/14, 4 Oct 50; GHQ FECOM, Directive AG 091.1 (5 Dec 50) RCA, 5 Dec 50, sub: Directive for the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>18</sup>The National Security Act of 26 July 47 had redesignated the War Department as the Department of the Army.

<sup>19</sup>Col T.A. Lane, CE, “Construction on Okinawa,” *Military Engineer* 44, No. 302 (Nov–Dec 52): 418.



been destroyed by Gloria's high winds had been so badly twisted and damaged as to be unsafe. Their subsequent demolition had to be added to the storm's destructive toll. Temporary construction was proving to be economically shortsighted—Far East Air Forces estimated that between September 1945 and Gloria's aftermath more than \$10 million had been spent restoring essential temporary structures damaged by typhoons.<sup>20</sup>

The Nold mission emphasized joint-use projects, such as roads, bridges, utilities, and harbors that would benefit both the military establishment and the local economy. This was not the first instance where Army planners developed programs for road and bridge construction on Okinawa, but the Nold mission represented something significantly different: for the first time military construction efforts on the island were to focus on facilities that would not only clearly serve the military mission, but at the same time would actively stimulate local civilian economic activity by providing jobs, water, power, and improved transport for native laborers and products. In November the Far East commander approved the mission's specific recommendations for construction.

To devise a military construction program along the lines recommended by the Nold mission, Under Secretary Voorhees sent a team of economic planners and budget expeditors under Robert A. Martino and Lt. Col. F. C. Norvell to Okinawa in November. The team developed plans for numerous joint-use projects. Roads, harbor facilities, public utilities, and military housing were all to be rehabilitated. At the same time, Martino and Norvell concentrated on giving Okinawa a face lift, ameliorating its image as a physical junk pile. The vast acreage of rusting vehicles and other equipment dumped on Okinawa by the Far East Command in Tokyo would be rehabilitated; the "junk" vehicles and equipment would be reclassified as scrap to be shipped back to the United States or surveyed and turned over to the civilians as scrap for recycling in local industries. The efforts of Voorhees, Nold, Martino, Norvell, and many others resulted in an integrated military construction program—one in which even strictly military construction would stimulate the civil economy—under the direction of the District Engineer, Okinawa Engineer District.<sup>21</sup>

These ambitious plans could not come to fruition, however, until Congress provided adequate monies from the special Government and

<sup>20</sup>Maj Gen James B. Newman, Jr., USAF, "Air Force Construction on Okinawa," *The Military Engineer* 42, No. 287 (May–June 1950): 172.

<sup>21</sup>Msg, DA Conference TT No. 2839 to Conferees, 23 Nov 49, Ofc of History, C of E, File 12; USCAR, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 5, copy in CMH Library. See also "MG Officials Set Plans to Beautify Okinawa," *Stars and Stripes*, Pacific ed., 14 Nov 49.

Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) fund and from military construction funding. Before fiscal year 1950 all Government and Relief in Occupied Areas procurement for Okinawa came directly from the United States. Beginning with 1950, however, Congress directed that, whenever possible, supplies for the Ryukyus reconstruction program should be procured in Japan. It did this because Japanese traders had been having difficulty with foreign sales due to Japan's lack of diplomatic status and the economic rehabilitation of Japan was viewed in Washington as an American responsibility. Congress, therefore, insisted on a "double use of the dollar" approach to reconstruction on Okinawa; that is, insofar as possible, the American occupation officials on Okinawa were to spend appropriated funds in the Japanese marketplace. For fiscal year 1950 civil affairs planners anticipated spending over \$19 million in Japan for men and material committed to Ryukyu construction, thereby enabling the Congress to take appropriated funds from one pocket to put into another, through the "double use of the dollar" concept.

Despite this careful planning, the question remained whether Congress would in fact appropriate the necessary funds. In May 1949 President Truman wrote to Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, in support of increased expenditures for the Ryukyus:

Only by the continuance of this program could we expect the people in those areas eventually to become self-supporting. I feel that provision of an amount adequate to carry on the [GARIOA] program . . . at the level requested will, in the long run, reduce the overall cost of accomplishing our occupation responsibilities.<sup>22</sup>


Later that autumn, Pentagon officials also began to lobby Congress on behalf of the expanded Ryukyuan military construction program. Because of the sense of near emergency surrounding the Okinawa budget request, Congress took the unusual step of agreeing to the funds for the year quickly without a lengthy prior justification process. To aid that step, the Pentagon's representatives agreed to submit the necessary rationale later.<sup>23</sup> In January 1950, Under Secretary Voorhees provided part of that rationale and defended appropriations not only for that fiscal year but also for subsequent years. Noting that "facilities of all kinds on Okinawa are extremely poor and inadequate," Voorhees outlined the Army's plan to use Japanese and Okinawan labor and materials to redeem this situation.<sup>24</sup> His proposals coincided nicely with the will of Congress, which responded with an initial combined Army-Air Force military re-

<sup>22</sup>Ltr, Truman to Cannon, 26 May 49, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library.

<sup>23</sup>Lane, "Construction on Okinawa," p. 419.

<sup>24</sup>Ltr, Voorhees to Cannon, 16 Jan 50, File: Office of the Military Secretary, RG 5, MacArthur Archives.





GARIOA REHABILITATION PROJECTS. *Naha City water supply system with housing development in background (1953 photograph).*

construction budget of approximately \$74 million for fiscal year 1950. Within a matter of weeks the lawmakers in Washington also authorized \$25 million in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds.<sup>25</sup> Subsequent appropriations increased the initial funding for fiscal year 1950 considerably and gave the engineers hope that funding for construction in later fiscal years would be assured.<sup>26</sup> In January this hope was realized when Congress authorized an additional \$37.8 million in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds through fiscal year 1952 and authorized construction, much of it housing construction, to proceed.<sup>27</sup>

In June 1950 the Ryukyus Command solicited bids for the rehabilitation of Okinawa's Bucknerville water system, and, for the first time, solicited bids from Japanese contractors. American, Filipino, and Japanese contractors all bid competitively on the fixed price (lump sum) contracts, which were drawn to American standard specifications.<sup>28</sup> With a few exceptions, Japanese contractors underbid their competitors, and most Filipino and American contractors withdrew from the Okinawan market by the end of 1950. Regardless of which national group held the

<sup>25</sup>Lane, "Construction on Okinawa," p. 419; msg, Voorhees to MacArthur, WAR 95122, 5 Oct 49, sub: Construction on Okinawa, Ofc of History, C of E, File 12; memo, Asst. Sec State for Far Eastern Affairs to Sec State, 12 Dec 49, *FRUS* 1949, Vol. VII *The Far East and Australia*, Part 2, p. 912.

<sup>26</sup>History of the Okinawa Engineer District, Aug 66, p. 2; memo, Chief of Engineers (Maj Gen Lewis A. Pick) to Director of Logistics, GSUSA, 8 Feb 50, sub: Defense of the Army's Fiscal Year 1951 Construction Program, Ofc of History, C of E, File 12.

<sup>27</sup>RYCOM Historical Rpt., 1950, pp. 2–3, RG 407.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 4–9.



principal contracts, the local population began to benefit from the construction boom as thousands of Okinawans, especially after November 1951, were hired to assist with the construction programs on the island.

The construction boom and the opening of bidding to everyone spawned the growth of at least two indigenous Okinawan construction firms. Founded before the war, the Kokuba-Gumi (company) in 1949 became the first Okinawan prime contractor to beat out Japanese and Filipino competitors for a major joint-use construction project, the Chibana Bridge. This successful undertaking led to the award of other military construction projects for the company and its president, Kokuba Kotaro, including numerous roads on American bases, the Makiminato (Machinato) Ordnance Work, and the American military hospital in Chantan Son. A second construction firm, the Oshiro-Gumi, soon joined in the economic expansion, thereby facilitating the task of military government economic planners by assuring more local jobs and consumer revenues.<sup>29</sup>

Despite interruptions and the shortage of men and equipment caused by the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the rehabilitation of buildings, runways, roads, harbor facilities, and utilities continued without serious pause. Okinawa was on its way to becoming a major island bastion in the American network of overseas bases. In addition to its large contingent of construction troops, the Ryukyus Command included a number of combat units, including the 29th Infantry, at a peace-time strength of 85 officers and some 2,000 men, and the 97th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, consisting of the 22d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion and the 65th AAA Gun Battalion. More important, the command played host to the Twentieth Air Force, whose rapidly expanding components included the 22d and 307th Bomb Groups, the 19th Bomb Wing, Medium, and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. These units, along with the 6332d Air Base Wing, the 529th Aircraft Control and Warning Group, and the 931st Engineer Aviation Group were deployed at Okinawa's two major air facilities, Kadena Air Base and Naha Air Base.<sup>30</sup>

The continually enlarging presence of air units in the islands set the priority for construction. In July 1950 Far East Air Forces made \$2.5

<sup>29</sup>Kyoh Katoh, *True Okinawan Spirit*, pp. 61–63; interview, Freimuth with the author, 1 May 85.

<sup>30</sup>At the conclusion of World War II, Army Air Force units on Okinawa were part of the Eighth Air Force, which joined the war in the Pacific after V-E Day. In June 1946 the 1st Air Division succeeded the Eighth Air Force, units of which remained on Okinawa as components of the 1st Air Division. On 1 Dec 48 the Thirteenth Air Force transferred, less personnel and equipment, from the Philippines to Okinawa and succeeded the 1st Air Division, which was inactivated. In mid-May 49, the Twentieth Air Force transferred, less personnel and equipment, to Okinawa, and the Thirteenth Air Force returned to the Philippines. Thirteenth Air Force units on Okinawa then became components of the Twentieth Air Force. Historical Data, Twentieth Air Force, July–December 1949, Vol. I, p. 1, copy at Office of Air Force History, microfilm A7723, index 1165.

million available for expansion of runways and hardstand extension and maintenance at Kadena. It also earmarked \$2 million for the rehabilitation of Yontan, Bolo, and Futema auxiliary airstrips with the construction of new runways, taxiways, and service aprons.<sup>31</sup> This construction marked the beginning of a growing Air Force presence on Okinawa that, with periodic expansions and contractions, would remain even after reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan a generation later.

Although air base construction won highest priority, General Sheetz was particularly mindful of the connection between troop morale and the relationships with the islanders, and between troop morale and improved housing and recreational facilities for servicemen and their dependents. He wanted to emphasize this area of construction in 1950, and both the Ryukyus Command and the Twentieth Air Force featured a high proportion of recreational facilities and troop housing projects in their plans for that fiscal year. Included among these projects was an innovative program that involved a high concentration of local civilian employees.

At the beginning of fiscal year 1950, the Ryukyus Command demonstrated ingenuity in combining the need for more military housing with military government's efforts to rebuild the local economy. The terrible storms of 1949 had severely damaged numerous structures and created an acute housing shortage for the services. General Sheetz had no extraordinary funds to rehabilitate these dilapidated buildings except Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds, but these monies could legally be used only to support military government programs to directly benefit the Okinawan economy—the funds could not be employed to rebuild desperately needed military housing. The Ryukyus Command's expedient was to declare 438 battered quonset huts as surplus, to be released to the Ryukyuan native government. Once this transfer was accomplished, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds could be used to rehabilitate the quonsets, using local labor and materials. The refurbished units could then be rented back to the military forces, thereby achieving both original objectives: creating additional housing for American servicemen, while at the same time providing both funds and employment for the local economy.<sup>32</sup>

To expedite this program, military government headquarters chartered a quasi-governmental corporation, the Okinawa Housing Corpo-

<sup>31</sup>*History Twentieth Air Force (AF-DA-U3A) 1 July through 31 December 1950*, Historical Office, Twentieth Air Force (Capt Richard Bergman), 24 Mar 51, microfilm roll M7004, index 1184; Historical Data, Twentieth Air Force, Jan–Jun 50, Vol. I, pp. 392–3, 413–5, microfilm A7224, index 1512. Both at Office of Air Force History.

<sup>32</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings: Appropriations for Foreign Aid for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1951*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, p. 542; ltr, Comptroller Gen of the U.S. (W.L. Morrow) to Sec Army, B-114950, 17 Aug 53, Freimuth Papers.

ration, and released the quonsets to that corporate entity. By March 1950, thirty-two additional rehabilitation housing and recreational projects involving the services of local artisans and laborers had been developed.<sup>33</sup>

The new construction, along with other command initiatives to make life more enjoyable for servicemen, including establishment of an island-wide bus service for the troops, American banking facilities, and even a privately-owned local English-language newspaper, all began to transform popular attitudes toward assignment to the islands. Along with the increased workload and the quickened tempo of construction and rehabilitation came a growing sense among officers and men alike of the importance of their mission. Okinawa was no longer a quiet backwater of the Far East Command. General Sheetz could report a marked improvement in morale in 1950, a transformation made complete some two years later when a survey revealed that the island had come to be considered a welcome duty assignment by officers and men of the Far East Command.<sup>34</sup> The civil population benefitted in at least three ways from the transformation of service life on the island. The Okinawan economy derived considerable gain from the use of the roads, utilities, and harbor facilities that resulted from the expanding building effort. At the same time, thousands of Okinawans were hired to assist with the construction boom on the island. Finally, as more and more military personnel gladly accepted duty on the island, the civilians were exposed to fewer of those malcontent servicemen whose attitude had caused so much misery just a few years earlier.

### *The Land Issue*

These benefits were purchased at dear cost to the traditional Ryukyuan way of life. As discussed earlier, the physical configuration of the islands was such that the same arable soil that supported the growth of rice and sweet potatoes was the only land appropriate for airfields and ammunition dumps. From the first days of the occupation, therefore, a competition over land had existed between those officials charged with creating a strategic base for military operations and those assigned to the care and rehabilitation of Okinawan society. President Truman's approval of NSC 13/3 had continued, not ameliorated, tensions between the strategic mission and the military government effort. The National Security Council program had imposed a mandate both to renew and expand the languishing base construction and to create a socio-economic foundation

<sup>33</sup>RYCOM Historical Rpt., 1950, pp. 1-9, RG 407.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.; Lane, "Construction on Okinawa," p. 420.



that would support a long-term American presence. Revitalized base construction clearly would have an impact on a local economy. Both Congress and the military chiefs in Washington assumed that this impact would be favorable, as appropriated funds created new jobs and improved the Okinawan standard of living. Perhaps even the civil affairs officers on the island were not fully aware of the adverse impact the base build-up would have, not only on local land use and therefore on local employment, but also on Ryukyuan-American relations in general. In fact, rather than improving relations, the National Security Council program only served to heighten the tug of war over land use, with the tactical forces seeking to absorb more and more acres for additional facilities while military government officials sought release of land already occupied by the military. It was an unequal contest; in every case civilian needs had to give way to the command's overriding military mission. The land issue that resulted from the appropriation of civilian holdings, no matter how economically favorable it might have seemed for the islanders, created a negative image of Americans in the minds of many Okinawans, so much so as to overshadow and eventually undermine many of the progressive programs undertaken by civil affairs officers. The question would sour Ryukyuan-American relations for years to come.<sup>35</sup>

Recognizing that 20 percent of the land under cultivation before the American invasion was now behind barbed wire or under concrete, General MacArthur admitted that military government was substantially burdened in its efforts to promote agricultural growth. On 1 July 1946 only 11,000 acres of farm land had been in production on the island of Okinawa; by the end of 1947 that acreage had risen to between 40 and 45,000—a remarkable increase and no mean triumph for military government's agricultural program. However, another 35,000 acres, at least 70 percent of it arable, remained within the confines of military bases.<sup>36</sup>

In February 1948 James H. Boulware, a consultant in the Natural Resources Section of General MacArthur's headquarters, had recommended that units in the Ryukyus and elsewhere be directed to reevaluate their needs for agricultural land and that nonessential parcels of land be released for agricultural use.<sup>37</sup> Subsequent efforts by General Sheetz and

<sup>35</sup>*Passtime-Keystone News*, Okinawa, Japan, Vol. 8–9, 1–15 May 82, item: "Naha Suit Against U.S. Forces Land Use Starts." As recently as 1982, for example, the mayor of Naha sued the Japanese government in an effort to remove American installations from municipal land occupied without lease.

<sup>36</sup>GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [*sic*] Islands for the Secretary of War, 11 Oct 47, p. 9, File: SCAP; Government Section, Occupation Reports Japan and Ryukyus, RG 5, MacArthur Archives.

<sup>37</sup>Memo for record, James H. Boulware, Nr. 309 (20 Feb 48) A, 20 Feb 48, sub: Agricultural Conditions in the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers.

others on Okinawa resulted in the release of some acreage by the Army and Navy, but very little. In mid-1950 military reservations still occupied over 17 percent of Okinawa's territory.<sup>38</sup> And this token shift in land usage from military to civilian priorities would be more than wiped out by the impact of the Korean War. By 1954 military installations and their supporting areas once again occupied 26 percent of Okinawa's total land area.

Statistics alone did not reveal the full nature of the problem. Once the soil had been graded and paved over or oiled for use as a road, hardstand, or airstrip, fertility suffered considerably, and it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make the ground once again workable with hand implements. The American military presence, therefore, not only affected the bucolic nature of Okinawan society, it altered the nature of the soil itself.

In an effort to increase the amount of land under cultivation, civil affairs officers were able from the first to convince commanders of some military installations, including Kadena Air Force Base, to permit farming within the installations' boundary fences. Although statistics on how many additional acres were farmed as a result of these efforts are not exact, it is unlikely that the number was very great. And, after 1948, when another American action established and enforced the so-called "one-mile limit," even this modest effort was undermined.

Since the beginning of the garrison phase of operations Army officers had imposed sundry restrictions upon civilian use of land directly adjacent to military installations and housing areas. One such restriction—one of the more galling to the civilians and more injurious to the agricultural effort—was the "one-mile limit" which prohibited any native structure within one mile of any dependent housing or military billet of 100 or more soldiers. The prohibition, which was prompted by General Eagles' concerns about health and sanitation, was reiterated in a succession of military government directives and was enforced, sometimes very reluctantly, by the native police.<sup>39</sup> The public rationale for this particular distance was that one mile was estimated to be just outside the flying range of a mosquito. The fact that a mosquito need not fly to travel between native huts and American billets, since the larvae, borne in the run-offs of sudden rains, could easily penetrate within a one-mile radius, did not seem to be a consideration in drafting the restrictive directives.

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<sup>38</sup>"Land Use in 1950, Okinawa Gunto," *Ryukyus Statistical Bulletin*, No. 6, June 1950, p. 57, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>39</sup>MG Directive No. 3, 18 Jan 49, sub: Building Permits; MG Directive No. 17, 17 Jun 49, MG Ordinance No. 1, Change 1, 13 Jul 49, and memo, Chief of Public Safety Section (Paul Skuse) to Acting Director, Government and Legal Dept. (Lt Col Andrews), undated, sub: History of the So-Called "One Mile Limit," Skuse Papers.

In trying to enforce the one-mile limit in the name of sanitation, Headquarters, Ryukyus Command, was working at cross purposes with the Military Government Section's goal of achieving maximum agricultural output. In certain less fertile sections of Okinawa the arbitrary limit was hardly noticed, but in the more intensely farmed areas, such as the Nakagami District in central Okinawa, it proved to be a real detriment to farming. In that particular district, well over half the land under cultivation fell within the one-mile limit. Tools and crops had to be carried over greater distances than would otherwise be necessary. Moreover farmers, who without the restriction could live nearer their plots, were now crowded into swollen settlement areas further away from their farms. In retrospect, it could be argued that the one-mile limit, designed to improve the overall sanitary situation on the island, might have had the opposite effect in some areas of Okinawa.

In September 1949 the Vickery agricultural mission emphatically condemned the one-mile limit's adverse effects on agricultural productivity. Questioning the necessity for such restrictions, the group urged that "the restricted zone be drastically reduced."<sup>40</sup> Despite the Vickery group's recommendation, the one-mile limit was neither eased nor eliminated for several more months. Nevertheless, the native Okinawans continued to test the restriction by trying to build closer than permitted to military facilities. Especially after a typhoon's visitation, during the confusion of civilian salvage efforts, the islanders invariably attempted to move their sundry structures nearer to American installations.

Moreover, acquisition of land for military purposes flew in the face of the islanders recently acquired concept of land ownership. The notion of private ownership for the masses was less than a half-century old when the Americans arrived to establish bases on the islands. In earlier centuries a feudal system had prevailed under which the king allocated lands among his loyal nobles and organized the distribution of arable land among the villagers. Periodically, kings would adjust allocation of land to accommodate increases in population or equalize the tax burden among the villages. Gradually, the concept of land ownership developed in the urban areas of Naha and Shuri, where permanent buildings and business establishments were not adaptable to such adjustments and where the kings retained control of land to support their retinue. Elsewhere, land continued to be reallocated periodically, although a trend developed that left ancestral homesites in the hands of the same extended family groups.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup>Vickery Report, p. 22, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>41</sup>Clarence J. Glacken, *The Great Loochoo: A Study of Okinawan Village Life* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955), pp. 124, 126.



In 1899 Tokyo had enacted an Okinawa Prefecture Land Reform Law which, along with initiating the last official redistribution of land, also ushered in the popular notion of land ownership for the masses for the first time in Ryukyuan history.<sup>42</sup> Once established, the concept of private ownership quickly became deeply rooted in the Okinawan psyche. Since previously only the nobility or wealthy urban merchants owned land, land ownership became an important symbol of status. If at all possible, rural families sought to own rather than rent land. More important in a rural society where the extended family was the focus of daily life, plots of land that could be handed down from generation to generation served as concrete links to the entire family, past, present, and future.

The Okinawan view of the soil differed widely from traditional American ways of evaluating real estate. In America, farms or ranches were often measured in hundreds or thousands of acres and such land was usually viewed as a business asset to be bought or sold as circumstances warranted. On Okinawa, where arable land was far less abundant, farm plots were not measured by the acre, but by the *tsubo*, a measure equivalent to 3.6 square meters, or approximately 36 square feet. Each tiny plot, however infertile, was psychologically important to the Okinawan farmer, who would never consider selling his land—his ancestral homesite and, in many cases, his ancestors' resting place—unless under the direst of circumstances.<sup>43</sup> To sell one's land was to lose a large measure of one's sense of identity.

Most military government officials were sensitive to Okinawan attitudes toward the land and to the inevitable feelings of rootlessness experienced by Okinawans displaced by the base development program. As early as September 1945 the command's deputy commander for military government had raised the issue of land usage on Okinawa with his superior.<sup>44</sup> Rear Adm. J.D. Price's response clearly pledged the American forces to restore to civilians "as much of the area of Okinawa as is possible" and ordered civil affairs officers to indicate those areas desired for release for civilian use. His one caveat: the release of land was "subject to the approval of the Commandant."<sup>45</sup> Whatever land proposals military government officials might develop, therefore, remained subject to veto if, in the judgment of the tactical commanders, the land was needed by their units to carry out their military mission.

Military government used the Price statement as a starting point for

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<sup>42</sup>USCAR, Study of the Land Problem in Okinawa, 1 Oct 55, Appendix 1, pp. 1–2, Freimuth Papers.

<sup>43</sup>Morris, *Tiger by the Tail*, p. 78.

<sup>44</sup>Ltr, Dep Cmdr for MG to CG ASCOM I, 19 Sep 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>45</sup>Memo, Commandant, NOB, to Deputy Commander for MG, 23 Oct 45, Serial 2320, Sub: Administrative and Economic Measures for Okinawa, Proposals for, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

the eventual consideration of land claims. Headquarters issued a proclamation to the islanders promising to protect their “property rights.”<sup>46</sup> Although the term was clear in American law, the exact meaning of property rights was open to several confusing interpretations on Okinawa. A great deal of the confusion was caused by American ignorance of Okinawan property law and evidence of ownership. In December 1945, eight months after the American invasion, military government headquarters directed district commanders to assemble and preserve property records.<sup>47</sup> This delay was understandable. Attempts to resettle the thousands of displaced refugees from military government camps to their home areas did not begin until October 1945. Moreover, so long as hostilities continued, civil affair officers were overwhelmed with responsibilities considerably more pressing than searching for property records.

Once the search began, the results were disappointing. The American air raid of 10 October 1944 and the battle for the island had destroyed the Okinawa Prefectural Office in Naha, the police station, city hall, tax office, and post office. The great majority of their records, including, of course, deeds and real estate tax records, were lost along with the buildings themselves. Moreover, very few individual householders succeeded in preserving their own property records. To make matters worse, the evidence suggests that as American forces approached various other towns and villages, retreating Japanese units systematically destroyed the records. Such was the case in Nago, Onna, and other towns. Military government officers did, however, find some official records and newspaper archives extant in Nago, as well as some civil and police records in Ito-man.<sup>48</sup> Taken as a whole, therefore, the land ownership picture created by the surviving documentation was very incomplete.

The task of digesting such property records as could be found fell to the newly-created Real Estate Branch of the Okinawa Engineer District. Working with military government’s General Affairs Department, the Real Estate Branch surveyed and delineated boundaries and prepared maps of tract locations. In February 1946 officers from the General Affairs Department of military government headquarters began to respond with what little they had in the way of land records to the increasing number of Okinawa title claims. Under the supervision of the General Affairs Department of the Okinawan Advisory Council, each *mura* appointed a *mura* land claims committee of five residents and for each *aza* (village section) an *aza* land claims committee of ten residents. Land

<sup>46</sup>USN MG Proclamation No. 1–A, Article IV, 26 Nov 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>47</sup>HQ USN Mil. Govern., Okinawa, Directive No. 63, 6 Dec 45, sub: Land Records—Assembling and Preservation of, RG 260.

<sup>48</sup>Bennett, “The Impact . . . on the Civilians,” pp. 268, 270.

claimants lacking real documentation, a majority of the landowners coming forward at this time, could submit a declaration of ownership, along with a description of the land in question and the signatures of two witnesses who were neighbors. In those instances where the landowner had died, the next of kin could file for title.<sup>49</sup>

These early claims were for the mere recognition of ownership. In those instances where American military facilities occupied the land in question, recognition of the owner's residual right to the land was about all he could hope to achieve. Despite whatever military government officers may have wanted, Headquarters, Island Command, had no intention of discussing compensation for such land usage in 1946, since the American point of view held that such land had been taken as an act of war and that under the Rules of Land Warfare no compensation was required.<sup>50</sup> The civil affairs officer's responsibility was to convince the tactical commanders that this position could be counterproductive for the occupation, since it might well lead to Ryukyuan-American estrangement. It was not an easy task, and it was complicated further by the fact that some military government officers failed to appreciate local attitudes toward private property, sharing instead the tactical commander's lack of awareness of what a time bomb the land use issue could be.

Not all the land of Okinawa had been in private hands before the American invasion, of course. Certain parcels, particularly in and around the urban areas of Naha and Shuri, were public lands belonging to one agency or another of the Japanese government. Military government headquarters concluded that for the time being this land should not be released for private settlement. Its ultimate disposition would necessarily remain in doubt pending the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers. Until then, former property of the Japanese government and other unclaimed real estate and personal property became the responsibility of the Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian within Headquarters, Ryukyu Command. As of 1948 that office administered 2,243 parcels of land on Okinawa and another 84 on Oshima with a combined area of 1,339,044 tsubo (approximately 5,356,200 sq. yds.).<sup>51</sup>

Such was military government's policy concerning private and public land claims. Although the system was inadequate, it was a commitment by military government headquarters to restore much of Okinawa's land to its proper owners. That commitment proved virtually impossible to

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<sup>49</sup>HQ USN Mil. Govern., Directive No. 121, 28 Feb 46, sub: Land Claims, Preparation of data concerning, Watkins Papers, RG 200.

<sup>50</sup>Higa, *Politics in Postwar Okinawa*, p. 42.

<sup>51</sup>Rpt, HQ RYCOM MG, Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian, 1948, TAGO Occupied Area Rpt., File: Property—Ryukyu 1948, RG 407.



keep during the late 1940s because of the inherent disparity between the landowners claims and the armed forces perceived need for land. By 1950 the clamor for reimbursement for land usage threatened to make the American policy based on its interpretation of land taken as a legitimate consequence of war untenable. That clamor was expressed in the face of an increasing American need for land associated with base expansion in the Cold War era. It centered on the Real Estate Branch of the Okinawa Engineer District, which was responsible for making land appraisals and any other preparations necessary to initiate additional acquisitions. The branch proceeded with these tasks despite a lack of information about prewar land values and the absence of reliable Okinawan land appraisers.<sup>52</sup>

While Okinawa's farmers raised the issue of land ownership and rental fees, tactical commanders continued to maintain that under the Rules of Land Warfare American forces were not *legally* obliged to compensate Okinawan landholders for the use of their land. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were not interested in legal haggling, but rather in seeing that the Ryukyus Command secure the uninterrupted use of whatever land was necessary to sustain the American facilities in the islands. Accordingly, in October 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the necessity of paying rentals for privately owned land.<sup>53</sup> Their willingness to end the argument was reflected in the directive for the U.S. Civil Administration issued by General MacArthur to the Ryukyuan commander, Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, on 5 December 1950. MacArthur ordered McClure to protect Okinawans from loss of property without due process, to give priority to land title determinations, and to pay rent for private property used by American forces before July 1950. Yet if some civilian landowners took heart from this statement, others must have been dismayed by MacArthur's further direction to McClure to secure title to any "real estate . . . required permanently by the United States Government by *purchase . . . or through condemnation*" if necessary.<sup>54</sup> Obviously, the accretion in American property holdings was to continue, and quite possibly in a manner that avoided any controversy about rental fees by permanently depriving the Okinawan landowner of any title whatsoever.

Despite General MacArthur's commitment to deal forcefully but fairly with the land problem, its ultimate resolution proved elusive because so many different issues were involved. For example, the Far East com-

<sup>52</sup>William W. Vincent, U.S. Army Engineer Div., West Pacific, Summary of the U.S. Real Estate Program in the Ryukyu Islands, 13 Sep 71, p. 2, Freimuth Papers; Morris, *Tiger by the Tail*, pp. 73–75.

<sup>53</sup>JCS Directive 1231/14, 4 Oct 1950, RG 218.

<sup>54</sup>Appendix D, GHQ FECOM, Directive AG 091.1 (5 Dec 50) RCA, 5 Dec 50, sub: Directive for the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers. Emphasis added.



OKINAWANS RECEIVE PAYMENT FOR LAND *acquired by U.S. armed forces at Yontan.*

mander directed that Ryukyans be paid rent for their property used by American forces prior to July 1950, but what constituted fair compensation? The Real Estate Division, formerly the Real Estate Branch, struggled with this question for some time and, with assistance from appraisers from the Hypothec Bank of Japan, proposed rental figures only to have them rejected by the dissatisfied owners.<sup>55</sup>

Many other Okinawan landowners resisted selling their tracts to the Americans. Condemnation, however, was an unpopular procedure considered by many nothing more than an American “land grab,” and, in the end, the command tried to work out a program of 20-year leases with the landowners. Based on fee appraisals conducted by the Hypothec Bank, which fortunately possessed a good deal of data on prewar Okinawan land values, the Real Estate Division reached appraisals totalling approximately \$10 million for 39,000 acres. They then calculated rentals for fiscal years 1951 and 1952 based on 6 percent of appraised value.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup>The political dissatisfaction with the American failure to compensate landowners for requisitioned land during the period 1945–1950 grew gradually and reached confrontational proportions years later. At that point corrective action had to be taken and Congress approved a Department of the Army proposal that some \$21 million be paid to landowners retroactively—as a “debt of honor,” despite the exoneration of American liability by Article 19(b) of the Peace Treaty of 1952.

<sup>56</sup>SCAP, Study of Land Problems in Okinawa, 1 Oct 55, p. 6, Freimuth Papers.



Despite these efforts very few leases were concluded, since many landholders felt the compensation was inadequate, and almost all of them resented the idea of leasing their holdings for twenty years—a large number of the next generation's productive years.

In the face of continued civilian intransigence, the Ryukyus Command threatened to disavow any legal liability for the compensation of landowners whose land had been occupied before the effective date of any peace treaty with Japan. At the same time, it reviewed the land holdings at issue and raised the appraisal of the real estate by 60 percent, with a corresponding rise in the rentals offered. This carrot and stick approach failed to satisfy the owners, who once again declined to negotiate voluntary extended leases, even at the new, higher rentals. The civilian Government of the Ryukyu Islands, in total frustration over the land impasse, threatened to abandon all further attempts to negotiate leases on behalf of the American administration. This threat was only a prelude to what would become another decade of acrimonious debate over this perennial problem.

The legacy of the unresolved land issue proved a bitter one. The most fundamentally disturbing aspect of the issue in the perception of the civilian population was the American failure, from the earliest days of the occupation, to understand the role of land and land ownership in Okinawan society. To the military a few tsubos of marginally fertile land represented a second-rate piece of real estate, while to the landowner those same tsubos meant far more than meager livelihood; they also represented status, self-respect, and family heritage.

The difference in the American and the Okinawan perceptions of the land was further exaggerated by the Ryukyuan practice of diversified land holdings—a custom sure to strike most Americans in agriculture as curious. Farmers in the United States, by and large, seek to acquire relatively larger plots of land, and to have these plots contiguous. Such an arrangement facilitates the use of bulky but efficient farm machinery. Okinawan farmers, by contrast, usually had several small plots, often widely separated one from another. This type of land distribution made eminent good sense on a crowded island beset by typhoons. Such an arrangement permitted each farmer to have a share of the best land, as well as the worst; the most hilly or dry, as well as the most level and watered. Such a practice was not only fair, it was also prudent, because a rampaging typhoon was less likely to strike all of any one farmer's widely scattered holdings. What American military personnel often failed to perceive when they required a man to surrender a small plot of land—a minor percentage of his total holdings, after all—was the fact that any given plot might be



a farmer's only good land, or the only tract with crops that might survive this year's typhoons.

Many in the American military demonstrated this lack of sensitivity involving land issues. One of the most glaring examples involved the master plan for land acquisition which included a proposal to acquire land near Koza Shi to extend the Army's Awase Meadows Country Club's golf course.<sup>57</sup> Thus valuable crop land was appropriated for an eighteen-hole course. Many former landowners were bitter over this apparent exercise in misplaced priorities, notwithstanding the obvious need for some American recreational facilities on the island. Their bitterness surprised the Americans operating the golf links, since the previous owners could earn considerably more money working on the course than they ever could from farming the same land. Once again, a narrow economic perspective prevailed. Apparently few, if any, Americans considered the possibility that the former owners might have been happier retaining their status in Okinawan society as independent farmers. Instead, Okinawan families were supposed to be content making more money as caddies and bartenders for the permanent contingent of foreigners camped on their soil.<sup>58</sup> In the seemingly straightforward process of acquiring some acres, the American military had also reduced the proud former owners to servant status.<sup>59</sup>

During the years of the military government administration, a large number of Okinawans in various walks of life found their existence changed in much the same way as these landowners; that is, they found themselves financially better off because of the foreign presence, but sometimes at the cost of diminished social status. Thus, the American military establishment in the Ryukyu Islands had a profound impact, not just on the land and the landowners, but on the island's social order—including the traditional concepts of status. The military build-up of the late 1940s and beyond altered the face of Okinawan life dramatically, and marked the beginning of the end for an ancient culture based primarily on small agriculture, fishing, and cottage industries. For better or worse the overwhelming majority of Okinawans had by then traded the land and the sea for a new way of life.

For a number of reasons, some economic and some psychological, American military officials failed to reconcile divergent outlooks toward the land and what the soil represented to the two cultures. This failure

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<sup>57</sup>Master Plan for Land Acquisition, 1954, USCAR records, File 601.53—"Leases and Loans," RG 260. The Air Force also had an extensive golf course near Kadena Air Force Base.

<sup>58</sup>Caddies on Okinawa were always women during the 1940s.

<sup>59</sup>There were exceptions: a tiny minority of former landowners became very rich as the result of Okinawan-American land transfers.

left a legacy of mistrust and ill will toward the uninvited American guests and provided the first impetus to the idea of reversion to Japanese control.

Curiously, by the time the American tenure in the Ryukyu Islands ceased, the painful land issue had done more than accelerate the drive for reversion: it had also produced some decidedly positive results. In a very real sense, as the Okinawan people moved out of farming and into light industrial and service-oriented occupations, many lost their psychological links with their rural heritage. Their society was transformed into one more capable of meeting the challenges of the late 20th century. This painful change had been brought about as more and more islanders found employment and a new way of life because of the construction and operation of the American bases. The Okinawan economy emerged from the occupation more diversified, sophisticated, and flexible than in pre-war days. The American requirement for land on Okinawa, therefore, had not only turned its citizens against the American presence, it had also turned them into more productive Japanese nationals once reversion was secured.

## CHAPTER VII

# Summary and Conclusion

The account of America's military government efforts in the Ryukyu Islands is a textbook study in theory and practice, in trial and error. In some crucial ways the exercise was unique, or very nearly so. The American tenure in the Ryukyus was a singular effort—no United Nations or Allied presence intruded. In the 1960s the Japanese government in Tokyo voluntarily began to contribute financially to some of the programs in the islands, most notably in the areas of public health and education—long-range concerns that would have a direct impact on Japanese society when the islands ultimately returned to Tokyo's administrative control. But during the years of American military government administration, the civil affairs officers on the scene were conscious of being very much on their own. Within occupied Germany there were Allied governments to be consulted and foreign zones to be regarded. Even in postwar occupied Japan, which was also an exclusive American stewardship, Douglas MacArthur and his staff could hardly ignore the interests of the Department of State and a host of other American agencies in the performance of their duties. In contrast, not even the military governor in the Ryukyus—whether Admiral Nimitz or General MacArthur—ever set foot in the archipelago during the military government years. Preoccupied with more immediate concerns as perceived in their respective headquarters, they were obliged to scrutinize conditions on Okinawa from a distance and to leave events in the hands of the deputy military governor on the scene.

In at least two other ways the American occupation experience in the Ryukyu Islands was unquestionably unique. The first consideration concerns the totality of the destruction visited upon the island of Okinawa; not only physical destruction, but also the obliteration of the most basic features of the island's economy and society. Following World War II, no other society on enemy soil experienced the utter desolation experienced by the citizens of the largest Ryukyuan island. Certainly, no one can deny the devastation suffered by the citizens of Dresden, Hiroshima, and Na-



gasaki, yet the fact remained that within the occupied German and Japanese societies—however, traumatized and destitute they were—there existed both human and physical resources that remained intact. There was in these other societies not only a certain level of productive capacity, but also a vital human element in the person of doctors, bureaucrats, and other professionals and entrepreneurs. With the surviving physical assets firmly in American hands, these important individuals soon emerged to assist the conquerors with the administrative tasks. By contrast neither physical nor human infrastructure remained on Okinawa after the summer of 1945. The totality of the physical destruction was patent; compounding this reality was the fact that virtually all of the administrative machinery and professional positions on Okinawa had been in the hands of home-island Japanese. The great majority of the Japanese either withdrew from the archipelago in the face of the imminent American assault, were unwilling to cooperate with the foreign overseers, or were of questionable loyalty to the new administration. The military government regime therefore had to function with a minimum number of able, local leaders—leaders on an island much of whose terrain largely resembled a moonscape. The occupation was also unique in the American experience because of its longevity. The Army directed affairs in the Ryukyu Islands for twenty-seven years, through the military government years and the period of the Civil Administration. By comparison, the American tenure in occupied Germany and Japan was relatively brief.

Both the Army and Navy prepared and trained civil affairs officers for this unique exercise. Many of the new trainees brought not only technical experience to the islands, but also a sense of high purpose. For the first few months military government's limited role in Operation ICEBERG and the desolation encountered on Okinawa gave little opportunity to exercise technical expertise, except for medical and organizational skills. As the months and years passed, however, the military government function in the Ryukyus changed and expanded. From the comparatively uncomplicated, albeit difficult task of population control and disaster relief, the mission grew to one in which the military government officers became totally responsible for the administration and future development of an area that in later years would be termed a "Third World country." Consequently, any assessment of military government's success in the Ryukyus during the period covered by this study must be made at two distinct time intervals—once after the first few months ashore, and again in December 1950, after five years of expanding commitment to the future of Okinawan society.

Achievement is most easily measured in terms of how well the military government officers met the Okinawans' material needs for food, security

from harm, shelter, and rudimentary medical care. Despite interservice carping, insufficient supplies, and a host of other problems, the civil affairs detachments succeeded admirably in fulfilling their short-term mission. Their actions clearly saved both American and Ryukyuan lives and facilitated the task of the tactical forces. Notwithstanding these successes, there still were losses. One unexpected casualty of those first few months on Okinawa was the sense of idealism held by many of the civil affairs officers. Several of these men, as a result of their training at Charlottesville, Columbia, or Chicago, came ashore with a much broader concept of military government's role than merely feeding and caring for the refugees of battle. These men were determined to be nation-builders who carried not only medicine and DDT in their baggage train, but also law books and constitutional forms of government. Some of these men became cynical when they discovered that they could not immediately employ their specialized skills and that the tactical forces regarded the military government mission as less important when compared with either combat operations or the base development plan. They were particularly embittered by the competition for land that emerged between the tactical commanders and military government headquarters—an unequal contest which they quickly realized could not be won so long as the senior military commander necessarily valued airfields and supply depots above civilian village restoration.

The surrender of Japan brought a renewed ray of hope to these men. The base development plan virtually ceased, and the two armed services released some 8,000 acres for civilian resettlement. Okinawa's military governors, mostly Navy officers, dusted off their plans for nation-building. Armed with a Joint Chiefs of Staff mandate to restore the island's prewar standard of living, they developed programs for economic as well as political rehabilitation. The more ambitious military government mission, which the military commanders with their focus on the larger military mission neither understood nor appreciated, was begun.

The burst of enthusiasm was short lived. With the Japanese Empire defeated, the rationale for extensive Okinawan bases evaporated like the island's morning mists. The whole *raison d'être* for an American military presence seemed to disappear. Facilities construction ground to a virtual standstill, as the great majority of engineer troops withdrew to new assignments elsewhere. Washington drastically curtailed funding for most projects on the island, thereby drying up the Okinawan economic recovery. Trained and experienced civil affairs officers, somewhat disillusioned, departed and were replaced by Army officers directly from the United States or from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. The earlier officers left their plans and programs for economic and political rehabilitation,

but without backing from Washington there was little the relatively unseasoned replacements could accomplish. After a sixteen-month period (April 1945–July 1946) that must be described as American civil affairs' finest hour, military government's fortunes waned. The next period, almost three years, was characterized by apathy and neglect from both Washington and MacArthur's headquarters in Japan.

Clearly, this period was the lowest ebb of the military government years in the Ryukyus. Official Washington largely ignored the archipelago. Army officials focused their attention on base requirements in Japan and the newly-independent Philippines. If the Department of State thought about Okinawa, it was always in the broader context of Japanese-American relations and the future status of the island under international law. As a consequence of this period of relative indifference, Army programs on Okinawa languished, chronically short of both funding and direction from Washington.

The island became the dumping ground of the Far East Command, a handy out-of-sight repository for MacArthur's rusting bulldozers and jeeps, as well as for disfavored individuals and units. The word quickly spread throughout the services: avoid Okinawa as a duty station, since it was nothing but a backwater with miserable housing and very few other facilities. This assessment hardly exaggerated the situation on Okinawa, where the already run-down physical plant took a particularly heavy beating from typhoons during the late 1940s.

Since no strong impetus for reform emerged from within the Ryukyus Command itself, these deplorable conditions might have persisted indefinitely had not external developments reshaped the American role on Okinawa. The onset of the Cold War in Europe and the concomitant communist advances in China focused General MacArthur's attention once again on Okinawa as an American forward base. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council were responsive to MacArthur's warnings about the new Sino-Soviet threat to Taiwan and Japan. Their response was NSC 13/3, approved by President Truman in May 1949, which committed the United States to an energetic program of base development and economic rehabilitation.

NSC 13/3 also reintroduced the Department of State as a concerned observer of events in Okinawa. It was a State Department official, Douglas L. Oliver, whose critical impressions of the military government situation on the island awakened the Army's determination to overcome the results of three years' neglect. Subsequent visits by Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins confirmed both the extensive typhoon damage and the disturbing lack of military government initiative.



After the long period of collective neglect, the Army, the Department of State, and the Congress all contributed to the dawn of a new era in the islands. General Collins installed a new Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, Maj. Gen. Josef Sheetz, who quickly revived a spirit of idealism among the civil affairs officers. The Department of State prepared a new draft directive for General MacArthur that interpreted the spirit of NSC 13/3 in such a way as to promote Ryukyuan economic and social well-being, as well as greater autonomy. The Congress, for its part, authorized nearly \$75 million for an expanded construction program and another \$25 million in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds for military housing and a variety of joint-use projects such as roads and harbors. As expected, the revitalized base construction program provided many new jobs for the civilian population. Suddenly, Okinawa was a beehive of activity. This time the Army chiefs intended nothing less than to build a strong military bastion against the spread of communism and to create a socio-economic structure that would support a long-term American presence. The determination, the plans, and the funds—everything seemed to be in place to accomplish this desirable transformation.

On balance, the five years of military government must be judged a qualified success. Under military tutelage the Ryukyans progressively moved toward local self-government and began to enjoy one of Asia's highest standards of living. But neither of these realities could stifle the islanders' growing desire to return to Japanese administrative control. The nub of the tension between the Americans and the Okinawans was the control and use of arable land. Most civil affairs officers had come to appreciate, even if they did not fully understand, the people's psychological attachment to the land. Consequently, these officers tried through a number of measures to respond to local expectations regarding the land. They also came to understand that the policies enunciated by the National Security Council in 1949 merely exacerbated the tension between the needs and priorities of the tactical forces and the military government mission. To pursue the base development plan, the tactical commanders needed many additional acres, yet at the same time the civil affairs officers continued to seek the release of land already occupied by the military. It was an uneven contest which military government headquarters could not hope to win. The expectations of the newly invigorated Ryukyuan society concerning the land issue, therefore, would never be fully met.

The land issue remained unresolved as the military government years drew to a close. It lingered like a festering sore, a poisoner of American-Ryukyuan relations and a dissonant counterpoint to military government's many positive achievements. If military government's accomplishments became the legacy left to the Civil Administration after 1950, the

land issue was also an unfortunate part of that legacy. It ultimately undermined American efforts to imbue the Okinawans with American democratic ideals. Ironically, it also fed the larger reversion issue, becoming one of the major reasons why in 1972, a century after Okinawa first became Japanese territory, the island reverted to Tokyo's rule. Before that reversion, American policies, especially those developed after 1948, had transformed Okinawan society from one centered on agriculture to a service economy dependent to a considerable extent on the American military establishment. It was a remarkable transformation, a socio-economic leap of perhaps a century or more, yet one accomplished in the span of a few short years. At the same time, for many Okinawans, this transformation meant shattered hopes for land ownership or radically altered social status. These effects, however unintentional on the part of military government officers, became realities that could not be reversed or erased by the act of reversion.

# Note on Sources

Typhoons have wrought considerable destruction in the Ryukyu Islands over the centuries, and it was a typhoon in 1945 that destroyed many records about the earliest months of military government in Okinawa. Those records had been gathered by a three-member team of the 1st Information and Historical Service, AUS, a combined public affairs and history unit, for the express purpose of preparing a monograph about military government activities in the Ryukyus. The documents and notes that did survive the typhoon, along with the accounts of the later years, became part of the Tenth Army and Island Command's historical record. Eventually, these documents made their way to warehouses in Alexandria, Virginia, and then to their final resting place in Suitland, Maryland.

## *Official Archival Material*

The majority of the official records used to prepare this volume are in the permanent custody of the Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland. Record Group 407 (RG 407) contains the most important documents for the early story of military government in the Ryukyus, the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1917– , Reports Files, 1945–1951 which cover military government operations in occupied areas. There are several significant files in this collection, but the most valuable are the background papers of Island Command, Okinawa (98ISC1–5), including the notes, interviews, and partial manuscript on military government by Tech. Sgt. Julius M. Bloch (Ph.D., Harvard), who was with the 1st Information and Historical Service team on Okinawa; the Island Command, Okinawa, Action Report, 13 December 1944–30 June 1945 (98ISC1–0.3); the Ryukyus Command Historical Record (98BC6–0.2); and the Headquarters, Military Government, Island Command, Recommendations for Consideration in Planning Next Operation (98ISC1–5.01).

The late Prof. James T. Watkins, IV, formerly with the Hoover Institution, served as a Naval Reserve lieutenant commander on Okinawa for sixteen months. As official historian for the military government forces during the Navy "year" (21 September 1945–1 July 1946), he gath-



ered together a large collection of orders, directives, draft manuscripts, staff studies, memoranda, photographs, news clippings, and working notes. These unclassified papers constitute an invaluable source of information on the Navy's role in military government operations on the island. Prof. Watkins' papers are available at Suitland on six rolls of microfilm in RG 200.

The Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II (RG 260) include a large subsection identified as the Records of the United States Civil Administration, Ryukyu Islands, and Predecessor Commands. This valuable collection consists of over 1,300 Hollinger boxes of records, but, unfortunately, only a very small portion of the record group has been declassified for use by the general public.

A number of Joint Chiefs of Staff documents shed light on the decision to undertake Operation ICEBERG, as well as on the subsequent strategic planning for postwar Asia—including the long-term administration of the Ryukyus. These records (RG 218) are available through the Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. The unclassified records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's involvement with military government considerations are available at the same repository in RG 353.

A number of record collections outside of the National Archives system proved to be useful. The collected papers and documents of General Douglas MacArthur held at the archive of the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia, were the most valuable of these collections (especially RG 5 and RG 9), simply because the assembled materials dealt with so many different aspects of the American presence in the Ryukyus. The author found the files of the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kingman Building, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, particularly rich in information about the postwar base development, facilities construction, and the land issue. For similar information about facilities expansion by the Air Force on Okinawa, the writer turned to the histories of the 1st Air Division and the Twentieth Air Force, both of which are on microfilm at the Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. Finally, the files of the Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division, Washington (D.C.) Navy Yard, provided preliminary insights into the Navy's nine-month military government tenure in the Ryukyus, although most of the relevant Navy records have been transmitted to Suitland, Maryland, where they may be found in RG 38 and RG 260.

*Private Collections*

For the most part, the documentary record of the American military government effort in the Ryukyus is now deposited in governmental repositories, either federal or—in the case of the MacArthur Memorial—municipal. However, a few veteran “Okinawa hands” have preserved private aggregations of papers for personal reasons. In addition to official documents, these collections often contain valuable memos, working notes, photographs, and other more obscure items which, without the cooperation of the individual holders, might well have escaped historical scrutiny altogether.

Of the personal papers examined by the author, two are particularly noteworthy. Paul Skuse, former Director of Public Safety on Okinawa and now retired in Arizona, has retained a number of documents on that particular subject. Commander Skuse, who went to Okinawa with the Navy in 1945, joined the Civil Service in 1946, and remained in Okinawa until 1958, was kind enough to share these materials with the author. By far, however, the most extensive and most valuable private collection of Ryukyus materials belongs to Edward O. Freimuth. Mr. Freimuth, now retired and living in northern Virginia, spent twenty years (1946–1966) on Okinawa, arriving as an Army lieutenant and remaining as a civilian. He became head of the General Affairs Department and ultimately served as the principal liaison official between the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) and the native Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI). During that time he amassed a large quantity of documents about the American tenure in the Ryukyus. Much of this material consists of esoteric memos, reports, and staff studies, which flesh out the impressions created by the more formal documents in the governmental repositories.

*Interviews*

Personal recollections, whenever these are possible, do much to enhance the written record of historical events in which the principals participated. The men who took part in administering military government on Okinawa have forgotten certain details of the 1945–1950 period on the island. Such information that has been retained, however, enriches the historical picture considerably. As always when using personal recollections which may have been colored by time and events, the interviewer must check all oral statements against the records to seek verification.

The author found four interviewees particularly informative for the light they could shed on particular events. By far the most valuable re-

source person was Edward O. Freimuth, mentioned above, whose tenure on Okinawa spanned not only the military government era, but also the years of its legacy. The writer interviewed Mr. Freimuth on six occasions, and several others times by telephone. In each case he demonstrated his first-hand knowledge on a variety of relevant subjects, but especially in the areas of Ryukyuan-American relationships, the land problem, and Okinawan political parties. In addition to providing information about places and events, Mr. Freimuth suggested individual names for possible questioning, thus enabling the author to contact two of the other three principals he interviewed.

Former Naval Commander Paul H. Skuse was the military government's Director of Public Safety during the period 1946–1949. He graciously permitted the author to interview him over a three-day period at his home in Arizona. During that first visit, and at a subsequent meeting in Freimuth's home, Skuse described in colorful terms his experiences on Okinawa.

Prof. James Watkins, IV, now deceased, consented to a number of telephone interviews from California. His understanding of the Navy's contributions to military government were very useful, and in talking with him the author began to sense some of that spirit of idealism that motivated so many of the early civil affairs officers on Okinawa.

Prof. Seigen Miyazato, a native Okinawan, was thirteen years of age when the Americans invaded his island. He soon found himself in a military government camp at Taira on the Motobu Peninsula. During his interview he provided valuable insights, especially in the following areas: the impact of Japanese defensive preparations on the civilians, the dislocation resulting from population shifts from the south to the north, and the early food and sanitary conditions under the military government regime.

### *Printed Material*

The secondary materials found especially helpful by the author have been cited throughout the volume, but special attention should be drawn to certain works in a variety of areas. For general information about Okinawan life and history, the author principally relied upon George H. Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People* (Rutland, Vt. & Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1958), M.D. Morris, *Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail* (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1968), and the Chief of Naval Operations' *Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands*, OPNAV 13–31, 15 November 1944.

Robert Ross Smith has written an important book for those partic-



ularly concerned with the strategic debate leading to the American invasion of the Ryukyus: *Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of Chief of Military History, 1963). For those individuals who are interested in the battle for Okinawa itself and its immediate aftermath, the author found three volumes and one article significant. Roy E. Appleman, et al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948), Charles S. Nichols, Jr., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific* (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3 Div., 1955), James H. Belote and William M. Belote, *Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1970), and Henry Stanley Bennett, "The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Okinawa," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 72, No. 2 (February 1946).

Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg's *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964) contains background information on the evolution of military government training, especially concerning the Army's School of Military Government at the University of Virginia. The story of the Navy's civil affairs schools at Columbia and Princeton emerges from Lt. Comdr. Dorothy E. Richard's *The Wartime Military Government Period, 1942-1945*, Vol. I of the series *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands* (Washington: Dept. of the Navy, Office of the CNO, 1957).

Not many of the men who served in military government in the Ryukyus were moved to take pen in hand to tell their own story. Those few that did attempt to relate some of their experiences include Clellan S. Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 267 (January 1950); David D. Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," *Far Eastern Quarterly* 7 (May 1948); and Leonard Weiss, "U.S. Military Government on Okinawa," *Far Eastern Survey* 15 (July 1946). Shannon McCune, the first civilian Civil Administrator under USCAR, is a geographer whose books *Geographic Aspects of Agricultural Change in the Ryukyu Islands* (Gainesville: University of Florida Social Sciences Monograph No. 54, 1975) and *The Ryukyu Islands* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1975) are valuable resources for information on Okinawan agricultural development, but do not directly address military government agricultural policies in detail. One individual, Vern J. Sneider, was able to survive the trials and tribulations of his fellow civil affairs officers and still retain his sense of humor. His *The Teahouse of the August Moon* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1951) and *The King from Ash-*

*tabula* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960) remain a delightful satirical look at military government's foibles.

Two volumes from the Japanese point of view are worth noting for their value in describing American-Ryukyuan relations and the evolution of Okinawan political sophistication: Mikio Higa, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963), and Akio Watanabe, *The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970).

Finally, the author found useful a number of printed materials that have not been published and are not generally available to the public. In January 1971 the U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, directed Mr. Edward W. O'Flaherty, then Special Assistant for Ryukyuan Affairs in the International and Civil Affairs Directorate, ODCSOPS, to write a monograph entitled "American Military Government and Civil Administration, Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1972." Mr. O'Flaherty began this project, but for a number of reasons, never finished. What emerged was a partial manuscript of fourteen brief chapters. The manuscript is deficient in several respects, but when used with caution, provides insight into many of the problems faced by the military government regime. For information on the postwar build-up of military installations on Okinawa, the author turned to another internal manuscript by Karl C. Dod: "Military Activities of the Corps of Engineers in the Cold War." This manuscript, like the O'Flaherty one, must be used with caution. It is held by the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Nobuo Takaramura's MBA thesis, "Reconstruction and Development of the Okinawan Economy with Emphasis upon Monetary Method" (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1957) presented an overview of the evolving American economic policies to rehabilitate postwar Okinawa. Mr. Takaramura was head of the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation in its early years and later served with the World Bank. The Office of Military History Officer, Headquarters, American Forces Far East/Eighth Army (Rear) produced a summary entitled "The Far East Command, 1 January 1947–30 June 1957" (1957), which enables one to follow the relationship between MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo and the civil affairs officers on the ground in the Ryukyus.

Part Two

DOCUMENTING  
THE MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE





# Selected Documents

While American military government tenure on Okinawa was unique in a number of ways, the civil affairs officers there grappled with problems that were hardly endemic to the Ryukyu Islands. Many of the situations these men encountered, whether issues of administrative procedures, public welfare, or resources management, were the same type that any American military government mission, at any given time or locale, might reasonably expect to face. Not surprisingly, therefore, a representative sample of the documents produced during America's military government experience on Okinawa not only imparts the unique flavor of operations in the Ryukyus, but also underscores for the reader the persistent nature of military government problems and concerns.\*

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\*Because of space limitations, certain of these documents have been reproduced with minor deletions as indicated. Otherwise, these documents appear without historical editing. Except for one title, *sic* has been omitted.





## Preparing Civil Affairs Officers

Historically reluctant after 1900 to become involved in civil affairs operations, the Army before World War II tended to regard such functions as falling within the narrow, legal confines of the Judge Advocate General's application of the rules of war. Gradually, an appreciation of the complex nature of military government activities in the age of modern warfare led, by the time of the American invasion of Okinawa, to the Army's leaders issuing more comprehensive instructions for civil affairs officers.

1. FM 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*, 1 October 1940.

(Source: Judge Advocate General's Office)

Prepared by the Judge Advocate General's Office, this field manual reflects the pre-World War II legalistic concept of the military government function within the American Army. In one brief chapter, "Military Occupation and Government of Enemy Territory," the Judge Advocate General deals with the whole question of civil affairs operations:

### CHAPTER 10

#### MILITARY OCCUPATION AND GOVERNMENT OF ENEMY TERRITORY

**271. Military occupation.**—Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised (*H.R.*, art. 42).

**272. Occupation, question of fact.**—Military occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader is in position to substitute and has substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded.

**273. Does not transfer sovereignty.**—Being an incident of war, military occupation confers upon the invading force the right to exercise control for the period of occupation. It does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant, but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of sovereignty. The exercise of these rights results from the established power of the occupant and from the

necessity for maintaining law and order, indispensable to both the inhabitants and to the occupying force.

**274. Distinguished from invasion.**—The state of invasion corresponds with the period of resistance. Invasion is not necessarily occupation, although it precedes it and may frequently coincide with it. An invader may push rapidly through a large portion of enemy country without establishing that effective control which is essential to the status of occupation. He may send small raiding parties or flying columns, reconnoitering detachments, etc., into or through a district where they may be temporarily located and exercise control, yet when they pass on it cannot be said that such district is under his military occupation.

**275. Distinguished from subjugation or conquest.**—Military occupation in a foreign war, being based upon the fact of possession of *enemy* territory, necessarily implies that the sovereignty of the occupied territory is not vested in the occupying power. The occupation is essentially provisional.

On the other hand subjugation or conquest implies a transfer of sovereignty. Ordinarily, however, such transfer is effected by a treaty of peace. When sovereignty passes, military occupation, as such, must of course cease; although the territory may, and usually does for a period at least, continue to be governed through military agencies which have such powers as the President or Congress may prescribe.

**276. Occupation must be effective.**—It follows from the definition that military occupation must be both actual and effective; that is, the organized resistance must have been overcome and the forces in possession must have taken measures to establish law and order. It is sufficient that the occupying army can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the occupied district. It is immaterial by what methods the authority is exercised, whether by fixed garrisons or flying columns, small or large forces.

**277. Presence of invested fort immaterial.**—The existence of a fort or defended area within the occupied district, provided such place is invested, does not render the occupation of the remainder of the district ineffective, nor is the consent of the inhabitants in any manner essential.

**278. Proclamation of occupation.**—In a strict legal sense no proclamation of military occupation is necessary. On account of the special relations established between the inhabitants of the occupied territory and the occupant by virtue of the presence of the invading force, the fact of military occupation, with the extent of territory affected, should be made known. The practice of this Government is to make this fact known by proclamation.

**279. Commencement of occupation.**—In the absence of a proclamation or similar notice the exact time of commencement of occupation may be difficult to fix. The presence of a sufficient force to disarm the inhabitants or enforce submission and the cessation of local resistance due to the defeat of the enemy's forces determine the commencement of occupation.

**280. Cessation of occupation.**—Occupation once acquired must be maintained. In case the occupant evacuates the district or is driven out by the enemy, or by a *levée en masse*, and the legitimate government actually resumes its functions,

the occupation ceases. It does not cease, however, if the occupant, after establishing his authority, moves forward against the enemy, leaving a smaller force to administer the affairs of the district. Nor does the existence of a rebellion or the operations of guerrilla bands cause it to cease unless the legitimate government is reestablished or the occupant fails promptly to suppress such rebellion or guerrilla operations.

#### ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY

**281. Necessity for military government.**—Military government is the organization through which a belligerent exercises authority over the territory of the enemy invaded and occupied by him. The necessity for such government arises from the failure or inability of the legitimate government to exercise its functions on account of the military operations or occupation.

**282. Duty to restore law and order.**—The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country (*H.R., art. 43*).

**283. Functions of government.**—All the functions of the hostile government—legislative, executive, or administrative—whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under military occupation, or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader.

**284. Nature of government.**—It is immaterial whether the government established over an enemy's territory be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority is the same. It is a government imposed by force, and the legality of its acts is determined by the laws of war. During the military occupation it may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war.

**285. The laws in force.**—The principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. In restoring public order and safety he will continue in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws of the occupied territory which do not conflict with this object. These laws will be administered by the local officials as far as practicable. All crimes not of a military nature and which do not affect the safety of the invading army are left to the jurisdiction of the local courts.

**286. Power to suspend and promulgate laws.**—The military occupant may suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action.

**287. Nature of laws suspended.**—The occupant will naturally alter or suspend all laws of a political nature as well as political privileges and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command. Of this class are those relating to recruitment in occupied territory, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the right of suffrage, the freedom of the press, the right to quit or travel freely in occupied territory. Such suspensions should be made known to the inhabitants.



**288. Nature of laws promulgated.**—An occupant may create new laws for the government of a country. He will promulgate such new laws and regulations as military necessity demands. In this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the protection of the army.

**289. Prohibition as to rights and rights of action.**—It is especially forbidden \* \* \* to declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and rights of action of the nationals of the hostile party (*H.R., art. 23, last par.*).

**290. General restrictions imposed; commercial relations.**—The occupant has the unquestioned right to regulate commercial intercourse in the occupied territory; that is, he may prohibit entirely or place such restrictions and limitations upon such intercourse as he considers desirable for military purposes.

**291. Censorship of press and correspondence.**—The military occupant may establish censorship of the press and of telegraphic and postal correspondence. He may prohibit entirely the publication of newspapers or prescribe regulations for their publication and circulation especially in unoccupied portions of the territory and in neutral countries. He is not required to furnish facilities for postal service, but may take charge of them himself, especially if the officials of the occupied district fail to act or to obey his orders.

**292. Means of transportation.**—The military occupant exercises authority over all means of transportation, both public and private within the occupied district, and may seize and utilize them and regulate their operation.

**293. Regulation as to taxes.**—If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the state, he shall do so, as far as is possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate government was so bound (*H.R., art. 48*).

**294. When existing rules may be disregarded.**—If, due to the flight or unwillingness of the local officials, it is impracticable to follow the rules of incidence and assessment in force, then the total amount of the taxes to be paid may be allotted among the districts, towns, etc., and the local authorities be required to collect it as a capitation tax or otherwise.

**295. Surplus may be used.**—The first charge upon the State taxes is for the cost of local maintenance. The balance may be used for the purposes of the occupant.

**296. What included in taxes, tolls, etc.**—The words “for the benefit of the state” were inserted in the article to exclude local dues collected by local authorities. The occupant will supervise the expenditures of such revenue and prevent its hostile use.

#### EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE POPULATION

**297. Right to enforce obedience.**—The occupant can demand and enforce from the inhabitants of occupied territory such obedience as may be necessary for the

security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and the proper administration of the country.

**298. Oath of allegiance forbidden.**—It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power (*H.R., art. 45*).

**299. Must respect persons, religious convictions, etc.**—Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, \* \* \* as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected (*H.R., art. 46*).

**300. United States rule.**—The United States acknowledges and protects, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; the persons of inhabitants, especially those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.

**301. Reciprocal obligations of inhabitants.**—In return for such considerate treatment, it is the duty of the inhabitants to carry on their ordinary peaceful pursuits; to behave in an absolutely peaceful manner; to take no part whatever in the hostilities carried on; to refrain from all injurious acts toward the troops or in respect to their operations; and to render strict obedience to the officials of the occupant. As to neutrals resident in occupied territory, see paragraphs 397–399.

**302. Limitation as to services of inhabitants.**— \* \* \* Services shall not be demanded from \* \* \* inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be \* \* \* of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country.

Such \* \* \* services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied \* \* \* (*H.R., art. 52*).

**303. General right to requisition services.**—Services of the inhabitants of occupied territory may be requisitioned for the needs of the army. These will include the services of professional men, and tradesmen, such as surgeons, carpenters, butchers, bakers, etc.; employees of gas, electric light, and water works, and other public utilities; and of sanitary boards in connection with their ordinary functions. The officials and employees of railways, canals, river or coast-wise steamship companies, telegraph, telephone, postal, and similar services, and drivers of transport, whether employed by the State or private companies, may be requisitioned to perform their professional duties so long as the duties required do not directly concern the operations of war against their own country.

**304. Restoration of general conditions.**—The occupant can requisition labor to restore the general condition of the public works of the country to that of peace; that is, to repair roads, bridges, railways, and as well to bury the dead and collect the wounded. In short, under the rules of obedience, they may be called upon to perform such work as may be necessary for the ordinary purposes of government, including police and sanitary work.

**305. Construction of forts by inhabitants, etc.**—The prohibition against forcing the inhabitants to take part in operations of war against their own country precludes requisitioning their services upon works directly promoting the ends of the war, such as construction of forts, fortifications, and entrenchments; but there is no objection to their being employed voluntarily, for pay, in this class

of work, except the military reason of preventing information concerning such work from falling into the hands of the enemy.

**306. Information about enemy by inhabitants.**—A belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of defense (*H.R., art. 44*).

**307. Interpretation of the foregoing article.**—This article was reserved by Germany, Austria, Japan, Montenegro, and Russia, because it was believed that it would contravene the pre-existing general rule and practice of the nations permitting impressment of guides.

**308. Impressment of guides.**—Article 44 (par. 306) is generally construed as prohibiting the impressment of guides from the inhabitants in an occupied territory. This is the construction placed upon it by the United States. In a war against any power reserving the article the impressment of guides is not prohibited.

#### OFFICIALS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

**309. Oath of officials.**—The occupant may require such officials as are continued in their offices to take an oath to perform their duties conscientiously and not to act to his prejudice. Every such official who declines to take such oath may be expelled; but, whether they do so or not, they owe strict obedience to the occupant.

**310. Salaries of officials.**—The salaries of civil officials of the hostile government who remain in the invaded territory and continue the work of their offices, especially those who can properly continue it under the circumstances arising out of the war—such as judges, administrative or police officers, officers of city or communal governments—are paid from the public revenues of the invaded territory, until the military government has reason wholly or partially to dispense with their services. Salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles are always suspended.

**311. Removal of civil officials.**—By virtue of his powers of control the occupant is duly empowered to remove officials of every character. He will on principle remove political officials. Any official considered dangerous to the occupant may be removed, made a prisoner of war, or expelled from the occupied territory.

**312. Punishment of civil officials.**—Acts of civil officers that are harmful or injurious to the occupant will be dealt with under the laws of war. Other wrongs or crimes committed by them will be punished according to the law of the land.

#### TREATMENT OF ENEMY PROPERTY

**313. Destruction and seizure of.**—It is especially forbidden \* \* \* to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war (*H.R., art. 23, par. (g)*).

**314. General rule as to war right to seize and destroy property.**—The rule is that in war a belligerent may destroy or seize all property of whatever nature, public or private, hostile or neutral, unless such property is specifically protected by some definitive law of war, provided such destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.



## PUBLIC PROPERTY

**315. Real property of a State.**—The occupying State shall be regarded as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State and situated in the occupied territory. It must safeguard the capital of these properties and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct (*H.R., art. 55*).

**316. Occupant's disposition of such property.**—The occupant does not have the absolute right of disposal or sale of enemy real property. As administrator or usufructuary he should not exercise his rights in such wasteful and negligent manner as seriously to impair its value. He may, however, lease or utilize public lands or buildings, sell the crops, cut and sell timber, and work the mines. A lease or contract should not extend beyond the conclusion of the war.

**317. State real property susceptible of direct military use.**—Real property of a State which is of direct military use, such as forts, arsenals, dockyards, magazines, barracks, railways, canals, bridges, piers, and wharves, remains in the hands of the occupant until the close of the war, and may be destroyed or damaged, if deemed necessary, in military operations.

**318. Property of municipalities, etc.**—The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property.

All seizures of, destruction, or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art, science, is forbidden and should be made the subject of legal proceedings (*H.R., art. 56*).

**319. Authorized treatment.**—The property included in the foregoing rule may be utilized in case of necessity for quartering the troops, the sick and wounded, horses, stores, etc., and generally as prescribed for private property. Such property must, however, be secured against all avoidable injury, even when located in fortified places which are subject to seizure or bombardment.

**320. Movable property.**—An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations (*H.R., art. 53, par. 1*).

**321. Two classes of movable property.**—All movable property belonging to the State directly susceptible of military use may be taken possession of as booty and utilized for the benefit of the invader's government. Other movable property, not directly susceptible of military use, must be respected and cannot be appropriated.

**322. Property of unknown ownership treated as public property.**—Where the ownership of property is unknown—that is, where there is any doubt as to whether it is public or private, as frequently happens—it should be treated as public property until ownership is definitely settled.

## PRIVATE PROPERTY

**323. Must be respected—Private property** \* \* \* **must be respected** (*H.R., art. 46, par. 1*).

**324. Devastation.**—The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of war. As an end in itself, as a separate measure of war, devastation is not sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy's army. Thus the rule requiring respect for private property is not violated through damage resulting from operations, movements, or combats of the army; that is, real estate may be utilized for marches, camp sites, construction of trenches, etc. Buildings may be used for shelter for troops, the sick and wounded, for animals, for reconnaissance, cover defense, etc. Fences, woods, crops, buildings, etc., may be demolished, cut down, and removed to clear a field of fire, to construct bridges, to furnish fuel if imperatively needed for the army.

**325. American rule.**—This rule (respect for private property, etc.) does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, boats or ships, and lands, for temporary and military use.

**326. Confiscation.**—Private property cannot be confiscated (*H.R., art. 46, par. 2*).

**327. Booty.**—All captures and booty belong, according to the modern law of war, primarily to the government of the captor.

Prize money whether on land or sea can now be claimed only under local law.

**328. Private gain by officers and soldiers prohibited.**—Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate.

**329. Pillage.**—Pillage is formally forbidden (*H.R., art. 47*).

**330. Seizure and devastation of private property.**—Private property can be seized only by way of military necessity for the support or other benefit of the army or of the occupant. All destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a town or place by assault, are prohibited under the penalty of death or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate to the gravity of the offense.

**331. Private property susceptible of direct military use.**—All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of ammunition of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is declared (*H.R., art. 53, par. 2*).

**332. What included in rule.**—The foregoing rule includes everything susceptible of direct military use, such as cables, telephone and telegraph plants, horses and other draft and riding animals, motors, bicycles, motorcycles, carts, wagons, carriages, railways, railway plants, tramways, ships in port, all manner of craft in canals and rivers, balloons, airships, airplanes, depots of arms, whether military or sporting, and in general all kinds of war material.

**333. Destruction of such property.**—The destruction of the foregoing property and all damage to the same is justifiable if it is required by the exigencies of the war.

**334. Submarine cables.**—Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in the case of absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made (*H.R., art. 54*).

#### REQUISITIONS

**335. Requisitions.**—Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country.

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.

Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible (*H.R., art. 52*).

**336. What may be requisitioned.**—Practically everything may be requisitioned under this article that is necessary for the maintenance of the army, such as fuel, food, forage, clothing, tobacco, printing presses, type, leather, cloth, etc. Billeting of troops for quarters and subsistence is also authorized.

**337. Method of requisitioning.**—Requisitions must be made under the authority of the commander in the locality. No prescribed method is fixed, but if practicable requisitions should be accomplished through the local authorities by systematic collection in bulk. They may be made direct by detachments if local authorities fail for any reason. Billeting may be resorted to if deemed advisable.

**338. The amount taken.**—The expression “needs of the army” was adopted rather than “necessities of the war” as more favorable to the inhabitants, but the commander is not thereby limited to the absolute needs of the troops actually present. The object was to avoid reducing the population to starvation.

**339. Fixing prices.**—The prices of articles requisitioned will be fixed by agreement if possible, otherwise by military authority. The prices of commodities on sale may also be regulated and limits placed on the hours and places of trading. All authorities agree that it is good policy to pay cash if possible and to take up receipts as soon as possible.

**340. Method of enforcing.**—If cash is paid, coercion will seldom be necessary. The coercive measures adopted will be limited to the amount and kind necessary to secure the articles requisitioned.

#### CONTRIBUTIONS

**341. Contributions.**—If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the above article (art. 48; see par. 294), the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, this shall only be for the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question (*H.R., art. 49*).

**342. Methods of levying contributions.**—No contribution shall be collected except under a written order and on the responsibility of a commander in chief.



The collection of the said contribution shall only be effected as far as possible in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence of the taxes in force.

For every contribution a receipt shall be given to the contributor (*H.R., art. 51*).

COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENTS

**343. Penalty for individual acts of inhabitants.**—No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible (*H.R., art. 50*).

**344. Above article does not prevent reprisals.**—Reprisals by the occupant for violations of the laws of war or breach of the occupant's proclamations or regulations by enemy individuals not belonging to the armed forces are not prohibited by the above article. (See par. 358.)

2. FM 27-5 (OPNAV 50E-3), *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, 22 December 1943.

(Source: War and Navy Departments)

Moving well beyond the limited scope of chapter 10 of FM 27-10, this joint War and Navy Department publication draws heavily upon the conventions of the Hague Conferences and treats in a comprehensive way the broad issues and situations likely to be faced by military government officers:

## SECTION I

### GENERAL

#### 1. MILITARY GOVERNMENT—CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. **Military Government.** The term “military government” is used in this manual to describe the supreme authority exercised by an armed force over the lands, property, and the inhabitants of enemy territory, or allied or domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation, or from rebels treated as belligerents. It is exercised when an armed force has occupied such territory, whether by force or by agreement, and has substituted its authority for that of the sovereign or a previous government. Sovereignty is not transferred by reason of occupation, but the right of control passes to the occupying force, limited only by international law and custom. The theater commander bears full responsibility for military government. He is, therefore, usually designated as military governor, but may delegate both his authority and title to a subordinate commander.

b. **Occupied Territory.** The term “occupied territory” is used to mean any area in which military government is exercised by an armed force. It does not include territory in which an armed force is located but has not assumed supreme authority.

c. **Civil Affairs.** The term “civil affairs” is used to describe the activities of the government of the occupied area and of the inhabitants of such an area except those of an organized military character. “Civil affairs control” describes the supervision of the activities of civilians by an armed force, by military government, or otherwise. The term “civil affairs officers” designates the military officers, who, under the military governor, are engaged in the control of civilians.

\* \* \*

3. **OCCASION FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT.** Military government must be established either by reason of military necessity as a right under international law, or as an obligation under international law. In this connection, attention should be given to the following considerations:

a. Military necessity may require an armed force to establish military gov-

ernment to assist in the accomplishment of its military objective. The right in such cases is recognized by international law.

b. As the military occupation of enemy territory suspends the operation of the enemy's civil government, it is an obligation under international law for the occupying force to exercise the functions of civil government in the restoration and maintenance of public order. Military government is the organization which exercises these functions. An armed force in territory other than that of an enemy likewise has the duty of establishing military government when the government thereof is absent or unable to maintain order.

c. These reasons, concurrently as well as singly, may dictate the establishment of military government.

d. Military government is not confined to belligerent occupation. Military necessity may require its establishment in such areas as the following, with or without the consent of the existing or a prior government:

(1) Allied or neutral territory which has been dominated or occupied by the enemy.

(2) Technically neutral or allied territory actually unfriendly or hostile.

(3) Genuinely allied or neutral territory, the occupation of which is essential to a military operation.

(4) Domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation or from rebels treated as belligerents.

**4. OBJECT OF CONTROL.** The object of civil affairs control through military government is to assist military operations, to further national policies, and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law. This assistance is rendered by maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active or passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, and mobilizing local resources in aid of military objectives and carrying out governmental policies of the United States which usually are predetermined. Further, the efficient conduct of a military government as a part of one military operation will promote military and political objectives in connection with future operations.

**5. DEGREE OF CONTROL.** The occupant may demand and enforce from the inhabitants of the occupied area such obedience as may be necessary for the purposes of war, the maintenance of law and order, and the proper administration of the area under the unusual circumstances of hostile occupation. In return for such obedience, the inhabitants should be granted freedom from all unnecessary or unwarranted interference with their individual liberty and property rights. Under military government the degree of control maintained by the occupying forces varies greatly according to the relations which have previously existed between the government of the occupying forces and the government of the territory occupied, the existing attitude of officials and inhabitants, the projected military operations, and current military, political, economic and other pertinent circumstances. In the territory of an enemy, rigid control of civil affairs is necessary if the objectives of military government are to be achieved. In neutral, allied, or domestic territory, sufficient cooperation from the officials



and inhabitants may be obtained to permit greater latitude for action by local officials under broad policies and general supervision of the occupying forces, particularly in those governmental fields least important to the military forces in current or pending operations. In any territory, as conditions approach normal, the control exercised by a military government will be relaxed, the supervision of the occupying force will become less direct, and supreme authority will finally be released to a recognized sovereign power.

**6. PERIOD OF CONTROL.** The period of time during which military government or civil affairs control is maintained will vary, depending on whether military operations are continuing, the use or nonuse of the area as a base for future operations, whether the territory is belligerent or otherwise, the degree of cooperation of the inhabitants, the national policy regarding the future position of the territory, and other military and political considerations. As long as military operations continue, some degree of control will be necessary. Military government may extend beyond such operations until it achieves the ends of national policy toward which the operations are directed.

**7. AUTHORITY FOR CONTROL.** Military government is exercised by virtue of and in accordance with rules of international law. Authority for the exercise of such control is derived from the mere fact of occupation or from some form of agreement such as an armistice, a convention, or a treaty. The more important of these rules are set forth in the military manuals of the leading civilized countries and in international treaties, such as the Hague Convention No. IV, 1907 (Annex Sec. III). The rules which govern the armed forces of the United States are set forth in the War Department manual FM 27-10. While the Hague rules apply legally only to enemy territory, as a matter of policy they are generally applied to other territories occupied by United States forces.

**8. EXERCISE OF CONTROL A COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY.** The exercise of civil affairs control is a command responsibility. In occupied territory the commander, by virtue of his position, has supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority, limited only by the laws and customs of war and by directives from higher authority.

**9. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES IN THE CONDUCT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS.**

**a. Military Necessity.** The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the military operation to a successful conclusion. Military necessity is the primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government. So long as the operation continues, it is the duty of the commanding officer to exercise such control and to take such steps in relation to the civil population as will attain the paramount objective.

**b. Supremacy of Commanding Officer.** It follows from the basic principle of military necessity that the theater commander must always have full responsibility for military government.

**c. Civil Affairs Jurisdiction.** The paramount interest of the combat officer is in military operations. The paramount interest of the civil affairs officer is in dealing with civilian relationships of concern to the commander. Such interest

will be expressed in restoring law and order and in returning to the civilian population certain facilities or services and restoring living conditions to normal, insofar as such activities will not tend to interfere with military operations. Whether interference with military operations will result shall be determined by the commanding officer after giving consideration to the recommendations of his combat and civil affairs officers.

**d. Economy of Personnel.** Since efficient control of the civilian population and mobilization of local civilian manpower will lessen the need for garrison forces, adequate civil affairs personnel will in the long run prove an economy. The stimulation and supervision of production and use of local resources will likewise make savings in shipping and supply. All plans and practices of military government should be adopted with this in view and at least the minimum necessary number of Army and Navy personnel trained in civil affairs be provided. The duties of civil affairs officers should be confined wherever possible to supervision.

\* \* \*

**g. Treatment of Population. (1)** International law requires and military necessity dictates just and reasonable treatment of the inhabitants of occupied territory to minimize their belligerency and obtain their cooperation. The cooperation of the inhabitants, where it can be secured, is of direct advantage to the occupying forces in maintaining public order and accomplishing the objective of military government. While the welfare of the inhabitants should be considered also for humane reasons and should be safeguarded as far as military requirements permit, the primary purposes of just treatment are to facilitate the military operations and to meet obligations imposed by law. Proper treatment will be of direct benefit to the occupying forces in preventing chaos, promoting order, and in the procurement of labor, services, and supplies. It will have a favorable influence upon the present and future attitude of the population toward the United States and its allies. It will provide incentive to populations of other territories to accept our future occupation. Such a policy, however, should not affect the imposition of such restrictive or punitive measures as may be necessary to accomplish the objectives of military government in any area, but especially in one in which the population is aggressively hostile and engages in active and passive sabotage.

**(2)** The treatment of the population of any occupied territory will vary, depending upon the attitudes of the people toward the occupying forces; their degree of cooperation with these forces; the degree of their industrial, economic, political and moral development; and the political, diplomatic, and military policy of our government toward the government of the territory occupied. The civil affairs officers should become fully informed concerning the local population and their customs, institutions and attitudes, and should direct military control in the light of the local situation and requirements. In considering the treatment of populations in occupied areas, the following factors should be taken into account:

(a) Generally, less restrictive measures will be necessary in dealing with nationals of friendly or nonhostile countries than with nationals of enemy countries.

(b) The taking of hostages, the imposition of collective fines, or the carrying out of reprisals become military necessities in some situations though such measures should only be taken as an unavoidable last resort to induce a hostile population to desist from unlawful practices. Such actions are usually an indication of weakness of the occupying forces and of ineffective control of the inhabitants. Careful consideration should be given to the question of determining whether such devices will serve as a deterrent or aggravate an already difficult situation. (See FM 27-10.)

(c) Force may be used to the extent necessary to subdue those who resist the authority of military government or to prevent the escape of prisoners or persons suspected of crime. Persons accused are entitled to a fair trial before the imposition of punishment. The theater commander has the power to provide immediate trial, when an example is necessary. Sentences of military courts should be proportionate to the offense and the need for a deterrent effect. The maximum punishment should not be awarded automatically. The nature of sentences to be imposed and whether they should be carried out in public, depends in part upon the customs and habits of the population and the types of punishment which have been found most effective in the particular locality.

**h. Retention of Existing Laws, Customs, and Political Subdivisions.** Local officials and inhabitants of an occupied territory are familiar with its laws, customs, and institutions. To avoid confusion and to promote simplicity of administration, it is advisable that local laws, customs, and institutions of government be retained, except where they conflict with the aims of military government or are inimical to its best interests. In general, it is unwise to impose upon occupied territory the laws and customs of another people. Any attempted changes or reforms contrary to local custom may result in development of active or passive resistance and thereby handicap the operation of military government. For similar reasons it is advisable, if possible, to retain existing territorial divisions and subdivisions. Laws and customs in one political division of a country may differ widely from those in another and the inhabitants therefore may be accustomed to the decentralization of governmental authority which usually parallels such divisions.

**i. Retention of Local Government Departments and Officials.** (1) Offices which are unnecessary or detrimental to military government will be temporarily discontinued or suspended by the military commander as military governor. In some areas this may be the case with entire departments or bureaus of the government.

(2) Such legislative bodies as are still in existence will usually be suspended. Supreme legislative power is vested in the commanding officer in the theater of operations.

(3) Usually it will be necessary to remove high ranking political officials from office. This action will include the removal of the nominal and actual heads of the national government, cabinet ministers, and the heads of principal political



divisions. No permanent appointments to such positions should be made by the military governor without approval of higher authority because of the political implications of such appointments. While membership in unfriendly partisan organizations or political parties may not by itself be cause for removal, such officials as have been active leaders of such organizations will ordinarily not be retained in office, nor will other officials who prove to be unreliable or untrustworthy. Willful failure of retained local officials to perform their duties satisfactorily should be regarded as a serious offense against the military government.

(4) So far as practicable, subordinate officials and employees of the local government should be retained in their offices and made responsible for the proper discharge of their duties, subject to the direction and supervision of civil affairs personnel.

(5) In some areas the native population may have had very limited participation in government because of the domination of a foreign power. In such areas civil officials may have fled when invasion takes place, or it may be inexpedient or unsafe for them to continue in office, even if they remain. In territories of this sort it may become necessary for military government to train native personnel to take over certain positions.

(6) Civil affairs personnel should as far as practicable deal with the inhabitants of occupied territory through such officers and employees of the local government as are retained or appointed. When an official is removed, a replacement should be sought from among the inhabitants who by training and experience is qualified to take over the duties of the office. In the selection of officials, careful consideration should be given to their reliability, their willingness to cooperate with the military government, their positions in the community, as well as their other qualifications for the particular position. Appointments from a political faction or clique, regardless of their friendly sentiment, should be avoided, except in unusual circumstances. In some circumstances it may be determined that the duties of the position can better be performed by a representative of the military government.

(7) Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, should have any part in determining the policies of the military government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, any local political elements except by directions from higher authority.

(8) So far as possible, civil affairs officers should confine themselves to supervision and avoid assumption of the duties of the operating head of a political subdivision or of a department of government.

(9) It may be advisable to provide protection for persons who continue in, or are assigned to, local public office. They may be accused of disloyalty by some inhabitants of the area. Their persons and property may be threatened or endangered.

(10) Civil affairs officers and personnel, as representatives of the United States government, should keep their relations with local officials and inhabitants on a strictly official basis, avoiding unofficial social relationships. All personal fa-

vors or gifts which may be offered by civilians are to be refused unless authorized by higher authority.

**j. Political Prisoners.** Persons imprisoned by the previous government for political or racial reasons only should be released after investigation, unless directed otherwise by higher authority, with warning that political activity on their part, during the period of military government, will not be tolerated.

**k. Economics.** The basic economic policy of United States military government is twofold: first, to revive economic life and stimulate production in order to reduce to a minimum the needs of the area for United States and allied assistance and to develop the area as a source of supply for further operations, and second, to use available goods and services as efficiently as possible for the satisfaction of military and civilian needs. Corollaries of this basic policy include the following:

(1) An equitable distribution of necessities, such as food, fuel, medicine, and clothing, should be instituted as quickly as possible. To this end it will be necessary to reestablish, to some degree at least, public utilities, transportation, communications, and trade. It will often be necessary to enforce controls, which may or may not be the same as those in effect before occupation, over various aspects of economic life, including prices; over marketing by rationing, by measures to bring hoarded goods out of hiding, and by suppression of black markets; over imports and exports; over money and banking. The reestablishment of communications will normally require the instituting of censorship. At times military governments will have to engage actively in some types of economic activity in order to assure that the armed forces and the population receive at least a minimum of necessary goods and services.

(2) Such plans as may be practicable should be laid in advance for the resumption of production, especially in agriculture, fishing, and manufacture, but also in mining, forestry and the service trades. Preliminary decisions must be reached as to which types of economic activity are most important.

\* \* \*

**12. FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS.** The chief function of the civil affairs officers during hostilities is to further the mission of the combat forces in every way possible. As areas are successively occupied he will assist by controlling the civil population so that it will not interfere with military operations. He will help reconstitute civil administration so that local resources in manpower and in strategic material may be utilized to further military operations as authorized by the laws of war. His task may embrace a wide variety of activities, since the responsibilities of his commanding officer may range all the way from controlling a few simple functions of government in a small isolated rural region or a primitive island or group of islands, to controlling the many and complex functions of government in a large, densely populated, industrialized, continental area. In the occupation of such territories for a considerable period of time, the civil affairs officer will in most cases be concerned with the following and other activities:

**a. Political Government and Administration.** The supervision, or even, in rare instances, the actual administration of the chief political offices of the government, such as, for example, the offices of the chief executive, ministers, cabinet officers, secretariats, and other high ranking executive or administrative officials on the national, provincial, or municipal levels.

**b. Maintenance of Law and Order.** The preparation, issuance, and enforcement of proclamations and ordinances regulating the conduct of the inhabitants; reestablishment of the old police force or the creation of a new one, supplemented by military police, marines or shore patrol; prevention, detection and prosecution of crime; maintenance of public order and security of persons and property; regulation of relations between our forces and the inhabitants. . .

\* \* \*

## SECTION VI

### PROCLAMATIONS, ORDINANCES, ORDERS, AND INSTRUCTIONS

#### 35. INITIAL PROCLAMATION.

**a. Issuance.** While not mandatory under international law, as soon as practicable after commencement of an occupation, the theater commander, or an authorized subordinate, should issue to the inhabitants of the occupied territory a proclamation informing them of the fact of occupation, the extent of territory affected, and the obligations, liabilities, duties, and rights of the population under military government. Generally, this proclamation will have been prepared in advance and in accordance with directives from higher authority. Where occupation of a large area is proceeding by stages, it is proper to state that the proclamation will be applicable in adjacent areas as they are occupied.

**b. Form and Character.** (1) The proclamation should be brief and in simple terms. It should be published as widely as possible in English and in the languages of the occupied area. Any translation should be idiomatic, clear, and concise.

(2) The tone and character of the proclamation will vary in different territories and will depend upon a number of factors. Among them will be: the military and political objectives to be attained in the occupied and other territories; the strategic situations; the existence or nonexistence of a recognized government on the ground or in exile; the composition and disposition of the occupying forces whether American or allied; the attitude of the inhabitants; historical and psychological considerations; and the extent to which control over civil affairs must be exercised in the particular territory. It is probably advisable to address the people of a major enemy firmly and bluntly, but the language should not be vindictive or needlessly offensive. In other territories, inhabited by a nonhostile population which is being freed from enemy domination, the proclamation will be more friendly in character and may emphasize deliverance from a common enemy.

(3) In occupations of neutral or allied territory, lately held by an enemy, a manifesto may also be issued by the legitimate government supporting the oc-



cupation and calling upon officials and inhabitants to cooperate and to obey the rules laid down by the commanders of such forces. Such manifestos are not legally necessary, but are issued to promote cooperation of the population with the occupying forces. In occupations of this type, the theater commander will usually clear such manifestos with the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff.

**c. Contents.** The initial proclamation will vary in content according to the circumstances of the occupation. The important items to be covered are the state of affairs which exists, a definition of the area and peoples to which the proclamation applies, the extent to which the civil administration will be affected, the manner in which the inhabitants are to conduct themselves, and the measures which will be resorted to by the military government. It is impracticable to outline the contents of proclamations for all types of occupations. In definitely hostile territory the proclamation should, in general, cover the following points:

**(1) Declaration of the Occupation.** This is formal notice of the fact of occupation and of the territory in general over which the military government assumes jurisdiction.

**(2) Purpose and Policy of the Occupation.** It may be advisable to include a statement as to the purpose and policy of the occupation. Political objectives should be included only pursuant to instructions from higher authority.

**(3) Supremacy of Military Authority of Occupying Forces.** This is an essential prerequisite to the administration of any military government. It should be announced that a military governor has been appointed and that political ties with and obligations to the enemy government, if any, are suspended. It should be announced that inhabitants will be required to obey orders of the theater commander and his subordinates and to abstain from all acts or words of hostility or disrespect to the occupying forces.

**(4) Retention of Laws and Officials.** It should be announced that, unless the military authority directs otherwise, local laws and customs will continue in force, local officials will continue in office, and officer and employees of all transportation and communication systems and of public utilities and other essential services will carry on with their regular tasks.

**(5) Treatment of Inhabitants.** Assurance should be given that persons who obey the instructions of the military authority have nothing to fear and will be duly protected in their persons, property, family rights, religion, and occupation; and that those who commit offenses will be severely punished.

**(6) Resumption of Usual Occupations.** Inhabitants should be instructed that they must continue or resume their usual occupations, unless specifically directed to the contrary. This will assist in the maintenance of law and order and restoration of normal economic conditions.

**(7) Detailed Rules of Conduct.** It is advisable to put the population on notice that further proclamations or ordinances will specify in detail what is required of the inhabitants and what is forbidden them to do.

**(8) Miscellaneous.** Other matters may be covered, if circumstances warrant. Proclamations published by previous military governments may also serve as useful guides.

**(d) Publication.** Proclamations may be published by posting, publication in newspapers, broadcasting, or any other practicable method available in the particular territory. It may be advisable to publish them in the same manner as legal notices are published in the occupied area, or to create a new official publication devoted exclusively to actions of the military government and to provide that proclamations and ordinances become effective when they appear in such publication.

3. Memo, MG Gullion (PMG) to ACofS, G-3, 11 Jan 43, sub: University Training Program for Officers of the Specialist Reserve Section, Officer Reserve Corps.

(Source: Copy in Center of Military History files)

With endorsements and five tabs, this memo outlines the proposed curricula for the School for Military Government at Charlottesville, the Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), and the Provost Marshal School at Fort Custer. Many of the earlier military government officers on Okinawa, as well as in other American-occupied areas, received training along the lines set forth in this memo:

January 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM for The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. THRU: Commanding General, SOS. THRU: Chief, Administrative Services, SOS.

Subject: University Training Program for Officers of the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps.

1. The procurement authority of November 23, 1942 (WDGAP 210.1 ORC, AG 210.1 (11-23-42) ), as amended by authority of November 27, 1942 (AG 210.1 PR-A-A), authorizes the Provost Marshal General to recommend for commissions 20 lieutenant colonels, 30 majors and 2450 captains and lieutenants (a total of 2500) in the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps, at a rate of not to exceed 300 per month. It is contemplated that this procurement objective will be reached during the calendar year 1943. The 20 lieutenant colonels and 30 majors and not in excess of 325 of the other authorized officers will, when and as commissioned, attend the School of Military Government, at Charlottesville, Virginia, for sixteen weeks' courses during the year 1943 and, upon the completion of such courses, will be returned to an inactive status if assignments are not then available. The other officers commissioned under this authorization are to constitute a reserve pool of specialists for future employment in the military governments of occupied areas.

2. The procurement authority further provides, as to all the 2500 officers, that they

“will be called to active duty promptly by The Adjutant General as requested by The Provost Marshal General and assigned to a course in military government, upon the completion of which they shall revert to an inactive status.”

3. As above indicated, not in excess of 375 of the 2500 authorized officers will attend the Charlottesville School. As to the remaining officers, it is intended to earmark each for probable eventual duty in some general overseas area and



then to call each temporarily to active duty for some brief instruction in military government and the background of the general area for which he will have been earmarked. Such instruction would in each instance be for a period not to exceed six weeks. Not only is such instruction indicated by the procurement authority, but without it these officers would enter upon important active service overseas without any special training whatsoever.

4. As already pointed out, it will not be possible to provide training at the Charlottesville School for more than 375 of these officers during the year 1943. It will be feasible, however, to arrange with a group of colleges and universities to furnish such training by farming out these officers in small groups from time to time for instruction in military government and backgrounds of the general areas involved.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That the principle of "farming out" these reserve officers to a group of college and universities for periods not to exceed six weeks be approved and

(b) That The Provost Marshal General be authorized to engage in the necessary preliminary discussions to accomplish this objective, all final arrangements and agreements to be consummated by the duly authorized agencies of the War Department.

Allen W. Gullion,  
Major General,  
The Provost Marshal General.

Subject: University Training Program for Officers of the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps.

SPTRS 210.1 (1-11-43) 1st Wrapper Ind. JAN 18, 1943  
WAR DEPT., HQS SERVICES OF SUPPLY, TRAINING DIVISION,  
Washington, D.C.

To: Provost Marshal General, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.  
(THRU: Chief of Administrative Services). ATTENTION: Colonel Miller.

The basic communication is returned without action for inclusion of a detailed training plan and program of instruction in accordance with the results of the conference attended by the Deputy Director of Training, Training Division, Services of Supply, and Colonel Miller, Office of the Provost Marshal General.

By Command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL:

/s/ W. L. WEIBLE  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Deputy Director of Training, S.O.S.

1 Incl.

/s/ J. M. R.

The details of the program referred to are the same details called for by the 1st Indorsement of the Deputy Director of Training, SOS, to which the following

is responsive and “in accordance with the results of the conference” referred to therein.

2. The general training program agreed to at said conference contemplates a two-months’ course of basic military training at Fort Custer, Michigan, to be followed by a two-months’ course of instruction in military government, particularly in the backgrounds of special areas of potential occupation, at a number of civilian colleges and universities. The details of this general program are the matters called for by the present reference. They will be discussed under two headings, viz. timing and curriculum.

3. Timing. It is necessary to bear in mind the successive steps in the training program which will, within the briefest possible time limits, produce the desired number of adequately trained officers. Three stages are involved, which will be dealt with in the following order: (a) selection and processing, (b) basic training at Fort Custer and (c) instruction at civilian colleges.

(a) Selection and Processing. The selection of officers possessing the necessary qualifications will be difficult for a number of reasons. Many special skills and a variety of refinements under some of them must be recruited, including experts in public works and utilities, public health, safety and welfare, fiscal affairs, education, communications and economics. In certain of these fields, the available supply of qualified personnel is today very limited. Serious competition for these meager supplies must be expected from such civilian agencies as the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (Governor Lehman). The most difficult situation, however, will arise from the fact that The Provost Marshal General’s procurement authority establishes an age range of 35 to 55 and a maximum rank, with few exceptions, of Captain. This combination of high age and comparatively low rank will make the selection job most difficult.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that, after selection by the Provost Marshal General, the processing mortality will be high. The experience of the Military Government Division of the P.M.G.O. in commissioning civilians for the School of Military Government under the existing procurement authority has disclosed that less than 60% of those selected are ever actually commissioned.

Finally, since the other portions of the military government personnel program have been planned upon a two-year basis, the selection and training of the specialists pool should be geared to this time limit. This imposes a maximum time factor upon the selection and processing phases here under discussion.

The foregoing factors have been reduced to the time table appearing herein as Tab “B”. Its production estimates, however, are based upon the assumption that some relief will be afforded from certain of the handicaps noted above. The inevitable alternatives will be either a relaxation of desirable and necessary standards or a failure to meet the following schedules. As appears from Tab “B”, the recruitment program can meet the specifications indicated above and have sufficient numbers of Reserve Officers available for the end college training by August 15, 1944.

(b) Basic training at Fort Custer. Allowing six weeks for processing, 100



student officers will be available to enter Fort Custer on May 1, 1943. A like number will enter on June 1, July 1 and August 1, and thereafter groups of 150 will enter on the first day of each succeeding month until the full 2500 have been absorbed. This procedure will produce a student group of 200 from June 1 to September 1, 1943; a student group of 250 in September and thereafter groups of 300. The facilities at Fort Custer will be ample for these purposes.

(c) Instruction at civilian colleges. As will be later indicated the background instruction to be given in the college courses should cover five general areas. The unanimous opinion of all concerned is that no student group should exceed 50 student officers. Furthermore, the college training program must be geared to the productive capacity of the Selection Board and must be completed as nearly as possible by December 31, 1944.

Giving effect to the foregoing factors requires that six (6) colleges be employed in the program and that the various courses be conducted at the times and in the distribution shown on Tab "C".

The number of institutions competent to provide the necessary training is definitely limited. A careful investigation of the field discloses that twenty-eight (28) colleges and universities are equipped to participate in the program. They are listed on Tab "D".

4. Curriculum. Two curricula must be provided, viz. for (a) Fort Custer and (b) civilian colleges. Inasmuch as the training program is a novel venture, sufficient flexibility should be retained at this time to make possible such minor adjustments as experience may prove to be desirable.

The Charlottesville School has developed a general pattern of instruction that, it is believed, should be followed as nearly as possible in the new training program. This should be done not only because the Charlottesville method is believed to be sound, but because the adaptation of its essentials to the present program will create a desirable uniformity in all instruction given to military government personnel.

The Charlottesville instruction is divided generally into two parts—(I) that relating to the general principles of military government which are applicable and important regardless of the particular area of occupation and (II) the study of the backgrounds of areas of potential occupation. Under (I) are included such topics as Army organization and staff functions, the international law and American regulations relating to military government, the experiences and practices of the United States and other nations in the actual operation of military governments and the general principles of public administration. Included under (II) are matters concerning the institutions, customs and practices of particular areas and the language thereof.

It is proposed to allocate to the Fort Custer training those portions of the instruction embraced in (I) above and to the civilian colleges and universities those portions embraced in (II).

A brief explanation for the desirability of such an allocation should be made. In the first place, it will be very difficult to establish in six separate colleges a satisfactory course of instruction embracing the general principles making up

Part I of the Charlottesville curriculum inasmuch as persons trained in certain of the topics are not usually found on college faculties. On the other hand, there is already in operation at Fort Custer a Department of Military Government, which is furnishing the instruction in its two schools for occupational police (officers and enlisted) upon the same topics which should be included in the present curriculum. It will be an easy matter to augment the existing faculty at Fort Custer and to furnish the instruction in that way. Furthermore, this procedure should result in a betterment of the existing Military Government faculty at Fort Custer. Finally, since only one hour per day, or a total of 48 hours for each course, will be devoted to this instruction, it will not materially reduce the time allotted to basic military training.

With the foregoing remarks in mind, the two proposed curricula are now discussed:

a. Fort Custer. Tab "E" sets up a proposed curriculum for 8 weeks of basic military training. It has been prepared by the Military Police Division of the P.M.G.O. and, with one exception, it is self-explanatory.

The noted exception is the reservation of 48 hours for the Director, Military Government Division. These 48 hours are allotted for instruction in the general principles of military government referred to above. The course of instruction to be furnished during these 48 hours has been prepared after consultation with the Charlottesville School and is in substantial conformity with the treatment of the subject matters involved by the Charlottesville School. See Tab "F".

It should be noted that the curriculum covers 8 weeks instead of two months. This will leave two to three days at the end of each course for final processing and travel from Fort Custer to college courses beginning on the first day of the following month.

b. Colleges and universities. The training to be provided here is essentially the backgrounds of certain general areas of probable occupation. The most feasible grouping of the areas of study are believed to be five, namely:

- (1) Germany and Western Europe
- (2) Germany and Southeastern Europe
- (3) Italy and the Mediterranean
- (4) Japan and Southeastern Asia
- (5) The Southwest Pacific

The curriculum would consist of three basic sub-divisions described as follows:

(1) Special Instruction in the characteristics and conditions of the area. This would consist of (a) lectures, supervised project work and discussion relating to the people, their physical environment, their ways of living, their institutions and customs, as they affect problems of military government and (b) lectures

and assignments concerning major recent events and developments which explain the relation of the area to the causes of the war.

A more detailed description of the subject matter to be covered in this part of the curriculum would include the following features:

**Place.** The location of the region with reference to adjacent regions and why that location is significant; access to the area by roads, railroad, water, air; distinguishing features of transportation in the area; climate, temperature, rainfall and some of the results which may be expected from extremes; the means for guarding against these results; the soil of the area, whether covered or barren; types of crops, fertility, topography, altitudes, minerals; effects of technological changes on the natural resource base, such as cultivation for export, mining development, construction of railroads, airports, etc.; water supply and its problems; irrigation; general relation or effects of the presence or absence of natural resources upon food, dress and activities of the people.

**People.** The racial composition of the people of the area, and where these races have come from; whether there is a movement of the population, from where and to where; analysis of birth and death rates and knowledge of resulting pressures; analysis of principal causes of death rates; linguistic, racial, religious and other groupings; status and caste relations and some of the specific problems emerging; influence of the stronger social, racial, color, religious or other groups on domestic politics and on international relations; special points of friction which must be watched.

**How They Make a Living.** What the basic natural resources are and their extent; the dominant industries and other economic activities based upon them; types of special skills and institutions based on dominant industries and kind of international trade; recent changes in the local economy resulting from technology, war, colonial policies, tariffs, etc.; the labor supply—its amount, skill, treatment, freedom, wage rates, organization, political activity; presence or absence of a labor movement; the professional and managerial groups in the community, their size, recruitment, status and influence; the ownership of land, size of tracts, tenancy, terms of holding, changes in holdings, peculiarities of land law; effect of government upon the daily life—taxation, public utilities and services, government ownership and regulation, government monopolies, subsidies, tariffs, social security; financial control within the community, banking groups, control by corporations, political effects (e.g. Japan), representation of foreign financial interests.

**How They are Governed.** The presence or absence of colonial government; the degree of local self-government and administration; the positions, number and authority of local officials, their selection and their relation to central government; the subdivisions of government organization, the relation of central and local units; the role of elections, tradition or status in the selection of officials; political parties or groups, their types of organization and methods; party programs, leaders and slogans, their racial and social foundations, their intensity of feeling; the Civil Service, its selection and training, presence or absence of a “spoils” system; its status and influence in the community; its stability; the



possibilities of its use in occupied zones; significant features of the judicial and legal systems, forms of punishment, authority of courts, etc.; government finance, sources of revenue and principal objects of expenditure by local and central governments; peculiar methods, forms and objects of taxation; the role of invisible government; place of distinctive individuals and their leadership.

How They Live. The characteristics of family life and the resulting effects upon the community; religions and their social and political influence; religious influences affecting local life and customs; e.g. diet, ceremonies, the relation of the sexes, and the use of special places and objects of worship; the schools and what they teach, general and technical; the control over the educational system; the degree of literacy; the availability of popular education; reading habits, libraries, newspapers, magazines, radio; censorship and control of the press and education; the major popular classics, other books; the distinctive features of local architecture, arts, music, dress, sports, diet, etc.; special accomplishments in literature, arts and sciences; accomplishments of particular pride; use of money, barter, wages, price understandings; sanitation and living conditions.

Historical Background and Contemporary World Affairs. The essentials of the historical relations of the area to other adjacent or related areas and to the United States.

(2) Language training. All officers who have a speaking or writing ability in a useful foreign language will be given speaking practice in that language; all other officers will be given intensive instruction (for speaking) in one of the following languages: German, Italian, French, Japanese, Malay and Melanesian Pidgin.

(3) Special application of civilian specialty to military government situations. This part of the curriculum will consist of (a) lectures and conferences on the relationship of technical, professional and other lines of specialized knowledge to military government organization and (b) lectures and conferences on special situations and problems in technical, professional and other lines of specialization which will be encountered in the area for which the officers are being prepared.

The distribution of total hours involved among the three general topics just discussed appears on Tab "G".

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That training for two-months' periods begin at Fort Custer on May 1, 1943, with 100 students, to be followed by monthly groups as set out in column (4), Tab "B".

2. That instruction in colleges in the five general areas, indicated herein, begin on July 1, 1943, and be carried out in six institutions in student groups of 50 each, as indicated in Tab "C".

3. That the six colleges to be designated for this purpose be selected from the list set out in Tab "D".

4. That the curriculum for Fort Custer, set out in Tabs "E" and "F", be approved.

5. That the curriculum for colleges, set out in Tab "G", be approved.

/s/ Allen W. Gullion,  
Major General,  
The Provost Marshal General.

TAB "A"

WDGAP 320

January 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5

SUBJECT: The War Department Military Government Program

1. Paragraph 5 of FM 27-5 sets forth the policy of the War Department with respect to the exercise of Military Government in occupied territory. Paragraphs 6 and 8 fix the responsibility for the preparation of plans and determination of policies and the supervision of instruction and training of the necessary personnel upon the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. Paragraph 7 prescribes the policy to be pursued with respect to the procurement of personnel for the exercise of Military Government. The procurement of this personnel is also a function of the Personnel Division, G-1.

2. The present program of the War Department contemplates the training of a considerable number of enlisted men, junior officers and senior officers of the Army at schools currently under the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General and the commissioning of a considerable number of civilians skilled in various phases of civil government in the Specialists Section of the Officers Reserve Corps with a view to giving them additional training in the various aspects of Military Government. The details of the program are as follows:

a. The School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, has been established, and courses of instruction extending over a period of approximately four (4) months are being given to officers drawn from the service commands and units of the field forces and to a limited number of civilians who have been commissioned in the Specialists Section of the Officers Reserve Corps. The capacity of this school is 150 students.

b. A school for junior officers and enlisted men is being opened at Fort Custer, Michigan, under the Provost Marshal General for the training of approximately 1,200 junior officers during the current year. The number of enlisted men to be trained has not yet been definitely determined.

c. The Provost Marshal General has been authorized to recommend for appointment in the Specialists Section of the Officers Reserve Corps 2,500 civilians having special skills in civil government. These individuals are to be appointed at a rate of not more than 300 per month and upon appointment are

to be called to active duty and given a basic course of military training followed by a suitable course in military government at some civilian institution, upon the completion of which they will be returned to an inactive status if there is no immediate need for their services in an active theater. Complete details of this program have not yet been worked out by The Provost Marshal General and submitted for approval.

The training of the personnel listed in a, b and c above will be under the guidance of the Training Division, Services of Supply, and supervised by the Personnel Division, G-1, as contemplated by paragraph 8, FM 27-5.

3. The disposition of graduates of the Schools of Military Government will be determined by the requirements of active theatres and of the desires of field force commanders with respect to the establishment of Civil Affairs Sections in their Headquarters within the continental limits of the United States. Where an appropriate assignment can be found for graduates this Division will direct their assignment to duties for which they have been trained. Where an appropriate assignment is not available for officers and enlisted men detailed to the Schools from units of the Army they will be returned to units of the field forces where they will remain until their services are required. Where appropriate assignments are not available for those officers appointed directly from civil life they will be returned to an inactive status upon completion of training and will remain available to the War Department until their services are required.

4. For details concerning the origin of the basic program, and particularly the establishment of the School of Military Government, attention is invited to G-3/41983, March 5, 1942, subject: "Training of Personnel for Military Government and Liaison", and to file AG 352 (912-3-410).

/s/ M.G. WHITE  
Brigadier General,  
Assistant Chief of Staff

Incls.

Memo to G-1 fr G-3, 1/19.

File AG 352.

mlr



TAB “E”

Proposed Eight Week Program for Specialists  
to be Commissioned in Officers Reserve Corps  
for Specialists Duty in Occupied Countries

SUBJECT	HOURS
<u>Basic and General</u>	
1. Orientation Lecture and Definition of Military Terms	2
2. Qualifications and Responsibilities of officers	2
3. Close Order Drill	16
4. Defense Against Chemical Attacks	3
5. Duty of Officers “Off Duty”	1
6. Extended Order Drill	4
7. Military Sanitation and First Aid	6
8. Interior Guard Duty	2
9. Exterior Guard Duty	2
10. Inspections	3
11. Leadership and Discipline	3
12. Map and Aerial Photo Reading	20
13. Marches and Bivouacs	4
14. Military Courtesy, Customs of the Service	8
15. Safeguarding Military Information	2
16. Organization of Army	4
17. Uniform and Equipment	3
Total	85
<u>Police Instruction</u>	
1. Field Trips:	
Div. C. P.	4
M. P. Company	2
Plant Protection	4
2. Military Training	6
3. Office of P.M.G.	1
4. Organization of Corps of M.P.	2
5. Prisoners of War	2
Total	21
<u>Weapons</u>	
1. Anti-Aircraft Firing Rifle	3
2. Bayonet	1
3 Carbine	4

SUBJECT	HOURS
4. Field Demonstration, .50 Cal. and .30 Cal. machine gun and 60 MM Mortar	4
5. Fire Orders and Control	1
6. Grenade	3
7. Infantry Weapons, characteristics	4
8. Machine Gun, Cal. .30 (L. & H.) and Cal. .50	10
9. Pistol and Revolver cal. .45	10
10. Rifle, cal. .30 (MI & 03)	10
11. Shot Gun	2
12. Technique of Rifle Fire	3
13. Thompson Sub-machine Gun, cal. .45	10
14. 60 MM Mortar	2
Total	67

#### Tactics

1. Combat Intelligence	2
2. Combat Orders	1
3. Counter Intelligence	2
4. Defense Against Air Borne Troops	2
5. Defense Against Air and Mechanized Attacks	2
6. Employment of Chemicals	1
7. Entrenchments and Camouflage	2
8. Estimate of the Situation	1
9. Medical Services in the Field	2
10. Mission and Functions and Arms and Services	4
11. Outposts	2
12. Reconnaissance and Security	2
13. Scouting and Patrolling	4
14. Signal Communications	4
15. Supply	6
16. Staff Duties	4
Total	41

#### Criminal Investigation

1. CNI, FBI, POI, ONI	2
2. Codes	2
3. Drugs	1
4. Fingerprints	2
5. Handwriting Identification	1
6. Sabotage Methods	10
Total	18

SUBJECT	HOURS
<u>Law and Administration</u>	
1. Army Postal Service	1
2. Articles of War (to include 104 A.W.)	6
3. Basic Law	2
4. Charges and Specifications	1
5. Classification	1
6. Company Administration to include Military Correspondence	4
7. Military Arrests	1
8. Military Jurisdiction	2
9. Procedure During Trial	2
Total	20
<u>Physical Training</u>	
1. Judo	12
2. Physical Training	24
Total	36

Proposed Eight Week Program for Specialists  
to be Commissioned in Officers Reserve Corps  
for Specialists Duty in Occupied Countries  
SUMMARY

SUBJECT	HOURS
Basic and General	85
Police Instruction	21
Weapons	67
Tactics	41
Criminal Investigation	18
Law and Administration	20
Physical Training	36
Review and Examination (2 hours per week)	16
Open Time (4 hours per week)	32
Reserved for Director, Military Government Division	48*
Total Number of Hours	384

\*See Tab "F"



TAB "F"Distribution of 48 hours of Military Government  
Instruction - Fort Custer

	<u>Lectures</u>	<u>Hours (60 Min.) Practical Work.</u>
<u>Army Organization and Staff Functions</u>		
War Department organization; general staff; tactical organization; rear areas; special staff functions; military orders; staff and command procedure; reorganized army.	8	
<u>Legal Instruction</u>		
Practice of military war tribunals, including jurisdiction and procedures.	2	
<u>Military Government. (General)</u>		
Law of Military Government (FM 27-10, Chapters 6, 10, 11 and other relevant paragraphs); organization and practice of military government (FM 27-5); application of basic principles to concrete situations.	4	13
<u>Military Government (Experiences)</u>		
A study of past and present experiences and practices of the United States and other countries.	11	
<u>Public Administration</u>		
Public Safety, Public Health, Public Welfare and Relief, Labor, Public Relations, Banking and Currency, General Administration, Problems in Military Government, general principles of Public Administration.	8	2

TAB "G"

CURRICULUM for COLLEGES and UNIVERSITIES

	<u>Lectures or other Class Room Work</u>	<u>Supervised Project Work</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. Special instruction in Characteristics and conditions of general area	84 hours	168 hours	252 hours
2. Language training	96 "		96 "
3. Special application of civilian specialty to military government	<u>12</u> "	<u>24</u> "	<u>36</u> "
	192	192	385

TAB "H"

Proposed Eight Week Program for Specialists  
to be commissioned in Officers Reserve Corps  
for Specialist Duty in Occupied Countries

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
<u>Basic and General</u>	
1. Orientation Lecture and Definition of Military Terms.	3
2. Qualifications and Responsibilities of officers.	3
3. School of Soldier, Squad, Platoon and Company.	40
4. Defense against Chemical Attacks	5
5. Military Sanitation and First Aid	8
6. Guard Duty including Security and anti-sabotage measures	14
7. Inspections	8
8. Leadership and Discipline	3
9. Map and Aerial Photo Reading	10
10. Military Courtesy, Customs of the Service	4
11. Safeguarding Military Information	2
12. Organization of Army, CMP, MP, PMC, to include Organization T/O and Com. Zone.	12
13. Uniform and Equipment	3
Total	115
<u>Weapons</u>	
1. Infantry Weapons, characteristics	1
2. Pistol and Revolver Cal. 45	10
3. Rifle, Cal. 30 (MI and .03) carbine	10
4. Thompson Sub-machine Gun Cal. 45	4
Total	25
<u>Tactics</u>	
1. Counter Intelligence	2
2. Defense against Air Borne Troops	4
3. Defense against Air and Mechanized Attacks.	4
4. Employment of Chemicals	3
5. Signal Communications	6
6. Supply System	8
Total	27
<u>Law and Administration</u>	
1. Army Postal Service	1
2. Articles of War (to include 104 AW)	6



SUBJECT	HOURS
3. Military Law	18
4. Military Correspondence and Army Regulations	12
5. Staff Organization and Functions	8
6. Medical Service, American Red Cross	
U.S. Public Health Service	6
7. Rules of Land Warfare	3
8. Prisoners of War	3
9. Utilization of Economic Resources in War	3
10. Relations of Military Forces with civil populations, Ordnances Military Commissions and Military Requisitions	10
11. Evacuation of civilians	8
Total	78
<u>Training</u>	
Physical Training	24
Methods of Training	3
Examination (Training Inspections)	16
Total	43
<u>Summary:</u>	
Basic and General	115
Weapons	25
Tactics	27
Law and Administration	78
Training	43
Reserved for Ass't Commandant	48
Reserved for Director, Military Government Div.	48
Total	384



## The Theory Behind a Military Government Program

As the date for Operation ICEBERG drew closer, Tenth Army planners developed specific instructions for the military government headquarters and the field detachments. These plans, together with two directives from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, applied the central principles derived from the field manuals and civil affairs courses to the particular military government challenges anticipated on Okinawa.

4. Operational Directive Number 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General Tenth Army (Short Title: GOPER), 6 January 1945.
- (Source: National Archives and Records Service Suitland, Md., RG 407)

Despite its curious title, and the fact that the derivation of its short-title (GOPER) remains obscure, this directive is a comprehensive document detailing the composition and function of the military government detachments, providing guidance on various aspects of civil affairs administration—such as currency regulation and education, and assigning personnel and material to the various military government field teams:

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE)6 January 1945

NUMBER7)

Military Government; Short Title: GOPER

1. OBJECT: The object of Military Government is to assist military operations, to further national policies, and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law. This assistance is rendered by maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active and passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of local civil adminstration, and mobilizing local resources in the aid of military objectives.
2. RESPONSIBILITY:
- a. Command:



(1) Function: Military Government is a function of command. Each commander is responsible for military government operations in the area under his control.

(2) Channels: Military government personnel attached to a command will be under the direct command of the commanding officer of the unit to which they are attached. Military government staffs may use direct channels of communication for technical subjects.

(3) Transfer of Command: Initially the Commander Expeditionary Troops will be responsible for all military government operations. On order from Commander Expeditionary Troops, direct responsibility for and command over military government personnel and operations will pass to the Island Commander.

b. Policies:

(1) General Limitations:

(a) International Law and Military Necessity: The subordinate commanders are delegated such powers of government as international law and military necessity may require.

(b) Rules of Land Warfare: Commanders will carry out their duties in accordance with the laws and customs of war on land.

(c) Directives from Higher Echelons: Procedure with respect to MG operations in any area under the CG, TENTH Army will be in accordance with the policies laid down in directives or orders from higher echelons and in accordance with those here set forth. Military Government staffs for all echelons under the CG, TENTH Army will prepare necessary plans for civilian control within their respective areas in accordance with policies established herein.

(2) Degree of Control:

(a) General: Commanders under the TENTH Army may demand and enforce from the inhabitants of the occupied area such obedience as may be necessary for the purposes of war, the maintenance of law and order, and the proper administration of the area under the circumstances of hostile occupation. In return for such obedience, the inhabitants shall be granted freedom from all unnecessary or unwarranted interference with their individual liberty and property rights. The degree of control to be maintained by the TENTH Army will vary according to the attitude of officials and inhabitants, the projected military operations, and current military, political, economic, and other pertinent circumstances. Rigid control of civilians will be exercised to accomplish objectives of military government. As conditions approach normal, the control exercised by military government will be relaxed.

3. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL:

a. In the assault phase, Military Government staff, detachments, teams, and units with tactical forces will be under the command of the Commander Expeditionary Troops. Military Government operational teams and detachments may be attached to subordinate units, and when so attached will be under the direct command of the subordinate commander concerned.

b. In the garrison phase, the Island Commander has responsibility for

military government, which will be operated by the Deputy Commander for Military Government.

c. Military Government personnel (Army and Navy), are organized into headquarters, operational teams, and detachments as follows:

- (1) Military Government Headquarters (Appendix #I)
- (2) Divisional "A" Detachments, each of 4 officers and 11 enlisted men. (Appendix #II)
- (3) "B" Detachments, each of 8 officers and 19 enlisted men. (Appendix #III)
- (4) "C" Detachments, or Camp Teams, each of 10 officers and 26 enlisted men. (Appendix #IV)
- (5) "D" Detachments, or District Teams, each of 22 officers and 60 enlisted men. (Appendix #V)
- (6) Special detachments, made up of personnel assigned in accordance with duties to be performed.

d. In addition, the following are type units, both Army and Navy which may be assigned to duty for military government operations:

- |                                     |        |
|-------------------------------------|--------|
| (1) MP Units                        | (Army) |
| (2) QM Truck Cos.                   | (Army) |
| (3) MP Criminal Investigation Units | (Army) |
| (4) G-2 Hospitals                   | (Navy) |
| (5) G-4 Hospitals                   | (Navy) |
| (6) G-6 Hospitals                   | (Navy) |
| (7) G-7 Dispensaries                | (Navy) |
| (8) G-10 Dispensaries               | (Navy) |
| (9) G-14 Dispensaries               | (Navy) |
| (10) G-17 Malaria Control Units     | (Navy) |
| (11) G-18 Epidemiological Units     | (Navy) |
| (12) N-1A Camp Components           | (Navy) |
| (13) N-4A Camp Components           | (Navy) |
| (14) N-4C Camp Components           | (Navy) |
| (15) N-5C Camp Components           | (Navy) |
| (16) Construction Battalions        | (Navy) |

#### 4. OPERATIONS:

a. Military Government Headquarters: At the direction of the CG, TENTH ARMY, the Military Government Section, Hq TENTH ARMY, will be augmented by such personnel, assigned for Military Government duties in the area, as may be necessary to enable it to operate as a staff section exercising control over all military government activities under the Area Commander. If Hq TENTH ARMY should leave the area, the augmentation portion of the Military Government Section, Hq TENTH ARMY, will remain in the area as the continuing military government staff of the Area Commander and as such will, under his direction, control and supervise the activities of the military government in the area. While together, the two parts of the Military Government Section, Hq TENTH ARMY, will operate as a unit.

b. Military Government "A" Detachments: The "A" detachments attached to divisions will remain under divisional control until completion of the operation. "A" detachments conduct military government reconnaissance, and assist in the following civilian functions: control; establishing civilian collection points separate from but adjacent to prisoner of war collection points; posting proclamations and issuing civilian relief supplies available to the division. In addition they may act as military government staffs for the division commanders. At the direction of the Expeditionary Troop Commander they may be transferred to the control of the Island Commander.

c. Military Government "B" Detachments: These detachments are attached to corps and divisions and perform duties within the areas of units to which assigned. When the "A" detachments are required to advance, "B" detachments will continue the emergency military government work begun by the "A" detachments. "B" detachments will normally remain in the area to which initially assigned and at the discretion of the next senior commander may be relieved from units to which assigned and used for military government duties in the areas uncovered by the advance.

d. Military Government "C" Detachments: The principal mission of the "C" detachment is that of establishing and operating civilian camps. These detachments will land under corps and Army control and are capable of providing initially a camp for 2500 people, which later may be expanded to a capacity of 10,000.

e. Military Government "D" Detachments: These detachments will be landed at the target during the late assault phase or the early garrison phase, and will take over the military government duties at the district level, absorbing the "B" teams and exercising control over the "C" teams within their districts. A "D" team after absorbing "B" teams is capable of administering a civilian population of between 60,000 to 100,000 people, and in addition can supervise any civilian camps located within the district.

f. Special MG Detachments: Whenever required by the peculiarities of the situation, as when a remote area is to be governed, special MG detachments may be constituted, or standard detachments may be subdivided.

g. Other Units: Navy Medical and CB, and Army MP and quartermaster truck units will arrive on the target to work in conjunction with the detachments listed above. Normally they will not be used for other than military government assignments.

##### 5. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION: (See Appendix VI, MG Supply Responsibilities)

a. Military Government Detachments: Supplied all classes through normal channels by units to which attached.

b. Civilian:

(1) Class I:

(a) Initial: Assault Divisions or Separate Combat Teams will mount out with civilian rations as directed. Number of rations prescribed will depend on tonnage allocations and estimated need for such rations at the target. For



components of civilian ration for this area see Appendix VII (Table of Basic Ration – Subsistence for Civilians).

(b) Resupply: Will be from captured local food stocks and civilian rations landed from maintenance shipping.

(c) Issue of Military Rations to Civilians: In emergencies, commanders may authorize the issue of military rations to civilians.

(2) Class II – (Clothing):

(a) Emergency stocks of civilian clothing will be landed in early maintenance and resupply shipping subsequent to the assault. Gratuitous issue to cover minimum essential civilian requirements may be made in early phases of the operation. At the earliest possible date, gratuitous issue will cease. Clothing and materials therefore will then be furnished to civilians only through trade stores, civilian commercial channels or in direct payment for services rendered. Exceptions may be made in cases where eligibility for free issue has been determined by Welfare Department.

(3) Economic Supplies – (Agriculture, Fishing, Trade Goods, etc): Will be landed on scheduled maintenance shipping in accordance with estimated requirements and assigned tonnage allocations. Small initial gratuitous issue may be made. The bulk of such supplies will be sold through the medium of trade stores or local commercial channels.

(4) Engineer: Will be furnished in accordance with the Base Development Plan. Special engineer equipment and supplies included as organic equipment with MG units and detachments will be shipped and landed with the respective units.

(5) Medical and Sanitary Supplies: Initial supplies accompany Military Government Medical Units. Resupply by block Shipments in maintenance shipping.

c. Storage and Issue:

(1) Service Units of the tactical Commands and IsCom are responsible for landing Military Government supplies, for storage in unit or IsCom Dumps and for issue to MG units and installations on request of SMGO. MG supplies will be handled by the appropriate Technical Service charged with comparable classes and types of Military Supplies.

(2) Military Government personnel will be responsible for opening and operating Civilian DP's (distribution points) at Camps or other locations as required.

d. Transportation:

(1) MG units will use organic transportation and/or assigned transportation units to the greatest extent practicable for all MG activities.

(2) Captured transportation will be turned over to MG units to reinforce organic transportation unless urgently required for combat operations.

(3) MG transportation requirements over and above (1) and (2) above will be furnished by tactical units or IsCom.

e. Water:

(1) Initially facilities will be established to provide water for civilians on the basis of 1 gal. per civilian per day.

(2) Purification Units are organic equipment with MG "C" and "D" Teams for this purpose.

(3) As a reserve against possible lack of surface water, distillation equipment will be landed from early echelon shipping, to provide 1 quart of distilled water per day for estimated number of civilians.

(4) IsCom will establish facilities capable of furnishing supply of potable water for civilians in camps on the basis of 4 gals. per person per day during the garrison phase.

f. Evacuation: Civilian casualties will be evacuated through the tactical evacuation system to MG Medical installations.

g. Miscellaneous:

(1) Local Resources and Salvage: Maximum utilization of local resources and salvaged equipment are essential to carry out the MG plan. Prompt and continuous reconnaissance by all MG personnel will be made to uncover and report usable supplies and equipment from civilian and captured enemy sources. The following captured enemy military supplies and miscellaneous civilian salvage not required for emergency military use will be made available by commanders for civilian use:

- (a) Foodstuffs,
- (b) Clothing,
- (c) Medical supplies,
- (d) Fishing gear and equipment,
- (e) Hand tools and agricultural implements,
- (f) Building materials,
- (g) Stray livestock and poultry.

Control and issue of such materials will be effected through military government units.

(2) Levels: Levels for all classes of civilian supply will be announced by IsCom after occupation of the target area and a survey of local resources.

(3) Markings: MG Supplies will be marked to indicate service responsible for handling and will bear additional distinctive markings to identify them as MG supplies.

## 6. GOVERNMENT:

a. Legal Affairs: Commanders will discharge their level responsibilities of military government through their military government units.

(1) Proclamations, Orders and Ordinances which establish military government and govern the population will be delivered to appropriate military government units at the mounting area.

(a) Immediately upon entering the target area, commanders of leading assault units will cause to be posted basic proclamations establishing and announcing military government.

(b) Thereafter, commanders will formulate and announce such other enactments and orders as may be necessary.

(c) Civilians violating military government enactments will be turned over to the military government for trial and punishment.

(2) Court Administration and Supervision: Commanders may request Expeditionary Troop Commanders or Island Commanders to establish Exceptional Military Courts. Until further orders local native courts will be closed.

(3) Property Custodianship and War Claims:

(a) Military government will keep accurate records of all property requisitioned or otherwise taken into custody. Tactical commanders requisitioning property will conform to military government procedures so that similar records can be maintained.

(b) Civilian claims against United States forces will be forwarded to military government headquarters with all available information. Claims will be processed and paid as directed by Island Commanders or higher authority.

b. Political Affairs:

(1) Public Safety: Military government units will assist commanders to:

(a) Supervise the establishment and maintenance of law and order among the civilian population.

(b) Supervise and control necessary civilian fire and air-raid defense.

(c) Establish control over penitentiaries, prisons and civilian concentration areas.

(2) Civilian Circulation Control: Military government units will assist commanders in the control of displaced persons.

(3) Evacuation of Civilian Population: Evacuation movements of civilian population will be effected as ordered by the Commander, Expeditionary Troops.

(4) Local Government: Local government will be established as the situation permits.

(5) Postal Service: Initially, communications among civilians will be stopped and may later be established by order of the Area Commander.

(6) Censorship: Military Government units will take necessary action to prevent civilians under their control from communicating with enemy civilians. During garrison phase, civilian censorships will be responsibility of the Island Commander.

c. Information:

(1) Press and Radio: All press, radio, and other releases concerning military government will conform to policies and directives issued by the Expeditionary Troop and Island Commanders.

(2) Cultural Institutions:

(a) Religion: All political and nationalistic Shinto practices will be barred, and Shinto temples will be closed; individual religious observances either in non-Shinto temples or elsewhere will be permitted if they do not jeopardize public order.



(b) Arts and Monuments: Properties and objects of cultural value will be protected and preserved as the military situation permits.

(c) Education: Emergency educational-recreational programs may be undertaken; a more formal and permanent educational system may be instituted as soon as conditions permit.

## 7. HEALTH, WELFARE, AND LABOR:

a. Public Health: Medical care and public health work for civilians will be carried on by Military Government units to the extent required to prevent interference with military operations and meet minimum humanitarian needs. When circumstances warrant, requests will be made through channels upon the appropriate services of the tactical forces or Island Command for assistance or supplies.

### (1) Civilian Medical Care:

(a) Collection and evacuation of civilians: (see paragraph 5 f).

(b) Civilians in urgent need of hospitalization or out-patient treatment will be sent to hospitals or dispensaries, designated for military government.

(c) Hospitals and dispensaries designated for military government will work in close cooperation with the surgeon of the units to which they are attached.

(d) Native medical personnel, institutions and salvaged enemy medical and sanitary supplies will be used exclusively for the treatment of civilians.

(e) During assault, reconnaissance will be made promptly of native communities and refugee groups to determine extent of civilian casualties and adequacy of community or group resources for handling sick and wounded.

### (2) Preventative Medicine:

(a) Such measures will be taken as are practicable and urgently required for control of communicable disease among civilians.

(b) So far as possible, persons suffering from communicable diseases will be segregated and treated in accordance with standard public health quarantine procedures.

(c) In the assault, reconnaissance will be made promptly of native communities and refugee groups to determine prevalence of communicable diseases and measures required to prevent their spread.

### (3) Sanitation:

(a) Supervision will be exercised over sanitary quality of water supplies furnished to camps and over community water supplies not supervised by other engineers.

(b) Supervision will be exercised over sanitary conditions in native communities, at civilian collection points, and in civilian camps.

(c) During the assault, reconnaissance will be made promptly of native communities and refugee groups to determine unsanitary conditions which are likely to result in disease outbreaks.

b. Welfare: As directed by commanders, military government personnel will:

(1) Establish and operate civilian collection centers in combat and rear areas, assembly points and camps on temporary or permanent sites.

(2) Distribute civilian type rations available to the responsible commander, where local food supplies are inadequate. (See Par. 5 b (1) (c))

(3) Issue minimum relief supplies, including cash where advisable, for destitute civilians in communities outside of camps.

c. Labor:

(1) Through their MG detachments and teams, commanders will assemble and process native civilian labor for assignment to employing units of the combat and service forces as rapidly as conditions permit.

(2) Available labor will be allocated in accordance with priorities set by the Island Commander.

(3) Among other responsibilities, employing units will furnish transportation and guards as required, meals which occur during working hours, and water.

(4) As conditions stabilize in rear areas and during the garrison phase, employing units will keep time records and arrange with appropriate disbursing officers for payment in accordance with instructions to be announced by IsCom.

8. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY:

a. Captured Enemy Supply and Salvage: (See Par. 5 g)

(1) Captured Transport – (See Par. 5 d (2)): Captured vehicles of new design or equipped for Special Military purposes will be cleared through intelligence agencies.

(2) Control and issue of such materials will be effected through military government units.

b. Restoration of Native Agriculture, Fishing, Trade & Industry: During the garrison phase, military government will be responsible for the restoration of civilian commerce and production, on a supervisory basis, to provide maximum local output and distribution of essential items in order to maintain minimum standards among the population. The specific duties will be:

(1) To supervise and control the restoration of trade channels, supplemented when necessary by military government trade stores; to estimate imported supplies required to make up deficits in local production; to encourage essential industrial production and take necessary steps to minimize inflation and provide rationing control.

(2) To plan and supervise an agricultural program covering allocation, conversion, and use of land so as to obtain maximum production of the most essential crops.

(3) To permit the resumption of fishing as soon as clearance is obtained, and to supervise fishing operations.

9. TRANSPORTATION, UTILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION:

a. Restoration: Through military government detachments and teams, commanders will:

(1) Survey civilian transportation, utilities and construction conditions and facilities.

(2) Undertake, using local materials and labor, the restoration and necessary expansion of:

- (a) Local water supplies,
- (b) Minimum shelter for civilians.

b. Supervision: Through military government detachments and teams, commanders will arrange for:

(1) Utilization by military government of civilian and assigned military transport and communications facilities.

(2) Erection of necessary military government installations, including camps, hospitals and headquarters.

#### 10. FINANCE:

##### a. Occupational Fiscal Policy:

(1) Objectives: The fiscal policies of the Commanding General will seek to attain the following objectives:

(a) To provide for the combat forces and military government an adequate supply of currency; to control and stabilize currency and other mediums of exchange.

(b) To control the operation of all banks, trust companies, exchanges, and other financial institutions.

(c) To provide centralized control of all military government expenditures and of all local government expenditures within the area.

(d) To control inflation by the orderly attainment of the objectives listed above.

(e) To provide accurate reports for higher authority on the cost of military government and the use of military yen currency and American dollars by military government and the armed forces; to provide centralized control of accounts and records and uniform accounting policies for military government.

##### (2) Currency:

##### (a) Circulation:

1. Supplemental Military Yen Series B will be legal tender, in addition to regular yen currency, and will circulate with, and be interchangeable one for one with regular Japanese yen.

2. Japanese military yen will not be legal tender and will be confiscated and turned over to military government.

3. U.S. dollars will not be legal tender and will not be allowed to circulate. When found on the target, subordinate commanders will direct their seizure. Suitable receipts will be given.

4. Exchange Rates: The provisional rate of exchange will be ten Supplemental Military Yen Series B to one U.S. dollar. This rate will be used exclusively for pay of military and naval personnel and for accounting purposes.

5. Proclamations: Subordinate commanders will post currency proclamations immediately upon occupying an area.

##### (b) Supply of Yen Currency:



1. The Commanding General, TENTH Army, will control all yen currencies used by the occupying forces.

2. Requirements of yen currency, in accordance with estimates submitted by the type commanders will be secured from military government headquarters on the target.

(c) Shipment and Transfer:

1. Currency may be transferred from one military disbursing officer to another of any service. Funds may be drawn from, or turned over to, military government.

2. All receipts of yen currency from military government and all transfers between accountable finance officers of different services will be reported by both parties to the War or Navy Department as may be appropriate.

3. Subordinate commanders effecting shipment of currency will be responsible for its security in transit.

(d) Conversion:

1. Prior to landing, Navy disbursing officers or commanding officers who have been designated as fiscal representatives aboard ship will convert U.S. dollars into yen currency in amounts sufficient to provide unit commanders with requirements of their personnel.

2. On the target, limited conversion of U.S. dollars into yen may be made by appropriate disbursing officers at the request of unit commanders.

(e) Enemy Assets: Commanders will seize all enemy stores or currency in their areas and turn them over to military government.

(f) Foreign Exchange: All foreign financial transactions of any kind, including all exports and imports of currency and securities, are prohibited except as may be permitted by regulations issued by military government.

(g) Payment of civilian labor will be made by the using command.

(h) Accounting:

1. Military disbursing officers will report monthly to military government all currency transactions, whether in yen or U.S. dollars, making a separate report for each type of currency.

2. Military disbursing and finance officers will report all receipts and expenditures of yen on their accounts current in dollars at the established rate of exchange in order that earmarked dollar accounts established by the Treasury Department may be credited and charged. Supporting documents will show the yen and dollar amounts involved in each case.

3. Military government will maintain centralized accounting control, in terms of yen, over:

a. Currencies whether used for military or civil administration purposes.

b. Military government expenditures and receipts.

4. All advances of yen currency will be evidenced by receipts.

5. Subordinate commands will be required to furnish supporting data to enable military government to make reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the overall costs of occupation of the area.

6. Detailed accounting instructions will be issued by military government in a technical bulletin.

b. Native Fiscal Institutions:

(1) Closing of Fiscal Institutions: All financial institutions, including banks, postal savings offices, mutual loan companies, and credit cooperatives, will be closed. Their assets and records will be guarded, and institutions will be kept closed until reopened under conditions prescribed by military government.

(2) Enemy assets found in financial institutions will be segregated and placed under guard.

(3) No access will be allowed to assets located in financial institutions except under regulations prescribed by military government.

(4) A moratorium on the collection of taxes and the recovering of debts will be declared.

(5) All exchanges will be closed and remain closed until re-opened under conditions prescribed by military government.

c. Public Finance:

(1) Subordinate commanders will insure that the records and assets of public agencies are protected and placed under guard.

(2) All public finance officers, tax collectors and other finance officials, when found, will be turned over to military government.

(3) Military government will assume control of public finance in the area.

11. REPORTS:

a. During the assault phase Corps Commanders will report daily to the Army in brief form by dispatch the military government situation in their areas. These reports will be submitted in duplicate; will cover the period 0001-2400; will be due at 1200 daily; will be prepared by the SMGO of the reporting unit; will be classified "SECRET"; and will contain the reference "Par. 11, GOPER." They will cover:

(1) Location of military government detachments in their sector.

(2) Number and location of all civilian men, women, and children under care of military government and, specifically, of those being fed from military supplies.

(3) Number and location of civilian laborers requested and number assigned.

(4) Location and extent of serious communicable diseases.

(5) Salvage in the hands of military government.

(6) General status of military government operations.

b. Special matters of an urgent character regarding military government will be made the subject of immediate special reports to Army Headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General BUCKNER:

E.D. POST  
Brigadier General GSC  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:  
/s/J. S. GARFIELD  
Colonel AGD  
Adjutant General



OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
of  
THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY

APPENDIX NO. I

MILITARY GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS:

I Personnel:

- (a) Officers: In addition to a CMGO, his deputy and/or executive, officer personnel will be provided in sufficient numbers to perform the following functions:

Legal  
Public Affairs  
Information  
Public Health  
Public Welfare  
Labor  
Commerce and Industries  
Transportation, Utilities, and Construction  
Fiscal

- (b) Enlisted Men: Enlisted men will be provided as required, for assignment to the various headquarters departments.

II Equipment: In addition to authorized personal equipment (Army: T/E 21; Navy: Functional Component J15-A for E/M and Functional Component J15-B for officers) equipment will be provided so as to make the headquarters staff a self-sustaining unit in the field.

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
of  
THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY

APPENDIX NO. II

“A” Detachment

(1) Personnel

TITLE	NUMBER	MOS	DUTY
Lt. Colonel	1		Mil. Gov't Off.
Major	1		Public Safety Off.
Captain	1		Medical Off.
Captain	<u>1</u>		Engineering Off.
TOTAL COMMISSIONED	4		
Technician, Grade 4	1	196	Sanitary Tech.
Technician, Grade 4	1	673	Medical NCO
Corporal	1	669	Military Police
Technician, Grade 5	2	055	Clerks
Technician, Grade 5	1	345	Driver
Private	2	675	Messengers
Private	<u>3</u>	320	Interpreters
TOTAL ENLISTED PERSONNEL	11		
AGGREGATE	15		

(2) Major Items of Equipment:

ITEM	NO.
Carbine, cal. 30, complete	13
Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete	2
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 × 4	1
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 × 4 weapons carrier w/winch	1
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2w, cargo	1
Trailer, 1 ton, 2w, cargo	1
Paulins, canvas, 20' × 40'	2
Tent, command post, complete	1
Typewriter, portable	1

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENTof  
THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMYAPPENDIX NO. III

## “B” Detachment

## (1) Personnel

TITLE	NUMBER	MOS	DUTY
Lt Colonel	1		Mil. Gov't Off.
Major	1		Public Safety Off.
Major	1		Medical Off.
Captain	1		Asst. Public Safety Off.
Captain	1		Asst. Medical Off.
Captain	1		Engineering Off.
Captain	1		Legal Officer
Captain	<u>1</u>		Economics and Industry Officer
TOTAL COMMISSIONED	8		
Technical Sergeant	2	194	Salvage NCO
Staff Sergeant	2	194	Salvage NCO
Staff Sergeant	1	631	Intelligence NCO
Sergeant	2	356	Labor Supervisor
Technician, Grade 4	1	213	Stenographer
Technician, Grade 4	1	673	Medical NCO
Technician, Grade 4	1	196	Sanitary Tech.
Technician, Grade 4	1	415	Transmission Tech.
Technician, Grade 5	2	055	Clerks
Technician, Grade 5	3	345	Drivers
Technician, Grade 5	<u>3</u>	320	Interpreters
TOTAL ENLISTED PERSONNEL	19		
AGGREGATE	27		

## (2) Major items of equipment.

ITEM	NO.
Carbine, cal. 30, complete	24
Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete	3
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 × 4	2
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 × 4, weapons carrier w/winch	1



ITEM	NO.
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2w, cargo	1
Trailer, 1 ton, 2w, cargo	1
Paulins, canvas, 20' × 40'	2
Tent, command post, complete	1
Tent, Squad, M1942, complete	1
Typewriter, portable	2

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENTof  
THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMYAPPENDIX NO. IV

## “C” Detachment, Camp Team

## (1) Personnel

TITLE	NUMBER	SPEC. SERIAL NO. OR MOS	DUTY
Major	(1)	(9120)	Camp Commander
Captain			
Ass't Camp Comdr.	(1)	(9120)	Ass't Camp Cmdr.
Public Safety	(1)	(9000)	
Supply	(1)	(4000)	
First Lieutenant			
Public Safety	(2)	(9000)	Supervises camp area of 5,000 persons
Supply (Ass't.)	(1)	(4410)	Ass't Supply Off.
Cons. Engr.	(1)	(7110)	Supervises Cons.
Sanitary Eng.	(1)	(7960)	Supervises San.
Second Lieutenant			
Mess Supervisor	(1)	(4110)	Supervises Mess
TOTAL COMMISSIONED	10		
First Sergeant	(1)	(585)	Chief NCO
Staff Sergeant,			
Clerk	(1)	(502)	
Mess	(1)	(824)	Supervises refugee mess
Cons. Foreman	(1)	(059)	Supervises refugees in camp cons.
Utility Repairman	(1)	(121)	Supervises inmates in camp repair work
Carpenter (General)	(2)	(050)	Supervises Mainten- ance
Electrician	(1)	(078)	
Mechanic, auto wheel veh.	(1)	(727)	San. work and main- tenance of la- trines, etc.

TITLE	NUMBER	SPEC. SERIAL NO. OR MOS	DUTY
Water supply tech.	(1)	(727)	San. work and main- tenance of la- trines, etc.
Sergeant, Commissary Steward	(1)	(819)	Refugee food dis- tribution
Carpenter (Gen)	(1)	(050)	
Technician, Grade 4			
Technician, Grade 5			
T/4 Cook	(2)	(060)	
T/5 Cook	(2)	(060)	
T/5 Clerk	(6)	(055)	
T/5 Driver	(2)	(345)	
Interpreter	(2)	(320)	
TOTAL ENLISTED MEN	26		
AGGREGATE	36		

The above camp is organized to provide administrative and technical personnel for supervision of the operation of a camp for civilians.

## (2) Major Items of Equipment

Item	No.
Carbine, cal. 30, complete	32
Gun, submachine, cal. 45, M9	3
Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete	1
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 × 4	3
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2w cargo	1
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 × 4, weapons carrier w/winch	1
Truck, 1 1/2 ton cargo, 6 × 6, w/winch	1
Trailer, 1 ton, 2w, cargo	1
Paulins, large w/handle	10
Tent, hospital, ward, 11' × 50' × 16'	30
Tent, pyramidal	3
Tent, storage, 13' × 20' × 17'	12
Cups, drinking, enameled	4800
Plates, metal, enameled, soup	4800
Blanket, wool, OD	200
Range, Army, field, No. 1	10
Cots, folding, canvas	110
Pumps, water, bail, ponton	100
Water Purification Set, complete	1



Item	No.
Trailer, water, 250 gal.	3
Typewriter, portable	2

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

of

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMYAPPENDIX NO. V

“D” Detachment – District Team.

## (1) Personnel

TITLE	QUAN- TITY	MOS	DUTY	SECTION
<u>COMMISSIONED</u>				
Lt. Colonel	1		Chief	All Sections
Major	1		Ass't Chief & Pub Rel	All Sections
Major	1		Military Courts	Legal
Major	1		Headmen Supervisor & Labor Procurement	Labor
Major	1		Chief	Public Safety
Major	1		Chief	Medical & Sanit.
Captain	1		Native Courts & Claims	Legal
Captain	1		Ass't Headman Supervisor & Labor Procurement	Labor
Captain	1		Assistant	Public Safety
Captain	1		Assistant	Medical & Sanit.
Captain	1		Chief	Public Welfare
Captain	1		Chief	Commerce & Industry
Captain	1		Transp. & Utilities	Engineer
Captain	1		Chief	Fiscal
Lieutenant	1		Assistant	Public Safety
Lieutenant	1		Ass't Headmen Supervisor & Labor Procurement	Labor
Lieutenant	1		Assistant	Medical & Sanit.
Lieutenant	1		Assistant	Public Welfare
Lieutenant	1		Chief	Agriculture
Lieutenant	1		Construction	Engineer

TITLE	QUAN- TITY	MOS	DUTY	SECTION
Lieutenant	1		Salvage	Engineer
Lieutenant	<u>1</u>		Sanitation	Engineer
TOTAL	22			
<u>ENLISTED PERSONNEL</u>				
Technical Sergeant	2	(059)	Construction Foreman	Engineering
Staff Sergeant	1	(814)	Mess Sergeant	General
Staff Sergeant	1	(821)	Supply Sergeant	General
Sergeant	5	(356)	Labor Supervisor	Labor
Tech.Grade 3	2	(821)	Storekeepers	Economics
Tech.Grade 3	2	(194)	Salvage NCO	Engineering
Tech.Grade 4	2	(213)	Stenographers	General
Tech.Grade 4	1	(213)	Stenographer	Legal
Tech.Grade 4	3	(213)	Stenographers	Welfare
Tech.Grade 4	2	(409)	Medical Technician	Medical
Tech.Grade 4	2	(196)	Sanitary Technician	Medical
Tech.Grade 4	1	(055-213)	Statistical Clerk	Economics
Tech.Grade 4	2	(624)	Finance Clerk	Finance
Tech.Grade 4	2	(727)	Filter Operator	Medical
Tech.Grade 4	1	(1766)	Radio Operator	Transp. & Utilities
Tech.Grade 4	1	(1648)	Radio Technician	General
Tech.Grade 4	2	(014)	Mechanic	General
Tech.Grade 5	2	(055)	Clerk	General
Tech.Grade 5	2	(055)	Clerk	Legal
Tech.Grade 5	4	(060)	Cook	General
Tech.Grade 5	1	(835)	Supply Clerk	General
Tech.Grade 5	4	(320)	Interpreter	General
Private	<u>15</u>	(345)	Driver	General
TOTAL	60			
AGGREGATE	82			

## (2) Major Items of Equipment

ITEM	NO.
Carbine, cal. 30, complete	76
Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete	6
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 × 4	8
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 × 4, weapons carrier w/winch	5



ITEM	NO.
Truck, 1 1/2 ton, 6 × 6, cargo	2
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2w, cargo	6
Trailer, 1 ton, 2w, cargo	4
Paulin, large	10
Range, field, M1937, 2 unit, complete	1
Safe, field	1
Tent, squad, M1942, complete	12
Pumping and Hypochlorinating Unit	2
Typewriter, portable	10

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

of

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY

APPENDIX NO. VI

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITIES

The responsibility for obtaining and arranging for delivery of all equipment and supplies for Military Government rests with ComGenPOA.

Organizational equipment, including tents, for Army Units assigned for use of Military Government will be provided by the Army.

Military Government personnel assigned to the Staffs of Army or Marine Units will be furnished living and messing accommodations, office equipment and supplies, and essential transportation by the Army or Marine Headquarters to which assigned.

Camp and office equipment, including tents, housekeeping gear and transportation for the Military Government refugee camp units and other Military Government installations will be requisitioned from and supplied by ComServPac.

Hospitals and camp units for housing medical personnel for use in Military Government will be requisitioned from and supplied by ComServPac.

Construction material for housing, water supply, electric services, etc., including hospitals, for the use of civilians will be requisitioned from and supplied by ComServPac.

Construction work incidental to Military Government activities will be the responsibility of the Island Commander.

CinCPOA will furnish construction personnel for the supervision of the construction of refugee camps and shelter.

All consumables required for the relief of civilians and all trade goods intended for sale to civilians will be requisitioned from and supplied by ComServPac.

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

of  
THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY

APPENDIX VII

TABLE OF BASIC RATION — SUBSISTENCE FOR CIVILIANS

Food requirements for MILITARY GOVERNMENT are based on a standard civilian ration of:

1. Composition of Civilian Feeding Ration:

Quantity Ounces	Item	Calories	Protein grams	Fat Grams	Carbohydrate grams
14	Rice	1,224	30.0	1.0	291.2
3½	Beans, soy	350	28.0	9.0	35.1
½	Fat/oil	120	0.0	14.28	0.0
1	Fish, canned	50	5.9	2.6	0.0
½	Sugar	80	0.0	0.0	14.0
½	Salt	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
20		1,824	63.9	26.88	340.3

Milk supplement figured at ½ oz. evaporated milk per child & nursing mother.

2. Estimated quantities for 1000 destitute civilians for 30 days:

Item	Net Wt. ShortTons Edible Basis	Unit	No. Units	Gross Wt. Short Tons	Ship Tons 40 cu. ft.
Rice	13	100 lb bag	262	13.15	16.875
Beans	3¼	100 lb bag	66	3.28	4.562
Fish, canned or meat	1	Case	45	1.53	1.721
Fat/oil	½	37# Can	27	.61	0.757
Sugar	½	Case of 6 10 lb bags	17	.53	0.362
Salt	½	Case of 6 10 lb bags	17	.53	0.362
Milk, evaporated	1/20	Case of 48 14½ oz cans	2	.06	0.063
Milk, dry	1/40	Case of 6 5 lb cans	2	.04	0.065
TOTAL	18 33/40			19.73	24.767



5. HQ Tenth Army, Tentative Operations Plan 1–45, Annex 15, 6 January 1945, Military Government Plan.

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., RG 407)

Annex 15 defers to GOPER for statements on broader issues of military government policy, while providing more specific details about operations. It assigns the various military government field teams to their respective operational units, and also details what constitutes the civilian rations the assaults units will carry with them:

HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY

Office of the Commanding General

APO 357

ANNEX 15

6 Jan 1945

TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 1–45

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. OBJECT: See TENTH Army Operational Directive Number 7, Military Government, short title “GOPER”.
2. RESPONSIBILITY: See “GOPER”  
For table of population uncovered as progress lines are reached, see Appendix 1.  
For map of progress lines and population uncovered, see Appendix 2.
3. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL: See “GOPER”
  - a. Organic military government personnel (Army and Navy) will be constituted into headquarters, operational teams and detachments as follows:
    - (1) Military Government HQs.
    - (2) 6 Division “A” Detachments
    - (3) 10 “B” Detachments
    - (4) 13 “C” Detachments or Camp Teams
    - (5) 6 “D” Detachments or District Teams
    - (6) Reserve of 5 officers and 19 enlisted men.
  - b. In addition, the following units will be assigned for military government duties:
 

(1) 1 MP Bn	(Army)
(2) 1 QM Trk Co. 4124	(Army)
(3) 1 Construction Battalion	(Navy)
(4) 3 MP CI Sections Type BI or BJ, T/O & E 19-500	(Army)

- (5) 2 G-2 Hospitals (No personnel) (Navy)
- (6) 1 G-4 Hospital (No personnel) (Navy)
- (7) 6 G-6 Hospitals (expanded to 500 beds) (Navy)
- (8) 20 G-10 Dispensaries (expanded to 24 beds) (Navy)
- (9) 3 G-14 Dispensaries (No personnel) (Navy)
- (10) 5 G-17 Malaria Control Units (Navy)
- (11) 2 G-18 Epidemiological Units (Navy)
- (12) 6 N1A Camp Components (Navy)
- (13) 6 N5C Camp Components (No personnel) (Navy)

c. For assault lift, see Appendix 3; for echelonment of subsequent lifts, see Appendix 4.

#### 4. OPERATIONS: See "GOPER"

a. The following military government units are attached to organizations as follows. They will join the organization to which attached at the mounting area and be landed at the target with the assault echelons.

- XXIV Corps - - - - - B-6 Detachment  
B-7 Detachment  
C-2 Camp Team  
3 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 1, 2, & 3.  
1 G-6 Hospitals, No. 2  
Unit of 5 officers and 19  
enlisted men attached for  
movement only from mounting  
area to target.
- 7th Division - - - - - A-4 Detachment  
B-4 Detachment  
2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 4 & 5
- 77th Division - - - - - A-5 Detachment  
B-9 Detachment  
2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 6 & 7  
C-13 Camp Team
- 96th Division - - - - - A-6 Detachment  
B-5 Detachment  
2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 8 & 9
- III Amphibious Corps- - - - - B-8 Detachment  
C-1 Camp Team  
1 G-10 Dispensary, No. 12  
1 G-6 Hospital, No. 1
- 1st Marine Division - - - - - A-1 Detachment  
B-1 Detachment  
2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 17 & 18
- 2nd Marine Division - - - - - A-2 Detachment  
B-2 Detachment  
2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 19 & 20
- 6th Marine Division - - - - - A-3 Detachment

	B-3 Detachment
	2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 10 & 11
81st Division - - - - -	2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 13 & 14
27th Division - - - - -	B-10 Detachment
	2 G-10 Dispensaries, Nos. 15 & 16

b. Military Government Headquarters will be at TENTH Army Headquarters.

5. SUPPLY: See "GOPER"

a. Class I (Civilian Rations)

(1) Initial: 7th, 77th and 96th Divisions; and 1st, 2nd, and 6th Marine Divisions will mount with 70,000 rations for civilians consisting of:

Rice - - - - -	61,250 lbs.
Beans, soy - - - - -	15,309 lbs.
Fat/Oil - - - - -	2,191 lbs.
Fish, canned - - - - -	4,395 lbs.
Sugar- - - - -	2,191 lbs.
Salt - - - - -	2,191 lbs.

(2) Water:

- (a) Purification Unit (7.5 GPM) 1 per "C" Team.
- (b) Hypochlorinating & Pumping Unit (Portable) 2 per "D" Team.
- (c) Distillation Unit w/Tanks (250 GPH) 5—1st Echelon
- (d) Purification Unit (7.5 GPM) 12—1st Echelon

(3) Reserves: Thirty (30) days rations for 100,000 civilians will be held in the Marianas by Commander Forward Areas and a like amount held on West Coast both subject to call in emergency by Commander Expeditionary Troops or Island Commander.

b. Class II (Civilian):

- (1) Clothing: In maintenance and resupply shipping.
- (2) Economic Supplies: In maintenance and resupply shipping: Trade Goods, Agriculture Supplies, and Fishing Equipment.
- (3) Medical and Sanitary: Medical Supplies and Sanitary Supplies in maintenance and resupply shipping.

- c. Class III: Any Army or Navy Class III Distribution Points.
- d. Class IV: Engineering: Included in Base Development Plan.
- e. Storage: See Base Development Plan.

f. Markings: Standard Army and Navy markings will be used for Military Government Supplies. Additional distinctive markings in the case of Army-supplied items will consist of one-half inch green dots spaced in eleven-sixteenth centers, horizontally and vertically, three inches wide and at least six inches long on four sides of the containers or boxes. Navy-supplied items carry distinctive letters in red, six inches high: "For Civilian Use", on four sides of the containers.

6. GOVERNMENT: See "GOPER"

a. In later phases of operations, when conditions permit, six military government districts will be established generally paralleling existing local political subdivisions. (See Appendix 5 for district boundaries and headquarters).



Two provisional districts will also be established as follows:

1. KERAMA RETTO
2. The "Eastern Islands," i.e., The Islands of IKE, TAKA, HENZA, HAMAHIKA, TSUGEN, and KUTAKA.

b. In the garrison phase the eight districts mentioned above will be administered by IsCom, APO 331.

7. HEALTH, WELFARE, AND LABOR: See "GOPER"

a. For locations of permanent camp sites during garrison phase, see Appendix 6.

b. For permanent locations of G-6 hospitals and G-10 dispensaries during garrison phase, see appendix 6.

8. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY: See "GOPER"

9. TRANSPORTATION, UTILITIES, and CONSTRUCTION: See "GOPER"

10. FINANCE: See "GOPER"

11. REPORTS:

a. During the assault phase Corps Commanders will report daily to the Army in brief form by dispatch the military government situation in their areas. These reports will be submitted in duplicate; will cover the period 0001-2400, will be due at 1200 daily; will be prepared by the SMGO of the reporting unit; will be classified "SECRET"; and will contain the reference "Par. 11, "GOPER". They will cover:

- (1) Location of military government detachments in their sector.
- (2) Number and location of all civilian men, women, and children under care of military government and, specifically, of those being fed from military supplies.
- (3) Number and location of civilian laborers requested and number assigned.
- (4) Location and extent of serious communicable diseases.
- (5) Salvage in the hands of military government.
- (6) General status of military government operations.

b. Special matters of an urgent character regarding military government will be made the subject of immediate special reports to Army Headquarters.

6. CINCPAC-CINCPOA to CG Tenth U.S. Field Army, CINCPAC File A17-10/A1-1(10), 1 March 1945, sub: Political, Economic and Financial Directive for Military Government in the Occupied Islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

In this broad-ranging directive, Admiral Nimitz asserts his authority as Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, directs that all instructions be issued in his name, outlines the mission of military government on Okinawa, and specifically orders certain steps taken to accomplish that mission.

Cincpac File  
A17-10/A1-1 (10)

(910) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS  
Serial 00825 Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

1 MARCH 1945

From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific  
Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.  
To: Commanding General, Tenth U.S. Field Army.  
Subject: Political, Economic and Financial Directive for  
Military Government in the Occupied Islands  
of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters.

#### POLITICAL DIRECTIVE

1. The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas will be the Military Governor of the islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent waters occupied by the forces under his command. The Military Governor will be the supreme authority and will possess all rights, powers and responsibilities vested in the Commander of an occupying force in time of war by international law. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas will exercise his authority as Military Governor through the Commander Expeditionary Troops, and through the Area, Sub-Area and Island Commanders duly established.

2. You will establish Military Government in the occupied islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters in the name of Commander in Chief, United

States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. You will possess all rights, powers and responsibilities vested in you by international law as the Commander of an occupying force in time of war, subject to the proclamations, orders and directives issued by Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. This authority will include the authority to take all measures deemed by you to be necessary or desirable in the execution of your military mission. You may in your discretion delegate to subordinate members of your command, in whole or in part, the authority herein granted you, and you may authorize such subordinate members to subdelegate such authority to their subordinates.

3. The objective of your military government will be to facilitate to the greatest extent possible the accomplishment of your military mission.

4. Administration by Military Government will be stern, but just. In your treatment of the local population, the degree of severity to be exercised will be determined by the conduct and the attitude of the people and their willingness to co-operate with the military authorities.

5. The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas will issue an appropriate proclamation declaring that:

(a) Japan's aggression and its attack upon the United States have forced the United States to wage war against Japan.

(b) Military occupation and government of these islands is a necessary part of the military operations and of the process of destroying Japan's power of aggression and the Military class which controls the Japanese Empire.

(c) Treatment of the Japanese people during the occupation will depend in large measure upon their behavior.

You will disseminate and enforce the contents of the foregoing proclamation by such means and on such occasions and under such circumstances as may be appropriate.

6. Koreans and Formosan Chinese are regarded by the United States as having a status different from that of ordinary Japanese subjects, and may be given preferential treatment if military considerations permit.

7. You will take such steps as are necessary or proper for the prompt restoration and maintenance of law and order and for the punishment of offenses against the military Government and for such other matters as circumstances may require. To that end you will establish exceptional military courts and the jurisdictions and procedures thereof, subject to:

(a) The Proclamations, Orders and Directives issued by Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

(b) The United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27-5; OpNAV 50E-3).

(c) War Department Basic Manual, Rule of Land Warfare (FM27-10).

(d) Civil Affairs Manual, Procedure for Military Government courts (OpNAV 13-23).

8. You may suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or regulations which interfere with the furtherance of your objectives.



9. You will remove from office all high ranking or policy making officials. You will also remove from office all other officials, government employees, police and other persons who cannot be relied upon to perform their duties satisfactorily under your administration.

10. Subject to the foregoing, you will provide for the continuance of essential government functions, using local inhabitants insofar as feasible and making use of the existing local government machinery so far as such use advances or is not inconsistent with the objective of the military government. You will also, so far as is feasible, use the techniques of administration with which the local populations are familiar.

11. You will in your discretion activate the local courts and permit them to function under your supervision and subject to such regulations as you may prescribe.

12. You may move civilian populations in whole or in part and place them in restricted areas or refugee camps, if military considerations or the interests of such civilians so requires.

13. You may intern civilians whose activities may in any way endanger the success of your operations, according them treatment compatible with the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war insofar as it is adaptable to civilian internees. Under special arrangement with the Japanese government, entered into at the outbreak of war, civilian internees (as distinguished from refugees or other civilians whose movements may be restricted for reasons of military necessity or of their own welfare) may not be required to perform work other than that involved in the care and maintenance of internment camps.

14. You will detain and suitable intern diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with the United States or any of its Allies pending further instructions from Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. Diplomatic and consular officials of neutrals will be taken into protective custody and their presence will be promptly reported to Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. All practical measures will be taken to protect the health and welfare of such neutral officials.

15. In conformity with directives separately issued by Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas you will assume control of censorship of the press, printing, publications, mails, wireless, radio, telephone and cable, as may be necessary.

16. You will prohibit the dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-national ideology and propaganda in any form.

17. You will dissolve all Japanese patriotic or secret societies, such as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and their affiliates, and you will prohibit all political activity except such local activity as may facilitate the administration of military government.

18. You will refrain from any public expression of opinion concerning the future status of the Emperor or the institution of the Emperor and instruct the forces under your command to the same effect.

19. You will permit freedom of religious worship consistent with military security, the maintenance of law and order, and the provisions of paragraphs 16 and 17 above.

20. You will close educational institutions or permit them to remain open, in your discretion. Whenever schools have been closed it would be desirable that they be re-opened as soon as security conditions permit.

21. Civilian nationals of the United Nations interned by the Japanese will be identified and reported in order that their presence may be communicated to their respective governments. They may be placed in protective custody or restricted residence, if you deem it desirable. All practical measures will be taken to protect the health and welfare of such civilians.

22. Your responsibility for the property of the United Nations (other than the United States) and their nationals, shall be the same as for the property of the United States and their nationals. Within such limits as are imposed by the Military situation you should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect such property.

23. All property belonging to the Japanese Government, the Japanese Imperial Family, the Japanese Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Japanese Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and property belonging to any country with which any of the United Nations are at war will be treated as having the status of public property. Such property will be controlled directly or indirectly as military requirements may dictate, subject to use thereof as you may direct. If there is doubt as to the public status of any property (e.g. property of quasi-official companies) adequate records will be kept of any such property taken or utilized to facilitate later settlement of any legitimate private claims.

24. You will restrict the production and consumption of narcotic drugs to medicinal and scientific purposes, insofar as feasible.

25. You will seize and preserve for information and use all government records, records of quasi-governmental agencies, and records of Japanese or Japanese-sponsored political, patriotic or secret societies.

26. You will protect and preserve all historical, cultural, and religious objects, so far as military expediency permits.

27. For the purpose of facilitating and advancing your mission by the prompt settlement of meritorious claims you are authorized to appoint or cause to be appointed a claims commission, or commissions, each composed of one or more officers as the case may be to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine and make payments, where accepted by the claimant, in full satisfaction and in final settlement of claims on account of damage to or loss or destruction of private property both real and personal, or personal injury or death of inhabitants of the area occupied by the forces under your command when such damage, loss, destruction or injury is caused by U.S. Army, Navy or Marine Corps forces, or individual members thereof including civilians attached thereto where such claims arise from noncombat activities of such forces: Provided, that all such claims shall be paid in supplemental yen, or other yen currencies made legal tender by this or subsequent directives, and provided further, that no claim

against the occupying forces shall be processed for payment from United States funds nor be made a charge against the Treasury of the United States. You will make such regulations as you may deem necessary for processing of claims, the rules and procedure to be observed by Claims Commissions and such procedure as you may deem necessary for appeals and reviews as to any claim rejected or awards made. The provisions of the act of 2 January 1942 (55 Stat 880; 31 U.S.C. 224d) as amended by the act of 22 April 1943, (57 Stat 66) provisions of the act of 3 July 1943 (Public Law 112, 78th Congress) shall not be invoked for the settlement of claims arising as a result of non-combat activities of the forces under your command in the occupied Islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters.

### ECONOMIC DIRECTIVES

28. You will initiate such economic measures as deem expedient in the furtherance of your military mission.

29. The basic economic policy to be followed in the occupied islands of the Nansei Shoto is to develop maximum use of existing resources and productive facilities for the following purposes:

(a) To support the military occupation and military operations.

(b) To assure food and other essential supplies for the civilian population to the degree necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to your objectives.

(c) To minimize the importation of civilian supplies.

30. You will take such steps as you can, consistent with military objectives, to prevent or to minimize inflation.

31. You will establish such system or systems of rationing and price controls as you think may be required. You will make such use of existing machinery for these purposes as you deem feasible.

32. You will take vigorous measures to prevent black market operations and hoarding.

33. So far as practicable you will establish wages at the level prevailing shortly prior to occupation by our military forces, taking into consideration, however, the extent to which inflation and changes in currency values may have reduced purchasing power.

34. Wages may be paid in kind.

35. Prices at which imported civilian supplies are sold will be consistent with the current domestic internal economy regardless of landed cost; however, you may prescribe such prices as you deem desirable in order to recruit labor, stimulate production, combat inflation and otherwise aid in the achievement of your objectives.

36. You are authorized to furnish the civilian population, to the extent necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to your objectives, with such supplies as are available. Except when essential for purposes of emergency relief these supplies will be offered for sale under military control and if possible



through commercial channels. If you consider the distribution through commercial channels inadequate, you may establish and operate through personnel selected by and responsible to you, general trading stores for the sale of such supplies. You may deliver imported civilian supplies in bulk to appropriate indigenous organizations or consignees under conditions which you may set and the execution of which you should supervise, assuring yourself that profit margins are kept within prescribed limits and that supplies actually reach the ultimate consumer in accordance with the rationing and price controls which you establish.

37. You will require such distribution agencies as you may designate:

(a) To distribute, sell, or use supplies in accordance with the policies prescribed by you.

(b) To adhere to such prices as you may establish.

(c) To regulate the distribution of supplies, including locally produced supplies, by rationing or such other methods of control as you may prescribe.

38. Except in unusual circumstances, you will require payment in legal tender for civilian supplies you may provide.

39. You may exercise such supervision and control as you deem necessary over civilian production and distribution of materials endeavoring insofar as practicable to employ methods with which the civilian population is familiar.

40. You will supervise and control all exports and imports, merchandise may move into or out of any given territory only with your permission.

41. You will, so far as practicable, initiate efforts to restore and develop production of food and other products which will make the population less dependent upon imported supplies and may furnish necessary supplies as provided in paragraph 36 for this purpose.

42. You are authorized to adopt a system of licensing industry and trade similar to the system to which the local inhabitants have been accustomed, insofar as such a system may be of value to you in controlling industry and trade. You are authorized to fix appropriate fees for such licenses.

43. You will have control, in cooperation with the harbor authorities, of warehouses, ferries, boats used as living quarters and other craft used in connection with civilian waterborne operations in this area.

44. You will take control, to the extent you deem necessary, of the railways, postal, telegraph and telephone services, radio and other government monopolies.

45. You will restore to use public utilities and transportation facilities, to the extent which you may deem essential to accomplish your objectives.

46. You will encourage agricultural production and particularly the production of fresh vegetables, with a view to making the area, so far as possible, independent of imported food supplies.

47. Because of its potential value in supplying essential foodstuffs, you will take special measures so far as are consistent with military operations, to re-establish and develop the fishing industry, and you will exercise such control as

you deem feasible of the resulting catch and assure its equitable distribution among the population at fair prices.

48. You may establish such hours and conditions of labor as you think necessary or believe desirable to protect health or permit maximum efficiency of labor, taking into consideration those prevailing shortly prior to occupation by our military forces.

49. Enemy nationals will be used as laborers in accordance with international law, as established in the Annex to the Hague Convention Number 4 of October 18, 1907, embodying the regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Subject to the provisions of the paragraph following, enemy nationals may be required to engage in work "of such a nature as not to involve them in the obligations of taking part in military operations against their own country." They may, however, be so employed on a purely voluntary basis for pay. For other projects enemy nationals may be hired or requisitioned with pay in accordance with the aforementioned Annex of the Hague Convention.

50. Civilian enemy nationals who are interned may not be compelled to work except in the administration, maintenance and management of their camps.

51. You will make to the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, as soon as practicable after occupation of each of the several areas, estimates of the minimum quantities of supplies and equipment required to restore public utilities, industry, fishing, agriculture, storage facilities, postal services, shipping port facilities for ocean going vessels and other services to the extent which you may deem essential to accomplish your objectives. Your report should be subdivided in such a manner as to indicate the detailed supplies and equipment required.

52. You shall file with the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas as soon as practicable after occupation, a complete statement on the economic conditions which you have found giving further attention to:

(a) Fishing Industry.

(b) Phosphate Industry.

(c) Sugar Industry.

(d) Agriculture.

(e) Other industries essential to the civilian economy or to the war effort.

53. Supplemental military yen (type B) issued pursuant to military proclamation (hereinafter referred to as supplemental yen) and regular yen currencies in the possession of Military Government will be used in the occupied islands of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters. Regular yen currencies will include currencies which are now legal tender in the area, and notes of the Bank of Taiwan and of the Bank of Chosen. Supplemental yen will be declared legal tender by proclamation and will be interchangeable at par without distinction with regular yen currencies by the local population or by personnel of the armed forces is prohibited except on a one for one basis.

54. Any Japanese military yen issued for circulation in any territory occupied by Japanese forces will not be legal tender in the occupied islands of

Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters and will not be acceptable or interchangeable with supplemental yen and regular yen currencies.

55. U.S. dollars will not be permitted to circulate in the occupied islands of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters. All local holders of U.S. dollars will be required by proclamation to deposit such dollars with the Military Government against receipt. If it is considered advisable, local holders of gold coin and bullion, foreign exchange, foreign currency which is not legal tender in the area, and foreign securities may be required to deposit against appropriate receipt all or part of their holdings of such property under such terms and conditions as are deemed advisable. The subsequent disposition of or payment for such dollars and other deposits will be a matter of later policy determination by higher authority.

56. The provisional rate of exchange to be used exclusively for pay of military and naval personnel and/or military and naval accounting purposes will be 10 supplemental yen, and/or regular yen currency, to the U.S. dollar. Transactions at any other rate will be prohibited. A general rate of exchange may be furnished later.

57. All foreign financial transactions of any kind, including all exports and imports of currency and securities, will be prohibited, except as permitted under regulations issued by the Military Government of the occupied islands of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters. Army Finance Officers and Navy Disbursing Officers may, however, be authorized to accept U.S. dollars from personnel of the armed forces in the area, and from other authorized personnel of the armed forces in the area, for conversion into supplemental and/or regular yen currency at the established rate of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to the source of such U.S. dollars. Except for military or authorized personnel, no requests by holders of yen currency or deposits, for exchange of such currency or foreign exchange, will be allowed except in accordance with official exchange regulations issued by you. Such exchange regulations must be approved by Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas before becoming effective.

58. Upon occupation, all banks, security exchanges, and other financial institutions will be closed by proclamation. The assets and records of such institutions will be placed under appropriate guard; and as soon as practicable, an inventory will be taken by the Military Government.

59. Closed financial institutions may be reopened as soon as such action is deemed practicable and desirable and under such terms as you may establish.

60. No financial institution or branch thereof will be permitted to reopen except upon the following terms and conditions;

(a) That appropriate measures have been taken to insure that the institution is satisfactorily controlled, and that all undesirable personnel have been removed.

(b) That such general limitations are placed on all withdrawals as you deem necessary.



(c) That withdrawals from the new deposits be permitted free of restriction, except for such limitations as you deem necessary.

(d) That all accounts and assets in financial institutions owned or controlled by the following be blocked and be used or otherwise dealt with only as you may permit:

1. Enemy governments and agencies and instrumentalities thereof.
2. Government operations controlled directly or indirectly by the enemy.
3. All persons, including political organizations and societies, regarded by you as hostile and dangerous to military security and organizations and business enterprises owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons.
4. All absentee owners and holders, including neutral and United Nations governments or authorities, and organizations and business enterprises owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such owners and holders.

(e) That access to safe deposit boxes or vaults be allowed only after a proper system of supervision has been instituted.

(f) That no government or private banks or agencies issue bank notes or currencies except as specifically authorized by the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

61. If found practicable and desirable, you may designate, under direct military control and supervision, a suitable bank, or any branch thereof, or any other financial institution satisfactory to it, as its agent. When satisfied that such bank or other financial institution for its official business in yen transactions only and, if necessary, by making yen credits available, place such bank or other financial institution in a position to finance other financial institutions for the conduct of their business.

62. You will issue regulations prescribing the purposes for which credit may be extended and the terms and conditions governing the extension of credit. If banking facilities are not available, it may establish such credits or make such loans as it deems necessary for essential economic activities. These will be restricted to yen credits and loans. You may require as collateral any or all the assets of a borrower, or of the directors of a borrowing institution, and may accept as collateral obligations of the Japanese Government and its subdivisions.

63. You will maintain existing laws and regulations for the assessment and collection of revenues in the manner and to the extent you consider desirable. You may raise such additional contributions for the administration of the area as are consistent with international custom and usage.

64. You will control the budgets of government units and agencies and their expenditures in the manner and to the extent you consider practicable and desirable. Payment of interest or principal on Japanese Government obligations will not be allowed unless specifically authorized by the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. Local public issues may be serviced if deemed practicable and desirable.

65. A general moratorium will be declared by proclamation. You may lift

same in whole or in part when such action is considered warranted in the light of conditions prevailing in the area.

66. The Military Government will include in its functions the control of all funds to be used by forces within the occupied islands of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters, other than U.S. dollars the disbursement of which will be under the control of Army Finance Officers and Navy Disbursing Officers of your forces. The Military Government will maintain such accounts and records as are necessary to indicate the supply, control and movement of all currencies and other funds as well as financial data required for the determination of expenditures arising out of operations and activities involving participation of military forces.

a. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of yen currencies for the pay and other cash requirements of military and naval components in the area, the Military Government will supply supplemental yen or regular yen currency from currency on hand, and will record the debit against the Military and naval forces concerned.

b. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of yen currencies for civil administration, the Military Government will supply supplemental yen or regular yen currency from currency on hand and will record the debit against itself.

c. The records of the Military Government will indicate in all cases the currency in which receipts were obtained or disbursements made by Military Government.

67. Basic accounting instructions, supplemental to the foregoing directive will be issued separately.

C.W. NIMITZ

7. CINCPAC-CINCPOA to Distribution List, CINCPAC File A17-10/A1-1(10), 12 December 1945, sub: U.S. Naval Military Government, POA

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., RG 38)

In December 1945 Admiral Raymond A. Spruance reiterates what constitutes the military government mission in the Pacific Ocean Areas. In this directive the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, declares, among other things, that instruction in the English language "is a prime necessity" for the local populations:

Cincpac File

A17-10/A1-1(10) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

Serial: 52855 Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

12 Dec 1945

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST.

Subject: U.S. Naval Military Government, Pacific Ocean Areas.

1. Military Government in the Pacific Ocean Areas was established by reason of military necessity in furtherance of our military objectives. Its stated mission was:

- (a) To relieve the tactical forces of the necessity for administering the affairs of the civil populations.
- (b) To make available to our forces the labor and economic resources of the area.
- (c) To maintain law and order among the civilian populations.
- (d) To administer emergency relief.
- (e) To restore the civilian populations to the highest degree of self-sufficiency that the exigencies of the military situation would permit.

2. With the cessation of hostilities, Military Government continues to administer the occupied territories until such time as a permanent civil government has been provided by duly constituted authority. During the interim, it shall be the mission and duty of the U.S. Naval Military Government to give effect to the announced policies of the United States by:

- (a) The physical restoration of damaged property and facilities.
- (b) The continued improvement of health and sanitation.



- (c) The early establishment of self-governing communities.
- (d) The institution of a sound program of economic development of trade, industry and agriculture along lines which will ensure that the profits and benefits thereof accrue to the native inhabitants and which will assist them in achieving the highest possible level of economic independence.
- (e) The establishment of an educational program adapted to native capabilities and to local environment and designed to assist in the early achievement of the foregoing objectives.

3. Military Government is a command function and the responsibility for the accomplishment of its mission devolves upon the several Area, Atoll and Island commanders within the limits of their commands. The principles herein set forth are to be considered as a general guide for the commanders concerned subject to modifications made necessary by conditions peculiar to a particular locality.

#### RESTORATION OF DAMAGED PROPERTY AND FACILITIES

4. Cincpac despatch 280133 of November 1945, authorized and directed the transfer to Military Government of certain materials, supplies and equipment to be utilized for present and future construction and for sale as trade goods through Military Government through USCC Trade Stores. It is desired that such materials be employed in the physical rehabilitation of the area and for the restoration of the facilities necessary to the re-activation of trade, industry and agriculture. Included within the purview of the despatch are those materials necessary for the construction of permanent governmental facilities such as administration buildings, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, trade stores, and warehousing, as well as quarters for government personnel in outlying localities such as YAP and PONAPE. Area commanders are directed to review the present and future needs of their areas with respect to these and similar features to the end that materials currently available may be allocated to a building program to be initiated when availability of labor and other considerations permit. In this manner it is anticipated that the need for future appropriations for island government may be held to a minimum.

5. Concerning the sale of materials for the reconstruction of private dwellings and the restoration of facilities for trade, industry and agriculture, it is recognized that the type and volume of items required will vary in different localities according to the needs of the inhabitants and their ability to buy. Cincpac serial 40414 of 1 November 1945, gave area commanders discretionary powers in establishing the load-factor to be applied to sale process of trade goods in offsetting landed costs. The same discretion will be employed in arriving at the selling price of materials transferred for purposes of sale. In this connection the Navy has designated by the Foreign Liquidation Commission as the agency within the POA for the disposal of certain types of surplus property by donating

to charitable institutions. In making such disposal consideration should be given to the donation to missions, churches and similar charitable institutions of such surplus materials declared to be within this category as may be suitable and available for their purposes.

### HEALTH AND SANITATION

6. The current program for improvement in health and sanitation shall be continued and shall be extended to newly occupied areas. It is desired that the facilities of the Medical Training Center on GUAM be utilized to the utmost for the training of native medical practitioners and native nurses. Institutions in hygiene and sanitation shall be included in the educational program. U.S. Pacific Fleet Letter No. 53L45 delineates the responsibility of Military Government with respect to the practice of preventative medicine.

### ESTABLISHMENT OF SELF-GOVERNING COMMUNITIES

7. It is desired that the inhabitants of the occupied territories be granted the highest degree of self-government that they are capable of assimilating. They shall be encouraged and assisted to assume as much as possible of the management of their own affairs and the conduct of their own government. Local governments, insofar as practicable, should be patterned on the politico-social institutions which the inhabitants have evolved for themselves. Military Government ordinances and regulations should give due weight to local traditions and customs. Legislation and its enforcement machinery should be held to the minimum requisite to the preservation of peace and order, the maintenance of property rights, the enforcement of measures for health and sanitation and those laws respecting trade, industry and labor which are essential to economic well-being.

### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

8. Indiscriminate exploitation of the meager natural resources of the area is to be avoided. Trade and industry should be encouraged along lines which directly benefit the native inhabitants by providing for their physical needs and material well-being and which are of a nature and on a scale such that ultimate ownership and management can be transferred to native hands. The establishment for the profit of aliens, of enterprises which tend to maintain the native economy at the level of cheap labor and those which do not permit the natives to enjoy the full benefits of their own labor and enterprise shall not be tolerated.

9. The U.S. Commercial Company has been designated as the Federal agency for the purpose of providing trade goods, purchasing and marketing handicraft and copra, and for the conduct of such other commercial enterprises as may be appropriate. This is an interim arrangement until such time as the

native inhabitants of the various localities are in a position to carry on these functions on their own account. In the Marshalls, the trade stores on certain atolls have been sold to native co-operatives. It is desired that this practice be continued where ever practicable.

10. In those areas in which the inhabitants are agriculturally minded, they should be encouraged and assisted in bettering their method of agriculture and in increasing the yield. In other areas where the natives are not agriculturally inclined, consideration shall be given to the importation of trees and plants which, while requiring little cultivation will effect an augmentation of the food supply or will provide materials for native construction and handicraft. The services of the USCC agriculturalists are available to Area Commanders for the above purposes.

### EDUCATION

11. The type and extent of educational facilities will vary in different localities according to local needs and the native capability for assimilation. The primary consideration is a system which will benefit the many and which will assure a progressive development of each community along lines which will raise the native standards by improvement in health and hygiene, by betterment in methods of food production and in the nature of food supply, and which will equip the natives for the conduct of their own government and the management of their trade and industry.

12. Educational programs shall foster and encourage instruction in the native language and history and in native arts and crafts. Instruction in the English language for natives of all ages is a prime necessity but this is not to be construed as discouraging instruction in native languages and culture. Vocational training in trades, skills, agriculture and home-making as suited to the particular locale should be included in all curricular Texts and educational materials should be appropriate to the local environment, should be geared to the capacity of the natives to absorb and should be calculated to effect the aims of the system as enumerated above.

13. The establishment of agricultural experimental and demonstration on projects is anticipated at a future date. These projects should be utilized to assist in education in agriculture and animal husbandry. The U.S. Naval Military Government Medical Training Center of GUAM will soon be available for the training of native corpsmen and nurses aides. Educational facilities on GUAM can be made available for the higher education of those individuals who demonstrate a capability and adaptability for advanced work and who should be considered as a potential source of teachers and government officials.

R. A. SPRUANCE





## Creating a Local Administration

One of military government's objectives, as set forth in the early directives, was to transfer as quickly as possible the administrative burden for the Ryukyu Islands from the civil affairs officers to responsible Okinawans entrusted with implementing the military government program. The four directives that follow provide for the creation of an indigenous, local bureaucracy in the areas of education, industry, fisheries, finance, commerce, the courts, and political administration.

8. HQ USN MG Okinawa, Directive No. 86, 2 January 1946, sub: Okinawa Education System.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

### HEADQUARTERS U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT OKINAWA

2 January 1946

#### DIRECTIVE NUMBER 86

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government


To: Distribution "A"

Subject: Okinawa Educational System

1. Educational affairs insofar as they concern actual operation of the schools, including planning of curriculum, preparation of texts, appointment and removal of principals and teachers and other personnel, inspection of schools, allocation of personnel, maintenance of records, and general administrative detail are hereby placed under an Okinawan Department of Education, staffed by Okinawans but supervised at the Headquarters level by Military Government personnel who retain final discretion. In other words, strictly educational matters of the type which in other communities would normally fall within the jurisdiction of a public department of education and a local school board will now

come under the jurisdiction of an Okinawan native Department of Education. District Commanders will retain responsibility for furnishing school shelter, for cooperating locally in the educational program, and for providing for the physical welfare of teachers and pupils; they will be kept informed of all educational developments which are not mere routine. Communication and authority will be maintained directly between Headquarters and the schools without intermediate staging through district offices.

2. The organization of the department will be as follows:



3. The assignment of duties is as follows:

- a. The Headquarters Education Office will work directly with the Okinawan Director of Education, handling matters of supply from Military Government sources and checking on all matters of policy and procedure.
- b. The Director of Education will coordinate the activities of the Okinawan headquarters staff with the activities of the local schools and will exercise general supervision over the educational system.
- c. The Text Compilation Staff will plan school curriculum and prepare standardized text materials.
- d. The Secretariat will maintain complete school records, direct the submission and compilation of reports from local schools, and conduct correspondence concerned with educational affairs.
- e. The Printing Office will reproduce and distribute text materials prepared by the Text Compilation Staff.
- f. The Inspection Staff will visit local schools regularly, report on local conditions and make recommendations to the school principals and to



the Director of Education. It will pay particular attention to matters of efficient use and allocation of personnel.

- g. The District Superintendent will coordinate the activities of the schools in his district and maintain liaison with headquarters and with the District Military Government Office.
  - h. The School Principal will be responsible for proper and effective administration of his school in accordance with policy announced from headquarters, for the performance of his teachers, the maintenance of discipline, the compilation of records, the submission of reports, and general administrative detail.
4. The procedure for appointment and removal of Okinawan personnel will be as follows:
- a. The Director of Education will be appointed or removed in accordance with the majority vote of the Okinawan Advisory Assembly.
  - b. The members of the headquarters staff will be appointed or removed by the Director of Education.
  - c. The District Superintendents will be appointed or removed by the Director of Education after conferring with the District Mayor.
  - d. School Principals will be appointed or removed by the Director of Education acting on the recommendation of the District Superintendent.
  - e. Local teachers and staff members will be appointed or removed by the District Superintendent acting on the recommendation of the school principal and with the cognizance of the Director of Education.
  - f. Personnel may be transferred from one school to another or from one district to another by the Director of Education acting upon the advice of the school inspectors and other members of the headquarters staff.
5. This announcement will not greatly affect the immediate staff or operation of schools already organized but is a guide for future expansion and development.
6. In connection with this announcement of a native Department of Education, District Commanders are instructed to give all possible assistance to local school principals in securing adequate school shelter. Three steps are recommended: first, that all school buildings now standing but used for other than educational purposes be made available as soon as possible for school use; second, that local schools be permitted to make use of quonset huts and other shelter which has been abandoned by military units nearby and turned over to Military Government; third, that temporary shelter of frame and canvas be provided when other shelter is unavailable.
7. General educational policy is restated below for the guidance of all concerned:

The present program is to provide eight grades of elementary school education for all children of the six to fourteen age group, attendance to become compulsory when school facilities are adequate to provide for all; the minimum curriculum amounts to three hours of instruction per day six days per week in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Provision is being made at Headquarters for adequate if not voluminous text materials and for a grad-

ually expanding program to include material on a greater variety of subjects and for more advanced students. Kindergartens and higher schools are to be developed and are now being developed as facilities permit.

/s/ Royal Firman  
ROYAL FIRMAN  
By direction

9. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 134, 15 March 1946, sub: Okinawan Departments of Agriculture, Industry, Fisheries, Finance, and Commerce—Organization of.  
(Source: Freimuth Papers)

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
RYUKYU ISLANDS

15 March 1946

Directive Number 134

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government  
To: Distribution "A".  
Subject: Okinawan Departments of Agriculture, Industry, Fisheries, Finance and Commerce — Organization of

1. To expedite the rehabilitation of Okinawa's economy the following Okinawan Departments are hereby established:

- a. Department of Agriculture
- b. Department of Industry
- c. Department of Fisheries
- d. Department of Finance
- e. Department of Commerce

2. Each Department shall be headed by an Okinawan Director, who shall operate under the direct supervision of the Economics Department, Military Government. The Director shall be appointed or removed by Military Government on the recommendation of the Okinawan Advisory Council.

3. The Director of each of the Departments specified in paragraph one (1) shall recommend policies and measures to the Economics Department, Military Government. Policies and measures approved by Military Government shall be issued through the General Affairs Department, Military Government, to the mura soncho for execution.


4. Each of the Departments shall be organized into bureaus, as specified below. The heads of the bureaus of each Department shall be appointed and removed by the Director of that Department. Officials within each bureau including section chiefs, shall be appointed and removed by the head of the bureau, subject to the approval of the Director of the Department.

5. The organization of each of the Okinawan Departments shall be as follows:



a. Agriculture

(1) Plan of organization




(2) The Okinawa Department of Agriculture shall be organized into the following bureaus:

- (A) General Crops — shall deal with problems relative to rice, sweet potato, sugar cane, soybean, vegetable culture, and other crops. It shall collect data on yield of each of these crops and maintain constant vigilance against plant disease epidemics. It shall recommend schedules of spraying or dusting of plants and seeds, as such needs arise.
- (B) Animal Industry — shall deal with all problems relative to cattle, horses, swine, goats, and poultry. It shall include a Chief Veterinarian and a number of Assisting Veterinarians to inspect livestock, to recommend slaughtering of hopelessly diseased animals, and to take general precautionary measures for the prevention of animal disease. The bureau shall also be responsible for planning a program of animal breeding.
- (C) Land Planning — shall survey all arable land and seed stocks available and determine the acreage to be planted to each crop.

It may also recommend specific land for specific purposes. It shall work out plans for crop rotation, seed harvesting and planting, so as to achieve maximum productivity.

- (D) Experiment Station — shall be charged with the supervision of existing experiment stations and the planning of new ones. All research programs carried out at experiment stations shall originate with the bureau upon approval of the Director Okinawa Agriculture Department.
  - (E) Forestry — shall be charged with the supervision of forest nurseries, forest-tree seed collection, reforestation programs, and the surveying of all timber lands of Okinawa.
  - (F) Agriculture Engineering. — shall have supervision over mechanical equipment, hand tools, and irrigation systems used in agriculture. It shall make recommendations regarding the methods of plowing, harrowing, cultivating, and irrigating the soil, and of spraying crops. It shall design tools to increase the efficiency of Okinawan agriculture.
- b. Industry
- (1) Plan of organization




- (2) The Okinawan Department of Industry shall be organized into the following bureaus:
- (A) Production — shall be charged with the stimulation, development, and general supervision of Okinawan industry so as to achieve the optimum utilization of available resources. It shall survey production possibilities and recommend the establish-

ment of new industries and the employment of more efficient methods and techniques in existing industries. It shall recommend, when necessary, the allocation to be made of scarce raw materials, equipment, and other materials to ensure the most effective use of existing resources.

- (B) Distribution — shall be concerned with the distribution of industrial products. In particular, it shall recommend an equitable allocation of items produced by Okinawan industry.
- (C) Planning — shall be responsible for assembling statistical information and preparing reports, studies, and recommendations concerning Okinawan industry.
- (D) General Administrative Affairs — shall be responsible for personnel and clerical services and all other matters pertaining to the internal administration of the Department.

c. Fisheries

(1) Plan of organization



(2) The Okinawa Department of Fisheries shall be organized into the following bureaus:

- (A) Production — shall be responsible for the stimulation, development, and general supervision of fishing output. It shall recommend the allocation to be made of fishing supplies and equipment, including boats, in order to maximize fishing output.
- (B) Distribution — shall be concerned with the distribution of fish.




In particular, it shall recommend an equitable allocation of the fishing catch.

- (C) Planning — shall be responsible for assembling statistical information and preparing reports, studies, and recommendations concerning fishing.
- (D) General Administrative Affairs — shall be responsible for personnel and clerical services and all other matters pertaining to the internal administration of the Department.

d. Finance

(1) Plan of organization



(2) The Okinawa Department of Finance shall be organized into the following bureaus:

- (A) Financial Management — shall be responsible for the general supervision and administration of Okinawa's financial system, exclusive of taxation and monopoly aspects. It shall exercise this function through the following two sections:
  - (I) Banking section — shall be responsible for the development and supervision of the banking system, the development and supervision of a credit system, the regulation of the money market, and the supervision and control of the money supply.
  - (II) Treasury section — shall be responsible for the integration and final preparation of the budgets of each of the Okinawan Departments and for the settlement of their accounts.

(B) Revenue — shall be responsible for developing and administering Okinawa's revenue system through the following two sections:


(I) Taxation section — shall be responsible for the assessment and collection of internal and external taxes, including customs duties, and for the apportionment of the receipts therefrom.

(II) Monopoly section — shall be responsible for the control and management of public and other monopolies, unless the jurisdiction for such is explicitly assigned elsewhere.

(C) Planning — shall be responsible for the assembling of statistical information and the preparation of reports, studies, and recommendations relating to finance.

e. Commerce

(1) Plan of organization



(2) The Okinawa Department of Commerce shall be organized into the following bureaus:

(A) Domestic Commerce — shall be responsible for the promotion of domestic commerce. It shall develop and supervise distribution arrangements, paying special attention to the establishment of wholesale outlets, retail stores, and markets for highly perishable foodstuffs. It shall be responsible for developing and

promoting business standards and practices in the interests of the public welfare.

- (B) Foreign Trade — shall be responsible for the development and promotion of foreign trade.
- (C) Prices and Rationing — shall be responsible for developing and administering price and ration controls. Wherever necessary, it shall recommend ceiling prices and ration restrictions.
- (D) Planning — shall be responsible for assembling statistical information and preparing reports, studies, and recommendations relating to commerce.
- (E) General Administrative Affairs — shall be responsible for personnel and clerical services and all other matters pertaining to the internal administration of the Department.

/s/ Royal Firman  
ROYAL FIRMAN  
By direction



10. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 144, 29 March 1946,  
sub: Okinawan Courts, Establishment of.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
RYUKYU ISLANDS

29 March 1946

Directive No. 144

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government

To: Distribution "A"

Subject: Okinawan Courts, Establishment of

Enclosures: (A) USN Military Government Special Proclamation No. 5.  
(B) USN Military Government Legal Administrative Order No. 1.  
(C) USN Military Government Legal Administrative Order No. 2.  
(D) Roster-Summary Provost Court Officers.

1. Enclosure (A) established a system of local courts for trials of Okinawans committing minor offenses under local law. The jurisdiction of such courts is indicated in Article II thereof. Enclosure (B) directs that all violations of Special Proclamation Nos. 3 (curfew) and 4 (unauthorized circulation) shall likewise be tried by such courts.

2. Offenses against local law of a more serious nature, as well as violations of Military Government Proclamations 1-10 and the Special Proclamations, will continue to be tried by Exceptional Military Courts. Enclosure (D) contains a list of current Summary Provost Court Officers and the Judicial Districts for which they are responsible. Superior Provost Courts and Military Commissions will be convened as the need arises.

3. In order to obviate jurisdictional questions which might arise, attention is directed to para. 4a of enclosure (B), which indicates that the new "Judicial Districts"—seven in number—are identical in extent with the recent Military Government Districts. It should also be borne in mind that the police districts of the Okinawan Police Department are of like extent.

4. The establishment of Okinawan courts raises certain questions of the division of functions between such courts and Exceptional Military Courts. Therefore, the following considerations and procedures will govern:

(a) Okinawans arrested, whether by civilian or military police, for all offenses referred to in paragraph 1, above, will be taken to the District Okinawan

police station, and listed on the "blotter" maintained there. The cognizant Procurator (prosecutor) will prepare the necessary charges and transmit them to the Clerk of the Court for docketing.

(b) Okinawans arrested, whether by civilian or military police, for all other offenses (see para. 2 above) will be taken to the District Okinawan police station and put on the Summary Provost Court "blotter" by a Military Police "desk sergeant" who will be stationed there. A Military Police Officer or enlisted man appointed by the Provost Marshal will prepare formal charges, notify the cognizant Summary Provost Court Officer of the pending case, and serve as prosecutor before the Summary Provost Court.

(c) In all cases of doubt as to whether trial should be by Okinawan court or by Summary Provost Court, the Summary Provost Court Officer will make the decision. In his discretion, names will be transferred from the civilian to the military "blotter" and vice versa.

5. The Okinawan courts will be kept under strict observation and supervision by Summary Provost Court Officers. Offenses not properly triable by the Okinawan courts and cases in which there is an apparent irregularity may and should be transferred at any stage of the proceedings to the Summary Provost Court.

6. The jurisdiction of the local courts established herein is, in essence, that exercised by police chiefs under the Japanese system. If successful, the new system will be expanded at the earliest practicable time into a full-fledged judicial department, with courts of higher and appellate jurisdiction. The latter step, it is believed, will greatly reduce the work of the Summary Provost Courts.

7. Camp Commanders and Area General Affairs Officers will give conspicuous public posting to enclosures (A), (B), and (C).

ROYAL FIRMAN  
By direction

11. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 156, 22 April 1946, sub: Central Okinawan Administration, Creation of.

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., Watkins Papers, RG 200)

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
RYUKYU ISLANDS

22 April 1946

DIRECTIVE NUMBER 156

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government

To: Distribution "A"

Subject: Central Okinawan Administration, Creation of.

References: (a) CinCPac-CinCPoa ltr to Commanding General Tenth Army, Serial 00825, dated 1 March 1945.  
(b) CinCPAC-CinCPOA ltr Serial 52855, dated 12 December 1945.  
(c) CNOB ltr to Deputy Commander for Military Government Serial 2320, dated 23 October 1945.  
(d) Military Government Proclamation #1, Ryukyus.

1. References (a) and (b) authorized and directed the establishment of the highest practicable degree of native government in the Ryukyus. Reference (c) directed the Deputy Commander for Military Government, Okinawa, to proceed to establish a centralized responsible administration of Okinawans for the performance of all governmental functions.

2. In accordance with the above, a central Okinawan administration is hereby established.

3. The central Okinawan administration shall be headed by a chief official to be known as the Chiji and shall comprise the following:

- a. administrative departments as authorized.
- b. a court system.
- c. township, town and city administrations (mura, machi and shi).
- d. an advisory body to replace the present Okinawan Advisory Council.

4. The Okinawa Chiji shall be responsible directly to the Deputy Commander for Military Government for the proper performance by the central administration of all governmental functions in Okinawa Gunto in accordance with Military Government policies and directives.



5. Directives will be given to the central administration by the Deputy Commander for Military Government. The several Military Government departments which exercise cognizance over governmental functions and services may employ direct channels to the respective Okinawan departments for technical and informational purposes.

6. The relationship between civil courts and provost courts will continue for the time being in accordance with existing proclamations, orders and directives.

7. Effective upon the formal appointment and inauguration of the Chiji, the functions performed by the Okinawan Advisory Council are transferred to the Chiji and his department heads.

8. The Okinawa assembly, omitting for the present the representative from Miyako and Yaeyama, is reconstituted for the purpose of providing the limited function of advice to the Chiji. The term of the present membership is extended until such time as elections are authorized. Vacancies shall be filled by appointment from Military Government.

9. The Chiji, with confirmation of the Deputy Commander for Military Government, appoints and removes department heads. Until such time as elections are authorized, the Chiji, with confirmation of the Deputy Commander for Military Government, will also appoint and remove the headmen of mura, machi and shi.

10. Under authority of Reference (d), which is the Military Government Proclamation that concerns the effect of local law, the Okinawan administration will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of existing law except where expressly modified by Military Government enactment. It shall be the responsibility of the Chiji and his departments to bring to the attention of Military Government those provisions which by reason of existing circumstances are inapplicable and require amendment.

/s/ C. I. MURRAY

/t/ C. I. MURRAY

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps



## Fostering Political Democracy

A number of the civil affairs officers who served on Okinawa in the 1940s brought with them a sense of political idealism. For them, mere material relief in terms of food, shelter, and medical care was not enough; part of the military government mission was to inculcate the islanders with a sense of American political democracy. Democratic elections in the Ryukyus were held as early as September 1945, but it was not until February 1947 that the Philippines-Ryukyus Command requested the services of a Political Advisor (POLAD) from MacArthur's headquarters to help establish sophisticated and efficient electoral mechanisms. Ultimately, the American goal was to prepare the islanders to move beyond a mere administrative role to full-fledged local self-government. The fruit of these earlier military government efforts was the creation of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in February 1952.

12. MG Special Proclamation No. 23, 15 October 47, sub: Political Parties.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

As political activity in the Ryukyus revitalized, military government headquarters published a statement defining political parties and setting forth their duties and limitations:

### MILITARY GOVERNMENT SPECIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 23

#### POLITICAL PARTIES

TO THE PEOPLE OF

THE ISLANDS OF NANSEI SHOTO AND ADJACENT WATERS  
SOUTH OF THIRTY (30) DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE

WHEREAS it is deemed desirable to promulgate rules and regulations to govern political activity in the Ryukyus through political parties in order to assure fair and honest election in the Ryukyus.

NOW THEREFORE I, FEDERIC J. HAYDEN, Brigadier General, United



States Army, Chief Military Government Officer of the Islands of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters of Thirty (30) Degrees North Latitude, do hereby proclaim as follows:

## Article I

### DEFINITIONS

For all purposes relating to this Proclamation, “election” includes a general, special or primary election. “Candidate” means an individual whose name is presented at an election for election to a political office. “Contribution” includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value. “Expenditure” includes a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of money, or anything of value. “Political party” includes any committee, association or organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates. “Person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, and any other organization or group of persons.

## Article II

### DUTIES OF POLITICAL PARTY

Every Ryukyuan political party in the Ryukyus shall:

- a. Keep a detailed and exact account of all contributions received and all expenditures made by such political party, and shall file a verified copy thereof with the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and Military Government on the 15th day of each month for the preceding month.
- b. Provide the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and Military Government with a complete and current list of its officers and executive committee members.
- c. Formulate and furnish the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and Military Government with a written statement of the purpose of the political party, and also its program and platform.
- d. Publicly announce the names of all candidates that it supports and so inform in writing the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and Military Government.
- e. The accounts of contributions and expenditures, list of officers and executive committee members, purposes, program platform and candidates of a political party staff for a period of two years from the date of filing constitute a part of the public records of the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and shall be open to public inspection.

## Article III

RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTY

No Ryukyuan political party through its officers or members shall:

a. Utter any speech or circulate any printed or written matter for political purposes which is hostile or detrimental to or which criticizes the policies of any of the Allied Nations towards the Ryukyus or the policies of Military Government towards the Ryukyus or Ryukyuans or criticizes those acts of any local civilian administration which it performs at the direction of Military Government.

b. Conspire or attempt or abet or advise to violate or violate the penal provisions of the applicable election laws when they are promulgated.

c. Libel or slander any candidate or other person.

d. Advocate the violation of any law, Proclamation, Directive, order or regulation of Military Government.

e. Receive or accept any contribution from a bank or corporation in connection with the election of any of its candidates.

f. Make or offer to make any bribe to any person either to vote or withhold his or her vote or to vote for or against any candidate.

## Article IV

PUBLIC POLITICAL MEETINGS

Ryukyuan political parties may conduct public meetings, public assemblies and other public gatherings, whether indoors or out-of-doors, for the purpose of furthering their political campaigns.

## Article V

GENERAL

Nothing in this Proclamation shall be construed to prohibit a peaceful petition for the enactment, repeal or amendment of any law, ordinance or Proclamation, Directive, order or regulation of Military Government nor shall it preclude fair discussion of the fitness of any Ryukyuan public official.

## Article VI

Rescinded (MG Sp Proc #32)

## Article VII

POWER TO MAKE ORDERS

The Deputy Commander for Military Government may make such orders or regulations as he may deem necessary to effect the purpose of this Proclamation.

Article VIII

TRANSLATION

In case of any conflict or ambiguity between the English text of this Proclamation or any other proclamation, order or regulation issued under my authority, and any translation thereof, the English shall prevail.

Article IX

EFFECTIVE DATE

This Proclamation will become operative on the 15th day of October 1947.  
Given under my hand this 15th day of October 1947.

/s/ FREDERICK L. HAYDEN

/t/ FREDERICK L. HAYDEN

Brigadier General, United States Army  
Commanding General, Ryukyus Command  
Chief Military Government Officer

OFFICIAL:

/s/ William H. Craig

WILLIAM H. CRAIG

Colonel, Infantry

Deputy Commander for Military Government



13. MG Ordinance No. 17, 7 July 1950, sub: Election Law for Assemblymen and Mayors of Cities, Towns, and Villages Revised.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

This comprehensive civil affairs pronouncement is a textbook study in how to hold a series of elections. While certain features of the ordinance reflect situations and attitudes peculiar to the Ryukyus—such as deciding between two candidates for an Electoral Administrative Committee post by lot if they both had the same number of votes—most of the provisions of the ordinance have wide applicability for those interested in how to organize and conduct fair elections:

#### MG ORDINANCE

NUMBER 17

7 July 1950

#### ELECTION [sic] LAW FOR ASSEMBLYMEN AND MAYORS OF CITIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES REVISED

##### Section 1

##### General Provisions

##### Article I

1. The mayors and assemblymen of cities, towns and villages shall be elected by the electors from among such persons as are qualified to be elected to the office, at either a General or Special election.

2. General elections for the office of Mayor shall be held once every four years on the first Sunday in September. General elections for the offices of Assemblymen shall be held once every four years on the second Sunday in September. The foregoing shall apply to all cities, towns and villages with the exception of Taketomi Cho, Yaeyama Gunto, in which town both elections shall be held on the second Sunday in September. Special elections shall be held when required, in accordance with Articles XLII and XLVII of this Ordinance. Notwithstanding other provisions of this paragraph, the term of office of Mayor and Assemblymen shall extend until such time as their successor shall have been elected and inaugurated. (Change #3)

##### Article II

1. Any person who, being twenty years of age or upward, has been a resident of a city, town or village for six consecutive months, shall have the right to vote at the election of assemblymen and mayor of the City, Town or Village. The legal residence of any person in any city, town or village shall not be affected or impaired where such person is required by reason of his employment by a

municipal government to take up temporary residence in a city, town or village other than that which he claims as his residence. (Change #4)

2. a. Any person who, having been a resident of a city, town or village for six consecutive months and having been compelled to move out as a result of emergency or an act of God, has lost his right to vote at the election of assemblymen and mayor of the city, town or village, and any repatriate from abroad who, after returning, has been a resident for less than six months, may, upon the application to the Electoral Administrative Committee, acquire the right to vote notwithstanding the residential requirement.

b. Any person who is permanently resettled in accordance with a Government sponsored resettlement program, upon application to the Electoral Administrative Committee not later than five days prior to the date of election, shall acquire the right to vote and have his name entered in the Supplementary Register of Electors notwithstanding the residential requirements of paragraph 1 above and the provisions of paragraph 4, Article XVII of this Ordinance. (Change #6)

3. Such person as has acquired the right of voting in accordance with the provision of the last preceding paragraph shall not have the right of voting which he may possess in the city, town or village of his last domicile.

4. The period of six months contemplated in the first paragraph of this article shall not be interrupted by the creation, dissolution, union or division, or the alteration of the boundary of a city, town or village.

### Article III

1. Any person who, being twenty-five years of age or upward, possesses the right to vote shall be qualified to be elected to the office of mayor or office of assemblyman of the city, town or village in which he resides.

2. The age contemplated in the first paragraph of this article shall be computed as the day on which the General and Supplementary Registers of Electors become conclusive.

3. Any incompetent, quasi-incompetent any prisoner serving a sentence, or any probationer during the term of his probation, shall not have the right to vote or the right to be elected to any public office.

4. An Electoral Administrative committeeman, clerk of the committee, officer of a branch poll, presiding officer of election, a paid officer of a city, town or village who is currently serving in election affairs shall be disqualified for being elected to the office of assemblyman or mayor of the city, town or village within the area in which he is acting at that time.

5. A public procurator, a police officer and a revenue officer while in office shall be disqualified for being elected to the office of assemblyman or mayor of a city, town or village.

### Article IV

The affairs relating to the election in a city, town or village shall be administered by its Electoral Administrative Committee.

## Article V

1. If an event has occurred which necessitates holding an election of assemblymen or mayor of a city, town or village, an election shall forthwith be held.

2. The election of mayor or assemblymen shall not be held within 30 days prior to the day of expiration of the term of office of the incumbent mayor or assemblymen.

3. Forty-five days prior to the day selected for a General or Special election, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall give public notice of the date of the election and shall use every available medium to give this notice the widest possible publicity. The legal campaign period shall comprise a period of twenty consecutive days prior to and including the day of election. (Change #4)

4. The Electoral Administrative Committee shall, on or before the tenth day before the day of an election, give public notice of the polling station, including branch polling stations, which shall be understood whenever in this law the same expression appears, the day and hours fixed for the poll, and the number of assemblymen to be elected in the event an election of assemblymen is scheduled.

5. In cases in which branch polling stations have been set up, additional public notice shall be given of the areas served by such branch polling stations.

6. The poll at a branch polling station shall be taken on the same day and during the same hours as that of the election meeting.

7. If it is impossible to take the poll or it is necessary to take another poll on account of an Act of God or an emergency, the Committee shall appoint another day and cause a poll to be taken; in this case, public notice shall be given of the location of polling stations and the day and hours fixed for the poll, on or before the fifth day before the date of election.

## Section II

## Electoral Administrative Committee

## Article VI

Each city, town or village shall have an Electoral Administrative Committee. An Electoral Administrative Committee shall be composed of five committeemen.

## Article VII

1. The Electoral Administrative committeemen shall be elected by the city, town or village assembly from among the persons who have the right to vote at the election of city, town or village assemblymen.

2. When the election contemplated in the preceding paragraph is held, the assembly shall also elect as many supplementary committeemen as there are committeemen.

3. If a vacancy occurs in the office of a committeeman, the chairman of



the committee shall choose a committeeman to fill such vacancy from among the supplementary committeemen in conformity to the following order:

- a. When they have been elected at different times from each other, the person who has been elected first shall be chosen.
- b. Where they have been elected at the same time, the person who has polled the greatest number of votes shall be chosen.
- c. Where the votes are equal, such person as is determined by lot shall be chosen.
- d. And if there still remains an unfilled vacancy, a Special election shall be held.

#### Article VIII

Committeemen and supplementary committeemen shall be elected every other year, and shall hold office until their successors come into office. A supplementary committeeman who fills the vacancy of a committeeman shall hold office during the remaining term of his predecessor.

\* \* \*

#### Article XI

A meeting of the Electoral Administrative Committee shall be called by its chairman; if the demand for calling a meeting is made by a committeeman, the chairman shall call it.

#### Article XII

1. At a meeting of the Electoral Administrative Committee, no business shall be transacted unless three or more committeemen are present. No chairman or committeeman shall take part in such proceedings of the committee as may concern the personal interests of himself or of his parent, grandparent, spouse, child, grandchild, or brother or sister; provided, however, that he may attend and speak at the meeting upon obtaining the consent of the committee.

2. If the number of such committeemen as are qualified to take part in the proceedings at a meeting of the committee has come to be less than the number specified in Paragraph 1, in consequence of the exclusion as provided in the preceding paragraph, the chairman shall provisionally choose the persons to make up the deficiency in the number of committeemen from among such supplementary committeemen as have no connection with the business to be transacted thereat in conformity to the order mentioned in Article VII, paragraph 3. The same shall apply in a case where the number of committeemen present has come to be less than the number specified in the preceding paragraph because of other unavoidable circumstances.

#### Article XIII

All proceedings at a meeting of the Electoral Administrative Committee shall be decided by majority vote; in the case of an equality of votes, the chairman shall have the deciding vote.

In the case contemplated in the last preceding paragraph, the chairman shall not have the right to vote as a committeeman.

\* \* \*

### Section III

#### Register of Electors—General and Supplementary

##### Article XVII

1. The privilege of voting at any election shall depend upon the appearance of the elector's name in a General or Supplementary Register of Electors.

2. The Electoral Administrative Committee shall prepare a General Register of Electors as of July 15 of each year and shall hold the General Register open to the inspection of the public at the office of the city, town or village for fifteen days thereafter.

3. If any person feels that an omission or error exists in the General Register of Electors, he may file an objection with the Electoral Administrative Committee within the period during which the Register is open for inspection. The Committee shall thereupon make a decision upon the objection within five days from the date on which the objection was filed. Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the Committee may bring an action in the Circuit Court within seven days from the date of such decision. Should the decision of the Electoral Administrative Committee agree with the objection, or should the decision of the Circuit Court so require, the Committee shall forthwith amend the General Register of Electors and give public notice of the same. The General Register of Electors shall become conclusive on August 31, by which date the Circuit Court will without fail render its decision in all pending cases which have been filed under the provisions of this paragraph. The General Register shall be kept intact until August 30 of the following year.

\* \* \*

### Section IV

#### Election

##### Article XIX

1. The presiding officer of election of a city, town or village shall be the chairman of the Electoral Administrative Committee and shall take charge of the affairs relating to the polling.

2. The superintendent of a branch polling station shall be appointed by the presiding officer of election of the city, town or village from among the voters and he shall take charge of the affairs relating to the polling in the precinct served by that station.

3. The presiding officer of election or the superintendent of branch polling station shall vacate his office if he has lost his right to vote.

\* \* \*

#### Article XXI

The ballot paper shall be substantially like Appendixes B and C hereof.

#### Article XXII

An elector shall proceed to the polling station in person and vote after identifying himself. If identification is difficult, the presiding officer of election shall cause him to take an oath. And such person who refuses to take an oath may not vote.

#### Article XXIII

An elector shall, at the polling station, write in his own hand the name of one candidate on the ballot paper and deposit it in a ballot box. The name of the elector shall not be entered on the ballot paper.

#### Article XXIV

In case of voting, Kanji, Katakana, Hirakana or Romaji shall be used. The braille described in Appendix D may also be used.

#### Article XXV

1. No person whose name is not entered in a General or Special Register of Electors may vote; no person who is ineligible to be listed in the Register or who has lost the right to vote on the day of election may vote.

2. Any person who cannot write the name of a candidate in his hand may not vote.

#### Article XXVI

1. The denial of a vote shall be decided by the presiding officer of election with the advice of inspectors.

2. If an elector against whom the decision has been made by the superintendent of branch polls raises objection thereto, the superintendent shall cause him to cast a vote provisionally.

3. With respect to the ballot described in the preceding paragraph, an elector shall be caused to put the same in an envelope which shall be substantially like Appendix "E" hereof, seal the envelope, write his full name thereon in his own hand and deposit the same in a ballot box.

4. The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall apply to an elector whose vote has been challenged by an inspector of the poll.

#### Article XXVII

1. On the day of election the polls shall be open for voting continuously from 7 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening.



2. When the hour for closing the polls has arrived, the presiding officer of election shall, upon announcing this, close the entrance of the station and after the completion of the casting he shall close the ballot box. No person shall be allowed to vote after the closing of the ballot box.

#### Article XXVIII

1. At any time after the election date has been announced and before election day, an elector who has a certificate to establish his inability to proceed to polling station owing to illness, wound, pregnancy, crippleness or baby birth, may demand the ballot paper and envelopes from the respective presiding officer of election, which shall be known as a voter's absentee ballot.

2. A certificate stating facts which support the issuance of the absentee ballot mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be prepared only by a doctor, dentist or midwife.

3. Further, an absentee ballot shall be issued in the following cases:

- a. When a person is to be in service at a Military Installation.
- b. When a person is to be in sea-service or engaged in fishing away from his place of residence.
- c. When a person is to be taking charge of affairs relating to polling away from his residence.

4. In the cases listed in paragraph 3 above, the elector shall bring forward a certificate from one of the following persons:

If he relies on subparagraphs a. or b. of the preceding paragraph, a certificate from the captain or his employer.

If he relies on subparagraph c. of the preceding paragraph, a certificate from the head of the respective office.

#### Article XXIX

In case demand is made pursuant to Article XXVIII, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall examine the electors' register and give the elector an absentee ballot and two envelopes at once if satisfied that the reason shown by the elector is sufficient.

#### Article XXX

As soon as the absentee ballot and envelopes have been received in accordance with the provision of Article XXIX, the elector shall write in secrecy in his hand the name of a candidate on the absentee ballot, put it in the envelope, seal it, place this envelope, in another envelope, sign the outer envelope and hand it to the presiding officer or the superintendent of the polls.

#### Article XXXI

1. The presiding officer or the superintendent of polls shall receive the envelope, describe the date and place of voting and sign his name on the back of the outer envelope, and preserve it until the day of the election, at which time the presiding officer shall, in the presence of other committeemen, open the

outer envelope and deposit the sealed inner envelope containing the absentee ballot in the ballot box.

2. The presiding officer or the superintendent of polls shall prepare a document indicating the number of absentee ballots issued and returned, shall attach thereto the outer envelopes of all ballots returned, shall sign his name thereto and annex it to the record of election or the record of polling.

#### Article XXXII

When the presiding officer of election is satisfied that it will be impossible for an island or any other outlying place to return the ballot box on the day of election, he may determine an earlier date of voting in such place and direct the superintendent of the branch polling station to send the ballot box, record of poll, and Registers of Electors by the day of counting of ballots.

#### Article XXXIII

Prior to the counting, public notice of the date of the counting shall be given by the presiding officer.

#### Article XXXIV

1. The presiding officer shall, on the day of polling, or the following day, open the ballot box with the attendance of inspectors and count the total number of votes and voters.

2. After the counting described in the last paragraph is finished, the presiding officer shall examine the votes described in the second and fourth paragraphs of Article XXVI, acceptance of which shall be decided by the inspectors. The presiding officer shall examine the votes with the inspectors. In the case of a tie vote, the presiding officer shall decide the issue of acceptance.

3. If counting is impossible through a calamity or due to any unavoidable circumstance, the presiding officer shall appoint another day and give public notice thereof. In this case, if it is necessary to change the counting place he shall give public notice thereof.

\* \* \*

### Section V

#### Candidates and Elected Persons

#### Article XXXIX

1. A person who intends to be a candidate shall file notice to that effect with the presiding officer of election within the twenty day campaign period but in no event later than the third day prior to the date of election. (Change #4)

2. If a person whose name has been entered in either the General or Supplementary Register of Electors intends to cause another person to become a candidate, he may, upon obtaining the consent of that person and within the period described in the preceding paragraph, similarly file notice of recommendation of that person.

3. In a case of the election of a mayor, a person who files notice of his candidacy or notice of recommendation of a candidate shall effect the same under the joint signatures of thirty electors.

4. A candidate shall not withdraw from his candidacy unless notice thereof is filed with the presiding officer of election.

5. When such notices as are prescribed in the preceding four paragraphs have been filed with him, or when the death of a candidate becomes known to him, the presiding officer of election shall forthwith give public notice thereof.

6. When an assemblyman intends to be a candidate for mayor or when a mayor intends to be a candidate for assemblyman, he shall not file the notice described in the first two paragraphs unless he has resigned from the office of assemblyman or mayor.

#### Article XL

A person who has polled a plurality of valid votes shall be elected. If, in determining the elected person, an equality of votes is found to exist, the presiding officer of election shall, at the election meeting, determine him by the drawing of lots.

#### Article XLI

If a successful candidate declines to accept office, dies, or becomes ineligible to assume office, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall meet and substitute in his place the candidate who received the next largest number of votes and is otherwise qualified.

\* \* \*

#### Article XLIV

1. When the elected persons have been determined, the presiding officer of election shall forthwith give such persons notification of their having been duly elected. At the same time he shall give public notice of the full names and addresses of the elected persons, and shall report the full names and numbers of votes polled by each candidate, and such particulars as are concerned with the election to the Chief Executive of the Provisional Government. (Change #2)

2. If there exists no person duly elected or if the number of the persons elected at the election of assemblymen is less than the whole number of the assemblymen to be elected thereat, the presiding officer of election shall forthwith give public notice thereof, and at the same time submit a report thereof to the Chief Executive, the chairman of Electoral Administrative Committee and the mayor. (Change #2)

#### Article XLV

1. In a case where a duly elected person declines to accept office he shall, within ten days from the day on which he receives a notification of his having been duly elected, file notice thereof with the presiding officer of election.



2. If an elected person fails to file, within a term described in the preceding paragraph, a notification of his declination to accept office, he shall be deemed to have accepted office.

3. Any paid official or municipal contractor who has been duly elected to the office of mayor shall file notice of his resignation from office, or of his having ceased to be the person who has a contract for work with the respective local body or any other person who has received a mandate from the mayor for work paid for by the local body concerned, or as manager, partner, or director thereof. If he fails to file notice within the terms prescribed in the first paragraph he shall be deemed to have declined to accept office.

\* \* \*

## Section VI

### Actions

#### Article L

1. If an elector or a candidate for the office of assemblyman or mayor has an objection to the validity of an election or of the election of any person, he may file a protest with the Electoral Administrative Committee within fourteen days from the day of election, with regard to an election, and otherwise from the day on which the public notice described in Article XLIV has been given.

2. In this case, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall determine the issue within fourteen days from the day of receiving the objection by a document stating the reasons therefor and delivered to the person objecting.

3. Any person who is dissatisfied with the determination described in the preceding paragraph may appeal to the Circuit Court.

#### Article LI

In cases in which a violation of provisions relating to election has been committed, the Electoral Administrative Committee or the Court shall, if and only if it is substantive and affects the result of the elections, determine that the whole or a part of the election shall be void.

#### Article LII

An elector or candidate who considers the election of a person null and void in accordance with the provision of Article L may within twenty days from the date of announcement provided for in Article XLIV, bring action against the elected person as defendant in the Circuit Court.

#### Article LIII

When the decision on appeal described in Article LI has become conclusive and effective, the Circuit Court shall notify the same to the Electoral Administrative Committee concerned.

## Section VII

## Election Campaign

## Article LIV

1. No election campaign shall commence prior to the legal campaign period as prescribed in paragraph 3, Article V. (Change #4)

2. No election campaign office may be established by anyone other than a candidate or the person who recommends a candidate, or in case several persons recommend a candidate, their representative.

3. When the person mentioned in the preceding paragraph establishes or changes an election campaign office, he shall immediately notify the Electoral Administrative Committee.

## Article LV

1. Three election campaign offices may be established for each candidate.

2. No election campaign office shall be established within one cho or about 120 yards from a polling station.

3. Resting places or places of like character shall not be established for the purpose of election campaign.

4. When election campaign offices are found to be established contrary to the provisions of the 2nd paragraph of this Article or when election offices are found to be established in excess of the number authorized under paragraph 1, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall immediately order such offices to close.

## Article LVI

No election campaign shall be conducted until the notice of recommendation of a candidate or announcement of candidacy under the first or third paragraph of Article XXXIX has been made.

## Article LVII

No person shall carry on house-to-house visiting for the purpose of obtaining votes or of aiding or preventing the obtaining of votes.

## Article LVIII

No person shall conduct an election campaign by making use of his position especially related to children, pupils or students of schools under the age of twenty.

## Article LIX

No official mentioned in Article III, paragraphs 4 or 5 shall conduct an election campaign.

## Section VIII

## Election Expenses

Article LX

1. A candidate shall appoint a person to be responsible for disbursing election campaign expenses to be known as a responsible disburser. This does not prevent a candidate from himself becoming a responsible disburser, nor a person who has recommended a candidate (in case there are several such persons, their representative) from appointing with approval of the candidate a responsible disburser or from himself becoming a responsible disburser.

2. A candidate may relieve his responsible disburser by notice in writing. This rule shall apply also to a disburser appointed by a person who has recommended a candidate.

3. A responsible disburser may resign by notice in writing to the candidate and the person who has appointed him.

\* \* \*

Article LXII

Expenses of an election campaign shall not be paid by any person other than a responsible disburser, except expenses involved in preparation for candidacy and those paid without any understanding of the candidate or the responsible disburser. This rule shall not apply to a person who has obtained the written approval of the responsible disburser.

Article LXIII

Amounts paid out for any of the following purposes shall not be considered expenses of election:

1. For ships, horses, and vehicles used by a candidate.
2. For concluding business of an election campaign remaining after the date of election.
3. Expenses other than those paid out by or with the understanding of the candidate for whom notice has been given under Article XXXIX or the responsible disburser.
4. For preparation for candidacy other than expenditures made by or with the understanding of the person who has become the candidate or responsible disburser.

Article LXIV

A candidate who has accepted any contributions for his election campaign shall immediately inform the responsible disburser of the amounts, the sources, the kinds and other details of the contributions. Receipts accepted prior to the notification of candidacy shall be reported to the responsible disburser immediately after the notification.

\* \* \*



## Article LXVII

The responsible disburser shall keep books in which all expenses and receipts relating to election campaign shall be recorded.

## Article LXVIII

1. The expenses of elections campaign for each candidate shall not exceed the amount specified in the following items:

a. The amount obtained when the total number of electors registered on the final voters' list, divided by the number of persons to be elected, is multiplied by 5 Yen.

b. Deleted (Change #5).

2. The Electoral Administrative Committee shall publish the amount determined upon under the preceding paragraph as soon as the date of election is announced.

## Article LXIX

1. Within fourteen days from the day of election, the responsible disburser shall submit reports on the expenses and receipts relating to election campaign to the Electoral Administrative Committee to which notification under the third paragraph of Article LIV has been made.

\* \* \*

## Article LXXIII

The chief clerk of a political party or any other organization which recommends or supports a candidate shall prepare books under Article LXXII and state the expenses and receipts of its election campaign.

## Article LXXIV

In case the expense of election paid for a candidate exceed the amount published in accordance with the second paragraph of Article LXVIII, the election of the candidate shall be invalid except when the candidate and the person who has made the recommendation have paid due attention to the appointment and supervision of the responsible disburser or the person who takes over the duties of the responsible disburser and there can be found no wilful evasion of the law in the expenditure of campaign funds on the part of the responsible disburser or the person who takes over his duties.

## Section IX

## Punitive Rules

## Article LXXV

Any person who has effected by fraudulent process the insertion of his name in the voters' list or who has made a false declaration under the second paragraph Article XXII shall be liable to a fine of not more than 2000 Yen.

## Article LXXVI

Any person who has committed an act falling under any of the following items shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than three years or a fine or not more than 30,000 Yen:

1. When money, goods, or other presents, or public or private employment has been given to an elector or to a canvasser, or when such gifts have been proposed or promised or when entertainment has been provided, for the purpose of causing a candidate to be elected or preventing him from being elected.

2. When, with the objects mentioned above, irrigation, tenancy, credit or contributions to a shrine, temple, school, company, guild or local body in which an elector or canvasser is interested have been issued to influence an elector or canvasser.

3. When anything mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article has been delivered to an elector or a canvasser for the purpose of compensation for voting or carrying on an election campaign or for declining to do either or for persuading others to do so.

4. When a voter has received or demanded offers or accepted proposals of presents or entertainment mentioned in the first paragraph of this Article, or yielded to the forms of persuasion or asked for such forms of assistance as are mentioned in the second paragraph.

5. When, with the object of inducing the acts mentioned in paragraph 1 to 3, a person has made, proposed or promised offers of money or goods to election canvassers; or when an election canvasser has received, demanded or accepted such offers.

6. when a person has acted to persuade or mediate between others to accomplish the acts mentioned in the preceding items.

When any person in charge of election affairs has committed a crime mentioned in this Article, he shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than four years or a fine of not more than 40,000 Yen. This rule shall also apply to any police officer who has committed these crimes.

## Article LXXVII

Any person who has committed one of the following acts shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than five years:

When, with the object of obtaining material benefits, a person has, on behalf of a candidate, committed against a large number of voters or election canvassers, or caused them to commit, one of the acts mentioned in paragraph one to three, five or six of the preceding Article.

## Article LXXVIII

Any person who commits any of the following offenses shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than four years or a fine of not more than 40,000 Yen.

1. A person who has committed one of the acts mentioned in paragraphs

1 and 2 of Article LXXVI toward a candidate or toward a person who contemplates becoming a candidate for the purpose of dissuading him from candidacy, or toward an elected person for the purpose of persuading him to decline the election.

2. A person who has committed an act mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article LXXVI for the purpose of compensating a candidate for having withdrawn his candidacy or having refrained from becoming a candidate or an elected person for having declined election, or having mediated or persuaded for such purpose.

3. A person who has accepted or demanded offers or entertainment as described in the preceding two items or has yielded to the persuasion described in the first item.

4. A person who has acted to mediate between others to accomplish or attempt to accomplish the acts mentioned in the preceding items.

When any person in charge of the affairs of an election has committed a crime mentioned in this Article in connection with that election, he shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than five years or to a fine of not more than 50,000 Yen. The same rule shall apply when a police officer has committed an offense under the preceding paragraph.

#### Article LXXIX

Any goods or benefits received in consequence of acts mentioned in the three preceding Articles shall be confiscated.

#### Article LXXX

Any person who, during a campaign, commits any of the following offenses shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than four years or a fine of not more than 40,000 Yen or both:

1. Any person who subjects an elector, a candidate, an intended candidate, a canvasser, or an elected person to an act of violence, intimidation or abduction.

2. Any person who by force or fraud interferes with a political meeting or speech, or who by fraudulent or other unlawful means obstructs the exercise of the right to vote.

3. A person who threatens an elector, candidate, prospective candidate, canvasser or elected person with the loss or impairment to him of irrigation, tenancy, credit or contributions, or of the loss or impairment thereof to a shrine, temple, school, company, guild, or local body in which he is interested.

#### Article LXXXI

1. A person in charge of election affairs who wilfully neglects to discharge his duty or obstructs wilfully the exercise of the right of election by the abuse of his authority shall be liable to confinement for not more than four years.

2. Any person in charge of election affairs who requests an elector to reveal the name of the candidate for whom he intends to vote or has voted shall be



liable to confinement for not more than six months or to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen.

Article LXXXII

A person in charge of election affairs who reveals the name of a candidate voted for by an elector shall be liable to confinement for not more than two years or to a fine of not more than 20,000 Yen. The same rule and penalty shall apply regardless of the truth of the statement.

Article LXXXIII

A person who unlawfully interferes at a polling station with the voting of an elector, or who uses any device to discover the name of the person voted for, shall be liable to confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen.

Article LXXXIV

A person who commits violence against or threatens an election official, or who disturbs the peace at a polling station, or who seizes, damages, or defaces a ballot, a ballot-box, or an election document, shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than four years.

Article LXXXV

1. A person who assembles a mob and induces it to commit an offense mentioned in the first item of Article LXXX or in the preceding Article shall be liable as follows:

a. The principal leaders shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not less than one year and not more than seven years.

b. The leaders shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not less than six months and not more than five years.

c. A person who has knowingly joined such a mob to add to its influence shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than one year and to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen.

2. A person who has knowingly formed a mob or joined it for the purpose of committing an offense against any provision of the first paragraph of Article LXXX or of the preceding Article and has disobeyed more than three times any order of police officers or officials of the election to disperse shall, if he is leader, be liable to confinement for not more than two years, and, if only a member, to confinement for not more than one year and to a fine of not more than 2,000 Yen.

Article LXXXVI

A person who, in an election demonstration, continues to assemble a mob, conduct a procession or parade, use fireworks, bonfires or torchlight, beat bells or drums, sounds conches or bugles, raises flags, or use other similar devices, after having been warned by a police official to desist, shall be liable to confinement for not more than six months or to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen.

## Article LXXXVII

A person who, with the object of inducing other persons to commit any of the acts prohibited by this Ordinance, incites them by means of speeches, newspapers, magazines, circulars, placards or other such devices shall be liable to confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen, provided that in case a newspaper or magazine is found guilty of such acts, the person registered as the editor or who has taken the place of the editor shall be liable to the aforesaid punishment.

## Article LXXXVIII

1. A person who commits any of the following offenses by means of speeches, newspapers, magazines, circulars or placards, shall be liable to confinement for not more than two years or to a fine of not more than 20,000 Yen or both. In case of newspapers and magazines, the proviso of the preceding Article shall apply.

a. For the purpose of being elected, or causing a candidate to be elected, to publish knowingly a false statement of fact about his rank, position, occupation or career.

b. For the purpose of preventing the election of a candidate, to knowingly publish any false statement of a material fact.

2. An editor or publisher who discriminates between opposing candidates with respect to advertisements in his newspaper or magazine shall be liable to confinement for not more than two years, or to a fine of not more than 20,000 Yen or both.

## Article LXXXIX

1. A person who votes, knowing that he is not a qualified elector, shall be liable to confinement for not more than one year, or to a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen.

2. A person who votes by assuming the name of another, or by other fraudulent means, shall be liable to confinement for not more than two years or to a fine of not more than 20,000 Yen.

3. A person who knowingly uses a counterfeit ballot, intending it to be mistaken for a legal vote or who manipulates votes for the purpose of causing a false count shall be liable to confinement or servitude, for not more than three years, or to a fine of not more than 30,000 Yen or both.

4. Any election official who violates the provisions of this Article shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than five years or to a fine of not more than 50,000 Yen or both.

## Article XC

Any inspector who fails to discharge any of the duties provided in this Ordinance without justifiable reason shall be liable to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen.

Article XCI

Any person who violates any of the provisions of Article LVI to LVIII or disobeys an order given in accordance with paragraph 4, Article LV is liable to confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen.

Article XCII

Any person who establishes election offices in excess of the number authorized by paragraph 1, Article LV or who violates the provisions of paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article LV shall be liable to a fine of not more than 7,000 Yen.

Article XCIII

Any person who violates the provisions of the first paragraph of Article LV or Article LIX shall be liable to confinement for not more than six months or to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen.

Article XCIV

Any person who, having the duty to make reports or to give notice in accordance with the third paragraph of Article LIV fails to do so shall be liable to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen.

Article XCV

Any person who, contrary to his duty, violates the provisions of one of the following items shall be liable to confinement for not more than six months or to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen.

1. One who neglects to hand over the account, contrary to Article LXXI.
2. One who, contrary to Article LXVII neglects to prepare the books or to keep them completely, or who enters a false statement in the books.
3. One who, contrary to the first paragraph of Article LXIX neglects to make reports or makes false reports.
4. One who, contrary to the first paragraph of Article LXX fails to keep books or documents.
5. One who enters a false statement in the books or documents to be preserved under the first paragraph of Article LXX.

Article XCVI

Any person who pays expenses of election contrary to the provision of Article LXII shall be liable to confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen.

Article XCVII

Any person who, contrary to the provisions of Article LX neglects to make a report or makes a false report shall be liable to a fine of not more than 50,000 Yen.



## Article XCVIII

A responsible disburser or a person who acts for him who pays expenses of an election in excess of the amount published in accordance with the second paragraph of Article LXVIII shall be liable to confinement for not more than one year or a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen.

## Article XCIX

An election shall be invalid when, in connection with the election, a candidate has been convicted of violating the provisions of this Section, or the person who controlled and managed his election campaign has been convicted of violating the provisions of Articles LXXVI to LXXVII except when the person elected has taken proper care in the selection and supervision of the person who controlled and managed his election campaign, and the acts were done without his knowledge or against his orders.

## Article C

The period of the statute of limitations and the term of prescription shall be one year for the offenses described in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article LXXXIX, and shall be six months for other offenses described in this Section.

## Article CI

Any person who commences an election campaign prior to the campaign period provided for in Section 1, Article V, paragraph 3 shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to confinement at hard labor for not more than one year or a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen, or both; any candidate whose campaign shall have been so commenced shall be ineligible to be elected to any office at the forthcoming election. (Change #4)

## Article CII

1. This Ordinance shall come into force on the day of its promulgation provided, however, that the General and Supplementary Registers of Electors heretofore prepared and declared conclusive by the Electoral Administrative Committee of each city, town or village in accordance with the direction of the Provisional Government, and the appointments and decisions of such committee shall be deemed to be valid and effective.

2. Supplemental rules necessary for the administration of this Ordinance shall be provided by the Chief Executive so far as are consistent with the same. (Change #2)

\* \* \*

BY DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR:

/s/ John H. Hinds

/t/ JOHN H. HINDS

Brigadier General, US Army

Deputy Military Governor

A TRUE COPY:  
R. C. HOUSTON  
CWO, USA

14. Civil Administration Proclamation No. 13, 29 February 1952, sub: Establishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands; and Civil Administration, and Ordinance No. 68, 29 February 1952, sub: Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

Taken together, these two pronouncements were the basis for local self-government in the Ryukyus, and represent the culmination of earlier military government steps toward such an administration. The constitution (CA Ordinance No. 68) details the procedures by which the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will exercise the broad powers enumerated in Proclamation No. 13, and until publication of Executive Order 10713 (1957) was the sole source for the powers and jurisdiction of the local indigenous government.

29 February 1952

## CIVIL ADMINISTRATION PROCLAMATION NO. 13

### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS

#### TO THE PEOPLE OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS

WHEREAS it is deemed desirable to establish a Government of the Ryukyu Islands in order to further the economic, governmental and social well-being of the Ryukyuan people,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ROBERT S. BEIGHTLER, Major General, United States Army, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, do hereby proclaim as follows:

#### Article I

There is hereby established the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, including legislative, executive and judicial organs.

#### Article II

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands may exercise all powers of government within the Ryukyu Islands, subject, however, to the Proclamations, Ordinances, and Directives, of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.



## Article III

The legislative power of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be vested in a Legislature elected by the People of the Ryukyu Islands. The Legislature, in the exercise of its legislative power, shall be independent of the Executive and Judicial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Legislature is authorized to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, including the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, as well as make grant-in-aid authorizations to the other governmental units within the Ryukyu Islands. The First Session of the Legislature shall convene on the first day of April 1952, in Naha, Okinawa, and thereafter shall meet in regular session as prescribed by law.

## Article IV

The executive power of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be vested in a Chief Executive, appointed by the Deputy Governor, pending the time such office shall become elective. The Chief Executive shall, from time to time, give to the Legislature information on the state of the Government, and shall recommend for its consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. He shall have power to convene the Legislature in special session. He shall be responsible for the administration and functioning of the necessary administrative governmental departments as authorized by legislative action, and shall make appointments of necessary personnel to such departments subject to the approval of the Deputy Governor. Provided, however, that no one who advocates the overthrow of government by force or violence, shall be permitted to serve as an official or employee of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Deputy Chief Executive shall be appointed by the Deputy Governor, pending the time such office shall become elective or shall otherwise be determined. In the event of absence or inability on the part of the Chief Executive to perform his duties, or in the event of a vacancy in such office, the Deputy Chief Executive shall perform such duties. (CA Proc #17)

## Article V

The judicial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be the Court of Appeals of the Ryukyus, the Circuit Courts, the Magistrate Courts, heretofore established and such other courts as may be established from time to time. Courts, in the exercise of their judicial power, shall be independent of the Executive and Legislative organs of government. The judges of the Court of Appeals shall be appointed by the Governor. The judges of the Circuit Courts and of the Magistrate Courts shall be appointed by the Chief Executive subject to the prior approval of the Deputy Governor. The Deputy Governor, may, in his discretion, review, approve, remand, suspend, commute, remit or otherwise modify or set aside any decision, judgment or sentence of any court.

## Article VI

The basic liberties of democratic countries, including freedom of religion, speech, assembly, petition and the press, and security from unreasonable search, seizure, and deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, shall be guaranteed as far as is consistent with the public welfare.

## Article VII

The Deputy Governor reserves the right, in the event of necessity, to veto, prohibit, or suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or regulations enacted by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or any civil government or agency of any such government; to order the promulgation of any law, ordinance or regulation he may deem advisable; and to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority, in the Ryukyu Islands.

## Article VIII

Upon the effective date of this Proclamation, the Provisional Central Government heretofore appointed and instituted shall adjourn and dissolve, provided that all lawful legislative, executive and judicial acts performed by the Provisional Central Government shall remain in force and effect until amended, repealed or superseded by acts of the respective organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands established by this Proclamation. Provided, however, all appointments heretofore made to Executive and Judicial positions in the Provisional Central Government shall continue in full force and effect with regard to similar positions in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

## Article IX

Subject to the provisions of the preceding Article, CA Proclamation No. 3 of 1 April 1951, "Establishment of Provisional Central Government," and the provisions of any other Proclamation, Ordinance and Directive in conflict herewith, are rescinded.

## Article X

This Proclamation will become effective on the first day of April 1952.  
Given under my hand this 29 day of Feb. 1952.

BY DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNOR:

ROBT S. BEIGHTLER  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Governor

29 February 1952

CA ORDINANCE  
NUMBER 68

PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS

Section I

General

Article I

The area of political and geographical jurisdiction of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall constitute and include those islands, islets, atolls and rocks and territorial waters within the following boundaries:

28° North Latitude, 124° 40' East Longitude; thence

24° North Latitude, 122° East Longitude; thence

24° North Latitude, 133° East Longitude; thence

27° North Latitude, 131° 50' East Longitude; thence

27° North Latitude, 128° 18' East Longitude; thence

28° North Latitude, 128° 18' East Longitude; thence  
to the point of origin.

Article II

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall have its capital in Naha City, Okinawa Shima, and shall not be changed to any other locality except by referendum which the total vote cast comes to seventy per centum of the total number of qualified electors as determined by the last General and supplementary Register of Electors. Provided that, in the case of a state of emergency, the seat of the government may be changed to ensure continued operation of the Government and the safety of its members, records, and allied matters.

Section II

Status, Duties and Rights of the People

Article III

1. A Ryukyuan shall be a natural person whose birth and name are registered in a family register in the Ryukyu Islands, provided that no family register shall be transferred into the Ryukyu Islands without authority of the Deputy Governor and no person who is a national of any foreign state other than Japan or who is a stateless person may be registered except in accordance with the provisions of law; provided, however, that the Government of the Ryukyu Islands is empowered to enact suitable laws for the creation, operation and maintenance



of a voluntary family register specifically for foreigners to the same general extent and with the same effect as may exist under prevailing law for Ryukyuan; provided further; that the creation of, or entry, in such a register for foreigners shall not, of itself, confer status as a Ryukyuan, a legal entrant into, or a resident of the Ryukyu Islands.

2. The duties of a Ryukyuan toward the Government of the Ryukyu Islands of which he is a part shall be that of assuming the general responsibilities of representative government, that of aiding in the maintenance of law and order, that of taking part in civil affairs, that of casting the ballot at all elections and that of paying taxes duly established and meted out to him.

3. No person shall have the right to vote in any election for public office or to hold any public office through either election or appointment who has been adjudged incompetent or quasi-incompetent, or who has been sentenced to imprisonment and has neither finished the execution of such punishment or has legally ceased to undergo the same, or who has been placed upon probation by a duly constituted court and has not completed the term of his probation.

4. No person who advocates, or who aids or belongs to, any party, organization, or association which advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or of the United States shall be permitted to run for or hold any public office of trust or profit.

5. The rights of a Ryukyuan toward the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be that of using in common with others the property and establishments of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and of the city, town or village in which they reside; the right of seeking public office; the right of participating in public election and the right of petitioning for general and just cause.

#### Article IV

Furthermore, a Ryukyuan shall have the right of exercising the initiative and referendum for the enactment, amendment, or abolition of laws; and that of initiating procedures for the recall of legislators, either severally or jointly, as provided for by law.

#### Article V

1. The rights of the people toward the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be that of obtaining protection of life, real and personal property and effects according to law.

2. All of the people shall be respected as individuals and held equal under the law. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.

#### Article VI

1. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or from any municipal or other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands, nor exercise any political authority.

2. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice.

3. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands or any municipal or other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

### Section III

#### Executive Branch Organization and Operation

##### Article VII

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall have an Executive Branch composed of the Chief Executive, Deputy Chief Executive and its administration which shall be so organized as to personnel, structure, and function that the affairs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be coordinated, effected, and executed to maximize its benefits for the inhabitants.

##### Article VIII

All executive and administrative offices, departments and instrumentalities of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and their respective functions, powers, and duties shall be allocated by law within not more than twelve and not less than seven offices of departmental status in such manner as to group related functions within one office so far as practicable.

##### Article IX

The Chief Executive shall, within his jurisdiction, coordinate affairs of the Civil Administrator as affecting city, town or village governments, and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, as fall within his powers under proclamation, directives, ordinances, or laws.

##### Article X

No person shall be Chief Executive or Deputy Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands who has not attained the age of 35 years and who has not been a resident of the Ryukyu Islands and domiciled therein for a minimum period of five years and whose family Register has not been maintained in the Ryukyu Islands for a similar period. The Chief Executive and the Deputy Chief Executive, shall not, while in such office, hold any other position or office under the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, or any other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands, or under any foreign government. Nor, shall the Chief Executive or the Deputy Chief Executive or any other officials or employees of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands be personally interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with said government or department or agency thereof. Nor, shall any person who has been convicted of bribery, perjury or any crime involving moral turpitude, be eligible to hold the office of Chief

Executive, Deputy Chief Executive or any other office or position of trust or responsibility in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

#### Article XI

The Chief Executive shall, at the commencement of each session, give to the Legislature information by message, of the condition of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and shall recommend such measures as he shall deem expedient. He shall accompany his message with a statement of all money received and paid out, subject to his order or the order of the treasurer or other official charged with such responsibility in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, with vouchers therefor; and at the commencement of each regular session, present estimates of the amount of money required by taxation for all purposes. The Chief Executive shall present to the Legislature such additional messages as he shall deem advisable from time to time.

#### Article XII

The Chief Executive may, on extraordinary occasions, convene, at his own instance, the Legislature; but when so convened, it shall enter upon no business except that stated in such call for such session, or as shall be broadened by him to include other matters which he shall deem expedient.

#### Article XIII

Every bill passed by the Legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Chief Executive. If he approves the bill he shall sign it, and thereupon it shall become a law; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the Legislature, which shall enter the objections at large upon its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members present and voting, agree to pass the bill, it shall be referred to the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands for final action thereon. But in all cases, the vote in the Legislature shall be determined by yeas and nays to be entered on the journal. Any bill which shall not be returned by the Chief Executive within fifteen days after he receives it, excluding Sundays and Holidays, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature by its adjournment, prevents the return of such bill, in which case it shall not be a law. However, the following shall be applicable to bills appropriating money or providing revenue: Every bill passed by the Legislature making appropriations of money or raising revenue, embracing distinct items, shall before it becomes a law, be presented to the Chief Executive; if he disapproves the bill, or any item or appropriation therein contained, he shall communicate such disapproval with his reasons therefor to the Legislature; but all items not disapproved shall have the force and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. Any item so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed by a two-thirds majority of the Legislature and approved by the Deputy Governor.



Article XIV

The Chief Executive shall be responsible for the promulgation of a law. He may establish detailed rules and regulations necessary for the execution of a law enacted by the Legislature, if so delegated by law.

Article XV

A system of civil service for the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be established in accordance with the provisions of law which shall control such responsibilities as appointment, promotion, and retirement which fall within the provisions of such system.

Article XVI

The Chief Executive shall perform such administrative and executive responsibilities in accordance with the powers as set forth under Article IV of Civil Administration Proclamation No. 12, "Establishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands," dated 29 February 1952. However, such powers shall be exercised independently of the powers granted to the Legislature or to the Judicial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

Article XVII

The Deputy Chief Executive shall perform such executive and administrative functions as shall be delegated by the Chief Executive, furthermore, in the event of absence or inability of the Chief Executive to discharge the powers and responsibilities of his office, the same shall devolve on the Deputy Chief Executive during such period.

Section IV

Legislature  
Organization and Operation

Article XVIII

The Legislature shall be composed of twenty-nine members to be elected by the people of the Ryukyu Islands in accordance with the provisions of law. The presiding officer of the Legislature shall be elected by and from among the members of the Legislature.

Article XIX

The Legislature is authorized to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, as set forth in Civil Administration Proclamation No. 13, "Establishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands," dated 29 February 1952, or as shall be delegated to it by the Deputy Governor. The Legislature, in the exercise of its legislative power, shall be independent of the Executive and Judicial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The style of the acts of

the Legislature shall be: "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands."

#### Article XX

The Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall convene in regular session at the seat of the government in Okinawa on the first Monday of April of each year. The Chief Executive may convene the Legislature whenever, in his opinion, the public safety or welfare shall require it. It shall be his duty to convene it, on application in writing of one-fourth of the members thereof, and for cause stated in which written application.

#### Article XXI

Every member of the Legislature shall be present within the Legislative chamber during sittings of the Legislature and shall attend the regular meetings of the standing committees or of select committees of which he is a member, unless excused or necessarily prevented. A majority of the members of the Legislature shall constitute a quorum for purpose of transacting business. In case a smaller number than a quorum of the Legislature shall convene, they are hereby authorized to send the Sergeant-At-Arms of the Legislature, or any other person or persons, by them authorized, for any and all absent members as the majority of such members shall agree, at the expense of such absent members, respectively, unless such expense for nonattendance shall be paid as the Legislature, when a quorum is convened, shall judge sufficient; and, in that case, the expense shall be paid out of monies appropriated by the Legislature.

#### Article XXII

No person shall be a member of the Legislature who shall not have attained the age of 25 years and who has not been a resident of the Ryukyu Islands and domiciled therein for minimum period of five years and whose family Register has not been maintained in the Ryukyu Islands for a like period. No person shall, while a member of the Legislature, hold any other position or office under the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or under any Gunto Government or other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands, or under any foreign government except as provided for in Article XXXIX of Civil Administration Ordinance No. 57, dated 18 December 1951. Nor shall any person who has been convicted of bribery, perjury or any crime involving moral turpitude be eligible for membership in the Legislature.

#### Article XXIII

Members of the Legislature shall, except for offenses in flagrante delicto, be privileged from arrest during the session and for ten days before and after the session unless such arrest is sanctioned by the Legislature. For speeches, debate, or reports made in the Legislature or in a committee thereof, a member shall not be called to account in any place except the Legislature.

## Article XXIV

No act of the Legislature shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title. However, if any subject shall be embraced in an act which is not so expressed, the act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed, and no law shall be revised, or amended, by reference to its title only.

## Article XXV

The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and cause the same to be published from time to time and all bills and resolutions shall be described therein. The following shall be contained in the journal:

- a. Messages from the Chief Executive.
- b. Titles of all bills, and the title and text of all resolutions.
- c. Every vote taken by yeas and nays, and a brief statement of the context of each petition, memorial or paper presented to the Legislature.
- d. A true and accurate account of the proceedings of the Legislature.

## Article XXVI

The Legislature shall name such standing committees, and from time to time such select committees, as it shall determine; but each shall consist of not less than three members, to be authorized in a manner as the Legislature shall establish. At the adjournment of each regular or special session of the Legislature, the chairman of the respective committee shall deliver to the Secretary of the Legislature, the record book of such committee proceedings, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Legislature to preserve the same among the archives of his office. The chairman of each standing committee shall cause to be kept for the purpose, a record of every meeting of the committee wherein shall be entered the following:

- a. The time and place of each committee meeting, and every hearing had before the committee.
- b. The attendance of members of the committee at each meeting thereof.
- c. The name of the person or persons appearing before the committee, and the interest represented by him.

## Article XXVII

1. The Legislature shall determine its own rules of procedure. However, all bills must go through three reading processes, but each reading process must be made on a separate day, unless, in case of urgency, by a vote of three-fourths of the members present taken on each bill, this requirement may be dispensed with.

2. No items under consideration will be unduly delayed by the Legislature in its deliberations, or held in committee beyond a reasonable length of time.

3. The Legislature is hereby vested with authority to conduct investigations and to order the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and to order the production of books and papers or documents, before the Legislature as a whole or



before any committee thereof. In such cases, the provisions of law concerning the inquiry of witnesses, as stated in the Code of Civil Procedure and subsequent modification by competent legislation shall apply mutatis mutandis with the exception of those provisions relating to detention or administrative fine. Any witness thus ordered to appear before the Legislature as a whole or before any committee thereof may be paid per diem expenses as determined by the Legislature or as provided for by law.

4. Conduct of members, witnesses and visitors during sessions of the Legislature shall be controlled by the Speaker, as prescribed by the Legislature. Misconduct and violations of lawful orders of the Legislature shall be punished as provided for by law. The Legislature may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of three-fourths of the members elected thereto, expel a member. Persons, other than members of the Legislature, who hold the authority of the Legislature in contempt may be tried by court action.

5. Any member of the Legislature may introduce a bill or a resolution. However, such bill or resolution may be prepared by the Chief Executive, Deputy Chief Executive, or by any official, agency, activity or by a citizen's group or private individual.

6. Enactments by the Legislature shall be made by a majority vote of the members present, a quorum being present at the time of such enactments.

7. A session of the Legislature shall be open to the public, provided that, on a motion of three or more members, a resolution for holding a secret sitting has been adopted by the majority of two-thirds or more of the members present, a secret session may be held.

#### Article XXVIII

Members of the Legislature shall receive salary and required travel and operational expenses as provided for by law. However, no per diem shall be allowed members of the Legislature for days they are absent from Legislative sessions and for days during which the Legislature is not in session, unless on authorized business. The salaries, travel and operational expenses of the Chief Executive, the Deputy Chief Executive, the members of the Court of Appeals and other courts, as well as of other employees or officials, of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, shall be provided for by law in accordance with budgetary limitations.

#### Section V

##### Courts Organization and Operation

#### Article XXIX

The governments, the inhabitants, and all persons present within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands unless otherwise excepted shall be governed in their relations with the judiciary of the Ryukyu Islands by the

provisions of Civil Administration Proclamation No. 12, dated 2 January 1952, titled: "Ryukyuan Court Systems."

#### Article XXX

The Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall exercise no additional governmental powers concerning the Judicial System except as specified in Civil Administration Proclamation No. 12, dated 2 January 1951, entitled: "Ryukyuan Court Systems."

### Section VI

#### Relationship with Municipal Government

#### Article XXXI

Regulations concerning organization and operations of municipal governments shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principals of self government.

#### Article XXXII

The municipal governments shall have assemblies as their deliberative body. The mayors, the members of the assembly, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall be elected by direct popular vote within each municipality.

#### Article XXXIII

Municipalities shall have the right to manage their property, administration, financial activities, and affairs and to enact their own by-laws in accordance with law.

#### Article XXXIV

Unless otherwise prohibited the Government of the Ryukyu Islands may exercise its power over a municipality when such action is in the specific interest of the inhabitants of the geographic area of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. No elected municipal official may be removed except for cause and in accordance with due process of law. However, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall have the power to bring action in mandamus in the appropriate court against a person who fails or refuses to execute the provision of a law which he is charged to administer.

### Section VII

#### Sundry Provisions

#### Article XXXV

1. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall engage in no foreign affairs except through the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

2. The following Ordinances and Directives of Civil Administration are rescinded or amended as indicated:

- a. CA Directive Number 5 of 22 May 1951 is hereby rescinded.
- b. CA Directive Number 6 of 22 May 1951 is hereby rescinded.
- c. MG Ordinance Number 22 of 4 August 1950 is hereby amended by the rescission of paragraph 2b of Article IX; and Article XI.

3. Legislative, executive and administrative actions performed in accordance with the Ordinances and Directives rescinded or amended by the preceding paragraph prior to the effective date of this Ordinance shall remain in force and effect until modified, rescinded or superseded by the appropriate branches of government.

Article XXXVI

The effective date of this Ordinance shall be 1 April 1952.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR:

JAMES M. LEWIS  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Civil Administrator





## Developing a Land Claims Policy

Okinawa's finite land resources became an issue early in the American occupation. Who really owned the land? And, irrespective of ownership, how should the land best be used? These questions emerged as persistent problems during the years 1945–1950 and beyond. At times the land issue caused heated competition between tactical commanders and military government officers as both sought acreage to promote their respective programs. More importantly, the land problem remained a frequent source of alienation between the Okinawan people and the American forces. Before these issues could be successfully addressed, the fundamental questions of land ownership on the island had to be confronted. It was the type of issue that could easily arise in any occupation situation, but it was particularly troublesome on Okinawa because of the intense, local, emotional attachment to the land.

15. HQ USN MG Okinawa, Directive No. 63, 6 December 1945, sub; Land Records — Assembling and Preservation of.

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., RG 260)

This directive instructs the commanders of the various military government districts to collect and preserve land records, but excludes from this effort the documents of title held by individual land owners:

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
OKINAWA

A12-1

6 December 1945

DIRECTIVE NUMBER 63.

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government.

To: Distribution "A".

Subject: Land Records – Assembling and Preservation of.

332 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950

1. District Commanders are directed to assemble, identify, and provide for the safekeeping of all available public records relating to the ownership of land. The place of storage of such records will be reported to this Headquarters.
2. This directive does not include documents of title in the possession of individual land owners.

/s/ Royal Firman  
ROYAL FIRMAN  
By direction



16. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 121, 28 February 1946, sub: Land Claims, Preservation of data concerning.

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., Watkins Papers, RG 200)

Military government headquarters addressed the problems of displaced individual landowners by authorizing a land claims committee within each Okinawan township to investigate claims by former owners or their heirs.

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOV'T  
RYUKYUS ISLANDS

28 February 1946

DIRECTIVE NUMBER 121.

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government  
To: Distribution "A"  
Subject: Land Claims, Preparation of data concerning.

1. In preparation for determining land rights on Okinawa, the General Affairs Department shall be responsible for assembling all pertinent data.

2. Under the supervision of the General Affairs Department, Okinawan Advisory Council, the soncho of each mura shall appoint a mura Land Claims Committee of five residents and for each aza an aza Land Claims Committee of ten residents.

3. Land owners shall submit to the aza LCC a declaration of ownership with a description of the land claims. Accompanying each declaration will be the signatures of two witnesses who are former neighborhood land owners. A land owner shall not have as a witness any one for whom the land owner himself has previously been a witness.

4. The aza LCC shall investigate all claims and report on the same to the soncho. In investigating land claims the aza LCC may, if necessary, consult with the LCC of other aza.

5. The mura LCC shall be charged with investigating and recording all public lands and all land whose ownership can not be established by claims of the former owners. It will report on the same to the soncho. In investigating land titles, the mura LCC may, if necessary, consult with the LCC of other mura.

6. The soncho may direct the LCC, either in the mura and in an aza, to investigate the status of any particular tract.

7. Arbitral committees of five members shall be established by the soncho

one for the mura and one for each aza. Disputed titles shall be submitted to the appropriate arbitral committee.

8. Where the owners are dead or missing, the next of kin shall file claims in the name of former owners. In the absence of all relatives, the mura LCC shall be investigated and report to the soncho.

9. A central arbitral committee of ten members shall be established by the General Affairs Department, Okinawan Advisory Council, with the Director of the Department as chairman ex officio. Disputes as to land formerly belonging to the prefectural government or to the Imperial Japanese Government and disputes as to land titles which, requiring consultation between the LCC of two or more mura, cannot be established by such consultation shall be submitted to the General Affairs Department, Okinawan Advisory Council.

10. All data received by the soncho shall be filed in the mura office subject to scrutiny by General Affairs Department, Okinawa Advisory Council. Maps showing the location of the land claims as established by the LCC shall be forwarded by the soncho to the General Affairs Department, Okinawa Advisory Council.

/s/ ROYAL FIRMAN

/t/ ROYAL FIRMAN

By direction

17. MG Special Proclamation No. 22, 7 October 1947, sub: Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

As the American requirement for land grew, Brig. Gen. Frederic L. Hayden initiated the controversial practice of acquiring additional acreage by condemnation proceedings, despite the opposition of the Okinawans:

#### SPECIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 22

##### ACQUISITION OF LAND FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES

TO THE PEOPLE OF:

#### THE ISLANDS OF NANSEI SHOTO AND ADJACENT WATERS SOUTH OF THIRTY (30°) DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE

WHEREAS it may be deemed necessary to acquire land by condemnation proceedings for public purposes in order to promote the general welfare of the people of the Ryukyus;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FREDERIC L. HAYDEN, Brigadier General, United States Army, Chief Military Government Officer of the Islands of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters south of thirty (30°) degrees North Latitude, do hereby proclaim as follows:

#### Article I DEFINITIONS

In this Proclamation and for all purposes relating thereto, an Acquiring Authority is any duly authorized Ryukyuan public agency or privately owned public utility, which shall have the power to exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire any land or easement therein in the Ryukyus for the accomplishment of a public purpose. Public Purpose means the construction, maintenance and operation of public buildings and works for the benefit of the general civilian public, such as schools, parks, roads, playgrounds, reclamation, flood control and irrigation projects, railroads, telephone, gas, electric and other similar public services.

#### Article II CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS AUTHORIZED

Whenever any Ryukyuan public agency or privately owned public utility has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized as an Acquiring Authority to acquire any land or easement therein, which shall be needed in connection with a public purpose, and shall be unable to obtain same by purchase and acquire a valid



title thereto, such Acquiring Authority, if it be a public agency, shall be conferred such power, or in the name of the local civilian administration, for the acquirement by condemnation of said land or easement. However, where such Acquiring Authority is a privately owned public utility, then condemnation proceedings shall be instituted in its own name. Where such condemnation is instituted by an Acquiring Authority which is a public agency, it shall be the duty of the Department of Justice of the local civilian administration to institute and conduct such proceedings upon the request of such Acquiring Authority. In all such condemnation proceedings, just compensation shall be paid for such lands or easements therein so obtained.

### Article III

#### JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS

The jurisdiction of such condemnation proceedings is hereby vested in the civilian courts where the land which is sought after to be condemned or any part thereof is located or situated, regardless of the value of same.

### Article IV

#### IMMEDIATE POSSESSION

Whenever an Acquiring Authority causes proceedings to be instituted for the acquirement by condemnation of any lands or easements therein, it shall immediately upon the institution of such proceedings have the right to take immediate possession of said lands, and proceed with such public purposes thereon as authorized.

### Article V

#### ACQUIRING AUTHORITY DESIGNATED

The Chiji of each local civilian administration in the Ryukyus is hereby empowered to designate who is an Acquiring Authority under this Proclamation which shall be subject to approval of Military Government.

### Article VI

#### POWER TO MAKE ORDERS

The Deputy Commander for Military Government may make such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary for the purpose of the administration of this Proclamation and for the procedure and practice in condemnation suits.

### Article VII

#### TRANSLATION

In case of any conflict or ambiguity between the English text of this Proclamation or any other Proclamation, order or regulation issued under my authority, and any translation thereof, the English shall prevail.

### Article VIII

#### EFFECTIVE DATE

This Proclamation will become operative on the 7th day of October 1947.

Given under my hand this  
7th day of October, 1947.

/s/ FREDERIC L. HAYDEN

/t/ FREDERIC L. HAYDEN

Bridagier General, United States Army

Commanding General, Ryukyus Command

Chief Military Government Officer

OFFICIAL:

/s/ William H. Craig

WILLIAM H. CRAIG

Colonel, Infantry

Deputy Commander for Military Government

18. HQ RYCOM MG, Directive No. 19, 7 April 1948, sub: Ryukyuan Property Custodian.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

Harkening back to Admiral Nimitz's Proclamation No. 7, which established the office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian, this military government pronouncement expanded the powers of that office and expands the scope of the Custodian's activities to include all categories of property, including land subject to seizure with due compensation:

MG DIRECTIVE  
NUMBER 19

SUBJECT: Ryukyuan Property Custodian

TO: All Chijis of Local Civilian Administrations

Section I  
General

1. Establishment and Regulations. — Pursuant to United States Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 7, entitled "Custodian of Property", there has been established a section in Headquarters, Ryukyus Command, Military Government, APO 331, known as the Office of Ryukyuan Property Custodian. The following regulations are hereby prescribed for the administration of the Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian.

Section II  
Interpretations

1. In this Directive and for all purposes relating thereto, a "person" includes any individual, association, partnership, trusteeship, corporation, administrator, assignee, conservator, executor or heir lawfully living or existing within the following boundaries: Thirty (30) Degrees North One Hundred Twenty Six (126) Degrees East, thence Twenty Four (24) Degrees North One Hundred Twenty Two (122) Degrees East, thence Twenty Four (24) Degrees North One Hundred Thirty Three (133) Degrees East, thence Twenty Nine (29) Degrees North One Hundred Thirty One (131) Degrees East, thence Thirty (30) Degrees North One Hundred Thirty One (131) Degrees Thirty Minutes (30') East, thence to the point of origin.

Section III  
Performance of Duties

1. In the performance of his duties, the Ryukyuan Property Custodian will:

a. Determine what property is to be taken into custody pursuant to the aforesaid United States Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 7.



b. Take custody of property and deliver a "Certificate of Custody" to the then occupant or possessor thereof; or, if such property is unoccupied or abandoned, post a copy of such certificate thereon.

c. Release property, requiring physical control to a person claiming interest therein, upon receipt from such person acknowledging that such release is without prejudice to blocking control or future vesting by the United States Government.

d. Effect a complete release to a person claiming an interest in property requiring control, when it is determined that the United States Government has no vestible interest therein.

e. Release property requiring physical control to persons currently in possession of such property, but having no claim or title thereto, provided such persons are able to continue maintenance and safekeeping. . . .

f. Place property in the physical possession of persons or governmental agencies, other than agencies of the Government of the United States of America, through lease agreements and/or contracts of custody.

g. Sell or otherwise dispose of property which because of its nature cannot be properly safeguarded, or which is rapidly deteriorating in value.

h. (1) Drop from accountability by means of an Inventory Adjustment Report (WD AGO Form No. 444) in accordance with War Department TM 38-403 "Station Supply Procedures", and instructions in current War Department circulars, property not found by physical check, which is either actually missing or reported missing due to minor operational losses, entry under wrong nomenclature, or undiscoverable posting errors. After a full and complete investigation has been made of each case, the present appraised value will be used to determine the amount of the loss. These losses will not exceed 3% per month for the duration of control, and will not exceed 40% of the total value. In case of accounts consisting entirely of personal property, other than cash and securities, ¥ 125.000 or less, may be dropped, provided that the evidence establishes the best interest of the United States Government are fully protected.

(2) Submit to a Board of Officers appointed under the provisions of par 4, AR 35-6640, dated 16 April 1947, for action on all other property which cannot be handled by the Inventory Adjustment Report.

i. Take such action as is deemed necessary to safeguard, preserve, protect, and insure the effective and profitable use of property taken into custody.

/s/ William H. Craig

WILLIAM H. CRAIG

Colonel Infantry

Deputy Commander for Military Government

19. MG Ryukyu Islands, MG Directive No. 1, 1 February 1950, sub: Central Committee, Determination and Certification of Land Title.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

This ordinance directs the governor of Okinawa to create a "Central Committee to Determine Land Title" to coordinate and standardize the work of the mura, or township, land claims committee and to anticipate problems and to make recommendations to headquarters on land issues before they got out of hand:

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR  
OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
APO 331

MG DIRECTIVE  
NUMBER 1

1 February 1950

SUBJECT: Central Committee, Determination and Certification of Land Title

TO: Chiji of Okinawa Gunto

WHEREAS, need has arisen to designate responsibility in determination and certification of land title in Okinawa,

NOW THEREFORE, it is directed that:

Responsibility in unifying, standardizing, and administering the work of Mura Land Claims Committees presently effecting determination and certification of land title in Okinawa is placed in the Chiji of Okinawa effective 3 February 1950.

The Chiji will submit to the Military Governor, within 15 days from date of this Directive, an outline of plans for:

1. Formation of a Central Committee for Determination of Land Title. It is suggested that:

a. The committee be representative of the land owners of various districts within Okinawa.

b. The immediate objectives of the committee be:

(1) To coordinate, unify and standardize the work undertaken by various mura land claims committees pursuant to Military Government Directive No. 121, 28 February 1946, subject: "Land Claims, Preparation of Data Concerning."

(2) To seek out problems and make recommendation concerning determination and certification of land title.

c. Further objectives of the committee will be to seek out problems

and make recommendations concerning rights accompanying land ownership – more specifically, limitations upon:

- (1) Amount of agricultural land one person may own.
- (2) Sale price an owner may demand of an assigned tenant.
- (3) Rent an owner may charge an assigned tenant.
- (4) Eviction of assigned tenant.

BY DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR:

HARRY B. SHERMAN  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Military Governor



20. HQ MG Ryukyu Islands, Special Proclamation No. 36, 14 April 1950, sub: Certification of Land Title.

(Source: Freimuth Papers)

By April 1950 the filing of land claims and the hearing of disputes was largely completed. Military government headquarters, therefore, directed that all claims be filed no later than 30 June; that certification of title begin in the case of uncontested claims, and that all subsequent claims and all contested titles be turned over to the appropriate circuit court for disposition:

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
APO 719

SPECIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 36  
CERTIFICATION OF LAND TITLE

TO THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA GUNTO

WHEREAS, during the course of the past three years, claims of land owners on Okinawa have been submitted to Aza Land Claims Committees, as required by Military Government Directive No. 121, dated 28 February 1946, subject: "Land Claims, Preparation of Data Concerning," and

WHEREAS the sonchos have appointed an arbitral committee of five members in each mura and aza who have heard disputes for the purpose of determining valid claims, and

WHEREAS the sonchos of each mura have reported to the Okinawa Civilian Administration that the filing of land claims and hearing of disputes is sufficiently complete to proceed with the issuance of certificates evidencing title to land;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, J. R. SHEETZ, Major General, United States Army, Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, desiring to encourage and assist in the determination and certification of land title and to sponsor the administration of justice in the settlement of all problems relating to the use and ownership of land, do hereby proclaim that the people of Okinawa shall proceed to completion with the program of determination, certification and registration of title to all land on Okinawa.

ARTICLE I

All declarations of land ownership required to be filed by Military Government Directive No. 121, dated 28 February 1946, shall be filed with the Aza Land Claims Committees on or before 30 June 1950, which date shall be the

final date for filing claims with the Mura or Aza Land Claims Committee. Thereafter, claims to land ownership will be prosecuted in the form of legal action in the appropriate district of the Circuit Court.

#### ARTICLE II

Representatives of the Central Committee for Determination of Land Title established by Military Government Directive No. 1, 1 February 1950, shall examine the files of all Mura Land Claims Committees to determine the accuracy of filing, investigating and mapping of all claims submitted. When the Central Land Claims Committee is satisfied that this work of the Mura Committees has reached standard requirements, it will issue to the Mura Land Claims Committee blank Certificates of Title and instructions to proceed with the certification program.

#### ARTICLE III

1. Upon receipt of the blank certificates, the Mura Land Claims Committee, with assistance of the Aza Committees, will proceed, with claims not contested, to fill in the blank certificate from data contained in the claimant's original claim to ownership and from the claimant's statement concerning the name of the person from whom he or she acquired ownership and date of acquisition. The claimant's original chart describing location of subject property will be transcribed to the certificate, with discrepancies noted. Thereafter the completed certificate of ownership (except for validating signatures) will be placed in a file open to public inspection for a period of thirty (30) days, during which time any opposing claimant shall have the opportunity to file with the Mura Land Claims Committee written notice of claims which he may wish to assert to the same parcel of land. Each Mura Land Claims Committee shall make public in advance, the designated period of notice.

2. In the event that more than one claim is filed to any parcel of land, no Certificate of Title will be issued, but all claimants will be notified by the Mura Land Claims Committee of the dispute concerning the title, the names of all claimants involved, and the necessity for bringing action in the appropriate Circuit Court to determine ownership. A copy of this notice to the claimants will be filed in the Land Registry in lieu of a Certificate of Title and will remain in such Registry until a court order determining title has become final, at which time a valid Certificate of Title shall be issued to the true owner as determined by the Court.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. After public notice and inspection, the certificate, provided it is not opposed nor contested, will be approved, signed and sealed by the soncho of the mura and delivered to the claimant owner.

2. Three notification copies of the original certificate will be prepared. The first copy will be clearly marked across its face "Land Registry Office," the second "Tax Collection Office," the third "Central Land Office," and each will be delivered by the soncho to its respective designated office.

#### ARTICLE V

Thereupon the signed certificate will be recognized as evidence of legal title, unless a prior or paramount title should be determined subsequently by regular judicial procedure in a court of proper jurisdiction, in which event the title so determined by the Court shall take precedence over the contested certificate issued by the mura soncho.

#### ARTICLE VI

1. In the event of a contest of validity of title by a person who maintains to have title paramount to the recognized owner of the land, the contestant shall institute an action in the Circuit Court and the true ownership of the land shall be determined by regular court proceedings and issuance of a court order.

2. In such circumstances, the clerk of court in which proceedings are instituted shall transmit written notice to the Land Registry Office, the Tax Collection Office, and the Central Land Office that such action is pending. This notice shall be attached to the Certificate of Title in the files and shall constitute notification to all persons that litigation is pending and that title to such land is in question.

3. The court order in settlement of a title dispute shall state, as a matter of record, the true owner of the land as determined by the Court.

4. If the title currently recognized is invalidated by the final court order, an entry will be made in the land registry, and the Certificate of Title shall be marked "Invalid" with reference to the authority contained in the court order and date. Thereon, a valid certificate of title shall be issued by the Land Registry Office pursuant to said court order.

5. The subject of assessing costs of the proceedings shall be within the discretion of the court.

#### ARTICLE VII

It shall be the duty of the landowner, upon receipt of a new Certificate of Title to register it in the Land Registry Office.

#### ARTICLE VIII

In the absence of any claim or assertion of ownership to a particular parcel of land, or in event the owner fails to appear to take delivery of certificate to title, subject land will be placed in custody of the Soncho of the respective area, in trust for the absent owner.

#### ARTICLE IX

Administration of land in the custody of the Soncho or his appointed representative shall be in accord with the following procedures:

1. All land taken into custody will be reported, within thirty days, to the Central Land Office. Maps of the land will accompany the report.

2. The land will be utilized for the best interest of the owner and the increment therefrom will be protected for this benefit by the Soncho as trustee or administrator.

3. The Soncho is empowered with authority to perform fully as trustee or administrator in the utilization and administration of the land. He shall not



allow the doing of any acts on the land which would tend to lessen the value of the owner's interest in said land.

4. The Soncho, or his appointed representative, shall be accountable as trustee for the owner. He shall collect revenue and make disbursements for taxes, maintenance and improvement of property. Disbursements on any particular parcel of land, however, will not exceed the revenue therefrom, nor will an excess of revenue from one parcel be applied to another parcel, except in payment of taxes. Taxes levied on property producing no income, or insufficient income, will be paid out of the trustee's reserve account of accumulated income; such payments will be in the form of a loan and will be charged to the particular property account. Thereafter, the loan for taxes will constitute a lien against the property until paid by the owner or his successor.

#### ARTICLE X

1. The Land Registry Offices will be reestablished and perform their normal function within the framework of the Government and Legal Department, Okinawa Civilian Administration. They will enter land title records in permanent official books and issue certificates of title in accord with established procedure. The Registries will be located in or near the buildings occupied by the Magistrate Courts.

2. A complete new set of land registration books will be instituted in each Land Registry Office and all certificates of title, issued in the current land title program by the Sonchos of the respective muras, will be registered in their particular Land Registry Offices. Henceforth, a copy of every document which effects a conveyance, transfer, release, encumbrance, or hypothecation of any interest in any parcel of land on Okinawa, or which effects a change in the legal relations in or to any parcel of land on Okinawa, shall, within thirty (30) days after its execution, be filed in the appropriate Land Registry Office, which office shall cause notification copies to be forwarded to the Tax Collection Office and the Central Land Office.

#### ARTICLE XI

There will be established within the Okinawa Civilian Administration a "Central Land Office" which shall maintain a central file of all data pertaining to land in Okinawa Gunto and establish authentic maps indicating land ownership. It shall coordinate the work of the Mura Land Claims Committees and also recommend uniform procedure to be followed by Land Registry Offices. It shall review custody reports of land administered by the various Sonchos, and make recommendations concerning the use and management of land in custody and revenue derived therefrom. Documents issued in procurement of land by government agencies will be channeled through the Central Land Office, which will record the procurement.

#### ARTICLE XII

The Mura and Aza Land Claims Committees, appointed pursuant to Directive No. 121, 28 February 1946, will complete all of their duties and be deactivated and dismissed 28 February 1951. Owner's original claims to land ownership,

bound in convenient volumes, together with maps and other pertinent land data will be transferred to the Central Land Office.

ARTICLE XIII

Any person who knowingly or wilfully accepts a Certificate of Title based on fraudulent assertions, or who wilfully makes any false statement or claim in connection with the issuance of a Certificate of Title, will be subject to a penalty not to exceed ¥ 50,000 or two years' imprisonment.

Given under my hand this  
14th day of April 1950.

/s/ J. R. Sheetz  
J.R. SHEETZ  
Major General, United States Army  
Military Govenor of the Ryukyu Islands

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